its support. From the nature of the right and of the wrong, the violation being a continuous act, the legal remedy is necessarily inadequate. The ordinary form of relief is an accounting of profits and an injunction in equity; indeed, the action at law is seldom resorted to,

Stein, 16 Ala. 214, 50 Am. Dec. 177; Burden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104, 62 Am. Dec. 758.

The California reports are so rich in most instructive cases that I may properly cite freely from them: Fitzgerald v. Urton, 5 Cal. 308; Burdge v. Underwood, 6 Cal. 45; Tenney v. Miners' D. Co., 7 Cal. 335; Tuolumne W. Co. v. Chapman, 8 Cal. 392; Weimer v. Lowery, 11 Cal. 104; Boggs v. Merced M. Co., 14 Cal. 279, 379; Henshaw v. Clark, 14 Cal. 460; Hicks v. Michael, 15 Cal. 107; Weaver v. Eureka Lake Co., 15 Cal. 271; Hicks v. Compton, 18 Cal. 206; Bensley y. Mt. Lake W. Co., 13 Cal. 306, 73 Am. Dec. 575; Logan v. Driscoll, 19 Cal. 623, 81 Am. Dec. 90; McLaughlin v. Kelly, 22 Cal. 212; Kittle v. Pfeiffer, 22 Cal. 484; Rupley v. Welch, 23 Cal. 452; Robinson v. Russell, 24 Cal. 467; Wixon v. Bear River etc. Co., 24 Cal. 367, 85 Am. Dec. 69; Leach v. Day, 27 Cal. 643; Ferrea v. Knipe, 28 Cal. 340, 87 Am. Dec. 128; Grigsby v. Burtnett, 31 Cal. 406; More v. Massini, 32 Cal. 590; Hill v. Smith, 32 Cal. 166; Levaroni v. Miller, 34 Cal. 231, 91 Am. Dec. 692; Yolo Co. v. Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193; Grigsby v. Clear Lake W. Co., 40 Cal. 396; Gregory v. Nelson, 41 Cal. 278; Cowell v. Martin, 43 Cal. 605; Cave v. Crafts, 53 Cal. 135; Robinson v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 50 Cal. 460; 57 Cal. 412, 40 Am. Rep. 118; and see the very important case of Woodruff v. North Bloomfield etc. M. Co., 8 Saw. 628, to enjoin several hydraulic mining companies from discharging their mining débris into a river, by which the lands of the adjoining proprietors below were destroyed, and the navigation of the river was impeded. Several of these California cases are very instructive with respect to injunctions against trespass.

Miscellaneous examples-Encroachments upon public parks, squares, and the like: Corning v. Lowerre, 6 Johns. Ch. 439; Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige, 254, 24 Am. Dec. 218; Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510.

Corporations encroaching upon the rights of adjoining proprietors: Coats v. Clarence R'y, 1 Russ. & M. 181; Bonaparte v. Camden etc. R. R., Bald. 205, 231; Mohawk etc. R. R. v. Artcher, 6 Paige, 83; Drake v. Hudson River R. R., 7 Barb. 508; Att'y-Gen. v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239; 6 Am. Rep. 227; Morris etc. R. R. v. Prudden, 20 N. J. Eq. 530.

except for the purpose of establishing the validity of the patent or copyright by the verdict of a jury when it is

Disturbance of a burying-ground: Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566, 584. Ringing of church bells: Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim., N. S., 133. Illustrations of various other nuisances: Vernon v. Vestry of St. James, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 449; Hedley v. Bates, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 498; Sturges v. Bridgman, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 852; Theed v. Debenham, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 165; Broder v. Saillard, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 692; Umfreville v. Johnson, L. R. 10 Ch. 580; Goodson v. Richardson, L. R. 9 Ch. 221; Att'y-Gen. v. Terry, L. R. 9 Ch. 423; Ball v. Ray, L. R. 8 Ch. 467; Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R. 8 Ch. 650; Gaunt v. Fynney, L. R. 8 Ch. 8; Hext v. Gill, L. R. 7 Ch. 699; Staight v. Burn, L. R. 5 Ch. 163; Inchbald v. Robinson, L. R. 4 Ch. 388; Att'y-Gen. v. Mid-Kent R'y, L. R. 3 Ch. 100; Clarke v. Clark, L. R. 1 Ch. 16; Tipping v. St. Helen's etc. Co., L. R. 1 Ch. 66; Ivimey v. Stocker, L. R. 1 Ch. 396; Smith v. Smith, L. R. 20 Eq. 500; Fenwick v. East London R'y, L. R. 20 Eq. 544; Allen v. Martin, L. R. 20 Eq. 462; Mott v. Shoolbred, L. R. 20 Eq. 22; Dyers's Co. v. King, L. R. 9 Eq. 438; Walker v. Brewster, L. R. 5 Eq. 25; Beadel v. Perry, L. R. 3 Eq. 465; Crump v. Lambert, L. R. 3 Eq. 409; Martin v. Headon, L. R. 2 Eq. 425, 434; Dent v. Auction Mart Co., L. R. 2 Eq. 238, 244, 246, 247; Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co., 7 De Gex, M. & G. 436, 460, 462; 7 H. L. Cas. 600; St. Helen's etc. Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas. 642; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; Parker v. Winnipiseogee etc. Co., 2 Black, 545; Cadigan v. Brown, 120 Mass. 493; Richmond Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic etc. Co., 10 R. I. 106, 14 Am. Rep. 658; Duncan v. Hayes, 22 N. J. Eq. 25; Meigs v. Lister, 23 N. J. Eq. 199; O'Riley v. McChesney, 3 Lans. 278; Snow v. Williams, 16 Hun, 468; Rothery v. N. Y. Rubber Co., 24 Hun, 172; Seaman v. Lee, 10 Hun, 607; Beach v. Elmira, 22 Hun, 158; Henderson v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 78 N. Y. 423; Lynch v. Mayor etc., 76 N. Y. 60, 32 Am. Rep. 271; Adams v. Popham, 76 N. Y. 410; Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep. 567; Olmsted v. Loomis, 9 N. Y. 423; Davis v. Lambertson, 56 Barb. 480; Owen v. Phillips, 73 Ind. 284; Wahle v. Reinbach, 76 Ill. 322; Greene v. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50; Pettibone v. Hamilton, 40 Wis. 402; Lewis v. Stein, 16 Ala. 214, 50 Am. Dec. 177; Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198, 58 Am. Dec. 321; Lamborn v. Covington Co., 2 Md. Ch. 409.

It is only by examining a large number of decisions that any adequate notion can be obtained of the wide extent of this jurisdiction, as well as of its limitations. These cases show that the jurisdiction is not exercised merely in exceptional cases, as might be inferred from some judicial language.

really contested. Under the constitution of the United States, the cognizance of suits for the infringement of these rights belongs exclusively to the federal courts.1

§ 1353. Literary Property as Distinct from Copyright. In analogy to the protection of copyrights, a jurisdiction has become well established by modern decisions to restrain the invasion or piracy of literary property in the product of intellectual labor, which still remains in the form of manuscript, or which, if printed, has not been published, and over which, as a consequence, no statutory copyright has been obtained; and to restrain an invasion of the similar right which an artist has in his pictures, and other original works of his creative art. This jurisdiction belongs to the state courts. It will be exercised to restrain the unauthorized publication of unpublished manuscript or printed matter in violation of the rights of the person entitled thereto;1 the unauthorized publication, performance, representation on the stage, or other similar uses of dramatic compositions which have not been "published" by the author or proprietor; the unauthorized publication, delivery, or other like use of lectures which have been delivered by the

§ 1352, 1 Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215, 223; Nicol v. Stockdale, 3 Swanst. 687; Bacon v. Jones, 4 Mylne & C. 433, 436; Saunders v. Smith, 3 Mylne & C. 711, 728; Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim. 297. See Curtis on Patent and Copyrights, and Webster's Patent Cases.

§ 1353, 1 Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden, 329; Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342; Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435, 437; Keene v. Wheatley, 9 Am. Law Reg. 33; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100; Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 3 Bush, 480, 92 Am. Dec. 509.

§ 1353, 2 Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray, 545, 77 Am. Dec. 426; Keene v. Clarke, 5 Rob. (N. Y.) 38; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532, 7 Am. Rep. 480; 2 Sweeny, 530, 5 Abb. Pr., N. S., 130; Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. 87; Keene v. Wheatley, 9 Am. Law Reg. 33; Crowe v. Aiken, 4 Am. Law Rev. 450.

§ 1353, (a) For annotations to this section, see Pom. Equitable Remedies, § 576.

author, but not otherwise published;3 the unauthorized making, sale, or exhibition of copies of paintings, engravings, and other works of art, even though the originals may have been publicly exhibited; and the unauthorized publication of private letters, whether on literary topics, or on matters of private business, friendship, or family.5

§ 1354. Trade-marks.a-Somewhat akin to the protection of patent and copy rights is that which courts of equity give, by means of the injunction, to the peculiar species of right arising from the adoption and use of "trade-marks." Although some judicial opinions and some recent statutes speak of "property" in trade-marks, or call the right to their exclusive use a kind of property, yet in strictness the remedy does not depend upon any true property acquired in these symbols and names, but upon the broad principle that a court of equity will not permit fraud to be practiced upon the public nor upon private individuals.1 It is well settled by modern deci

§ 1353, 3 Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 1 Hall & T. 28, 40; 3 L. J. Ch. 209; Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray, 545, 77 Am. Dec. 426, per Hoar, J.; Bartlett v. Crittenden, 4 McLean, 300.

§ 1353, 4 Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Macn. & G. 25; 1 Hall & T. 1; 2 De Gex & S. 652; Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. 121, 510.

§ 1353, 5 The restraint may be at the suit of the writer against the person written to, or his assigns, or a stranger, or at the suit of the person written to, or his personal representatives against a stranger: Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342; Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402; Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 737; Lord Perceval v. Phipps, 2 Ves. & B. 19, 24; Earl of Granard v. Dunkin, 1 Ball & B. 207; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100, 113; Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320; Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch. 515, 529; Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer, 379. § 1354, 1 The ground of the remedy was stated in Farina v. Silverlock, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 214, 217: "This right cannot properly be described as a copyright; it is, in fact, a right which can be said to exist only, and can be tested only, by its violation; it is the right which any person designating his wares or commodities by a particular

§ 1354, (a) Trade-marks, trade names, unfair competition, etc.: See Pom. Equitable Remedies, §§ 577-582.

sions, that when a trade-mark has been duly acquired by a manufacturer or dealer, an injunction will be granted at his suit to restrain other persons from using it upon their goods, or from using such limitations of it as will tend to mislead and deceive the public.2 For a discussion of the numerous questions concerning the nature and validity of trade-marks, who may acquire them, how they may be acquired, what imitations are wrongful, and the like, the reader must be referred to the special treatises upon the subject.

trade-mark, as it is called, has to prevent others from selling wares. which are not his, marked with that trade-mark, in order to mislead the public, and so incidentally to injure the person who is owner of the trade-mark."

§ 1354, 2 Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 896; Rogers v. Nowill, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 614; Farina v. Silverlock, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 214; Edelsten v. Edelsten, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 185; Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 11 H. L. Cas. 523; 4 De Gex, J. & S. 137; Flavel v. Harrison, 10 Hare, 467; Holloway v. Holloway, 13 Beav. 209; Cocks v. Chandler, L. R. 11 Eq. 446; Marshall v. Ross, L. R. 8 Eq. 651; Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345; Radde v. Norman, L. R. 14 Eq. 348; Hirst v. Denham, L. R. 14 Eq. 542; Seixo v. Provezende, L. R. 1 Ch. 192; Lee v. Haley, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; Wotherspoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66; Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 Kay & J. 423; Collins Co. v. Cowen, 3 Kay & J. 428; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 395; Hendriks v. Montagu, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 638 (using a name); Orr Ewing v. Johnston, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 434; Civil Service etc. Ass'n v. Dean, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 512; Boulnois v. Peake, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 513, note; Day v. Brownrigg, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 294; Merch. Bank Co. v. Merch. Bank, ` L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 560 (using name); Seigert v. Findlater, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 801; Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 834; Braham v. Beachim, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 848; Moet v. Pickering, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 770; Cheavin v. Walker, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 850; Hirsch v. Jonas, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 584; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 434; Estcourt v. Estcourt etc. Co., L. R. 10 Ch. 276; Upmann v. Elkan, L. R. 7 Ch. 130; 12 Eq. 140; Ford v. Foster, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; Cope v. Evans, L. R. 18 Eq. 138; Raggett v. Findlater, L. R. 17 Eq. 29; James v. James, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; Hall v. Barrows, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 150; Coffeen v. Brunton, 5 McLean, 256; Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311;