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effectual? Whether a government is bound, under any circumstances, to protect a citizen or subject, who not only withdraws voluntarily from the performance of every duty, but who, for nearly "twice the period that ordinary calculation assigns to the continuance of human life," incorporates himself and his resources with the numbers and the wealth of another nation? These, in my judgment, are questions well worthy of consideration, and less easy of solution than seems to be apprehended. But, as I have already exceeded the limits usually observed on occasions of this sort, I shall wave their discussion now, and notice only the more limited difficulties suggested by the course of the argument.

The facts relative to Mr. Richardson's naturalization here, and residence abroad, as disclosed by the further proof which was ordered, are these:

It appears that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States, in the year 1795, according to the laws then in force on that subject; that in 1797 he went to England; that in 1799 he came again to this country, and returned to England in 1800 -where he continued to reside till March, 1813, making a residence of 16 years in England, with the exception of a visit to this country of a few months. The effect of that will presently be noticed.

It is contended by the captors that this residence constitutes a domicil under the law of nations. A commercial residence, within the principles of prize law, investing the claimant with all the characteristics of a British trader, and involving him in all the consequences, and all the evils incident to that character.

I think it may be assumed as a principle, that the law of nations, without regarding the municipal regulations prescribed for his admission, views every man as a member of the society in which he is found. Residence is prima facie evidence of national character; susceptible, however, at all times, of explanation. If it be for a special purpose, and transient in its nature, it shall not destroy the original or prior national character. But if it be taken up animus manendi, with the intention of remaining, then it becomes a domicil, superadding to the original or prior character, the rights and privileges, as well as the disabilities and penalties of a citizen or subject of the country in which the residence is established.

"The domicil," says Vattel, " is the habitation fixed in any place with an intention of always staying there. A man does not then establish his domicil in any place, unless he makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly, or by an express declaration!"

Again-"The natural or original domicil is that given us by birth, where our father had his; and we are considered as retaining it, till we have abandoned it in order to choose another. The domicil acquired, is that where we settle by our own choice."

This is the general principle, determining the national character solely by the domicil, whether natural or acquired. As the original domicil is given by birth, it requires no explanation. But what shall constitute an acquired domicil?

Although the definition given of it, appears at first view, sufficiently plain, yet in analyzing it, we have soon to encounter an important difficulty. When shall the intention to remain be deemed to exist? If it be not openly declared, when, as Vattel expresses it, shall it be deemed to be tacitly made known? What shall be evidence of the animus manendi and determine the intention?

In order to ascertain this, we must resort to the exposition of able magistrates, whose duty it has been to expound and apply this public law; we must descend into an examination of the judgments and official acts of tribunals sitting and deciding un. der the law of nations.

It has been contended that the practical illustration of this doctrine, derived from the course and practice of the prize courts, justifies the following conclusions:

1st. That no residence establishes a domicil to any hostile purpose, or operating a condemnation of goods, but that which is either taken up or continued after the commencement of hostilities.

2d. That on the breaking out of war, a citizen or subject of one belligerent country, has a right to return from the other, and bring with him, or withdraw from thence, his goods and effects.

I think the consideration of these propositions will embrace all the arguments, and lead to an examination of all the authorities which are in any way applicable to the merits of this cause.

It must be remembered, that the principle laid down by Vattel is general, and must be universal in its application. It has no relation whatever, to either a state of war or peace. The different authorities which have been cited, must all be examined with a reference to that.

The most general view which has been taken of this subject by sir Wm. Scott, is in the case of the Harmony, 2 Rob. 266. "Of the few principles," he says, "that can be laid down generally, I may venture to hold, that time is the grand ingredient in constituting domicil. I think that hardly enough is attributed to its effects; in most cases it is unavoidably conclusive; it is not unfrequently said, that if a person comes only for a special purpose, that shall not fix a domicil. This is not to be taken in an unqualified latitude, and without some respect had to the time which such a purpose may or shall occupy; for if the purpose be of a nature that may, probably, or does actually detain the person for a great length of time, I cannot but think that a general residence might grow upon the special purpose. That against such a long residence, the plea of an original, special purpose could not be averred; it must be inferred, in such a case, that other purposes forced themselves upon him, and mixed themselves with his original design, and impressed upon him the character of the country where he resided."

Surely, if terms can be explicit, and language can be plain, this is so. There is in it not the least allusion to a state of hostilities, or to a belligerent country. The terms are as comprehensive as those of Vattel-Showing, that residence alone, wherever it may be, is the source and foundation of domicil, and that from the length of the residence is derived the evidence of an intention to remain. If this be not so, why is time the grand ingredient in constituting domicil? If residence in a hostile country were necessary, that would be the grand ingredient; the characteristic feature in this acquired character, which works a forfeiture of goods.

But it is said, that the further remarks of this great authority in the same case, furnish an inference unfavourable to the opinion I have expressed.

"Suppose a man comes into a belligerent country, at or before the beginning of a war; it is certainly reasonable not to bind him too soon, to an acquired character, and to allow him a fair time to disengage himself."

From this I should draw an argument directly the reverse of that which it has been cited to support-why is it too soon to bind him to an acquired character, who comes into a belligerent country at or before the beginning of a war? Most assuredly because he had not, by a residence previous to the war, established a domicil, or manifested his intention to remain. His residence had been too short to afford evidence of a determination to fix his habitation there. He shall, therefore, be permitted to make his election, to retire, and be allowed a fair time to disengage himself. If this claimant had arrived in England at, or immediately preceding the war, we would have had a very different case to examine.

Sir William Scott proceeds. "In proof of the efficacy of mere time, it is not impertinent to remark, that the same quantity of business, which would not fix a domicil in a certain space of time, would nevertheless have that effect, if distributed over a larger space of time. Suppose an American comes to Europe, with six temporary cargoes, of which he had the present care and management, meaning to return to America immediately; they would form a different case from that of the same American, coming to any particular country of Europe, with one cargo, and fixing himself there, to receive five remaining cargoes, one in each year successively. I repeat, that time is the great agent in this matter; it is to be taken in a compound ratio, of the time and the occupation, with a great preponderance on the article of time: be the occupation what it may, it cannot happen, but with few exceptions, that mere length of time shall not constitute a domicil."

He here supposes an American to go to Europe-not to any particular hostile country, and to remain for five years, intimating distinctly, that it would fix on him, the national character of the country in which he was thus established.

It appears also, from the same case, that one of the Murrays was considered by the common law of England, as a British trader, subject to the bankrupt laws of that kingdom. How a British trader? Hostilities did not exist then between that country and this. He had acquired, therefore, the character of a British trader, by a residence in time of peace. It is that character that

brought him within the operation of these local laws, and that character that would work a condemnation of his property in the prize courts of a nation at war with England.

This case is so replete with information on this subject, that I shall notice one other passage, found in the judgment of the

court.

"Time, I have said, is a great agent in those matters, and I should have been glad to have heard any instance quoted, on the part of Mr. Murray, in which a residence of four years, connected with a former residence, was deemed capable of any explanation."

It is true, that the residence of the claimant, in that case, was in a hostile country; but it is equally true, that in the passages to which I have referred, the court lays down the general principle, without any reference whatever to the fact, as is obvious from the context, and his general reasoning on the subject.

The case of the Indian Chief, 3 Rob. p. 17. affords much light on this question. This vessel was seized in a British port where she came for orders, on a voyage from an enemy colony to Hamburgh. The claimant was a native American, and the court, after stating that fact, says:

"He came, however, to this country in 1783, and engaged in trade, and has resided in this country till 1797-during that period he was undoubtedly to be considered as an English trader; for no position is more established than this, that if a person goes into another country and engages in trade, and resides there, he is by the law of nations, to be considered as a merchant of that country; I should therefore have no doubt in pronouncing that Mr. Johnson was to be considered as a merchant of this country, at the time of the sailing of this vessel on her outward voyage." The vessel sailed in 1795. The residence in this case was 12 years.

In the case of Mr. Miller, the claimant of the cargo of this vessel, the principle under consideration was applied with great rigor.

He was an American citizen and American consul, resident in some of the remote possessions of Great Britain, in India. He was for that reason pronounced by the court of admiralty, a British merchant, and his property condemned for being engaged in a trade prohibited to British subjects.