 | Joseph M. Grieco - 1990 - 276 lapas
...Defensive state positionalism, then, engenders a "relative-gains problem" for cooperation. That is, a state will decline to join, will leave, or will...commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in gains will substantially favor partners. It will so eschew cooperation even if participation... | |
 | David Allen Baldwin - 1993 - 396 lapas
...that defensive state positionalism "generates a relative gains problem for cooperation" in the sense that "a state will decline to join, will leave, or...commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favor partners" (1990:10; emphasis added). What Snidal has... | |
 | Stephen J. Rosow, Naeem Inayatullah, Mark Rupert - 1994 - 272 lapas
...work together," says Joseph Grieco, requires a reduction in conditions that alarm realist states; for "a state will decline to join, will leave, or will...commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favor partners" (Grieco 1990: 1, 10). The emphasis on egoistic... | |
 | Zeev Maoz - 1997 - 240 lapas
...for survival. This concem over relative gains, in tum, poses an additional constraint on cooperation: *a state will decline to join, will leave, or will...are likely to achieve relatively greater gains.'" One issue that must be reckoned with is the extent to which this neorealist approach, specifically... | |
 | Zeev Maoz - 1997 - 240 lapas
...survival. This concern over relative gains, in turn, poses an additional constraint on cooperation: 'a state will decline to join, will leave, or will...achieving, or are likely to achieve relatively greater gains.'01 One issue that must be reckoned with is the extent to which this neorealist approach, specifically... | |
 | Zeev Maoz - 1997 - 240 lapas
...survival. This concern over relative gains, in turn, poses an additional constraint on cooperation: 'a state will decline to join, will leave, or will...achieving, or are likely to achieve relatively greater gains.'1" One issue that must be reckoned with is the extent to which this neorealist approach, specifically... | |
 | Charles Lipson, Benjamin J. Cohen - 1999 - 442 lapas
...future.62 State positionality, then, engenders a "relative gains problem" for cooperation. That is, a state will decline to join, will leave, or will...or are likely to achieve, relatively greater gains. It will eschew cooperation even though participation in the arrangement was providing it, or would... | |
 | Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart - 1999 - 436 lapas
...in his own study of negotiations in the Uruguay Round of the GATT, "a state will decline to join, or leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favor partners."22 Implicit in Grieco's analysis is the presupposition... | |
 | Christine Sylvester - 2002 - 372 lapas
...together," says Joseph Grieco (1990:1), requires a reduction in conditions that alarm realist states; for "a state will decline to join, will leave, or will...commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favor partners" (p. 10). The emphasis on egoistic states,... | |
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That is, a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are achieving, or are likely to achieve, relatively greater gains. 