6 Opinion of the Court. sentences imposed run concurrently or consecutively provided that the two crimes which are committed and for which separate sentences are imposed arise out of separate transactions. Tassari v. Schmucker, 53 F. 2d 570. The Fifth Circuit takes the view that an alien is "sentenced once when, after a conviction or plea of guilty, he is called before the bar and receives judgment, whether for one or several crimes, with one or several terms of imprisonment. He is sentenced more than once when that happens again." Wallis v. Tecchio, 65 F. 2d 250, 252. That view is an adaptation of the position taken earlier by a District Court in the same circuit that Congress by this provision aimed to deport "repeaters," viz. "persons who commit a crime and are sentenced, and then commit another and are sentenced again." Opolich v. Fluckey, 47 F. 2d 950. The latter is the reading we give the statute. There is a trace of that purpose found in its legislative history. Congressman Sabath who proposed the provision as an amendment said it was aimed at the alien "who is a criminal at heart, a man who is guilty of a second offense involving moral turpitude and for the second time is convicted." 53 Cong. Rec. 5167. Congressman Burnett, who was in charge of the bill on the floor of the House, gave the same emphasis when he said that the amendment proposed "that those who committed a second crime involving moral turpitude showed then a criminal heart and a criminal tendency, and they should then be deported." Id., p. 5168. The Committee Report in the Senate put the matter into sharper focus when it stated that the provision was "intended to reach the alien who after entry shows himself to be a criminal of the confirmed type." S. Rep. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15. Perhaps the plainest "confirmed type" of criminal is the repeater. We give expression to that view by reading this provision of the statute to authorize deportation only where an alien having committed a crime involving moral turpitude and having been convicted and sentenced, once again commits a crime of that nature and is convicted and sentenced for it. We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile, Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used. JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES. Reversed. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 329. Argued December 18, 1947-Decided February 2, 1948. 1. Where officers detected the odor of burning opium emanating from a hotel room, entered without a search warrant and without knowing who was there, arrested the only occupant, searched the room and found opium and smoking apparatus, the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and a conviction for a violation of the federal narcotic laws based on the evidence thus obtained cannot be sustained. Pp. 11-17. 2. As a general rule, the question when the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search must be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. Pp. 13–14. 3. There were no exceptional circumstances in this case sufficient to justify the failure of the officer to obtain a search warrant. Pp. 14-15. 10 Opinion of the Court. 4. It being conceded that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest petitioner until he entered the room and found her to be the sole occupant, the search cannot be sustained as being incident to a valid arrest. Pp. 15-16. 5. The Government cannot at the same time justify an arrest by a search and justify the search by the arrest. Pp. 16-19. 6. An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. P. 17. 162 F.2d 562, reversed. Petitioner was convicted in a Federal District Court on evidence obtained by a search made without a warrant. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 162 F. 2d 562. This Court granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 807. Reversed, p. 17. James Skelly Wright argued the cause, and John F. Garvin filed a brief, for petitioner. Robert S. Erdahl argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Quinn and Irving S. Shapiro. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner was convicted on four counts charging violation of federal narcotic laws. The only question which brings the case here is whether it was lawful, without a warrant of any kind, to arrest petitioner and to search her living quarters. 1 Two counts charged violation of § 2553 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U. S. C. § 2553 (a)) and two counts charged violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act as amended (21 U.S. C. § 174). Opinion of the Court. 333 U.S. Taking the Government's version of disputed events, decision would rest on these facts: At about 7:30 p. m. Detective Lieutenant Belland, an officer of the Seattle police force narcotic detail, received information from a confidential informer, who was also a known narcotic user, that unknown persons were smoking opium in the Europe Hotel. The informer was taken back to the hotel to interview the manager, but he returned at once saying he could smell burning opium in the hallway. Belland communicated with federal narcotic agents and between 8:30 and 9 o'clock went back to the hotel with four such agents. All were experienced in narcotic work and recognized at once a strong odor of burning opium which to them was distinctive and unmistakable. The odor led to Room 1. The officers did not know who was occupying that room. They knocked and a voice inside asked who was there. "Lieutenant Belland," was the reply. There was a slight delay, some "shuffling or noise" in the room and then the defendant opened the door. The officer said, "I want to talk to you a little bit." She then, as he describes it, "stepped back acquiescently and admitted us." He said, "I want to talk to you about this opium smell in the room here." She denied that there was such a smell. Then he said, "I want you to consider yourself under arrest because we are going to search the room." The search turned up incriminating opium and smoking apparatus, the latter being warm, apparently from recent use. This evidence the District Court refused to suppress before trial and admitted over defendant's objection at the trial. Conviction resulted and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2 The defendant challenged the search of her home as a violation of the rights secured to her, in common with others, by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 2 162 F.2d 562. 10 Opinion of the Court. The Government defends the search as legally justifiable, more particularly as incident to what it urges was a lawful arrest of the person. I. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Entry to defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning of the search, was demanded under color of office. It was granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right. Cf. Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313. At the time entry was demanded the officers were possessed of evidence which a magistrate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search warrant. We cannot sustain defendant's contention, erroneously made, on the strength of Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1, that odors cannot be evidence sufficient to constitute probable grounds for any search. That decision held only that odors alone do not authorize a search without warrant. If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive character. The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law en |