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(21 S. Ct. 827, 45 U. S. (L. ed.) 1146), after quoting from sections 4401 and 4444 of the Revised Statutes, the court said: • The general object of these provisions seems to be to license pilots upon steam vessels engaged in the coastwise or interior commerce of the country, and at the same time, to leave to the states the regulation of pilots upon all vessels engaged in foreign commerce.' There, the steamer was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade under the laws of the United States and was engaged in trade between Porto Rico and New York after the treaty of cession. It was held that she was not within the pilotage laws of New York." See The Queen, reported in (N. D. Cal. 1910) 184 Fed. 537; (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1911) 186 Fed. 725, 108 C. C. A. 595; (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1913) 206 Fed. 148, 124 C. C. A. 214.

Steam vessels engaged in trade between Porto Rican ports and ports of the United States are coastwise steam vessels in the sense in which those words are used in this section. Huus 0. New York, etc., Steamship Co., (1901) 182 U. S. 392, 21 S. Ct. $27, 45 U. S. (L. ed.) 1146, affirming (S. D. N. Y. 1900) 105 Fed. 74.

Effect on treaties.- State pilotage laws, applied to a British vessel coming from a foreign port, do not conflict with a treaty provision that " no higher or other duties or charges shall be imposed in any ports of the United States on British vessels than those payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States," because of the exemption of coastwise steam ves. sels of the United States from pilotage, resulting from this section, or of any law. ful exemption of coastwise vessels created by the state laws. Olsen v. Smith, (1904) 195 U. S. 332, 25 S. Ct. 52, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 224, affirming (Tex, Civ. App. 1902) 68 S. W. 320.

any such vessel should have on board a pilot holding a federal license when entering or leaving such port, the regulation of such port pilotage is still subject to the laws of the state. Anderson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., (1912) 225 U. S. 187, 32 S. Ct. 626, 56 U. S. (L. ed.) 1047, wherein the court said: * The statute was thus construed in Murray v. Clark, (18731 4 Daly 468, affirmed [1874] 58 N. Y. 684, where a steamer sailing under register between New York and New Orleans, and touching at a foreign port as was her privilege, was held to be subject to the law of the state of New York as to pilotage in entering the port New York, although at the time she was under the control of her master who was a pilot licensed by the federal inspectors. In Joslyn 1. Nickerson, ([C. C. Mass. ] 1880) i Fed. 133, while it was held that a libel for pilotage could not be sustained, for the reason that the law of Massachusetts in question was not by its terms applicable, Judge Lowell said (page 135): *This statute' (referring to the federal act of 1866) has been modified, and the employment of such a pilot is now compulsory only upon coasting steam vessels not sailing under a register. R. S. sec. 4401. (See STEAM VESSE s.] Murray v. Clark, (1873] 4 Daly 468, affirmed [1874) 58 N. Y. 684. This vessel, therefore, was not bound to carry such a pilot, and was bound by any law of Massachusetts which might require her to take a local pilot. R. S. sec. 4444.' In Spraigue 1. Thompson, [1886] 118 U. S. 90, 96, 16 S. Ct. 988, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 115), where a claim for pilotage under the law of Georgia was disallowed, the steamer was a coastwise sea-going steam vessel,' and

* was

not sailing under register.' In Hus . New York, etc., Steamship Co., [1901] 182 U. S. 392, 394,

PIPE LINES
See ALASKA; INDIANS: ProfiC LANDS

PIRACY

R. S. 4293. Public Vessels to Suppress Piracy, 1250.
R. S. 4294. Seizure of Piratical Vessels, 1250.
R. S. 4295. Merchant-Vessels May Resist Pirates, 1251.
R. S. 4296. Condemnation of Piratical Vessels, 1251.
R. S. 4297. Seizure of Vessels Fitted Out for Piracy, 1254.
R. S. 4298. What Vessels May be Authorized to Seize Pirates, 1254.
R. S. 4299. Duties of Officers of Customs and Marshals, 1255.

CROSS-REFERENCES
Extradition for, see EXTRADITION.
Jurisdiction of Courts, see JUDICIARY.
Definition and Punishment of Offense, see PENAL LAWS.

Common-law offenses.—“It is well settled that there are no common-law offenses against the United States.” U. S. o. Eaton, (1892) 144 U. S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764, 36 U. S. (L. ed.) 591. See also cases cited in JUDICIARY, vol. 4, at p. 1001, under sido head Common-law jurisdiction.

Sec. 4293. [Public vessels to suppress piracy.] The President is authorized to employ so many of the public armed vessels as in his judgment the service may require, with suitable instructions to the commanders thereof, in protecting the merchant-vessels of the United States and their crews from piratical aggressions and depredations. [R. 8.]

Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. L. 510; Act of Jan, 30, 1823, ch. 7, 3 Stat. L. 721.

Sections 4293-4299 constitute chapter 8 (“ Regulations for the Suppression of Piracy”) of this title 48 (“ Regulation of Commerce and Navigation ") of the Revised Statutes.

Sections 5368–5384 are a part of chapter 3 (“Crimes Arising within the Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States ") of title 70 (“Crimes ") of the Revised Statutes. Of these sections 5368–5376, 5383, 5384 related to the definition and punishment of piracy. They were incorporated in the Penal Laws of 1909, in sections 290–310, and repealed by section 341 thereof. Sections 5377-5382 of said chapter 3 related to slave trade. These with other sections of the Revised Statutes were incorporated in the Penal Laws of 1909 in sections 246–271 and repealed by section 341 thereof. See PENAL Laws, ante, this volume, p. 873.

Sec. 4294. [Seizure of piratical vessels.] The President is authorized to instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels of the United States to subdue, seize, take, and send into any port of the United States, any armed vessel or boat, or any vessel or boat the, crew whereof shall be armed, and which shall have attempted or committed any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, upon any vessel of the United

p. 1252.

States, or of the citizens thereof, or upon any other vessel ; and also to retake any vessel of the United States, or its citizens, which may have been unlawfully captured upon the high seas. (R. S.]

Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. L. 512; Act of Jan.. 30, 1823, ch. 7, 3 Stat. L. 721.

“ Pirates may, without doubt, be law head in notes to R. S. sec. 4296, infra. fully captured on the ocean by the public or private ships of every nation; for All vessels guilty of piratical aggresthey are, in truth, the common enemies sions.-- The authority given by this statof all mankind, and, as such, are liable to ute is not merely over vessels of the the extreme rights of war.” The Mari United States, or over citizens of the anna Flora, (1826) 11 Wheat. 1, 6 U. S. United States, but it is extended over all (L. ed.) 405.

vessels guilty of piratical agressions upon "Armed vessel.” — A brig armed with a vessels of the United States, or the cannon and ammunition, and with pistols citizens thereof, or upon any other vessel. and daggers on board, is an “ armed ves

It cannot be presumed that Congress within the intent and meaning of meant to direct the capture of a foreign the statute. No distinction is taken or vessel and crew for an aggression on even suggested in the act, as to the ob the high seas upon another foreign vessel, jects, or purposes, or character of the unless the aggression was piratical under armament, whether it be for offense or de the laws of nations

- an offense of which fense, legitimate or illegitimate. Harmony

any
nation may

take cognizance. The 1. U. S., (1844) 2 How. 210, 11 U. Š. Schooner Chapman, (1864) 4 Sawy. 501, (L. ed.) 239.

Fed. Cas. No. 2,602. “ Piratical aggression.”- See this side

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Sec. 4295. [Merchant-vessels may resist pirates.] The commander and crew of any merchant-vessel of the United States, owned wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, may oppose and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon any other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any armed vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some nation in amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the same; and may also retake any vessel so owned which may have been captured by the commander or crew of any such armed vessel, and send the same into any port of the United States. [R. 8.]

Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. L. 513; Act of Jan. 30, 1823, ch. 7, 3 Stat. L. 721.

This statute expressly excepts seizures seizures by commissioned national vessels, by public armed vessels of nations in however irregular or unlawful the latter amity with the United States, thus indi may be. The Schooner Chapman, (1864) cating that the seizures referred to are 4 Sawy. 501, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,602. piratical seizures jure gentium and not

Sec. 4296. [Condemnation of piratical vessels.] Whenever any vessel, which shall have been built, purchased, fitted out in whole or in part, or held for the purpose of being employed in the commission of any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, or in the commission of any other act of piracy as defined by the law of nations, or from which any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure shall have been first attempted or made, is captured and brought into or captured in any port of the United States, the same shall be adjudged and condemned to their use, and that of the captors after due process and trial in any court having admiralty jurisdiction, and which shall be holden for the district into which such captured vessel shall be brought; and the same court shall thereupon order a sale and distribution thereof accordingly, and at its discretion. [R. S.]

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Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. L. 513; Act of Jan. 30, 1823, ch. 7, 3 Stat. L. 721; Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 48, 12 Stat. L. 314.

The offenses referred to are such only pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, as would be deemed piratical under the hostis humani generis. But why is he so laws of nations. The Schooner Chapman, deemed? Because he commits hostilities (1864) 4 Sawy. 501, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,602. upon the subjects and property of any

“ The fitting out, etc., referred to is a or all nations, without any regard to right fitting out within the United States, or or duty, or any pretense of public author. of an American vessel; for it is not per ity. If he willfully sinks or destroys an ceived by what authority the United innocent merchant ship, without any other States can direct the capture, on the high object than to gratify his lawless apseas, of a foreign vessel, which has been petite for mischief, it is just as much fitted out and held in a foreign port, for a piratical aggression, in the sense of the piratical purposes, unless she is, at the law of nations, and of the act of Congress, time of her capture, on a piratical cruise, as if he did it solely and exclusively and is a pirate under the laws of nations." for the sake of plunder, lucri causa. The The fitting out of a schooner as a priva law looks to it as an act of hostility, teer in a loyal state, to cruise under the and being committed by a vessel not comflag of the Confederate states, against the missioned and engaged in lawful warfare, commerce of the United States, was held it treats it as the act of a pirate, and not to be a fitting out for the purpose of of one who is emphatically hostis humani being employed in the commission of any generis. We think that the aggressions piratical aggression, and the officers and established by the evidence bring the case crew of a government vessel were not completely within the prohibitions of the entitled under this statute to a share of act; and if an intent to plunder were the proceeds. The Schooner Chapman, necessary to be established (as we think (1864) 4 Sawy. 501, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,602. it is not), the acts of aggression and hos

Piratical."— See also notes to R. S. tility and plunder committed on the Portusec. 4294, supra, p. 1251. In Harmony 1". guese vessel are sufficient to establish U. S., (1844) 2 How. 210, 11 U. S. the fact of an open although petty plund(L. ed.) 239, affirming a decree con erage.

Besides, the argument interprets demning a vessel under the Act of the act of Congress as though it con1819 embodied in the text section, Mr. tained only the word 'depredation,' or at Justice Story said: “ The next question least coupled aggression and depredation is whether the acts complained of are

as concurrent and essential circumstances piratical within the sense and purview of to bring the case within the penal enactthe act. The argument for the claimants ment of the law. But the act has no seems to suppose that the act does not such limitations or qualifications. It pun. intend to punish any aggression, which, ishes any piratical aggression or piratical if carried into complete execution, would search or piratical restraint, or piratical not amount to positive piracy in con seizure, as well as a piratical depredation. templation of law. That it must be Either is sufficient. The search or mainly, if not exclusively, done animo straint may be piratical although no furandi, or lucri causa; and that it must plunder follows, or is found worth carryunequivocally demonstrate that the ag ing away.” gression is with a view to plunder, and Piratical aggression by an armed ves. not for any other purpose, however hostile sel sailing under the regular flag of any or atrocious or reprehensible such purpose nation, may be justly subjected to the may be. We cannot adopt any such nar penalty of confiscation for such a gross row and limited interpretation of the breach of the law of nations. But every words of the act; and in our judgment it hostile attack, in a time of peace, is not would manifestly defeat the objects and necessarily piratical. It may be by mispolicy of the act, which seems designed ta or in necessary self-defense, or to to carry into effect the general law of na repel a supposed meditated attack by tions on the same subject in a just and pirates. It may be justifiable, and then appropriate manner. Where the act uses no blame attaches to the act; or it may the word “piratical, it does so in a gen be without just excuse, and then it carries eral sense; importing that the aggression responsibility in damages. If it proceed is unauthorized by the law of nations, farther, if it be an attack from revenge hostile in its character, wanton and crim and malignity, from gross abuse of power, inal in its commission, and utterly with and a settled purpose of mischief, it then out arīy sanction from any public author. assumes the character of a private unauity or sovereign power. In short, it means thorized war, and may be punished by all that the act belongs to the class of offenses the penalties which the law of nations can which pirates are in the habit of per properly administer.” The Marianna petrating, whether they do it for purposes Flora, (1826) 11 Wheat. 1, 6 U. S. (L. of plunder, or for purposes of hatred, ed.) 405, holding that a ship homeward revenge, or wanton abuse of power. bound with a valuable cargo and armed

re

rem,

did not engage in a piratical act in making a meditated hostile attack, when it was done upon a mistake of the facts, under the notion of just self-defense against what the master very imprudently deemed a piratical cruiser.

To make the fire of one vessel into another a piratical aggression within this statute, it must be a first aggression, unprovoked by any previous act of hostility or menace from the other side. (1860) 9 Op. Atty.-Gen. 455.

Innocence of owners.-- In Harmony v. U. S., (1844) 2 How. 210, 11 U. S. (L. ed.) 239, the court said: “ The act makes no exception whatsoever, whether the ag. gression be with or without the co-operation of the owners. The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner. The vessel or boat (says the act of Congress) from which such piratical aggression, etc., shall have been first attempted or made shall be condemned. Nor is there anything new in a provision of this sort. It is not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of nations, to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or crew thereof, a wrong or offense has been done as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner thereof. And this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offense or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party. The doctrine also is familiarly applied to cases of smuggling and other misconduct under our revenue laws; and has been applied to other kindred cases, such as cases arising on embargo and non-intercourse acts. In short, the acts of the master and crew, in cases of this sort, bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs."

“A vessel captured for engaging in piratical aggression becomes a prize on account of the state of universal war presumed to have been declared by a pirate against commerce and human kind at large, which requires no reciprocal declaration from any nation. Whether piracy is considered as a name applied only to indiscriminate plundering and robbery, either upon the high seas or upon the coasts where the high seas are used as the basis of operation, where the animus furandi is the distinguishing feature, as is expressed and held by President Woolsey, precluding the idea of a revolutionary or political sentiment, or whether there may be acts of piracy committed in fol

lowing out the direct course of a revolutionary struggle, as is contended by Judge Brown in the recent case of The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 408, there must be some overt act either in committing or attempting some offense against the law of nations, to give a piratical character to a vessel. An intent alone can never determine such a state of warfare as would justify the seizure of a prize.” The City of Mexico, (S. D. Fla. 1886) 28 Fed. 148.

Jurisdiction of the courts.- A statute authorizes a capture and condemnation by the United States courts of foreign vessels engaged in a piratical aggression.. Whatever may be the responsibility incurred by the nation to foreign powers, in executing the statute, there can be no doubt that courts of justice are bound to obey and administer it. The Marianna Flora, (1826) 11 Wheat. 1, 6 U. S. (L. ed.) 405.

Necessity of judgment in personam before libel in rem.--- In The Palmyra, (1827) 12 Wheat. I, 6 U. S. (L. ed.) 531, it was held that a judgment of conviction upon a prosecution in personam is not necessary to maintain a libel in

A proceeding in rem stands independent of and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.

“ Condemnation of the vessel as piratical does not necessarily imply a criminal liability of her officers or crew. The vessel might be condemned for being engaged upon a piratical expedition only, or for attempts at piratical aggression or restraint. In such a case no indictment for piracy would lie, because criminal punishment is inflicted only according to the municipal law of the captors; and our statutes do not make criminally punishable piratical undertakings or aggressions merely.” The Ambrose Light, (S. D. N. Y. 1885) 25 Fed. 408.

Exemption of cargo.— In Harmony v. U. S., (1844) 2 How. 210, 11 U. S. (L. ed.) 239, the court said: “ The remaining question is, whether the cargo is involved in the same fate as the ship. In respect to the forfeiture under the Act of 1819, it is plain that the cargo stands upon a very different ground from that of the ship. Nothing is said in relation to the condemnation of the cargo in the fourth section of the act; and in the silence of any expression of the legislature, in the case of provisions confessedly penal, it ought not to be presumed that their intention exceeded their language. We have no right to presume that the policy of the act reached beyond the condemnation of the offending vessel.”

Proceedings as in prizes captured in war. - In (1834) 2 Op. Atty.-Gen. 656, the attorney-general said that this statute does not expressly refer to the general statutory prize regulations, but in all

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