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Article 3801 of the Statutes of Texas exempts burthen, owned in the state of Texas, when arriving from or departing to any port in the state of Texas." The article conflicts with the text section, and such objectionable provisions are separable from the several provisions of the state pilot law. Olsen r. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) 68 S. W. 320, affirmed (1904) 195 U. S. 332, 25 S. Ct. 52, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 224.

"all vessels of whatsoever

By the provisions of sections 1965 and 1969 of the Code of Virginia, all vessels (excepting coastwise vessels with a pilot license) inward bound from the sea to Smith's Point, Yorktown, Newport News, or Norfolk, or any intermediate point, and all such vessels outward bound to the sea from Smith's Point, Yorktown, Newport News, or Norfolk, or any intermediate point, are subject to the compulsory regu

lations and rate therein provided. All vessels are subject to the same regulations, and, under the same circumstances and conditions, are required to pay the same fees. There is nothing in these statutes which expressly makes any discrimination between vessels going to or coming from sea. A state can establish a compulsory system of pilotage as to vessels coming from the sea into her inland ports, and as to vessels going from her inland ports to the sea, without also establishing a compulsory system of pilotage as to vessels trading between her inland ports respectively, or between her inland ports and the ports of another state which can be reached without going to sea. Darden v. Thompson, (1903) 101 Va. 635, 44 S. E. 755, affirmed (1905) 198 U. S. 310, 25 S. Ct. 660, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 1064.

Sec. 4444. [State licenses, pilot-charges, fees, etc.] No State or municipal government shall impose upon pilots of steam-vessels any obligagation to procure a State or other license in addition to that issued by the United States, or any other regulation which will impede such pilots in the performance of the duties required by this Title; nor shall any pilotcharges be levied by any such authority upon any steamer piloted as provided by this Title; and in no case shall the fees charged for the pilotage of any steam-vessel exceed the customary or legally established rates in the State where the same is performed. Nothing in this Title shall be construed to annul or affect any regulation established by the laws of any State, requiring vessels entering or leaving a port in any such State, other than coastwise steam-vessels, to take a pilot duly licensed or authorized by the laws of such State, or of a State situate upon the waters of such State. [R. S.]

Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100, 16 Stat. L. 455.

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See also as to state regulation of pilots, R. S. sec. 4325, supra, p. 1242. "The title" above mentioned is title 52 of the Revised Statutes, Regulation of Steam Vessels." See STEAM VESSELS.

History. This section is a part of the Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 100, sec. 51, 16 Stat. L. 440. The other part of section 51 will be found in R. S. sec. 4401. See STEAM VESSELS. Anderson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., (1912) 225 U. S. 187, 32 S. Ct. 626, 56 U. S. (L. ed.) 1047.

Vessel in tow.-This section in its terms is confined to coastwise seagoing steam vessels, and not to vessels wholly without motive power in charge of a tug. The Carrie L. Tyler, (C. C. A. 4th Cir. 1901) 106 Fed. 422, 45 C. C. A. 374, 54 L. R. A. 236.

Exemption of coastwise steam vessels - In general. The exemption of coastwise steam vessels of the United States from the operation of state pilotage laws

interferes with such laws only so far as they relate to these vessels. Olsen . Smith, (1904) 195 U. S. 332, 25 S. Ct. 52, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 224, affirming (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) 68 S. W. 320.

Registered vessels.-" Other than coastwise steam-vessels " must be deemed to refer to those not sailing under register. Anderson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., (1912) 225 U. S. 187, 32 S. Ct. 626, 56 U. S. (L. ed.) 1047. See The Queen, (N. D. Cal. 1910) 184 Fed. 537; (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1911) 186 Fed. 725, 108 C. C. A. 595; (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1913) 206 Fed. 148, 124 C. C. A. 214.

Registered coastwise seagoing vessels are not required by any federal law to have a United States pilot in entering or leaving any state port, and even if

any such vessel should have on board a

pilot holding a federal license when entering or leaving such port, the regulation of such port pilotage is still subject to the laws of the state. Anderson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., (1912) 225 U. S. 187, 32 S. Ct. 626, 56 U. S. (L. ed.) 1047, wherein the court said:

"The stat

ute was thus construed in Murray v. Clark, [1873] 4 Daly 468, affirmed [1874] 58 N. Y. 684, where a steamer sailing under register between New York and New Orleans, and touching at a foreign port as was her privilege, was held to be subject to the law of the state of New York as to pilotage in entering the port New York, although at the time she was under the control of her master who was a pilot licensed by the federal inspectors. In Joslyn r. Nickerson, ([C. C. Mass.] 1880) 1 Fed. 133, while it was held that a libel for pilotage could not be sustained, for the reason that the law of Massachusetts in question was not by its terms applicable, Judge Lowell said (page 135): "This statute (referring to the federal act of 1866) has been modified, and the employment of such a pilot is now compulsory only upon coasting steam vessels not sailing under a register. R. S. sec. 4401. [See STEAM VESSE S.] Murray v. Clark, [1873] 4 Daly 468, affirmed [1874] 58 N. Y. 684. This vessel, therefore, was not bound to carry such a pilot, and was bound by any law of Massachusetts which might require her to take a local pilot. R. S. sec. 4444.' In Spraigue r. Thompson, [1886] 118 U. S. 90, 96, [6 S. Ct. 988, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 115], where a claim for pilotage under the law of Georgia was disallowed, the steamer was a coastwise sea-going steam vessel.' and was not sailing under register.' In Huus r. New York, etc., Steamship Co., [1901] 182 U. S. 392, 394,

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[21 S. Ct. 827, 45 U. S. (L. ed.) 1146], after quoting from sections 4401 and 4444 of the Revised Statutes, the court said: 'The general object of these provisions seems to be to license pilots upon steam vessels engaged in the coastwise or interior commerce of the country, and at the same time, to leave to the states the regulation of pilots upon all vessels engaged in foreign commerce.' There, the steamer was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade under the laws of the United States and was engaged in trade between Porto Rico and New York after the treaty of cession. It was held that she was not within the pilotage laws of New York." See The Queen, reported in (N. D. Cal. 1910) 184 Fed. 537; (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1911) 186 Fed. 725, 108 C. C. A. 595; (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1913) 206 Fed. 148, 124 C. C. A. 214.

Steam vessels engaged in trade between Porto Rican ports and ports of the United States are coastwise steam vessels in the sense in which those words are used in this section. Huus v. New York, etc., Steamship Co., (1901) 182 U. S. 392, 21 S. Ct. 827, 45 U. S. (L. ed.) 1146, affirming (S. D. N. Y. 1900) 105 Fed. 74.

Effect on treaties.- State pilotage laws, applied to a British vessel coming from a foreign port, do not conflict with a treaty provision that "no higher or other duties or charges shall be imposed in any ports of the United States on British vessels than those payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States," because of the exemption of coastwise steam vessels of the United States from pilotage, resulting from this section, or of any lawful exemption of coastwise vessels cicated by the state laws. Olsen v. Smith, (1904) 195 U. S. 332, 25 S. Ct. 52, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 224, affirming (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) 68 S. W. 320.

PIPE LINES

See ALASKA; INDIANS; PUBLIC LANDS

PIRACY

R. S. 4293. Public Vessels to Suppress Piracy, 1250.
R. S. 4294. Seizure of Piratical Vessels, 1250.

R. S. 4295. Merchant-Vessels May Resist Pirates, 1251.
R. S. 4296. Condemnation of Piratical Vessels, 1251.

R. S. 4297. Seizure of Vessels Fitted Out for Piracy, 1254.

R. S. 4298. What Vessels May be Authorized to Seize Pirates, 1254.
R. S. 4299. Duties of Officers of Customs and Marshals, 1255.

CROSS-REFERENCES

Extradition for, see EXTRADITION.

Jurisdiction of Courts, see JUDICIARY.

Definition and Punishment of Offense, see PENAL LAWS.

Common-law offenses." It is well settled that there are no common-law offenses against the United States." U. S. v. Eaton, (1892) 144 U. S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764, 36 U. S. (L. ed.) 591. See also cases cited in JUDICIARY, vol. 4, at p. 1001, under sidehead Common-law jurisdiction.

Sec. 4293. [Public vessels to suppress piracy.] The President is authorized to employ so many of the public armed vessels as in his judg ment the service may require, with suitable instructions to the commanders thereof, in protecting the merchant-vessels of the United States and their crews from piratical aggressions and depredations. [R. S.]

Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. L. 510; Act of Jan. 30, 1823, ch. 7, 3 Stat. L. 721.

Sections 4293-4299 constitute chapter 8 ("Regulations for the Suppression of Piracy") of this title 48 ("Regulation of Commerce and Navigation ") of the Revised Statutes.

Sections 5368-5384 are a part of chapter 3 (" Crimes Arising within the Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States ") of title 70 ("Crimes") of the Revised Statutes. Of these sections 5368-5376, 5383, 5384 related to the definition and punishment of piracy. They were incorporated in the Penal Laws of 1909, in sections 290-310, and repealed by section 341 thereof. Sections 5377-5382 of said chapter 3 related to slave trade. These with other sections of the Revised Statutes were incorporated in the Penal Laws of 1909 in sections 246-271 and repealed by section 341 thereof. See PENAL LAWS, ante, this volume, p. 873.

Sec. 4294. [Seizure of piratical vessels.] The President is authorized to instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels of the United States to subdue, seize, take, and send into any port of the United States, any armed vessel or boat, or any vessel or boat the, crew whereof shall be armed, and which shall have attempted or committed any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, upon any vessel of the United [1250]

States, or of the citizens thereof, or upon any other vessel; and also to retake any vessel of the United States, or its citizens, which may have been unlawfully captured upon the high seas. [R. S.]

Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. L. 512; Act of Jan.. 30, 1823, ch. 7, 3 Stat. L. 721.

"Pirates may, without doubt, be lawfully captured on the ocean by the public or private ships of every nation; for they are, in truth, the common enemies of all mankind, and, as such, are liable to the extreme rights of war." The Marianna Flora, (1826) 11 Wheat. 1, 6 U. S. (L. ed.) 405.

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"Armed vessel."- A brig armed with a cannon and ammunition, and with pistols and daggers on board, is an armed vessel" within the intent and meaning of the statute. No distinction is taken or even suggested in the act, as to the objects, or purposes, or character of the armament, whether it be for offense or defense, legitimate or illegitimate. Harmony v. U. S., (1844) 2 How. 210, 11 U. S. (L. ed.) 239.

"Piratical aggression."- See this side

head in notes to R. S. sec. 4296, infra. p. 1252.

All vessels guilty of piratical aggressions. The authority given by this statute is not merely over vessels of the United States, or over citizens of the United States, but it is extended over all vessels guilty of piratical agressions upon vessels of the United States, or the citizens thereof, or upon any other vessel. It cannot be presumed that Congress meant to direct the capture of a foreign vessel and crew for an aggression on the high seas upon another foreign vessel, unless the aggression was piratical under the laws of nations - an offense of which any nation may take cognizance. The Schooner Chapman, (1864) 4 Sawy. 501, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,602.

Sec. 4295. [Merchant-vessels may resist pirates.] The commander and crew of any merchant-vessel of the United States, owned wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, may oppose and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon any other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any armed vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some nation in amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the same; and may also retake any vessel so owned which may have been captured by the commander or crew of any such armed vessel, and send the same into any port of the United States. [R. S.]

Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. L. 513; Act of Jan. 30, 1823, ch. 7, 3 Stat. L. 721.

This statute expressly excepts seizures by public armed vessels of nations in amity with the United States, thus indicating that the seizures referred to are piratical seizures jure gentium and not

seizures by commissioned national vessels, however irregular or unlawful the latter may be. The Schooner Chapman, (1864) 4 Sawy. 501, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,602.

Sec. 4296. [Condemnation of piratical vessels.] Whenever any vessel, which shall have been built, purchased, fitted out in whole or in part, or held for the purpose of being employed in the commission of any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, or in the commission. of any other act of piracy as defined by the law of nations, or from which any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure shall have been first attempted or made, is captured and brought into or captured in any port of the United States, the same shall be adjudged and condemned to their use, and that of the captors after due process and trial in any court having admiralty jurisdiction, and which shall be holden for the district into which such captured vessel shall be brought; and the same court shall thereupon order a sale and distribution thereof accordingly, and at its discretion. [R. S.]

Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. L. 513; Act of Jan. 30, 1823, ch. 7, 3 Stat. L. 721; Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 48, 12 Stat. L. 314.

The offenses referred to are such only as would be deemed piratical under the laws of nations. The Schooner Chapman, (1864) 4 Sawy. 501, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,602.

"The fitting out, etc., referred to is a fitting out within the United States, or of an American vessel; for it is not perceived by what authority the United States can direct the capture, on the high seas, of a foreign vessel, which has been fitted out and held in a foreign port, for piratical purposes, unless she is, at the time of her capture, on a piratical cruise, and is a pirate under the laws of nations." The fitting out of a schooner as a privateer in a loyal state, to cruise under the flag of the Confederate states, against the commerce of the United States, was held not to be a fitting out for the purpose of being employed in the commission of any piratical aggression, and the officers and crew of a government vessel were not entitled under this statute to a share of the proceeds. The Schooner Chapman, (1864) 4 Sawy. 501, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,602. "Piratical."- See also notes to R. S. sec. 4294, supra, p. 1251. In Harmony v. U. S., (1844) 2 How. 210, 11 U. S. (L. ed.) 239, affirming a decree condemning a vessel under the Act of 1819 embodied in the text section, Mr. Justice Story said: "The next question is whether the acts complained of are piratical within the sense and purview of the act. The argument for the claimants seems to suppose that the act does not intend to punish any aggression, which, if carried into complete execution, would not amount to positive piracy in contemplation of law. That it must be mainly, if not exclusively, done animo furandi, or lucri causa; and that it must unequivocally demonstrate that the aggression is with a view to plunder, and not for any other purpose, however hostile or atrocious or reprehensible such purpose may be. We cannot adopt any such narrow and limited interpretation of the words of the act; and in our judgment it would manifestly defeat the objects and policy of the act, which seems designed to carry into effect the general law of nations on the same subject in a just and appropriate manner. Where the act uses the word 'piratical,' it does so in a general sense; importing that the aggression is unauthorized by the law of nations, hostile in its character, wanton and criminal in its commission, and utterly without any sanction from any public authority or sovereign power. In short, it means that the act belongs to the class of offenses which pirates are in the habit of perpetrating, whether they do it for purposes of plunder, or for purposes of hatred, revenge, or wanton abuse of power.

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pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani generis. But why is he so deemed? Because he commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all nations, without any regard to right or duty, or any pretense of public authority. If he willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it is just as much a piratical aggression, in the sense of the law of nations, and of the act of Congress, as if he did it solely and exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri causa. The law looks to it as an act of hostility, and being committed by a vessel not commissioned and engaged in lawful warfare, it treats it as the act of a pirate, and of one who is emphatically hostis humani generis. We think that the aggressions established by the evidence bring the case completely within the prohibitions of the act; and if an intent to plunder were necessary to be established (as we think it is not), the acts of aggression and hostility and plunder committed on the Portuguese vessel are sufficient to establish the fact of an open although petty plunderage. Besides, the argument interprets the act of Congress as though it contained only the word 'depredation,' or at least coupled aggression and depredation as concurrent and essential circumstances to bring the case within the penal enactment of the law. But the act has no such limitations or qualifications. It punishes any piratical aggression or piratical search or piratical restraint, or piratical seizure, as well as a piratical depredation. Either is sufficient. The search or restraint may be piratical although no plunder follows, or is found worth carrying away."

"Piratical aggression by an armed vessel sailing under the regular flag of any nation, may be justly subjected to the penalty of confiscation for such a gross breach of the law of nations. But every hostile attack, in a time of peace, is not necessarily piratical. It may be by mistake, or in necessary self-defense, or to repel a supposed meditated attack by pirates. It may be justifiable, and then no blame attaches to the act; or it may be without just excuse, and then it carries responsibility in damages. If it proceed farther, if it be an attack from revenge and malignity, from gross abuse of power, and a settled purpose of mischief, it then assumes the character of a private unauthorized war, and may be punished by all the penalties which the law of nations can properly administer." The Marianna Flora, (1826) 11 Wheat. 1, 6 U. S. (L. ed.) 405, holding that a ship homeward bound with a valuable cargo and armed

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