OPERATION OF SAFEGUARD The CHAIRMAN. A question or two on Safeguard, and you can fill out the details for the record. Is it up to date and is it working up to expectations, and if not, specify, prepare a statement for us on that, if you will please. Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; I certainly will, Mr. Chairman. That system is progressing in a manner that makes everyone very proud. The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. All right, now, you elaborate on the the answer and add anything to it that is relevant, you see, as if the question were more inclusive. Dr. FOSTER. I will be pleased to do that. (The information follows.) The Safeguard system is up to date in that it represents the most advanced state of the art available in ballistic-missile defense systems. Extensive research and development, beginning with Nike-X and evolving into the Sentinel and Safeguard systems, have provided a high degree of confidence in our ability to deploy a system capable of countering the threat projected for the late 1970s. Extensive testing has shown that Safeguard is capable of meeting defense objectives within that projected threat; therefore, we are continuing the Safeguard deployment. At the same time, we are undertaking a Site Defense of Minuteman (SDM) Demonstration as a hedge against the possibility that the Soviet threat to our Minuteman force may increase substantially beyond that which Safeguard is designed to meet. The Safeguard system is progressing very well, and we are most pleased with the results of testing thus far. The prototype Missile Site Radar (MSR) and its associated data processor have been undergoing tests at Meck Island for some time, with outstanding results. Both Sprint and Spartan missiles, after successfully completing development testing, have been integrated with the MSR in the highly successful system-test program that began in April 1970. Thus far, 23 tests have been conducted in the system-test program. Of these, 19 were successful, 2 partially successful, and 2 unsuccessful. The causes of the partially successful and the unsuccessful tests have been identified and corrective action taken. With respect to the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), the only component of the system not being tested at Meck Island, extensive testing on a limited engineering development model has been completed, and we have high confidence of meeting the presently scheduled date for the first PAR site. Production of equipment for the first Safeguard sites is on schedule, and by the end of FY '72 virtually all equipment will have been released to production. Procurement has been initiated for all equipment for the Grand Forks and Malmstrom sites-the MSR and data processor for the Whiteman site, equipment for the Ballistic Missile Defense Center and the Tactical Software Control Site, repair parts, and limited long-lead-time items for advanced preparation of the Warren site. Construction is proceeding on schedule at the first Safeguard site, in North Dakota, and as of the end of January it was 70 percent complete. Although construction at the Malmstrom site in Montana was delayed by labor contract negotiations, work is now proceeding, and it is anticipated that we will meet the currently scheduled Equipment Readiness Date (ERD) of April 1976. Advanced preparation for construction at Whiteman and Warren is on schedule, and ERDS in early and late 1977, respectively, can be met if congressional authorization and appropriation of FY '73 funds are forthcoming. In summary, progress in the Safeguard program has been outstanding. There are no technical problems that would affect a decision to proceed with Safeguard deployment in FY 1973 and thereby provide the nation an effective defense against the currently projected threat to our Minuteman force and National Command Authorities, as well as a system capable of being expanded to meet all the ballistic-missile defense objectives announced by the President. CHEYENNE DEVELOPMENT The CHAIRMAN. On the Cheyenne, what is the situation there? I came in while you were talking about it a minute ago. What is the stage of it now? Dr. FOSTER. The status of Cheyenne now is basically that we had some difficulties with the contractor's delivering the aircraft on time. We had some difficulties with the aircraft itself, but these difficulties have been largely removed in test flights in recent months. We are now setting up tests, using the Cheyenne as well as the King Cobra and the Black Hawk aircraft in order to determine the effectiveness of helicopters-and, particularly, various types of helicopters-in engaging targets and, also, to determine the vulnerability of helicopters under different conditions. This information is needed to complete the study in which the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army have been involved. This summer the Army expects to make its decision on what to do with the helicopter program in the future. Then the Secretary of Defense will review and approve or disapprove that program; it is for that we are requesting the $53 million. PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MCINTYRE The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre either has or will want you to elaborate on that more later before his subcommittee. I want the record to show my very warm thanks to Senator McIntyre not only for the work he is doing as chairman of the important subcommittee but also for his diligence and attention here today, which was a help to all of us, including you, Dr. Foster, and it was to me because of other assignments that I had. Do you have anything else you wish to say? Dr. FOSTER. No, sir. Senator MCINTYRE. I have some more questions and I want to thank you very much for your helpful testimony here toeday. (Questions submitted by Senator McIntyre. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.) Question. Last year the budget submitted to Congress reflected an increase in the amount of research assigned to non-Defense agencies which in the past had been the responsibility of DoD. Is there greater emphasis on this shift reflected in the FY 73 budget? Provide for the record an identification of the items and amounts which were involved in this shift of limiting defense research to areas relevant to the Defense mission during FY 1971, 1972 and planned for 1973. Answer. We believe the transfers to other agencies that may be attributed to sharpened use of the relevance criterion have been completed. We are planning no additional transfers in the FY 1973 budget year. Major items transferred to the National Science Foundation (NSF) are shown in the following table: RESEARCH ACTIVITIES FORMERLY FUNDED BY THE DOD AND NOW FUNDED BY THE NSF1 1 Includes activities for which the NSF has assumed support during the period July 1, 1970, to Feb. 1, 1972. In addition to the foregoing major items, we have received a report from the OMB showing that, as of 8 February 1972, small research projects totaling $22.9 million that were formerly financed with Defense research funds are now being funded by the NSF. These are projects that have too low a priority or insufficient relevance to Defense needs to warrant continued DoD funding. Described by new proposals submitted to the NSF, these projects were of high enough scientific quality to receive NSF's support in their normal competitive award process. We are uncertain whether it should be assumed in every case that the project possesses a one-to-one correspondence with the actual research project previously supported by Defense Components. For purposes of this report, however, we will assume that all of them are transferred research projects. When added to the amounts listed for the major projects, the total amount of transferred research from the DoD to the NSF is $60.8 million for FY 1970 and 1971 and for the first 7 months of FY 1972. You will recall that Senator Fulbright suggested (during the FY 1970 hearings) that much of our foreign-area research program could more appropriately be sponsored and managed by the Department of State. This led to the transfer of the following funds from the DoD to State in the past 2 years: FUNDS TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOD TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR FOREIGN-AREA RESEARCH PROGRAM These funds support contractual research of Defense interest that is procured and managed by the Department of State. No plans have been made for similar fund transfers in FY 1973. Question. The Research and Development Subcommittee will hold separate hearings on the Department of Defense program for the Federal Contract Research Centers. Table 6-1 attached to your statement reflects an increase from $193.9 million to $201.6 million to $214.7 million for fiscal years 1971, 1972, and 1973, respectively. Will you explain the reason for the increase proposed for fiscal year 1973 and what do you foresee as the direction of the future level of support for these organizations? Answer. Table 6-1 summarizes the funding for Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRCs) from the RDT&E Appropriations. In FY 1971 and FY 1972 the Congressional limitations and the DoD implementation of those limitations on FCRCs were in terms of the total DoD funding from all appropriations. The total DoD funding levels are: fiscal year 1971, $239,012,000; fiscal year 1972, $242,729,000; budget request, fiscal year 1973, $254,865,000. The FY 1973 request is 5% over the Congressional limitation for FY 1972 and is intended to provide for the support of the same number of professionals in FY 1973 as in FY 1972 in the FCRCs as a group with a partial provision for inflation in costs. Although the FY 1973 funds have been allocated to various FCRCs in the budget, we would expect to exercise flexibility and selectivity in giving increases 74-696-72-pt. 2- -36 during FY 1973. I believe these institutions have provided much needed and very useful services to the Military Departments and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Under their outside Boards of Trustees and management, they have achieved an objective independent viewpoint that cannot be fully duplicated inhouse or obtained from profit-making contractors. The FCRC administrative and salary problems that were of concern during the 1960s have been solved, I believe, to the satisfaction of the Congress. Now I do not think all of the organizations are of the same caliber, nor do I propose the continued, unchanging support of each of them. I would hope, however, to work out in the forthcoming hearings a basis for the future DoD relationships with this form of organization. Question. In past years studies have been conducted by the Department of Defense as well as by committees of the Congress of total national capability involving wind tunnel and other major test facilities both in government and industry. In your opinion has sufficient time elapsed that a new look is warranted as part of a continuing need to improve the efficiency in the use of these major facilities? Answer. A major study of the test and evaluation facility base was concluded in August 1971. This study was instigated largely by one of the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report. The study included an audit of our test requirements for the next decade, the derivation of deficiencies and 48 recommendations designed to correct these deficiencies. On 29 October 1971 Mr. Packard directed implementing actions and target dates for accomplishment of recommended actions. One approved action was to conduct a joint-Service review of available wind-tunnel facilities, their use factors and any technical deficiencies. This action was initiated on 21 December 1971 with a scheduled completion date in May 1972. Another major recommendation that has been implemented is the formaiion of a Test Resources Review Committee (TRRC) under the chairmanship of my Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation. One of the major responsibilities assigned to the TRRC is the accomplishment of periodic reviews of the present and planned test and evaluation facility base to insure present and future adequacy to meet requirements and to avoid unwarranted retention of obsolete assets or unnecessary duplications. It is therefore my opinion that we are aggressively involved in taking a well planned look at the continuing need to improve the efficiency in the use of major test facilities. Question. A number of articles have appeared in the press relating to the ingenuity of the Israelis in adapting existing weaponry to more effective and new uses. In addition, they have been reported as being innovative in developing equipment which is unique to their own needs. Can you identify some of these efforts and indicate if the United States is benefiting from these in any way? Answer. Israel's capability to produce and modify military equipment is quite significant when compared with the country's population. However, the press has exaggerated their actual programs, often mixing plans with accomplishments. Their adaptations and modifications cover a broad area [deleted]. Question. Senator Pell has stated on the floor his concern about the Department of Defense efforts involving modification of weather for military purposes. He has also indicated that in an exchange of correspondence with the DOD he was unable to satisfy his concern because the DOD invoked a claim of secrecy. Would you care to comment on this situation? Answer. Senator, some aspects of our work in this area have important national security implications and information on them has been rigorously controlled. The chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees have been fully informed on these aspects. Question. Provide for the record a list of projects or programs which were terminated during the past fiscal years? Will you state the reason in each case and identify the amount of funds which were spent for each of these for all fiscal years prior to termination and how much was saved by the termination action? Answer. The major projects or programs terminated in FY 1971 and FY 1972 were only in the Army and only for the current fiscal year, and are as follows, together with the reasons for termination and the savings resulting: 1 This program was canceled at the direction of Congress. Question. In past years, DoD has stressed the potential benefits from the following principles: value engineering, cost avoidance, cost reduction, improved productivity, zero defects, and cost benefit analysis. Elaborate procedures were set up and a great amount of effort has been expended in furthering these programs. Address each of these in turn and indicate where they stand in the DoD consideration of improving the management and operation of that department. Which of these have been continued or modified or terminated and for what reasons? Answer. At present, the DoD is stressing decentralized management, competent people, clearly defined responsibilites, and the minimization of "paper." This stress is effective throughout the DoD. The points addressed in your question are the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Installations and Logistics and the Comptroller. I will touch on each briefly. Value Engineering.-The Value Engineering (VE) program is continuing. Policy on the use of VE methods and contract provisions is essentially unchanged. Adminstrative modifications in the form of directives consolidation and reduction of reports have been made to reduce needless overhead. Cost Avoidance.-Cost avoidance was merely a term used in the early days of the cost-reduction program to indicate the amount of costs avoided as a result of new or improved management actions. It was never a separate program. The use of the term was discontinued at the end of FY 1966, when cost-reduction program procedures were revised and simplified. Cost Reduction.-The cost-reduction program is operated in accordance with OMB Circular A-44. Within the DoD, responsibility for operating the costreduction program has been decentralized to the Military Departments and the Defense Supply Agency. Each year, an annual management-improvement report, of which cost reduction is one element, is submitted to the President through the Director, Office of Management and Budget. During FY 1971, DoD Components reported cost-reduction savings totaling $2,057.1 million. These savings resulted from almost 39,000 individual actions. As a result of those actions, more than 18,000 manpower spaces were either eliminated or transferred to meet other authorized requirements. Improved Productivity. The overall policy in this area remains essentially unchanged since the issuance of DoD Instruction 7045.11 on 17 December 1970. Since that time, the DoD has established a very active program in the productivity area known as DIMES, for Defense Integrated Management Engineering System. DIMES was designated as the principal DoD work- and productivity-measurement system in DoD Directive 5010.15, dated 13 January 1972. The objectives of the DIMES program are to (1) improve labor productivity through the application of management engineering principles and techniques and (2) provide a common base of work measurement and productivity data, for work planning and control, and the development of productivity performance indices relating output to input. Zero Defects.-Policy with regard to programs of the zero-defect type has been modified to make such programs optional for the Military Departments and defense contractors. This policy permits local management to determine the need for such a program and to tailor the program employed to the individual circumstances prevailing. This change in policy is in line with the trend toward decentralized management in the DOD. Cost Benefit Analysis.-The policy (as reflected in DOD Instruction 7041.3, dated 26 February 1969) has remained essentially unchanged. In 1970, the Defense Economic Analysis Council, a joint Service/DOD-Agency_group, was formed to coordinate the application of economic analysis within the DOD. The head of each Military Department and Defense Agency is delegated the responsibility and authority for conducting cost benefit analysis. |