It is emphasized that these data are furnished in response to a specific inquiry. It should not be inferred that the Defense Department finds any particular significance in data arranged in this way.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kelley, we are glad to have you with us.
Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, how long do you believe the United States and NATO Forces can wage a successful conventional war with the Warsaw Pact Forces if the enemy were to launch an allout conventional attack and the United States had very little warning?

Mr. KELLEY. Senator, I believe the answer to that question should be provided by Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer when they appear before this committee later this month. I am not able to provide it. Senator THURMOND. Could you provide it for the record? Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The probability of a massive-80 plus divisions-attack coming as a complete surprise is considered highly unlikely. A large number of Pact divisions are not stationed close to the border areas and would have to deploy in many cases several hundred kilometers to reach attack positions along the NATO border. Existing intelligence organizations should be able to detect activity of this scale and provide some warning time. The timely political interpretation and coordinated response by NATO will to a great extent determine whether the Allies could meet an attack with sufficient conventional force. The myriad of uncertainties involved in a combat operation and the limited methodologies available with which to predict the outcomes of the conflict make it difficult to state precisely how long the Allies could hold. As stated above a massive, surprise attack is considered highly unlikely. For an attack with some warning we feel that the existing force levels committed to NATO ensure a reasonable chance for successful defense of NATO.

Senator THURMOND. It is our understanding that the Joint Chiefs assume we will receive [deleted].

Is this correct?

Mr. KELLEY. I am not familiar with that figure. I would have to comment on that for the record.

Senator THURMOND. Maybe General DePuy could answer that question.

General DEPUY. Senator Thurmond, the strategy guidance that the services are given which in turn tells them how many divisions they have but not the level of support has the assumption that there would be [deleted]. In other words, that the Soviets would require [deleted] of mobilization and [deleted] after they started mobilization we would have strategic warning. Now, that is just in one set of scenarios.

Senator THURMOND. Could you tell me who made this judgment and the considerations it is based on?

General DEPUY. I cannot tell you what consideration it is based on except considered judgment. It is a piece of guidance which assists the services in determining the readiness of reserve components called to active duty because, as you know, Senator, they need a certain. amount of training. The guidance says that, if "D" Day were to be [deleted] after "M" Day that the National Guard and Reserve components would have a [deleted] start.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel as a military man it is a sound and valid assumption?

General DEPUY. I think that it is a reasonable assumption but it is not a guarantee. You could very well have none.

EFFECT OF REMOVAL OF A DIVISION FROM EUROPE

Senator THURMOND. What would be the effect of removing one U.S. division from Europe this year? Maybe you would like him to answer that.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, I would.

Senator THURMOND. General DePuy, in your opinion, what would be the effect of removing one U.S. division from Europe this year? General DEPUY. I am very much in the same boat as Secretary Kelley. I would prefer not to answer this question on this premise. I am not qualified to answer, which is the best reason. We are appearing here today to explain, as we should, the manpower that we think we need in order to support the forces that the strategy requires. I think it is much more appropriate that the Secretary and Admiral Moorer from the Joint Chiefs of Staff answer the type question that you are now asking.

Senator THURMOND. Could you get that answer from them for the record, then, so we will have it on the record here?

General DEPUY. I will pass that on, yes.

(The information follows:)

This question has military, political and cost implications. Militarily, withdrawal of one division from the current European force would create a hole in the NATO forward defense since all U. S. divisions are assigned missions in forward sectors. A reduction of one division would require that another unit assume a share of the responsibility and would further extend another NATO unit. Additionally, this change would impact on the mission for REFORGER

forces and increase the urgency of its return. In short, the threshold at which a PACT limited warning attack would achieve success would be lowered and NATO would face a greater risk of confrontation.

Politically, the unilateral reduction of U. S. forces would certainly cause the Allies to re-evaluate their obligations and commitments to NATO and place in jeopardy the force improvements pledged in the European Defense Improvement Program. Also, NATO bargaining position in a Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) would practically disappear, and our Allies might be forced to make accommodations with the Soviet Union.

As the following table shows, the cost impact of withdrawing a division from Europe varies significantly depending on whether the unit is (1) maintained on active duty so that it can be returned to Europe rapidly in a crisis or (2) deactivated.

Cost/Savings of withdrawing one mechanical division from Eurpoe1

[In millions of dollars]

1. Maintain on active duty and pre-position equipment in Europe.

1 Costs are based on a 16,500-man division plus an equal number of support troops. Assumes that a proportional part of the U.S. training and logistics base is also deactivated.

If we desire to be able to return the unit to Europe rapidly in a crisis, then it is necessary to (1) construct facilities to house a set of prepositioned equipment in Europe and (2) purchase an additional set of equipment to be used for training in the U.S. These costs, plus other one time costs (e.g., cost of renovating existing barracks in CONUS, cost of moving the unit from Europe to CONUS), exceed the expected annual savings by a factor of over 10. It should be noted that these costs are based on the assumption that troops returned to the U.S. can be housed in renovated World War II type barracks. If-in line with the All Volunteer Army Concept-new barracks are required, the cost of stationing these troops in CONUS could increase substantially, i.e., on the order of several hundred million dollars.

OPERATION REFORGER

Senator THURMOND. Another one-any of these you feel should not be answered you tell me and we will handle it that way. How is it that the United States was able to withdraw 28,000 troops in the last few years as a result of Project Reforger and yet this did not apparently adversely affect NATO?

General DEPUy. I think the NATO allies agreed to what the Air Force would call a dual basing concept and we call Reforger in which we took two-thirds of an infantry division and two-thirds of its support back to the United States. The division is at Fort Riley. The United States also sent certain squadrons of fighters back to the United States on the premise that during a period of strategic warning they could return.

In the case of the Reforger units, both support and the division itself, the equipment for two-thirds of the division is in Europe, so the troops would be flown back, and we would then have 5 instead of 4% divisions. The European allies accepted that, perhaps not with wild enthusiasm, but as perhaps a more economical way of meeting our initial onsite commitment.

Senator THURMOND. So, what you are saying in short as I understand, is that the European allies accepted that but were not too happy with it.

General DEPUY. Most of the European allies, to include the British and ourselves, have plans for reinforcement. What we have is consistent with what the other allies are doing.

TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT TO EUROPE IN CASE OF WAR

Senator THURMOND. Is it a fact that U.S. planning calls for [deleted] people and [deleted] tons of equipment to be transported to Europe within 30 days after the outbreak of hostilities, or are you familiar with that?

General DEPUY. I have some charts. Later I can show you the number of Army forces to be deployed at 30, 60, and 90 days. I am not quite sure whether you include Air Force in that or not. I would have to consult with my charts.

Senator THURMOND. I see. Could you just summarize that, then, and answer this question for the record?

General DEPUY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

During the first 30 days following mobilization for a NATO contingency, U.S. lift assets have the capability of delivering over [deleted] personnel and approximately [deleted] tons of supplies and equipment to Europe.

Senator THURMOND. What is our capability today to carry out the transportation of this large number of men and materials to Europe within 30 days?

General DEPUY. That is a question which either should be reserved for the appearance of the chairman, because the lift which is made available to the services for the 30, 60 and 90 days is a function of the allocation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have been allocated sufficient lift for planning purposes to get us there. Perhaps General Crittenberger would like to speak to that.

Senator THURMOND. We will be glad to have him if he is qualified to speak to that. Did you understand the question, General?

General CRITTENBERGER. Yes. I am General Crittenberger. I am from J-5, Joint Staff.

The strategic lift question is one that has been looked at for a number of years, as you know. Basically, there is a problem in airlift in the first [deleted] days but that is resolved by the end of that timeframe. The big problem is going to be in sealift because the Reserve Fleet has gone down, as you know, from about 5,000 vessels to around [deleted]. Further, with a short warning time we could not get enough of our Merchant Marine collected to use, so for about the first [deleted] days, there is a problem in sealift. At the end of the first [deleted] days, however, most of these problems have been resolved and hoping for not a very high attrition rate, there would be enough air and sealift to move the forces that would have to be moved.

Senator THURMOND. And you feel there would be?
General CRITTENBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

NEED FOR UNIFIED EUROPEAN COMMAND

With 22 separate NATO headquarters charged with the wartime mission in Europe and with each individual U.S. service, namely, the Army, Air Force, and Navy, having a major command of its own in Europe, why is it necessary to have another large headquarters organization, namely, a unified U.S. headquarters known as the U.S. European Command?

Mr. KELLEY. Senator, I believe that is a question to which Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer should respond when they are here and if you wish, we can provide an answer.

(The information follows:)

The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), with present headquarters at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, FRG, is the commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is Western Europe including the UK, the Mediterranean Sea and the islands therein, the entire Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East land mass to the eastern border of Iran, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

EUCOM is the Unified Command which coordinates and controls the overall peacetime activities of all U.S. Forces in Europe. It performs the primary task of war planning as well as the routine daily tasks of inter-Service coordination which permit our forces to perform as a team in war time instead of as individual fighting units. This is the underlying premise of the Unified Command concept. The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe performs the following functions: 1. Maintain the security of the U.S. European Command and protect the U.S. its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion.

2. Support SACEUR.

3. Exercise operational command over assigned forces through the Service component commanders.

4. Administer the Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs. 5. During peacetime, plan and utilize military resources available to reinforce and support political, economic, and psychological programs for the achievement of national security interests.

6. Evacuate and assist in the evacuation of U.S. non-combatants and certain non-U.S. persons abroad.

7. Prepare for the conduct of unconventional and psychological warfare in military conflict.

8. Coordinate and direct the intelligence activities of the U.S. European Command.

9. Implement the public affairs policies of the Department of Defense. 10. Coordinate International Cooperative Logistics Program.

Of particular importance in wartime is the control of nuclear weapons in the European Command. USCINCEUR is assigned the important task of control of nuclear weapons in accordance with NATO and unilateral U.S. procedures.

WARTIME MISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMAND

Senator THURMOND. All right. I would appreciate it. Is it not a fact that each individual service headquarters performs the peacetime responsibilities of personnel, training and logistics for its own. personnel?

Mr. KELLEY. It does in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator THURMOND. Is it a fact that the European Command does not have a wartime mission of directing U.S. forces in combat?

Mr. KELLEY. I would like to comment further for the record because I think that, too, falls within the range of Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer's comments.