operate our messes ashore; 500 additional will be substituted by July 1, this year, releasing nonrated personnel for sea assignment, releasing our nonrated personnel for sea duty who would otherwise be involved in those duties ashore.

Admiral FINNERAN. Chart 2 depicts selected examples of our skill requirements growth. I chose to compare a post-Korean war 1955 destroyer, a submarine, and an aviation squadron with their new weapons systems successors. Marked increases in the numbers of skills and numbers of men necessary to maintain and operate these weapons systems are indicated. Complex weapons systems demand complex manpower systems and more capable, highly trained individuals. New ship system designs are being critically reviewed to contain this trend. Design technology includes reduced housekeeping, improved maintainability and reliable automation. We are optimistic for the long term, but our current ship systems will be with us for many years to come and the demands for a trained skill base will continue to drive our manpower costs.

Senator DOMINICK. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt at that point and ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to deny you that privilege.

Senator DOMINICK. It will be very short.

In looking at this chart No. 2 and the A-6, are we talking about the number of squadrons, the number of aircraft, or what on the line just above 40?

Admiral FINNERAN. The length of the bar, sir, shows 41 skilled specialties and the number of specialties required to make up a squad

ron.

Senator DOMINICK. So, this is 320 people per squadron ?

Admiral FINNERAN. That is a squadron of 12 aircraft, yes, sir, 40 officers, 280 enlisted.

Senator DOMINICK. One more question. You need 41 skilled specialities in that squadron. What happens if one of the specialists gets killed in a war or falls overboard or whatever else? Do you have any backup?

Admiral FINNERAN. In most of those skills, sir, they are manned by two or more technicians. So, one would not be that critical instantaneously unless they were in a very critical point with respect to their maintenance capability. And, of course, we would be dependent upon replacements to provide relief for the squadron. Senator DOMINICK. Thank you.

22

CATEGORIZED BREAKDOWN:
FISCAL YEAR

a.

122

72

73

22

73

FORCE MISSION (PROGRAMS I,II, 28.1 23.0 30 30 30

b. OTHER MISSION (PROGRAMS III,VI, 4.2

IV, V)

Admiral FINNERAN. Turning to chart 3, I present the Navy's combat versus support manpower picture in Europe. The forces indicated in the solid line at the top are the 6th Fleet afloat plus Navy personnel ashore in Europe in support of the mission. The second line is the average 6th Fleet direct mission manpower. These are the ships and the aircraft.

The center broken line presents the support to combat ratio for that theatre, 14 men in support per 100 combat. As indicated on the chart, this ratio has stabilized in the past 2 years.

Admiral FINNERAN. Turning to chart 4, it presents two comparisons of officer to enlisted ratios by defense program definition. Note that under either methodology the force mission manpower at the bottom two lines has a relatively low officer/enlisted ratio. Our high ratios indicated at the top of the chart are the product of a rich mix essentially in defense programs six through 10. This results predominantly from the demand for proportionately heavier officer representation in our shore establishment in order for it to perform its mission.

Please note that reductions in this ratio are programed. We have accomplished this by deliberate reviews to downgrade rank requirements and increase responsibilities for enlisted personnel-400 officer spaces were converted to enlisted this year to date.

This chart does not include Marine Corps forces for which the Navy provides support, particularly in facilities engineering, all health skills and aviation training.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, I do not see any chart numbers. Admiral FINNERAN. At the bottom of the chart, sir, the small 5, synonymous with page.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral FINNERAN. Chart 5 presents the Navy's operational headquarters reduction programs. The top graph presents a strength profile. The center graph presents actual numbers of personnel assigned to all our fleet staffs. As you can see, this is a 12.4 percent reduction since 1968. The bottom graph is numbers of staff headquarters. Since 1968 we have created eight, decommissioned 67 and consolidated eight naval operational headquarters. This represents 20 percent reduction in command headquarters in the fleet.

Admiral FINNERAN. Chart No. 6 summarizes in similar fashion Navy Management Headquarters reduction programs. Again, since 1968 we have reduced by 10.5 percent military manpower (center graph). You will also notice a slight increase in 1973 in that program, primarily caused by the increases allocated to the Navy recruiting command.

The numbers of management headquarters are shown on the lower graph.

Turning now to chart 7, Mr. Chairman, I would like to present our permanent change of station program. This chart we call the stabilizing portion of our PCS program. The bars reflect the numbers of moves programed. For fiscal 1971 and earlier, they are actual moves; for fiscal 1972 and 1973, they are projected. At the top of each of the bars are shown the programed funds to support each category. The stabilizing moves are those to support our training requirements on the left hand side, our sea/shore rotation policy and readiness requirements to replace losses from the career force and balance our operational resources in ships and squadrons.

Shown in the two groups called operational and retentional on the right-hand side. As you can see, sir, our training moves are down and under control. Our operational and rotational moves programs have stabilized.

Turning to chart No. 8. These are our destabilizing moves. Please notice the influence on our overall program caused by large variations in our accessions and separations shown on the left-hand side. These moves must be met to maintain the strength programed. Unit moves (right-hand graph) requirements reflect decommissioning, activation and forces relocation.