General DEPUY. Back in the Korean War and again at the Berlin crisis we mobilized some Reserves but, as you know, we did not do so in Vietnam, and so as a consequence the Army grew from 1965 until the peak of the war in 1968 and 1969 from less than a million to over a million and a half with only a token mobilization. This meant, of course, that we promoted many soldiers to sergeant and many junior sergeants to senior sergeants, many junior officers to middle grade officers, and so on. As we started back down we plotted a path which would permit us to rid ourselves of some of the lower quality but at the same time, would not force us to take actions which were not cost effective and which would not be equitable to our people. We managed to do that reasonably well until this year, and I will come back and indicate some of the problems that have occurred this year. Fundamentally, we came down in this year as far as we would like to have come down in 2 years, and this is the source of many of our current problems. We have had many discussions of personnel costs as a percentage of the budget. Here is our view of it including subsistence and it has peaked and started down a little bit. It is 60.2 percent of our budget. Now, of course, this is a little bit of a phony, Mr. Chairman, because you see it has a lot to do with how big your budget is insofar as the total budget varies. For example, if we had a fixed amount of money that we put on our investment accounts, this figure would never change no matter what happened to the pay, so to that extent it is not meaningful. We have had a number of questions today which asked "What would happen if we took a division out of Europe?" Those are the kinds of questions which frankly, Mr. Chairman, we would prefer not to address. I say that because we in the Army are given guidance by the Secretary of Defense after he has checked with the NSC, the President, the JCS, and we have been told to provide certain division forces for certain purposes. We in the Army have been told to meet a requirement in Europe of [deleted]. We are also told if a war started in Asia that we should be prepared to send [deleted]. We have a 13-division force. So if, for example, we sent [deleted] to Asia and if we sent to Europe just those divisions for which we have prepositioned equipment, and that would be [deleted]. We are [deleted]. [Deleted] which we have designated, to which we have issued first line equipment and to which we are giving great attention on readiness. This is faster than we have done it at any time in the history of the country but nonetheless, it is our objective. It is that kind of stategy that led us to 13 divisions and that is the staring point for our structure. You asked a moment ago of Secretary Kelley the extent to which we rely upon the Reserves. This is a picture of the extent to which we rely on the Reserves for Europe in the first [deleted] days of a war. It shows over here what we would have to start with, and that would be after the deployment of the first division from Fort Riley. The red indicates Reserve component organized units. The numbers represent total Reserve component people. This little support increment, Mr. Chairman, [deleted] people, and vet [deleted] Reserves would be sent to Europe. The rest are individual replacements. They are the individual ready Reserves sent to fill up active units and to provide for combat casualty replacements. At the end of [deleted] days [deleted] would be individual replacements. When the active Army had 16 divisions there was less red on this chart. When we went to 14 divisions more red began to appear. When we went to 13 divisions more red appears. We think that if we have to meet that deployment schedule we cannot take the Active Army down much farther, so you can see over time that the integration of the active and Reserves has taken place each year relying more and more on the Reserves. This means those Reserve components have to be very ready because they not only have to be called to duty, they have to be trained up to readiness and shipped. This is a very optimistic picture, Mr. Chairman. The strategic guidance the Army gets from the Secretary of Defense tell how many divisions and what size special mission forces we must provide. I will speak to that. This Army does not control either one. We think it is entirely proper to appear before you, though. We are pleased to do that, to explain to you the support we put with the divisions and all the general support. We think it is our responsibility to be able to explain that and we hope that we can do it persuasively today. General DEPUY. Historically in a theater of war we have found that for every man in a division there have been two additional. We have more or less formalized that into calling it an initial support increment and a sustaining support increment, which I will discuss later in more detail. However, we cannot afford that in the active Army in peacetime nor do we have it, and we call that whole package a division force equivalent. But in peacetime in the active Army our divisions are [deleted]. We have only [deleted] in support. And so if you add those you get [deleted]. We have 13 divisions and if you multiply 13 divisions times [deleted] people which we have in division forces in the fiscal year 1973 manpower program which we have submitted to you. In case of war we would, of course, mobilize and bring in the extra support. Let me speak for a moment as to what that support is. If you could visualize for a moment a division as part of a corps with three divisions, the initial support increment and sustaining support increment together would be all of the forces in the theater outside the division. The initial support increment is all you would ever send, for example, if you only sent two or three divisions for a limited period of time. The sustaining support increment is what you would send if you had a fully mature theater, as we had, for example, in World War II where you had a number of armies and corps. Let us talk for a minute about what is in the support increment. Around the division are two kinds of forces, combat forces and combat support forces. We would have in support of each one of these divisions probably under the command of the corps commander, some extra helicopter companies, some aviation, perhaps some surveillance, perhaps gunships. We would have corps artillery with 155 millimeter and 8-inch howitzers. We would have surface-to-surface missiles, a Chaparral/ Vulcan air defense battalion. We would have engineers building roads and we would have in addition to that those kinds of units which you can compute on a workload basis: maintenance, supply, transportation, and medical units. All these can be computed on the basis of workload. The combat units are a matter of judgment, frankly. In the so-called support increments, 30 to 40 percent of an initial support increment are in fact combat troops. They are aviation, artillery, air defense, maybe more infantry and armor, and even in the sustaining support there are combat troops. For example, there is a full infantry brigade in this increment. In the workload related units that we have in our force we have ways of computing requirements for them. I will just show you about three, hoping to give you confidence in the way we go about it. AMMUNITION User-One 155-mm howitzer battalion (towed). 1 .0450 Requirement (75.52 short tons/day) -.0450 One ordnance company for every 22 General DEPUY. For example, a 155-millimeter howitzer battalion fighting in Europe for 90 days at intense rates will fire 7511⁄2 tons of ammunition a day. One ordnance ammunition company can handle 1,680 tons. So for every 22 of these battalions we need one company in the force structure. AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE User-one armor division. Requirement (341,640 general support maintenance man hours/year) =1.1 One armor division requires 1.1 maintenance companies to perform general support maintenance. General DEPUY. On automotive maintenance, one entire armored division generates this number of maintenance man hours. This kind of heavy equipment maintenance company can produce that number, so we have 1.1 in the force structure for every armored division. SUPPORTERS REQUIRE SUPPORT MAINTENANCE User-One heavy equipment maintenance company (general support). Supporter-One light equipment maintenance company (direct support). 1 .039 Requirement (5,037 maintenance manhours direct support/year) =.039 =One light equipment company for every 26 heavy equipment companies or equivalent General DEPUY. We could go on. For example, for every seven infantry battalions we need a thousand hospital beds. Also, of course, this must be iterated once or twice more because the heavy equipment company in turn needs some support and it takes 3 percent of the attention of a light equipment maintenance company. But for all workload related service support units we can show very clearly exactly how many are required. What we are seeing, of course, as we move from the infantry with rifles and bayonets the more difficult it is to maintain, but with more powerful weapons, we find more people behind them. An infantry battalion of 840 men, even in a very large theater, only has 271 people behind it. But an artillery battalion, with a self-propelled howitzer has 479 maintenance people, ammunition hauling, and the maintenance of the trucks that haul the ammunition, and so on. If you get to a Cobra gunship company, 213 men require 308 support. So this is a trend which is clear. I will come back to the relationship of teeth to tail but I would like to go through the rest of our structures. |