The CHAIRMAN. I tell you, I do not get much out of a slide, although we could have that. But what we want is something that some competent staff members could study and analyze with the help of the Air Force.

Secretary SEAMANS. We could make the material available in that form.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That will be quite helpful to us. (The information follows:)

There has been no report, either prepared by the Air Force or Systems Analysis, showing how approximately 100,000 men could be taken out of the Air Force "support" structure without endangering combat capability. "Support," regardless of how defined, is an essential component of the total fighting force. Adjustments to "support" manpower of the magnitude indicated would impact on combat capability, the degree of immediate impact varying with the type of manpower adjustment. To illustrate, hypothetically, we could conceivably achieve approximately 40% of a 100,000 man cut by eliminating all manpower associated with Research and Development. While this might have only minimal immediate impact on combat capability, it would undoubtedly be the direct cause of a serious deficiency in US readiness vis-a-vis potential enemies some years in the future. At the other extreme, a reduction of direct combat support personnel, such as those who sweep runways, would immediately degrade our ability to launch combat sorties.

There is, however, a report on manpower which will be provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approximately 1 March. That report, titled the Fiscal Year 1973 Manpower Requirements Report, has been prepared by OSD and is being forwarded in compliance with the provisions of Section 701, Public Law 92-129. It is a very detailed report covering manpower requirements of each Service. It portrays manpower requirements by Service through the use of the fiscal guidance categories employed by OSD Systems Analysis.

The use of these categories segregates an unrealistically high proportion of Air Force manpower in the General Support category and also makes comparisons between Services impossible because of definitional differences. For example, Air Force personnel in a direct combat support role-such as, combat crew training and base operations of our strategic, tactical, and airlift bases are defined in the General Support category, while comparable Army and Navy personnel are defined as Mission Forces. The table below shows two ways of looking at manpower requirements. The first set of numbers is based on fiscal guidance categories with the definitional differences and unrealistically high support ratio. The second set of numbers, in parentheses, is based on an alternative and more realistic way of viewing General support. Using this array, base operating support of combat forces, combat crew training, command and control of combat forces, and the manpower required for maintenance and storage of war readiness materials are not included in the General Support category. These direct combat support activities are realistically and properly counted as a part of the Mission Forces category. FISCAL YEAR 1973 MILITARY END STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS

There is a major Department of Defense effort underway to restructure and standardize manpower accounting and the Air Force is actively involved in obtaining a final resolution. But, whatever the "support" definition, our objective is to minimize manpower requirements through elimination of low priority functions and consolidation where feasible of remaining activities.

The broad Air Force initiatives undertaken to streamline headquarters management structure entailed fundamental restructuring of each principal command and management echelon. The key to the entire effort has been a function-byfunction analysis of headquarters activities, to arrive at an accurate identification

of, and accounting for, properly constituted headquarters staff functions as opposed to support functions and operating functions properly a part of field organizations. Standardized definitions of headquarters staff versus support and operating functions were developed, with particular emphasis upon the correct organizational level to which the respective functions should be assigned.

The actions taken at major command level were dedicated to the proposition that such headquarters should be composed solely of staff functions. Operating and support functions are being realigned to base organizations or, in the case of headquarters direct support functions, to the headquarters support squadrons. Intermediate headquarters are being streamlined to an operational configuration, by either eliminating or significantly reducing staff management functions such as Personnel, Comptroller, Civil Engineering, Materiel, Administration, Intelligence, Judge Advocate General, Surgeon, History, Inspector General, and Information. Intermediate headquarters are defined as numbered air forces, air divisions, and similar intermediate command and management echelons between the major command headquarters and the operational units in the field. Staff management functions heretofore accomplished at the intermediate level will be streamlined and centralized for accomplishment at the major command level. As a result, and on the basis of thorough function-by-function analysis, some functional centralization at major command level has taken place, with a commensurate increase in manpower resources at major command level devoted to those functions.

Our initial efforts will reduce direct support and intermediate headquarters manpower authorizations from approximately 28,700 to 20,600 by end-FY 72; a further reduction to 19,800 will take place in FY 73. Of these reductions, approximately 1,800 authorizations represent actual savings, with the balance transferred either to the major command headquarters in the case of staff functions being centralized, or to base units in the case of operating and support functions.

Additional savings may accrue as major commands gain additional experience under the new structure. But it is imperative that in the near term, that the management structure be permitted to "settle down" in its overhauled configuration. The only other alternative is to impose arbitrary percentage reductions, an alternative which the Congress specifically cautioned against during the FY 71 and FY 72 Appropriations Act Proceedings.

A review of departmental headquarters (that is, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Staff) and field extensions, was dedicated to essentially the same fundamental objectives as outlined above. Departmental staff functions heretofore carried in the field extensions have been realigned to departmental headquarters together with 739 associated manpower authorizations. Offsetting manpower reductions and savings have concurrently been effected within departmental headquarters, and approximately 50 manpower authorizations associated with operating and support functions have also been realigned to the field. As a result, there has been a small net increase in the size of departmental headquarters. As in the case of lower headquarters echelons, in the future, there will be a complete and accurate identification and accounting for properly constituted departmental headquarters staff functions.

The field extension organizational concept heretofore employed within the Air Force is being entirely eliminated. All field extension functions and manpower authorizations remaining after realigning pure staff functions to departmental headquarters as outlined above, are being realigned to field commands. A total of more than 14,000 manpower authorizations associated with a broad array of operating and support functions, the vast bulk of which are geographically dispersed throughout the United States and overseas, are involved. Four new Separate Operating Agencies have been established consisting of some 6,500 manpower spaces. They include: Air Force Audit Agency, Norton AFB, California; Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, Norton AFB, California: Air Force Office of Special Investigations, dispersed throughout the world with a small operating staff at Washington, D.C.; and Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas.

The balance of the manpower authorizations and functions heretofore carried in the field extensions are being transferred to major commands and separate operating agencies.

All of these field extension realignments are being effected concurrent with manpower reductions or savings identified in the course of our extensive headquarters costing studies.

These and related headquarters cost and realignment actions will dispel past difficulties in effectively managing the Air Force headquarters structure, will result in worthwhile manpower savings, and will lay the foundation for more cost-effective headquarters organization and sizing.

The CHAIRMAN. The other day this support percentage was brought up and the answer was, well, the American people want our men at the front to have plenty of support. Well, of course, they do. This committee wants them to have it. It is up to this committee to help see that they do have it. But that is not the real point at issue. The point at issue is what is necessary to have proper support and how we are going to provide the money for it.

All right. Is there anything else you want to say, Mr. Secretary? Secretary SEAMANS. No; I have nothing further to add.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General RYAN. Nothing further, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Crow, do you have something more you want to say?

General CROW. No, sir.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR STENNIS

The CHAIRMAN. A number of questions will be placed in the record. (Questions submitted by Senator Stennis. Answers supplied by Department of the Air Force.)

Question. For the record, would you tell the Committee what percentage of our nuclear deterrent is the responsibility of the Air Force?

Answer. The Air Force contribution to the overall nuclear deterrent effort in terms of numbers of weapons in about [deleted]. Expressed in terms of metatonnage yield this becomes [deleted]. The Air Force contributes about [deleted] of the numbers of alert weapons which converts to [deleted] when expressed in terms of megatonnage yield.

Question. The first three aircraft you requested in the fiscal year 1972 supplemental will use the existing command and control suit and new electronics will later replace that old equipment.

What is the total cost to modify and install the existing electronics in the first three aircraft, and how much will it cost to later remove the old electronics?

Answer. The total cost to modify and transfer equipment from three EC-135 aircraft to three 747 aircraft will be approximately $12M. The cost for the later removal of the old EC-135 electronics has not been identified separately at this time. However, approximately $7.5M per aircraft will be required for the work necessary to equip the 7478 with new electronics. This cost includes removal of the old electronics as well as modification of the aircraft to accept the new equipment and installation of this equipment.

Question. You are requesting $35 million for the Component Improvement Program.

(a) What is this money for?

(b) Why isn't this type of effort funded in R&D?

(c) Will these funds pay for work done during fiscal year 1973?

Answer. The Component Improvement Program has been employed in the aircraft engine area for many years and has proved to be a highly successful, efficient technique for engine improvements. The program permits the correction of service-revealed problems that occur after the engine has performed to operational requirement specifications and qualified for production. It includes engine improvements to maintainability and producibility. While engines are qualified to certain specifications and are tested in simulated aircraft flight conditions, we have always found that actual flight tests revealed additional problem areas. The early phases of aircraft engine operations are where the real payoff through component improvement is realized. This early detection of prob

lems and incorporation of corrections into the engine production line saves many dollars by avoiding a costly retrofit program. Our FY 73 Component Improvement Program will provide funds in the amount of $3.7 million to improve the TF-41 turbofan engine of the A-7 aircraft; $.9 million for the J-79 turbojet engine of the F- and RF-4 aircraft; $4.2 million for the J-85 turbojet engine of the T-38 and F-5 aircraft; $7.7 million for the TF-30 turbofan engine of the F- and FB-111; and $18.5 million for the F-100 turbofan engine of the F-15 aircraft. All design, development, fabrication, test, and evaluation conducted to qualify a new engine or to redesign an existing engine for increased performance is financed by R&D appropriations. This funding is used until the engine has passed its Military Qualification Test (MQT) and is approved for production. Engineering services and related effort required for the engine during the production phase and within the current performance envelope of the engine are funded from the aircraft procurement appropriation.

The contracts within the program are written on a calendar year basis similar to the procurement of production engines. Accordingly, most of our Component Improvement Program contracts will pay for work done during the 12-month period of calendar year 1973.

Question. General, on page 8 of your statement you express your concern for our reduced air defense capability and mention the elimination during fiscal year 1973 of a number of elements. This includes the transfer of active F-106 squadrons to the Air National Guard; the elimination of BOMARC squadrons; the phase out of several backup interceptor centers (BUIC); a reduced alert commitment; and a reduction in flying hours. Last year during the hearing before the Bomber Defense Subcommittee we were told that previous reductions, coupled with obsolescence, has seriously reduced the capability of our air defense system to the extent that its ability to perform its mission is questionable. With continued obsolescence, and further reductions in FY 1973, obviously the capability of our air defense system will be reduced even further. Is it now getting to the stage where it is so negligible that it is not cost effective to maintain the existing system?

Answer. I am concerned with the present state of our air defenses, but I would say that their contribution to deterrence is both substantial and cost effective. Even with the limitations that you mention we have a coherent and effective force that would preclude an enemy's assurance of success with respect to his desired objectives. If we did not have any defense radars or interceptors, we would have lost the capability to detect attackers until they were overhead, and once under attack, would have no way to effectively respond with defense weapons. Our present defense forces will continue to contribute to deterrence while we are building toward a modernized air defense force.

Question. The reasons for the reduction in our air defense capability need to be clarified for the purpose of the record. As I recall it, initially a portion of the reduction was made voluntarily by the Air Force to provide resources for modernization, and then later a more substantial amount of the reduction was directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, either because of obsolescence or for reasons of economy. The point I am trying to make here is that these reductions were not dictated or compelled by this committee. Is this an accurate statement?

Answer. Sir, the earliest (1962) reductions in air defense were based on an increase in the ICBM threat and the declining Bomber threat. The Air Force did not concur in this Bomber projection. Later rationale for reductions in air defense stemmed from an OSD concept paper (1968) which called for a reduced but modernized force. Latest reductions as well as slips in modernization were for reasons of economy. With reference to your specific point, it is an accurate statement.

Question. As a matter of fact, a chart furnished us last year shows clearly that the prototype aircraft for which procurement funds are now being requested were a part of the design, development, test and engineering program and were to be used for category I and category II tests. In view of all these facts what is the justification for putting the aircraft in procurement funding this year? Answer. These prototypes, unlike other prototypes, will enter the operational inventory after being temporarily used for testing. Most of the 30,000 flying

hours, for which these aircraft are designed, will be used operationally. Therefore, procurement funds were deemed appropriate.

Question. The justification sheet for the FY 1973 AWACS program shows:

(a) That it will be after November, 1972, at the earliest that the AWACS program will be allowed "to proceed into the next phase, Design, Development, Test and Engineering (DDT&E);

(b) that flight testing will not begin until March 1974; and

(c) that, as I have mentioned, the decision for full production is not scheduled before December, 1974.

In view of this, doesn't approval of production funds for these prototype aircraft violate the "fly before you buy" concept and introduce an unacceptable measure of concurrency into this program?

Answer. If the request to use procurement funds for the prototype aircraft was tied to a decision for full production, it would probably be a violation of the "fly before you buy" concept. In the case of AWACS, a full production decision is not planned until December 1974. The request for procurement funds simply reflects a judgment that this funding is appropriate since these aircraft will temporarily be used for test prior to entering the operational inventory.

Question. In any event, how can you justify seven test aircraft (two brassboard models plus five proposed test prototypes) for the AWACS program when, for example, the B-1 program only includes three test articles?

Answer. Only the two brassboard aircraft are comparable to the first three B-1 test articles. By the time Development, Test and Evaluation (DT&E) is completed, we will have involved seven B-1 test aircraft and six AWACS test aircraft. A recent decision to reconfigure the losing brassboard aircraft and use it as the first AWACS DT&E aircraft accounts for the reduction from seven to six. I will provide a chart which shows a comparison of test aircraft sequencing in the two programs.