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such attacks even being attempted, a policy designed to forestall any nation even acquiring the power to initiate such an attack. The first concrete statement of the principle that seems to have been made, at least that has been called to the writer's attention, is in the works of Admiral Mahan. He said: "It cannot be to her (the United States) a matter of indifference should events weaken a nation upon whose general accord she can count, and strengthen one less likely to act with her. It cannot be indifferent to the United States when the relative power of the European countries interested varies. On the contrary every such fluctuation in Europe will concern her. * * * In looking to the future it becomes for them (the United States) a question whether it will be to their interest, whether they can afford to exchange the naval supremacy of Great Britain for that of Germany. A German navy, supreme by the fall of Great Britain, with a supreme German army able to spare readily a large expeditionary force for overseas operations, is one of the possibilities of the future."

That we fought against Germany in 1917 a preventive war in order to forestall her, a land power, from becoming the sea power she seemed bent on being, with this principle in view, is now everywhere conceded.1

Mahan wrote the above in 1910, before the rise of Japanese power in the Pacific. That rise to power now fills us with apprehensions, conscious or subconscious, that she will add to her necessary sea power land power that, extending the principle stated by Mahan, represents a potential threat to us. But let Japan be assured were Russia to construct a preponderant sea power in the Pacific the same feelings of apprehension would undoubtedly arise, too. So let us reword the principle. It is that:

We cannot afford any one nation, trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific, becoming so supremely powerful, in its own region, on both land and sea, that it is subject to no effective restraint even if we were to throw our own power into the scales against it, so powerful that it could single handed launch an attack against our most vital national interests.

This policy is expressed, less clearly perhaps, more in the jargon of diplomacy no doubt, in the statement of the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee that "an adequate naval defense means also a defense that

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will keep any potential enemy away from our shores." [Italics ours.] This policy is particularly necessary if there be a scintilla of evidence that such aggregations of power are massing in concert with one another, on each side of us, Atlantic and Pacific; lest we be nut crackered at Panama, our solar plexus.

Publicists and statesmen all over the world know that if such be not our avowed policy, it ought to be. Those whom it favors cannot understand why the American public is not conscious of it. Our potential enemies hope and pray that it will never be explained to the public and that, if it should be, that the public will refuse to follow.

It is something like the old adage that the last one to know of a woman's indiscretions is her own husband. So we ourselves are the only ones not to be aware of our position. Let us tear away the camouflage that fools no one but ourselves.

It is not unlikely that potential enemies are behind the effort to mislead the public by campaigns of obfuscation, of red herrings, of befuddling the people with the distraction of doctrinaire conflict; in short with propaganda of every sort directed by organizations with high sounding, misleading names and slogans.

Moreover evidence is not lacking that even some, likely to benefit from our application of the principle, are short sighted enough to resent our awareness of these things, for fear it will deprive them of their traditional role in world affairs to some degree.

Here it seems not inappropriate to observe that one must be on guard against any attempt, however made, directly or indirectly. For instance, Britain made a direct attack on Spanish sea power and wiped her off the seas.

1 What is not everywhere conceded is that our action in 1917 was justified. For instance, General Hagood, like many other generals who have written concerning the war, admits that we entered the fight because "We were afraid Germany would defeat the Allies * * * and then, after that, would overrun America." However, some, such as Hagood, think that our apprehension was unwarranted.

It is pretended that after fighting a long and exhausting war Germany would not have been able to fight soon again. Yet only 20 years after losing the war she is ready again. What could she have done after winning it? History is replete with proof that, with the spoils of victory, it does not take long to gird up the national loins for the next victim.

Germany in the last war made direct attack by submarine and indirect attack on land. Louis XIV and Napoleon each made the attack indirect, "to conquer the sea by the land." For, all the time Napoleon was in Russia, Italy, or Spain he was really fighting the English.

The mere fact that a nation has no apparent sea power cannot obscure the possibilities of her acquiring it by other means such as land power. While so far sea power has always repulsed sea power, except when Rome was overthrown, today land power is supplemented by a new factor that seriously conditions the use of sea power when the airplane and submarine has bases near to the bases, routes, and termini of the sea power.

No legislation is necessary or advisable to effectuate these principles. Legal straight jackets in foreign affairs are out of place, as they are more often a source of embarrassment than help. Let us only understand what we have to do, and do it when, as, and if it is convenient, as with the Monroe Doctrine. POINT III

ENGLAND'S PROBLEM STUDIED

Britain with analogous defense problems solved them with:

(a) Seapower through the medium of a strong navy employing "fleet in being" strategy.

(b) Preventive action by diplomacy and if that failed by war.

(c) Collaboration with nations having, at any given time, interests parallel with her own.

In looking about for a guide in matters of national strategy, it is always well when one can look at the experiences of others, and see what has been done by nations in positions similar to our own; for war is a business of position. Napoleon received more attention with that maxim than he did for another which expresses the thought much better. The other statement is, "La politique des etats est dans leur geographie" which translated literally is "A state's policy is dictated by its geography."

When we seek a national strategy, we seek a national policy; as there is another truism among students of the subject, that "Policy and strategy go hand in hand." For national policies and objectives must be chosen that conform to the possibilities of the national power. Hence we seek example from other states having dictates of geography analogous to those which must influence us. In so doing we must also seek a nation with a long history of successful foreign policy or strategy.

Therefore in choosing, for example, the policy and strategy of Great Britain, it is because its position most nearly resembles our own, and because its policy has been successful in making it and keeping it a great power. The only other insular state we can study, Japan, is too young and its policy not yet tried by the processes of time. We will describe as briefly as possible the features of British geographical position that determine her policy; state her policy; and show what differences there are between what she can do, and what America can do.

ENGLAND'S CENTRAL POSITION

When the effect of the discovery of America was felt in the world, the political axis of Europe shifted from the Mediterranean and the continent itself to the Atlantic Seaboard. That put England in the middle. It meant England's position permitted her to operate on interior lines. She used those lines to become mistress of the seas and with her command of the seas she developed a national strategy we would do well to consider.

Let us quote Liddell Hart on the English strategy prior to the World War: "Our historic practice * * * was based on economic pressure exercised through sea power. This naval body had two arms: one financial, which embraced the subsidizing and military provisioning of allies; the other military, which embraced sea borne expeditions against the enemy's vulnerable extremities. By our practice we safeguarded ourselves where we were weakest and exerted our strength where the enemy was weakest."

The expeditions against the enemy's extremities were always relatively small and made up mostly of volunteers. The typical example is Wellington's

Peninsular Campaign.

The English used their armies as mobile reserves, not for field army purposes until the World War, but to turn the scales on the enemy's extremities. For instance, there is an important school of thought in England, that the proper

strategy in the great war would have been to ask France simply to contain the German forces, a strategy favored by the geological escarpments in Northern Franch, while the English only attacked in full force at the Dardanelles.

The reasoning is that had this been done, Germany would have wasted her manpower in attacks on the French lines while the English were forcing the road to Russia. For it is held in many circles that had communications with Russia been kept open so that she could be supplied with munitions, Russia would have had a decisive effect at an early date and the revolution in 1917 prevented.

THE FAR-FLUNG EMPIRE

Great Britain is an insular power, completely surrounded by water, and those British Isles constitute the vitals of a dispersed, far-flung empire, of which England is the heart. A stab at the heart and the empire dies. A severance of one of the members and the empire needs crutches.

Dispersal while the main problem of imperial defense is also the great advantage in the pursuit of offensive strategy. But Britain, to defend herself, is absolutely dependent on keeping the seas open, since her manpower, her foodstuffs, and her raw materials must come from far overseas. Her dominions must be protected and her investments which, provide with her exports, the foreign exchange with which to pay for what she imports, must be protected. Hence it is that the responsibilities of her defense forces are―

1. Defense of sea communications against attack by another power, or a combination of powers.

2. Defense against external attack; which include measures to prevent invasion of the British Isles as well as incursions of civilized or semi-civilized armed forces, against dominions and possessions.

It is worth while therefore to see what dispositions insular English takes to prevent anything being taken away from her, and how she used her means to keep on adding to her wealth and power. For England has won all her wars in modern history, save perhaps the American War of Independence.

ENGLISH DEFENSE METHODS

Her means are and have been: Concentrated battle fleets "in being" with dispersed cruiser forces to protect and convoy her own merchant ships all over the world's sea routes, while denying to enemy commerce the use of those same seas. 2. An army of almost insignificant size, barely adequate for local defense, but sufficient to: (a) provide expeditionary forces for the defense of naval bases of importance; to assist local garrisons in holding off attacks until reinforcements can arrive; (b) to provide a framework for expeditionary offensive forces; (3) for home defense to protect naval bases and ports in Great Britain against raids or landing forces; and (4) to provide anti-aircraft defense of vital centers.

3. Air forces, placed at points of importance along the lines of imperial communications to cooperate with sea and land forces operating locally; and to provide an air "fleet in being" based on England, for purposes of defense and offense in Europe.

With these means Great Britain acquired and defended a dispersed empire, lines of communications all over the world, that had to be kept open for the 46,000,000 tons of imports every year of the food stuffs and raw materials on which England feeds and supports herself; in peace as well as in war.

For England is deficient in almost every important foodstuff and industrial raw material. She produces only about 20 percent of her necessary wheat and practically none of her oil. It is true that all that she needs she can find within her empire. But to use it, like the life blood of the body, it must flow uninterruptedly to the heart, the heart of empire.

Moreover the sea lanes which feed her, converge into, and the heart itself are only protected from attack by a narrow sheet of water close by on which are neighbors respectedly strong on the sea, fully as powerful in the air, and far more formidable than Britain on the land.

Yet Britain goes on and on. She is always about to crumble, but never does. She muddles through, she says; but this writer does not call "muddling through" what appears to be a policy tried and not found wanting. It is worth studying. Thus with a couple of hundred heavy guns mounted on floating platforms that constitute her battle fleet, an army that the Germans in the last war termed "contemptible," and an only average air force, she is what she is. She protects her shores from invasion, keeps open the seven seas for her trade,

maintains her telegraph and wireless information services, her air routes, wins every war, and with every war adds somewhere to her superb chain of trading posts and naval bases.

ENGLISH FOREIGN POLICY

Her policy has been to use those forces in conjunction with principles as definite as the law of gravity:

(1) Never to allow any single European nation to acquire sea power equal to her own (in fact to maintain a two power navy).

(2) Never to permit any single state on the continent to acquire such land power that if British sea power were to be thrown into the balance against it, that England would not eventually prevail.

(3) Never to permit any great sea or land power to gain control of the shores of the low countries opposite her own from whence may be launched an expeditionary force against the heart of the empire.

(4) An English Monroe Doctrine which says in effect "The integrity of the lands around the Indian Ocean are as essential to the security of the empire as are the integrity of Mexico or Panama to the United States.

(5) To foster the prosperity and unity of the people of the British Isles and the Dominions, even more dependent on foreign trade than the United States. Moreover, she has operated on the basis of preventive action, not waiting until the wolf was at the door, but where a continental power engaged in a policy or a war the success of which might have conceivably resulted in the acquisition of the power or position that England would deny, England immediately joined such powers as were resisting the move, diplomatically, and that failing, with well coordinated offensive strategy.

ENGLISH INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS

As was stated above, England has a policy with respect to foreign commitments we would also do well to study. In fact, it can be said that it is the policy which George Washington enjoined upon his own country in his farewell address. For Washington said:

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""Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. (Italics ours.)

The English have distinguished between the temporary and the permanent and have never hesitated to build their defense policy on cooperation with other nations having interests similar to their own.

Now, after the failure of the post-war attempt at collective security, England has returned to her policy of selective security, of understanding based not on written treaties but on natural communities of interests with nations having effective power and whose interests they are least in conflict with.

If the distinction be borne in mind between permanent alliances and temporary cooperation, Mr. Hull's term “parallel action" seems apt in describing a form of cooperation that does not involve a country in commitments whereby it is bound to fight.

Like Admiral Mahan, let us distinguish between natural relations and those which are purely conventional and artificial, based on cleverly constructed treaties. Parallel action, however, depends on nations having parallel interests being educated to the realization of the fact. For if national policy is to be strong and consistent, it must be based on an informed public opinion. And in order to ascertain whether or not parallel action is advisable or possible, it is necessary that those to whom foreign relations are entrusted be free to consult with representatives of the foreign nation believed to have such common objectives; to get confirmation or denial of such belief; "reserving always the fullest freedom of judgment and the right of independence of action."

POINT IV

Our position fits us even better than Britain to employ her methods, and the exorbitant cost of land warfare in blood and treasure compared with the relative cheapness of a navy policy and collaboration with states having similar interests, makes it desirable that we act accordingly and leave to experts to whom such functions are delegated the technical application of that policy without undue interference.

SOME ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES PARTICULARLY AFFECTING US

The destruction of the German U 151, off the German coast, after a successful raid on American commerce off the American coast, by hitting a mine placed by an American warship, simply proves that the best if not the only defense against submarines can be made in the waters from which they emanate.

tated offensive strategy.

That necessiThere has been some confusion regarding the matter of offensive strategy that needs clarification. While experts have spoken of the decadence of the offensive, they have usually referred to matters of tactics rather than strategy. Strategy is the distribution and transmission of military means to fulfill the end of policy; whereas tactics, being where strategy leaves off, is concerned only with the methods employed in handling forces in battle or in immediate preparation therefor.

It is not denied that on land the lesson of the World War and subsequent operations, between forces equally matched in material, is that the tactical defensive is paramount to attack. It has to be admitted that offensives have had small effect in proportion to their cost in life and material.

The result is that tacticians have developed what they call the "baited" offensive which is a combination of offensive strategy, but with defensive tactics. It consists of so conducting operations as to invite an attack by the enemy, for which a riposte is ready, with victory in the counter attack. It has also been termed the "luring defensive."

However, the new tactics nowise affect the old principles of strategy that a war can only be won by offensive strategy. As for operations at sea, in the air, or operations of combined arms, the theory has not even been suggested that any war can be won other than by offensive strategy.

For war is a course of action to attain a national object, to which compliance is compelled only by the imposition of hardship. That hardship can be imposed by depriving an enemy of his internal and/or external communications.

The services of internal communications, i. e., production and transportation, are only subject to the interference of land and perhaps air forces. The external communications are the field of the Navy, and if a navy is to succeed it must attack.

It is not enough for the Navy to deny the enemy the command of the seas. It must capture that command of the seas for itself. For no war has ever been won by wearing out an enemy with an impregnable defense. Sea power alone can do little against any great land power. It never has. It makes use of the command of the seas which its superiority confers, to send superior military forces in time to the place where they can do the most good.

Only where sea power, such as England's, has been in alliance with effective land power, such as the French today, has it made itself effective in war or against war.

Such collaboration of sea power with land power is necessary if only to provide the military forces of the sea power with a secure bridgehead or tete de pont to the overseas scene of operations.

The Navy thus performs the function of denying to the enemy its ability to supply itself, while it convoys or feeds the military forces, which impose vast expenditures on the blockaded enemy designed to exhaust him, if in fact the army does not first succeed in penetrating the enemy country and get the situation in hand.

That function requires offensive strategy. But even in the realm of naval tactics, in engagements, the honors usually go to the attacker.

COMPARISON WITH BRITAIN THAT REQUIRE AND FAVOR OFFENSIVE STRATEGY FOR US

Now, there are certain aspects of position which differentiate ours from that of Britain. Most of these differences tend to make us less vulnerable to attack and facilitate a strategy of offense on our own part.

While we are not as truly insular as the British Isles, the land powers to the north and south of us are of little military importance, if we can command the seas and prevent any neighbors of ours from being conquered or reinforced, should they ever be unfriendly, by some trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific great power.

True, we have one disadvantage in having our most vital single spot, Panama, external to us; and in having a line of naval defense, as to it, that extends 14,000 miles from Unalaska to the Galapagos, if not to Cape Horn, in the Pacific; and from Greenland to Rio de Janeiro, if not the cape, in the Atlantic.