Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of EconomicsOxford University Press, 2000 - 288 lappuses Mainstream economics was founded on many strong assumptions. Institutions and politics were treated as immaterial, government as exogenous, social norms as epiphenomena. As the horizons of economic inquiry have broadened, these assumptions have become hindrance rather than aid. If we want to understand why some economies succeed and some fail, why some governments are effective and others not, why some communities prosper while others stagnate, it is essential to view economics as embedded in politics and society. This is a study of this embeddedness; it argues for an inclusive approach to institutions and the state. Modern economics recognizes that individuals' pursuitof their own selfish ends can result in socially suboptimal outcomes - the "Prisoners Dilemma" being the stark example. It has been suggested that what we need in such an eventuality is third-party intervention, which can take the form of imposing punishment on players. Kaushik Basu objects to this method of wishing third parties out of thin air. |
Saturs
Part II SOCIETY | 65 |
Part III THE STATE | 107 |
Part IV ETHICS AND JUDGMENT | 197 |
Part V CONCLUSION | 229 |
Various and Sundry | 241 |
References | 263 |
281 | |
285 | |
Citi izdevumi - Skatīt visu
Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political ... Kaushik Basu Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2000 |
Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political ... Kaushik Basu Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 2003 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
actions advice adviser agent Akerlof analysis answer argued argument assume assumption axiom backward induction Basu behavior beliefs Cambridge Chapter choice choose civil norm coercion common knowledge concept conjecture consider consumer theory context contracts Cuban Missile Crisis discussed dynamic inconsistency economists enforce example exogenous feasible set follows formal freedom game theory give given harassment Hawk-Dove game Hence human Hume's Law idea individuals influence instance institutions interesting interpersonal comparisons Journal kind maximize means ment moral move Nash equilibrium node nomics Note optimal outcome Oxford paradox payoff function payoff matrix person play player Political Economy politician possible predictions preference Prisoner's Dilemma problem punish question rationality reason restricted rules simply social norms society speech strategy subgame subgame perfect equilibrium Suppose theorem tion trade Traveler's Dilemma treated triadic true University Press utilitarianism violate welfare welfare economics
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
India's Emerging Economy: Performance and Prospects in the 1990s and Beyond Kaushik Basu Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2004 |
The Elgar Companion to Social Economics John Bryan Davis,Wilfred Dolfsma Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2010 |