Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics
Kaushik Basu, ABHIJIT AUTOR BASU, Professor of Economics and C Marks Professor Department of Economics and Director Program on Comparative Economic Development Kaushik Basu
Oxford University Press, 2000 - 288 lappuses
This book is a critique of economics as social science, unusual because it uses many of the same techniques that contemporary economics and positive political economy use. It relies on game theory, and more importantly, on game-theoretic reasoning; but the technical demands are small. The book cautions that perhaps we are trying to move too fast; that we are, mistakenly, dismissive of ideas that cannot be fully formalized, and too glib with our elegant toolsof analysis. It must be recognized that markets and the economy are embedded in society, politics, and the law; and an immense amount of research has to go into understanding the nature of this embedding before we can come out with reliable answers. Prelude to Political Economy suggests a new approach to lawand economics and to the state, and addresses important questions such as whether the state should guarantee freedom of speech and whether the free market can lead to coercion.
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actions advice adviser agent Akerlof analysis answer argued argument assume assumption axiom backward induction Basu behavior beliefs Chapter choice choose civil norm coercion concept conjecture consider consumer theory context contracts Cuban Missile Crisis described discussed domain dynamic inconsistency E-mail Game economics economists enforce example exogenous expect extensive-form fact feasible set fees follows formal game theory game tree give given harassment Hawk-Dove game Hence human Hume's Law idea individuals influence instance interesting interpersonal comparisons kind large number matter maximize means ment moral move Nash equilibrium node Note optimal outcome paradox payoff function payoff matrix person play player political politician possible predictions preference Prisoner's Dilemma problem punish question rationality reason restricted rules simply social norms society strategy subgame Suppose theorem tion trade Traveler's Dilemma treated triadic true utilitarianism violate welfare welfare economics
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