LIBEL AND SLANDER-continued.
3. The rule of qualified privilege attaches to the reasonable criticism of one
member of a local union by another at a meeting of the members,
with respect to acts claimed to be in violation of the rules of the
union, a matter in which all members are interested, it being pre-
sumed, in the absence of a contrary showing, that the criticism was
made without malice and for the good of the order. Id.
See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; MECHANICS' LIENS.
No equitable lien upon lands, for the payment of notes executed by the
owner for loans made to him, will be decreed upon the ground that
the borrower promised to execute a trust deed to secure payment of
the notes, where the original loan was upon the borrower's unsecured
notes, and the lender, after subsequently requesting the execution of
the trust deed and receiving the reply that its execution must be
delayed, accepted notes of a third person as collateral, and still later
made an additional loan accepting like collateral, and where the bor-
rower, though indulging the lender's expressed hope to obtain the
further security of a trust deed, made no certain promise to execute
one. Berl v. Dulany, 121.
LIFE ESTATES. See LIFE TENANTS.
LIFE INSURANCE. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1; INSURANCE.
The enhancement in value of the stock and fixtures of a store busi-
ness, during a life tenancy therein created by will, inures to the
estate of the life tenant, although the identity of the original
goods has been lost through bona fide dealing of the life tenant;
and where the property is sold at a judicial sale after the termina-
tion of the life tenancy, for more than the then appraised value, the
araount which the life tenant's executor may claim is not merely the
difference between the respective values appraised at the beginning
and at the close of the life tenancy, but the difference between the
first appraisal and the sale price, less deductions for the expenses
of the sale. Ruppert v. McArdle, 392.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See WILLS, 4.
1. The day upon which a note fell due is to be excluded in computing the
time allowed by sec. 1265 D. C. Code [31 Stat. at L. 1389, chap.
854], providing that no action shall be brought upon such an obliga-
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-continued.
tion after three years from the time when the right to maintain any
such action shall have accrued. Ambrose v. Brown, 25.
2. Where in 1879 the then appellate court of this District laid down a
rule for the computation of time in determining whether an action
on a promissory note was barred by the statute of limitations, and
that rule remained unquestioned until attacked in this court in
1914, this court held that it would be unjust to overrule it, even if
the court were disposed to question its soundness. Id.
3. An action against the commissioners of the District of Columbia to
compel the execution and delivery of a tax deed to the holder of a
tax sale certificate is not one for the recovery of land so as to render
applicable the fifteen-year period of limitation prescribed by sec.
1265, D. C. Code (31 Stat. at L. 1389, chap. 854), but falls within
the further provision of that section requiring that no action, the
limitation of which is not otherwise specially prescribed in the sec-
tion, shall be brought after three years subsequent to its accrual.
Luchs v. Christman, 326.
4. The holder of a tax sale certificate who neglects to demand a tax deed
for nine years after his right thereto accrues, and fails to pay
any subsequently accruing taxes, is guilty of laches precluding his
right to the deed, as against one succeeding to the tax debtor's title
eight years after the certificate holder became entitled to the deed,
even though he is chargeable with notice of the tax sale, as he had
the right to presume that the certificate holder had abandoned his
right or claim. Id.
LIVERY STABLES. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 20.
1. The act of Congress regulating the business of loaning money in small
sums on securities at more than 6 per cent interest is remedial,
and should be liberally construed with a view to giving force and
effect to the intent of Congress. (Following Reagan v. District of
Columbia, 41 App. D. C. 409.) Chew v. District of Columbia, 410.
2. Instruments in the form of receipts given by the borrower to a lender,
the total amount of which receipts equal the amount of the loan,
and the separate amounts of which are identical with the amount
of the instalments agreed to be repaid, are "security" within the
meaning of the act of Congress regulating the business of loaning
money in small sums at more than 6 per cent interest on security of
any kind, direct or collateral, tangible or intangible, especially where
the borrower regarded them as notes delivered to the lender for
the purpose of securing the debt. Id.
1. Before an action for malicious prosecution based upon a criminal pro-
ceeding can be sustained, it must appear that such proceeding has
been terminated. Simmons v. Sullivan, 523.
2. No final termination of a criminal proceeding instituted by information,
which will sustain an action of malicious prosecution, is effected by
quashing the information on accused's motion, with notice to him
that a new information will be filed, where a new information filed
on the same day and charging the same act is still pending, although
no warrant was issued on the second information. Id.
3. The fact that a substitute information charges certain acts to have
been done in violation of building regulations, whereas the original,
which was quashed, charged that they were in violation of police
regulations, does not, where it is otherwise a continuation of the
original proceedings, entitle the accused to maintain an action for
malicious prosecution upon the theory that the proceeding under
the original was terminated. Id.
MALPRACTICE. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 17, 18; EVIDENCE, 10, 13-16, 19,
20; PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.
MANDAMUS. See EMINENT DOMAIN, 8.
1. Mandamus cannot be made the substitute for a writ of error. United
States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, 514.
2. The writ of mandamus cannot be substituted for an appeal or writ of
United States ex rel. Trussed Concrete Steel Co. v. Ewing,
3. Mandamus cannot be made to perform the function of an appeal or writ
of error, and it will not ordinarily be granted if there is another
legal remedy, nor unless the duty sought to be enforced is clear and
indisputable. (Citing Moore v. United States, 40 App. D. C. 591.)
United States ex rel. Dunkley Co. v. Ewing, 176.
4. Mandamus will not issue to compel the performance of a legal impossi-
bility, such as the condemnation of land by a street railway company
whose right of condemnation has terminated by express limitation.
United States ex rel. Newman v. City & Suburban R. Co. 417.
5. Mandamus is not the proper remedy to control the judgment and
discretion of an executive tribunal in the decision of a matter,
which is by law imposed upon it. United States ex rel. Louisville
Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 514.
6. A decision by the Interstate Commerce Commission that a shipper's
claim for a refund of overcharges by a carrier is barred by limita-
tion cannot be reviewed by mandamus. Id.
7. Mandamus is not the proper remedy to compel a justice of the supreme
court of the District of Columbia to enter a final decree in a cause
remanded thereto by this court, the appropriate remedy being by
appeal. Prall v. Stafford, 383.
8. Mandamus is the proper and most adequate remedy in favor of a person
illegally removed from public office without notice and hearing,
since, the order of removal being void, the attempted appointment of
a successor is a nullity. Kalbius v. Siddons, 310.
9. None but a de jure officer can in mandamus question irregularities in
proceedings by which he was removed from office. Id.
10. Mandamus will not issue to control the manner in which the Commis-
sioner of Patents shall exercise his jurisdiction in proceedings be-
fore him, where an appeal to correct any errors therein committed
will lie to this court. (Citing Billings v. Field, 36 App. D. C. 16.)
United States ex rel. Dunkley Co. v. Ewing, 176.
11. The Commissioner of Patents cannot, after denying the right of an as-
signee of a patent and future improvements to intervene in an in-
terference proceeding between the assignor's subsequent application
involving improvements, and an application by a third person, be
compelled by mandamus to permit the intervention, even if his de-
cision was wrong. United States ex rel. Trussed Concrete Steel Co.
v. Ewing, 179.
12. Mandamus will not issue in favor of the assignee of a patent to com-
pel the Commissioner of Patents to declare an interference between
the patent and an application by a third person, since the determina-
tion of the existence of an interference is confided to the judgment
and discretion of the Commissioner by sec. 4904, U. S. Rev. Stat.
U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3389, providing that whenever an appli-
cation is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the Commission-
er, would interfere with a pending application or unexpired patent,
he shall give specified notice and direct the Primary Examiner to
determine the question of priority; and that the Commissioner may
issue a patent to the prior party unless the adverse party appeals;
and especially since the relator after patent to the third person has
a remedy for infringement, a special remedy under sec. 4918, U. S.
Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3394, and possibly a right to
reopen the case and prosecute an appeal from the Commissioner's
refusal to declare the interference.
13. The issuance of mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Patents to
permit the assignee of a patent and future improvements to inter-
vene in an interference proceeding between a subsequent application
by the assignor for improvements and an application by a third per-
son, and to declare an interference between the assigned patent and
the latter application, is not required by the fact that a United
States district court has adjudged title to the assignor's invention
to be in the assignee, upon the theory that it is the Commissioner's
duty to give effect to that decision, since the Commissioner acts in
such matters in a quasi judicial capacity. Id.
14. A decision by the Commissioner of Patents that a highway is not an
article of manufacture for which a label may be registered under
sec. 3 of the act of Congress of June 18, 1874 (18 Stat. at L. 79,
chap. 301), cannot, even though erroneous, be reviewed by mandamus.
(Citing Allen v. United States, 22 App. D. C. 271.) United States
ex rel. Lincoln Highway Asso. v. Ewing, 508.
MANSLAUGHTER. See HOMICIDE.
MARRIAGE. See DIVORCE AND SEPARATION; HUSBAND AND WIFE.
MARRIED WOMEN. See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 3; EMBEZZLEMENT, 2;
EVIDENCE, 18; RAILROAD RELIEF ASSOCIATIONS.
Statements of a telephone operator refusing to call a delinquent sub-
scriber, and of a lineman removing his phone in the presence of
third persons, that such course was taken for nonpayment of dues,
cannot be held within the scope of their authority, in the absence
of an express showing to that effect, so as to render the company
liable to the subscriber for the resulting damages. Clark v. Chesa-
peake & Potomac Teleph. Co. 444.
MATERIALMEN. See BONDS; CONTRACTS, 4, 6; MECHANICS' LIENS.
A subcontractor who did work upon and furnished materials for a build-
ing under contract with the contractor who thereafter absconded
upon receiving payment in full for work already done, the owner
having duly made the payments without notice of the subcontract-
or's right, has no lien or claim upon moneys subsequently accruing
to the contractor's surety by reason of its completion of the work
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