must have a beginning and an end. Common sense rejects an extension of the journey to the traveler's front door or the producer's farm or factory when no through order for carriage is in effect. The exact limits of interstate commerce in such fringe situations are uncertain." We are of the view, however, that the reach of interstate commerce goes to the delivery to Interstate, a common carrier, of the oil by the producer with his tender of shipment. That offer, when accepted, by its form is an order covering the amount of oil, origin and out-ofstate destination, and the route and tariff under which shipment is made. The commodity has been placed in the stream of commerce and will cross state lines in the regular course of business. We have held that shipping instructions, given to a freight conductor on a common carrier prior to any movement, put a car into interstate commerce 12 when the instructions were for shipment to an out-of-state destination after a preliminary transit between points in the state of loading. When a shipper delivers his commodity to a common carrier with instructions for billing by such carrier without purposeful delay via another or other common carriers to an out-of-state destination, we think interstate commerce has begun. Such an application of the commerce clause to transporta

12

11 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, at 232-33; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60, 71, note 6.

12 Philadelphia & Reading R. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284, 285: "The duties of the deceased never took him out of Pennsylvania; they related solely to transporting coal from the mines. When injured he belonged to a crew operating a train of loaded cars from Locust Gap Colliery to Locust Summit Yard, two miles away. The ultimate destination of some of these cars was outside of Pennsylvania. This appeared from instruction cards or memoranda delivered to the conductor by the shipping clerk at the mine. Each of these referred to a particular car by number and contained certain code letters indicating that such car with its load would move beyond the State."

tion accords with that given to regulation of other phases of interstate commerce.13 The absence of a through bill of lading is not significant. It is true that the shipment might be diverted to an intrastate destination without crossing a state line but that cannot change the character of the commerce until such diversion order is given. The movement in commerce has begun by the order and the , delivery and continues until the commodity is restored to the mass of property within a state by the termination of the transportation. See Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 337 U. S. 286.

Second. Mississippi determined that this tax was a privilege tax for carrying on the intrastate business of common carrier of oil in Mississippi, measured by a percentage of the income from that business. The preceding subdivision of this opinion expounds the arguments for our conclusion that all the business of appellant in operating a pipe line for transporting oil committed to move out-of-state from one point to another in Mississippi is interstate transportation. The statute in question was interpreted by Mississippi as laying a tax solely upon that business of transporting oil, not upon the "local activities of 'maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities'" such as are discussed in the opinions in the undecisive case of Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, at 92–93.

An opinion has been filed in this case, asserting that the Mississippi tax could be collected from the petitioner notwithstanding that its entire business is interstate commerce. With that conclusion we disagree.

Since appellant does only an interstate transportation business, the privilege tax exacted by Mississippi is actually a privilege tax for carrying on the interstate busi

13 Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282; Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564, 567.

ness of common carrier of oil, measured by a percentage of the gross income from that business, apportioned so as to include only income derived from that portion of the interstate commerce carried on wholly in Mississippi. The gross receipts from interstate commerce are the costs of carriage from point of origin—the field tanks to the point of destination-the out-of-state refinery. As only that portion of the costs covering the carriage from origin to pipe-line loading racks, both points in Mississippi, is used to measure the privilege tax, it is clear that the interstate gross receipts are apportioned to carriage wholly within the state. Our issue at this point is whether a privilege tax for carrying on a wholly interstate transportation business measured by a fairly apportioned part of gross receipts for carriage in interstate commerce is constitutionally permissible.

Phrased in terms of a privilege for carrying on an interstate business, such a tax historically has been deemed unconstitutional. The cases abound in statements to the effect that the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce itself is immune from state taxation. This is because it is a privilege beyond the power of a state to grant. .. it is a right which every citizen of the United States [and every corporation] is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; . Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 57; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91. The cases hold not only that a state may not exact a tax as a condition precedent to the doing of interstate business, but also that it may not levy privilege, excise or franchise taxes on a foreign corporation for the privilege of carrying on or the actual doing of solely interstate business after its admission to the state." Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v.

14 Since we perceive no difference for the purposes of this case between franchise, privilege, and excise taxes, insofar as they are exacted for the privilege of doing or the doing of interstate business,

Monier, 266 U. S. 555; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203. Cf. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218, in the light of Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, 153.1 The decisions in these cases were reached in spite of the fact that in each of them the tax sought to be levied was fairly measured according to the connections of the corporate taxpayer with the state. Thus in Ozark the tax was measured by a percentage of the capital stock and surplus of the corporation employed in business in the state, that proportion being deemed employed within the state "that its property and assets in this State bears to all its property and assets wherever located"; in Alpha by a percentage of the value of the "corporate excess" employed within the commonwealth (determined as in Ozark) and a percentage of "that part of its net inwhich is derived from business carried on within the Commonwealth" (also determined as in Ozark); in Anglo-Chilean by a percentage of capital employed in the state.

come

A recent pronouncement of this Court has recognized this limitation on state power. In Aero Transit Co. v. Comm'rs, 332 U. S. 495, we upheld a tax on motor carriers only after stressing the fact that the tax was "affirmatively laid for the privilege of using the state's highways" and was not imposed upon "the privilege of doing the interstate business." P. 504. See Memphis Natural Gas Co.

we have treated them as identical as far as their validity under the commerce clause is concerned. In Ozark and Anglo-Chilean Nitrate the taxes were called franchise taxes; in Alpha it was labeled an excise tax.

15 See the discussion of these cases in the opinion of REED, J., in Memphis Gas Co. v, Stone, 335 U. S. 80. See also New York ex rel. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 26; State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U. S. 41, 43.

16

v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 88, note 10. Where the corporate taxpayer conducts intrastate as well as interstate business, a franchise privilege or excise tax on the former is of course permissible. We have frequently upheld such a tax although it was measured by property or receipts which were used in or attributable to interstate business.17

The growth of commerce that is carried on in more than one state has brought responsibilities to states other than the one in which the commerce may be said to have originated. Producers, either directly or through middlemen and independent dealers, distribute natural resources, agricultural and manufactured products on a nation-wide scale. Transportation runs across state lines. All states are called upon to give governmental services for this commerce-service that costs and should be paid for by those who profit from its maintenance. In the absence of congressional direction as to the taxation of interstate commerce, this Court has interpreted the commerce clause to permit state nondiscriminatory taxation, for the use of state facilities, upon the property used in interstate commerce, upon production for commerce and upon net proceeds therefrom. Through such taxes, the states may exact payment for their protection and encouragement of commerce. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U. S. 422, 429, and cases cited. We have upheld, a tax on gross receipts from interstate transportation

16 Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U. S. 649; Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331; Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U. S. 22; Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148; Pacific Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U. S. 403; see collection of cases 105 A. L. R. 11, 36-56.

17 International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416; Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 298 U. S. 553; Matson Nav. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 297 U. S. 441.