PART II. ADDRESSES DELIVERED BEFORE THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL ADDRESS. DELIVERED BEFORE THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, AT CHICAGO, JULY 21, 1903. -- MURRAY F. TULEY, PRESIDENT. EQUITY MAXIMS. In considering Equity Maxims it is necessary to understand the origin of the court of equity and to some extent its history. What is Equity? I do not know that any definition of equity that can be found would be an improvement upon Aristotle's definition, which is, in substance, that "Equity is the rectification of the law, when by reason of its universality, it is deficient." Beach, in his work upon Modern Equity Jurisprudence, says, page 1,-"The equity jurisdiction arose out of the inability of the courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power, to adapt judgments to the special circumstances, to reach and do complete justice in all cases." If we consider the causes out of which the equity jurisdiction was evolved, no better statement thereof can be given than the foregoing. But, in answer to the question, What is equity. I much prefer the definition given by Blackstone: "Equity in its true and genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit of all law; positive law is construed by it, and rational law is made by it." But whatever differences there may be as to the true definition of equity, we know that the system or department of law known as equity jurisprudence had its origin in the fact that the common law of England, which had been sufficient and answered its purposes while the people were semi PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL ADDRESS. barbarous, was found to be totally inadequate to meet their wants as they advanced in commerce and civilization. Like all systems of law, springing from the customs of the people and founded upon traditional maxims, it had become hard, harsh, unyielding, administered upon technical rules with a blind adherence to established maxims and precedents. At common law no writ could be made to fit every new case that arose, and the struggle of the courts became, to make the case fit some writ in existence, and when this could not be done, "wrong went unpunished, and right often unvindicated." The king was recognized as the fountain of all justice, and applications were made to him as such, to grant relief, because no writ known to the common law could be found to fit the particular case and no precedent had been established upon which it could be adjudged. The king, being bound by no established precedent, granted such relief as the nature of the case required. As the deficiency of the common law and its inability to grant relief became more apparent as the years progressed, the king referred these petitions to his chancellor, who was sometimes termed the "keeper of the king's conscience," for action thereon, and gradually, by reason thereof, it became a practice to address the petitions to the chancellor in the first instance. In the. 4th Coke Inst., page 82, it is laid down as follows: "The chancellor was originally a court, having double, or two powers, namely, common law and equity." And quoting from Fleta, Chap. 12, Book II: "The office of chancellor can be so far traced up into the ages past as to discover that it has often been an office of the first rank, but for a long time his duties were more ecclesiastical and political than judicial. This court was known as, and called most frequently “The Common Law Court of Chancery,' and the ancient lawyers that speak of the chancery mention it not once as a court of equity or conscience. |