JAMES DE WITT ANDREWS.

inductive method of philosophy so far as that method of reasoning, research and expression is applicable to law.

The claim that the case method is the inductive method is one which may be questioned, but the claim that only those who teach by cases are using the inductive method and that the method of institutional teaching is not inductive is one entitled to consideration and worthy of examination.

Let us consider for a moment whether the case method as taught can stand the test of logical examination as being an adaptation of the inductive method of the logicians. It is said that they who use the inductive method start with particulars. But it should be borne in mind that they do not stop there. Does the examination of a single res gestae, a single case, fulfil the elements of the inductive method of the logicians?

No one will pretend that; but the claim may be that out of or from many cases a rule is deduced. This may be granted. Even this falls short in a material point of the end aimed at by Aristotle. It constitutes only a part of his system. He dealt with particulars just as the architect does, but only as parts of the edifice.

The inductive method is contrasted with the deductive method which it supplanted. The one assumed as true certain generals and descended to the particulars; the other took particulars and built up to the generals.

Let us understand The philosophy of Aris

the two leading ideas of Aristotle. totle had under it this principle: "Art commences when from a great number of experiences one general conception is formed which will embrace all similar cases."

It also had an object which was the ultimate goal broader than the method of reasoning. That object was to build up a system of learning which should be complete and orderly in all its parts. It brought to its aid the synthetical principle which enabled him to construct a system.

Aristotle examined the particulars for the purpose of

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION.

defining, classifying, grouping and arranging them. That is, whether in the kingdom of natural science or in the domain of logic, dealing with impalpable things, his aim was to group similars and from them to extract general principles, the result of which, when complete, was the system dominated by genus and species.

With this in view, Wilson in his famous lectures at the old Pennsylvania College, said to his students, "You have heard much of the celebrated classification of things into genera and species. On that distribution, Aristotle under

took the arduous task of resolving all reasoning into its primary elements. on that distribution likewise

*

營

the very essence of scientific definition depends."

Without pursuing the investigation further, it is thrown out here as a question to the profession, whether the teaching by cases as practiced, is fairly entitled to assume the name of the inductive method, for the reason that it is partial and extends only to one of the branches of that system. The synthetic idea was an essential element of Aristotle's method, the building up, the combination, these processes resulted in an exposition of the homogeneous whole of any department of learning. It is the synthetical process for which Aristotle was so famous, which if not entirely ignored is too little regarded by those who teach merely by subjects without the aid of the organizing influence of the institutional system.

It may also be further maintained that there is no jurisprudence worthy to be called scientific in any country until there is a recognition of that common system which will enable the presentation of main outlines, and fundamental principles in an organized systematic exposition such as is commonly denominated an institute.

Now the committee recognizes that this body can not act. There are other bodies with greater facilities; the Association of American Law Schools is adapted to the discussion, the formulation, the rejection or the adoption of a

JAMES DE WITT ANDREWS.

movement of this kind; the Committee on Legal Education of the American Bar Association is adapted to it; and these views are formulated here to-day simply for the purpose of communicating with those bodies in such a way as to provoke discussion and bring about some practical result.

REPORT OF NECROLOGIST.

REPORT OF NECROLOGIST.

JAMES B. BRADWELL.

Under the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association. it is made the duty of the Necrologist to provide for preservation among the archives of the Association, suitably written or printed memorials of the lives and characters of the deceased members of the Bar of this State, and report to each annual meeting of the Association. In pursuance of this duty, your Necrologist respectfully reports for the year ending July 1, 1903, the deaths of the following members of the Illinois Bar:

PROFESSOR VAN BUREN DENSLOW, for many years an editorial writer in Chicago, and the head of the Union College of Law of this city, died in New York City, July 19, 1902. Mr. Denslow was a gentleman of education, an able editor, and an experienced law writer and legal teacher. He is mourned by many lawyers who graduated from the Union College of Law while he was at its head. (See 7 Obit. Mem., p. 50.)

JASPER D. WARD, who died in Colorado August, 1902, where he resided since 1877, was admitted to the Illinois Bar June 14, 1853. In 1854 he associated himself in Chicago in partnership with Mr. Hoyt, under the firm name of Ward & Hoyt, which firm dissolved in 1857. Mr. Ward then formed a new partnership with George W. Stanford, under the firm name of Ward & Stanford. In 1872 Mr. Kohlsaat, now Judge of the United States District Court here, was added as a member of the firm. In 1863 Mr. Ward was elected to the State Senate and served until 1869. In 1872 he was elected

JAMES B. BRADWELL.

to Congress, and three years later received the appointment of United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. In 1877 he went to Denver and at the time of his death was a prominent lawyer of Colorado. (See 7 Obit. Mem., p. 50.) FREDERICK A. HERRING died Friday, August 1, 1902, in this city. Mr. Herring was for many years a member of the firm of Johnson, Herring & Brooke. He was admitted to the Illinois bar September 15, 1872, and began the practice of law in Chicago. At the time of his death he was fifty-nine years of age. Mr. Herring was an honest man, a good citizen and an attorney who had the respect of his brethren at the bar. (See 7 Obit. Mem., p. 50.)

JESSE COX was admitted to the Chicago bar September 17, 1873, died September 10, 1902, at the Presbyterian Hospital, after an operation for appendicitis. For twenty-one years he occupied a suite of rooms in the Staats Zeitung Building, and from that point conducted an extensive law business, which for the most part was of a general nature. For more than nine years, from 1878 to 1887, he made a specialty of patent law practice. He was a close and earnest student of the principles of law, and his knowledge of the science of jurisprudence was comprehensive and unusually accurate. Such was his ability and careful study that it was seldom he lost a case he undertook. (See 7 Obit. Mem., p. 51.)

JUDGE H. H. HORNER, one of the pioneer lawyers of Southern Illinois, and the oldest attorney in St. Clair county (having been admitted to the bar July 27, 1847), died suddenly at his home in Lebanon, Illinois, September 22, 1902, aged eighty-two years. He was the first Mayor of Lebanon, Circuit Judge, and held the position of Master in Chancery under Judge Underwood. (See 7 Obit. Mem., p. 51.)

JUDGE MASON B. LOOMIS died October 3, 1902. He was admitted to the Illinois bar November 2, 1861, commenced practice at Kankakee, and remained there until 1870, when he removed to Chicago. In 1868 he was elected State's At