PROCEEDINGS.

PRESIDENT TULEY: The next on the program is an address by the presiding judge of one of our neighboring circuits well known to the profession throughout the state. We of Chicago know him and love him both personally and judicially. He has kindly consented to give us a paper on the subject of "The Lawyer's Relation to Social Development." Is Judge Hilscher present? (Applause.)

(The address will be found in Part II.)

PRESIDENT TULEY: The next on our program is a general discussion on a subject of great interest, especially in Chicago: Personal Injury Litigation; its Growth and Extent; its Evils and the Remedy Therefor. I believe I am safe in saying that at least sixty per cent. of the litigation in the Chicago courts comes under the head of personal injury litigation. Some who are competent to judge place it as high as eighty per cent. There is nothing so cheap in Chicago as human life. We live so fast, so rapidly, we have no time to indulge in any sentimentality in regard to the value of the individual person, or the duty of society toward the individual; with us it is entirely a commercial question between those who are injured and those who inflict the injury. Mr. Hynes, who was expected to open the discussion, is not able to be present; there are several here who have kindly consented to take part in this discussion, and we expected Judge Waterman to say something in the matter. I will call on Mr. McMurdy, I think he has heard from him, to make a statement in regard to Judge Waterman.

MR. MCMURDY: Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: By reason of the fact that this year I happen to be upon the Executive Committee, I have been brought into communication with those who it was expected would take part in this discussion, and in that way it happened that Judge Waterman has asked me to read the few observations which he had to make upon this important subject. As those in Chicago, at least, know, the Judge's professional affairs have changed

PROCEEDINGS.

of late, and the business of reorganizing a law firm has so far taken up his time that he has not been able to prepare the paper which he expected to be able to prepare for us at this time, and in lieu thereof sends these few observations on the subject in hand, which I will now read.

(Paper read as follows:)

I see no reason for thinking that the volume of personal injury litigation is likely to grow less. On the contrary its increase in the future will be, as in the past, coincident with the enlarged use of machinery in manufacturing and transportation. Personal injuries occupy so much of the time of the courts, and are so important a factor in our social economy, that it is not out of place to consider what disposition should be made of the sum recovered by parties injured through the negligence of others. With that awarded to an injured party for the pain and suffering endured by him, and also the expense to which he is put in endeavoring to be cured, the public in an economic sense have no interest. In whatever he may recover for personal disability the public are interested. That sum should be secured not only so as to be of permanent benefit to him, but so as to prevent him or those dependent upon him from becoming a public charge.

The late Governor Altgeld, from his observations as a trial judge, came to the conclusion that whatever is awarded for permanent disability occasioned by the negligence of another should not be paid in a lump sum, but should be invested so as to produce a life annuity, thus securing to the injured person during his life an income commensurate with that which, but for such injury, he might have earned. The average person, never having been accustomed to handling and investing large sums of money, is incapable of doing so wisely, and in the majority of instances will make use of the thousands of dollars that come to him from the loss of a leg or arm in such manner that after a few years he will have nothing left of that given to him as compensation for the

PROCEEDINGS.

personal disability he has suffered. I am not aware that the suggestions of Governor Altgeld have ever been put in practice. I mention them because I think they are worthy of the serious consideration of all students of social economy, as well as of those who write or speak upon the subject of what shall be done in respect to the personal injury litigation with which our courts are burdened.

MR. MCMURDY: While I am upon my feet. although the Executive Committee has made some other provision for the discussion of this subject aside from those who may, at the moment, volunteer, it seems to me that the contribution of Mr. Hynes to the literature of this subject would be valuable, and with that in my mind I move you, Mr. President, that Mr. Hynes, who has been taken suddenly sick, be requested to complete his paper, hand it to the Secretary of this Association, and that the same be published with the proceedings of this meeting

The motion was seconded and carried.*

PRESIDENT TULEY: I see among other names of persons who have promised to take some part in the discussion, that of Mr. Charles H. Hamill, I believe he is present, and we would be glad to have him open the discussion.

MR. HAMILL: In the February, 1897, number of the North American Review there appeared an article by a foreign naval officer under the title "Can the United States Afford to Fight Spain," in which some statistics of the relative strength of the navies of the two countries were given and the learned conclusion was drawn that the inevitable result of a naval warfare between the two countries would be disaster to the United States. The author's figures were interesting and doubtless correct. Immediately preceding this article, in the same number of the Review, was a paper by a member of this

*In accordance with this motion, Mr. Hynes was requested to send his paper for publication, but up to the time this volume goes to press it had not been received.

PROCEEDINGS.

bar entitled "Speculation in Damage Claims for Personal Injuries," in which statistics were given showing the number of actions pending in our courts, and the conclusions drawn that claims were practically sure to result in favor of the claimant, that the contingent fee system was an imposition upon both plaintiff and defendant, and that a cessation of manufacturing and industrial activity in Chicago must result unless some radical change in the disposition of such causes could be effected. This author's figures, too, are interesting and doubtless correct. It there appeared that the number of actions brought in the courts of Cook county from January 1 to July 1, 1890, for personal injuries was 346, and during the same months for the year 1896 was 893. An examination of the Chicago Law Bulletin shows that the number of actions. on the case against railroads, street railroads, manufacturers and large employers (practically all of which are presumably for personal injuries) during the same months for the year 1903 is 2,287. The damages claimed in the 346 cases in the first period were $2,814,860, in the 893 cases of the second period were $13,510,000, and in the 2,287 cases of the third period $27,232,983. During the last period there were 822 judgments aggregating $1,002,828, an average of about $1,220 per judgment.

From the table subjoined as appendix A, it will be seen that the number of personal injury causes passed upon by the Appellate and Supreme Courts has also grown. In the five volumes of the Appellate Court Reports referred to in the North American Review article, there were 112 cases passed upon; in the last five volumes (101-105, inclusive) there were 146 cases. In the five volumes of the Supreme Court Reports referred to by the North American Review article, there were thirty-one cases passed upon, while in the last five volumes (196-200, inclusive), there were sixty-seven. These figures are sufficient to demonstrate both the growth and present extent of this class of litigation.

PROCEEDINGS.

The article referred to is written wholly from the standpoint of a defendant's lawyer to whom the decision of a court in a personal injury case is not an adjudication upon a question of law or fact but merely a gauge of the court's ignorance or corruption, and is typically expressive of the attitude of mind of many lawyers constantly engaged in the defense of these cases and probably also of the attitude of most large employers. They have so often found the views of juries and courts differing from their own as to what constitutes negligence on the part of the defendant and what constitutes contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff, and they are so certain that their own judgments on these questions are sound, that the situation is explicable to them. only on the ground that juries are misled by passion and prejudice and courts are either ignorant or corrupt. They have suffered such frequent surprises in the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, which has differed widely from that of defendant's own employes, who, from some strange reason, they think incapable of error or truthlessness, that they incline to the view that all plaintiff's cases are "fixed" by unscrupulous lawyers and disreputable claim speculators; and this view has become ineradicably set by occasional experiences of wholly fraudulent claims.

There can be no doubt that there are some thoroughly dishonest lawyers in this and every other large community who do not cavil to mould, and perhaps to manufacture, the evidence necessary to sustain a plaintiff's cause; nor can it be doubted that there are here, and elsewhere, some abandoned creatures, not lawyers, who, with the aid of others less smart but equally oblivious to the sin of perjury, fix up, and sometimes push to successful conclusions, cases which, if the truth were known, would certainly fail. It is equally true that these disreputables have added their quota to the immense sum of litigation. So it is also doubtless true that our courts, being human, occasionally err. It seems to me, how