of his injuries was in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care. This finding was not considered sufficient to authorize the verdict, in view of the testimony and the other findings. Mr. Justice Valentine, in that case, said: "If the findings in detail contradict the general findings we may order the judgment to be rendered in accordance with the findings in detail, and wholly ignore the general findings. For instance, where a question of negligence arises in the case, the jury cannot be allowed to say conclusively, after finding certain special facts, that these facts constitute negligence, when in fact and manifestly they do not constitute negligence."

Finally, it is claimed that although Lindley might have been guilty of contributory negligence, he is entitled to recover because the conductor and engineer of the railroad company were guilty of gross negli gence. Neither the findings of the jury nor the testimony introduced in the case establish that the company or any employee was guilty of such gross negligence as amounted to wantonness. Railway Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398: Railway Co. v. Whipple, 39 id. 531. Allen, the engineer, testified that the fireman signalled him to stop. Bradshaw, the fireman, testified that Guy, the head brakeman, signalled him. The jury found that the engineer did not see the plaintiff on top of the train just prior to the accident; therefore he was not actuated either by gross negligence or malice toward him or any one sise. The conductor did not give the engineer the signal to move forward. The jury, in returning their answers about the negligence of the employees of the train, found as follows: "Were any of the men who were running or operating the train guilty of any negligence at the time of accident? If yes, in what did it consist? Answer. Yes; in the hurried manner in which the employees of the train managed the same. Question. Did the engineer who was operating the engine at the time of the accident to the, plaintiff, and just prior thereto, use ordinary care in handling the engine? A. No." These answers do not tend to show malice or gross negligence.

The judgment of the District Court will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. All the justices concurring.

[See N. O., etc. R. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112; 12 Am. Rep. 356.-ED.]

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACTS.

ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS FRAUD -ATTACHMENT. (1) Goods and chattels assigned by a debtor to defraud creditors being attachable in the hands of his assignee at the suit of a defrauded creditor (Rinchey v. Stryker, 28 N. Y. 45; Frost v. Mott, 34 id. 253; Thurber v. Blanck, 50 id. 80; Anthony v. Wood, 96 id. 180) the sheriff or his indemnitors may defend the taking of such goods by showing that it was under a valid attachment, and that the assignment was fraudulent as to the attaching creditor. (2) Such taking may be justified even if the attachment be vacated, provided it was valid when the taking occurred. (3) In an action by an assignee for the conversion of property covered by the assignment, a ruling that defendants may not so justify the taking, and attack the validity of the assignment, cannot be supported on the ground that the debt and the papers on which the attachment issued were not proved, and therefore the attachment may have been void for want of jurisdiction, where the ruling was made before defendants had any opportunity to prove the attachment proceedings. Nov. 26, 1889. Hess v. Hess. Opinion by Andrews, J. Reversing 5 N. Y. Supp. 959.

66

CEMETERIES STREET ASSESSMENTS- STATUTES REPEAL.-Laws of New York of 1871, chapter 154, providing that the lands of cemetery associations in the city of Buffalo shall be exempted from taxes, rates and assessments, except assessments for grading or paving streets or sidewalks in front of and bounded on the lands of said associations, is not repealed by Laws of New York of 1879, chapter 310, providing that no land actually used and occupied for cemetery purposes shall be sold under execution for any tax or assessment," as the latter is a general law, and there is nothing to indicate the legislative intention that it should repeal the special statute. It is not questioned but that prior to the passage of chapter 310, Laws of 1879, the local authorities possessed the power of making an assessment for grading and paving adjoining plaintiff's premises. Cemetery v. City of Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 506. But the act referred to is a general act, and declares that no land actually used for cemetery purposes shall be sold under execution for any tax or assessment. If that act be applicable to lands owned and used for cemetery purposes within the limits of the city of Buffalo, the assessment in question is unlawful. The act of 1879 did not in terms repeal other statutes then existing. Whether it did repeal by implication the local and special acts authorizing the assessment in question is therefore one of legislative intent. It is a rule of construction that a special statute providing for a particular case, or applicable to a particular locality, is not repealed by a statute general in its terms and application, unless the intention of the Legislature to repeal or alter the special law is manifest, although the terms of the general act would be taken strictly, and but for the special law include the case or cases provided for by it. Van Denburgh v. Village of Greenbush,66 N. Y. 1; Whipple v. Christian,80 id. 523. A brief reference to the statutes discloses that at at the time of the passage of the act referred to, an assessment of the character of the one in question was authorized by local statutes relating to lands within the limits of the city of Buffalo. It is apparent therefore that the right to make an assessment against the lands of cemetery associations, within the limits of the city of Buffalo, was provided by local laws applicable to that city alone. Therefore, within the rule laid down in the cases cited supra, the Legislature will not be presumed to have intended their repeal by the enactment of chapter 310 of the Laws of 1879, unless such intention is manifest. Our attention is called to but one feature of the enactment from which it is claimed an inference of an intention to repeal the local act can be drawn. It is claimed that such intent is inferable from the fact that the city of Rochester is expressly excluded from its provisions. We think McKenna v. Edmundstone, 91 N. Y. 231, is authority for denying that the exemption affords an inference of such intention. Second Division, Dec. 10, 1889. Buffalo Cemetery Association v. City of Buffalo. Opinion by Parker, J. Bradley and Haight, JJ., not sitting. Affirming 43 Hun, 127.

EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGES-OPINION EVIDENCE.(1) In an action for damages for injury to property by the erection and maintenance of an elevated railroad, the opinious of witnesses as to what the fair rental value of the property would be if the railroad had not been built are inadmissible. Teerpenning v. Insurance Co., 43 N. Y. 279; Marcly v. Shults, 29 id. 346. (2) At the trial there was abundant evidence that the actual rental value of similar property in the same street had diminished from $1,600 or $1,800 a year to $600 or $900, and that after the erection of the road business in the street commenced to fall off, and left the street, on account of the dirt and smoke from defendant's train. Held, that this evidence of itself, was sufficient to establish a depreciation of $900 a year in the rental value

of the property, and the admission in evidence of the opinion of a witness as to what the rental value of the property would have been if the road had not been built, though inadmissible, was no ground for reversal; the jury having rendered a verdict for only $2,500, the road having been operated six years. Nov. 26, 1889. McGean v. Manhattan Ry. Co. Opinion per Curiam. Earl, J., dissenting.

INSURANCE

APPLICATION

ERRORS OF AGENT -MUTUAL BENEFIT-REFUSAL TO MAKE ASSESSMENT.(1) Where an applicant for life insurance gives true auswers to the questions put to him as the basis of insurance, but an authorized agent of the insurance company inserts in the application false answers, the company, and not the insured, is responsible for such falsity, and it is no defense to an action on the policy. Grattan v. Insurance Co., 80 N. Y. 281; 92 id. 274; Miller v. Insurance Co., 107 id. 292; Bennett v. Insurance Co., 106 id. 243. (2) A benefit society, which by its certificate of membership is bound to pay upon the death of a member such sum as may be realized by an assessment upon its members for a death claim, not exceeding a certain amount, is liable to an action at law for the damages sustained by a beneficiary by reason of its breach of contract in refusing to levy such assessment. When the defendant refused to make an assessment it violated its contract and became liable to the plaintiff for the damages caused by such viola tion; and such damages, like'all damages for breaches of contract, can be recovered by an action at law. So it has been held in many analogous cases. Peck v. Association, 5 N. Y. Supp. 215; Freeman v. Society, 42 Hun, 252; Cumming v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 11 Paige, 596, 602; Fulmer v. Association, 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 347; Fitzgerald v. Association, 5 N. Y. Supp. 837; Leuders' Executor v. Insurance Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 465; Earnshaw v. Society, 68 Md. 565; Jackson v. Association, 73 Wis. 507; Burland v. Association, 47 Mich. 424; Taylor v. Relief Union, 94 Mo. 35; Protective Union v. Whitt, 36 Kan. 760; Association v. Lemke, 40 id. 142; Association v. Riddle, 91 Ind. 84. Nov. 26, 1889. O'Brien v. Home Benefit Society. Opinion by Earl, J. Affirming 4 N. Y. Supp. 275.

NEGLIGENCE-EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS.-In an action for personal injuries caused by a fall on defendants' stairway, the complaint alleged that the accident was occasioned by defendants' negligent removal of treads from the stairs between two certain floors, but did not specify at what particular place on such stairs the treads had been removed. The stairs between the two stories were divided into two flights, both of which had been used for some days, and the testimony was conflicting as to which flight the fall occurred upon. Held, error to confine the jury to a consideration of one of such flights as the place where the fall occurred. Second Division, Nov. 26, 1889. Barker v. Poulson. Opinion by Potter, J. Reversing 21 Jones & S. 542. RAILROADS-STREET-NEGLIGENCE-EVIDENCE.-In an action against a street railroad company for injuries sustained by being run over by defendant's car, after plaintiff had fallen on the track, where it is undisputed that the track at that place was icy and slippery, evidence that there had been no storm for two days before the accident is inadmissible for any purpose. Nov. 26, 1889. Silberstein v. Houston, W. St. & P. F. R. Co. Opinion by Peckham, J. Ruger, C. J., and Danforth J., dissenting. Reversing 4 N. Y. Supp. 843.

conflict upon material matters, the verdict of the jury, whose determination rested upon a consideration of the conduct of the vessels at and before the collision, will not be disturbed. Nov. 26, 1889. Chase v. Belden. No opinion. Gray, J., dissenting. Affirming 1 N. Y. Supp. 48.

WILIS

STATUTE OF FRAUDS SALE OF GOODS POWERS. (1) A creditor, by parol agreement with the debtor, took the bonds, held as collateral security, in satisfaction of the debt, and discharged the debtor. The bonds were paid to the creditor, and the surplus was accepted by the debtor's representatives. Held, that the contract was fully executed, and the statute of frauds relative to sales has no application thereto. (2) A debtor, who held certain bonds as a legatee under a will with power to sell them, turned them over to his creditor in satisfaction and discharge of his debt. Held, that as the transaction in effect amounted to a sale it would be upheld, without construing the will as to the legatee's power to pledge the bonds. Nov. 26, 1889. Brown v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. Opinion by Finch, J. Affirming 4 N. Y. Supp. 422.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS-RECEIVER'S TITLE -LIENS-PLEADING.-Code of Civil Procedure of New York, section 2468, vests the property of a judgment debtor in a receiver appointed in supplementary proceedings "from the time of the filing of the order" appointing him. Section 2469 provides that where an order for the debtor's examination has been served, the receiver's title "extends back so as to include the personal property of the judgment debtor at the time of the service of the order." Under section 3343 "personal property" includes evidences of debt. Laws of New York of 1885, chapter 342, provides that a material man's lien shall be acquired upon "filing the notice." Held, that in an action by a receiver of a contractor appointed in supplementary proceedings, for a claim due from the owner at the time such supplementary proceedings were commenced, which action was begun several months after service of the order for the contractor's examination in the supplementary proceedings, an answer alleging that the claim was subject to liens filed and in existence "at and prior to the commencement of this action," without averring that they were filed prior to the commencement of supplementary proceedings, is insufficient. It is well settled that dealings in good faith between the owner of a building and a contractor for its construction, before the filing of a notice of lien, are protected. The second section of the act of 1885 protects persons entitled to file notice of lien against collusion and fraudulent payments made, or incumbrances created, by the owner to defeat the purposes of the act, although notice of lien had not then been filed. This section recognizes the rule which has been fre quently declared that the owner is protected in respect of payments to the contractor made bona fide before the filing of notice of lien, and this although the notice was filed within the statutory time; and an obligation to pay a third person is regarded as equivalent to payment to the extent of the obligation. Carman v. Mclncrow, 13 N. Y. 70; Crane v. Genin, 60 id. 127; Gibson v. Lenane, 94 id. 183; Lauer v. Dunn, 115 id. 406. We think the plaintiff, as receiver, has the superior claim. He stands, as the assignee of the claim of the contractor against the defendant, by a title which antedates the filing of the notices of lien. When the liens were filed there was a debt owing by the defendant. If the proceedings instituted by the creditor whom the plaintiff represents had been abandoned, the liens would have had priority; but not having been abandoned, and the equitable lien existing when the liens were filed having been converted into a legal title as of a time anterior to the filing of

the liens, the right to the debt, as between the plaintiff and the lienors, vested in the former. The plaintiff, we think, stands in as good a position at least as if, prior to the filing of the liens, the contractor had in good faith assigned his claim against the defendant to the creditor in the supplementary proceedings, as security for his debt. The assignee under such an assignment, according to the general current of authorities, would take precedence over lienors under liens subsequently filed. Superintendent, etc., v. Heath, 15 N. J. Eq. 22; Craig v. Smith, 37 N. J. Law, 549; Dorestan v. Krieg, 66 Wis. 604; Copeland v. Manton, 22 Ohio St. 398. We understand the general rule to be that lienors, on filing notices of lien, take their liens subject to any rights theretofore acquired by third persons in good faith from or under the contractor, and that whatever right such persons may assert against him or the owner in or to the debt, whether such rights spring from voluntary arrangement or contract, or are acquired by operation of law, may also be asserted against persons who, as laborers or material-men, might have previously filed notices of lieu, but omitted to do so. Nov. 26, 1889. McCorkle v. Herrman. Opinion by Andrews, J. Reversing 5 N. Y. Supp. 881.

WILLS CONSTRUCTION APPEAL- REVIEW. (1) Under a will giving the residue of testator's property to his executor in trust, with directions to invest it, and use so much as the trustee shall deem necessary for the proper care and maintenance of testator's son during his life, the son is entitled to support according to his condition in life, though he is able to support himself, and the trustee is to exercise his discretion as to whether he shall deliver money to the sou, or provide necessaries for him. (2) Where there is some evidence to support each finding of the trial court, and those findings have been affirmed by the General Term of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals will affirm the judgment. Second Division, Nov. 26, 1889. Holden v. Strong. Opinion by Haight, J. Follett, C. J., not sitting. Affirming 34 Hun, 625.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

CARRIERS PASSENGERS CONNECTING LINES. Where defendant sells plaintiff a first-class railroad ticket over its own and other lines, containing a provision that in selling the ticket defendant acted only as agent, and was not responsible beyond its own lines, plaintiff cannot recover against defendant for being ejected from a first-class car, and being compelled to travel in a smoking-car, on one of the other lines. The question of the liability of a railroad selling a through ticket beyond its own terminus, and over connecting roads, has been much discussed, and different opinions have prevailed. The same question has arisen with regard to the liability of the receiving company for freight shipped beyond its own terminus over connecting lines of transportation, but the existence of such liability seems now too firmly established to justify further discussion. There exists respectable authority to the effect that a distinction exists in this respect between the carriage of goods and of passengers. Hutch. Carr. 464; 2 Redf. Railw. 313. Other authorities hold that there are no substantial distinctions between the rules governing the two subjects. Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 313. In principle we can see no distinction. It has been contended that it is ultra vires for railroad corporations to contract to carry beyond their own lines, but the great weight of authority unquestionably is that, however that may be, the carrier that engages in such an undertaking is estopped from denying its obligation to perform it. In Hutchinson

Carriers (p. 117) it is said with regard to the carriage of goods: It is universally conceded that he may bind himself by an express contract to carry to any distance or to any destination, whether the carriage can be accomplished by his own means of conveyance, upon his own route, or will require the employment of agents or subsidiary carriers beyond it. In this respect he may bind himself to the same extent as other contracting parties, even to the performance of impossibilities, if he will." The obligation to convey passengers over its own line not only exists as a public duty, independently of any contract to do so, but from considerations of public policy it cannot even be modified by contract so as to exempt the carrier from the duty to protect the passenger from consequences of negligence of its agents and servants. Railway Co. v. MoGown, 65 Tex. 640. Beyond its own line a different rule in some respects prevails. It is only because the carrier has voluntarily contracted to do so that it can be required to transport a passenger over any other than its own line; and it results that, like other contracting parties, it may define the terms and limit the extent of its undertaking over other lines, insomuch as may be required to leave upon them the responsibilities of their own negligence. The case of Railroad Co. v. Schwarzenberger, 45 Penn. St. 208, was for the recovery of damage for the loss of baggage. The ticket sold by defendant to the passenger contained a stipulation as follows: "In selling this ticket for passage over roads west of Pittsburgh the Pennsylvania Railroad Company acts only as agent for the western lines, and assumes no responsibility west of Pittsburgh." The court says: "The defendants are not common carriers except between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. They were under no obligation to carry plaintiff beyond the termination of their route, or to transport his luggage. It is true, they received the fare for the whole distance from Philadelphia to Cincinnati, and if that were all, it might raise a presumption of an agreement to carry over the entire route between the two cities. But contemporaneously with the receipt of the fare, and as evidence of the contract into which they entered, they gave to the plaintiff a ticket informing him that they assumed no responsibility for his carriage, and of course for the carriage of his baggage, beyond Pittsburgh. They notified him that they acted only as agents for the carriers whose route extended west from Pittsburgh, and not at all for themselves. With this express disclaimer of personal liability, there is no possibility of implying an engagement. It is not to be doubted that the defendants could act as agents for a connecting railroad line, and if they could, the contract for carriage between Pittsburgh and Cincinnati was with the principals of defendants, and not with themselves. Their own engagement was performed when they had transported plaintiff to Pittsburgh, and delivered his baggage to the carriers on the connecting railroad beyond, leading to Cincinnati. * * A carrier * * may not release himself from responsibility for want of ordinary care. Here however was no attempt by defendants to limit their responsibility as common carriers. There was nothing more than an express refusal to assume an additional and unusual liability, a careful guarding against the implication of a contract, which without the notice, might have arisen from the fact that the passage-money for the entire distance to Cincinnati was here received.

*

*

* *This is the whole case. The plaintiff breaks down in the beginning. He fails to prove that these defendants contracted to carry him and his baggage beyond Pittsburgh. His remedy therefore is not against them, but against the company which undertook for that portion of the route upon which the carpet-bag was lost." It is equally clear in the case before us that the defendant's liability for negligence was by the express terms of the contract confined to

cause it is a law in restraint of trade, nor on the other, prohibit the sale or use of property already in his possession, because the denial of the right of enjoying it or disposing of it is depriving the owner of property without due process of law. Granting that the first of these positions is teuable, the principle is not at all analogous to that which governs our case. There can be no question about the right of the State to regulate the manner of selling any article produced or manufactured within its borders, in any portion of its territory, with the purpose apparent from the terms of the law of protecting the manufacturer or producer against fraud or dishonesty. Cooley Coust. Lim. *587; Tied. Lim., § 89. It is a rule founded on reason and supported by authority, as we have already intimated, that we should hold the apparent purpose of the law to be the real object aimed at by co-ordinate branch of the State government, whose duty it is to provide for the protection of its citizens. Upon the same principle as that announced in Jacob's Case, the Court of Appeals of New York, in the case of People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, declared an act unconstitutional which prohibited the manufacture of what is commonly called" oleomargarine," whether it was so made as to be a wholesome food or not. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that a law containing a similar prohibition was clearly constitutional and valid, as an exercise of the police power. Powell v. Com., 114 Penn, St. 265. But whatever may be the proper construction of laws similar in their provisions to those passed in New York or Pennsylvania, or whether they shall be ultimately held by our court valid or invalid, the production of cotton is not forbidden, nor the mode of its culture prescribed, and the sale of it is not prohibited, but regulated by the act of 1887, as amended by the act of 1889. There is therefore no analogy between the cases. N. C. Sup. Ct., Oct. 28, 1889. State v. Moore. Opinion by Avery, J.

CRIMINAL LAW-DYING DECLARATIONS.- On a trial for manslaughter, declarations of deceased that he and the accused were playing, and that it was an accident, were statements of facts, and not matters of opinion, and were competent as dying declarations. The accused was allowed, over the objection of the Commonwealth, to prove, as a dying declaration, what the injured party said after the shooting as to the circumstances of it. It is urged that the proper foundation was not laid for its introduction, and that the statement was in itself incompetent. It was proven that about fifteen minutes after he was shot the deceased, when lying upon the ground bleeding and suffering, said that he hoped he would live long enough to take the gun home, and that he died in about twenty minutes. The witness says that he did not say whether he believed he would die or recover, and that he (the witness) did not know whether he was conscious or not when he made the statement. It is well settled that a statement, to be admissible as a dying declaration, must be made when the party is in extremis, and has given up all hope of this life; but whether this be 80 or not may be determined, not only by what he may say, but by his evident danger, and all the surrounding circumstances. The injured party need not, in express words, declare that he knows he is about to die, or make use of equivalent language. Peoples v. Com., 87 Ky. Tested by this rule, we think the statement in this instance was made under a sense of impending death, and that what the injured party then said also shows he was conscious, not only of it, but of what he was saying as to the transaction. The statement, in substance, was that he and the accused were playing, and that it was an accident. To be competent as a dying declaration, the statement must not only relate to the immediate circumstances of the transaction resulting in the injury, but it must detail facts,

In our opinion,

and not the opinion of the declarant. the statement in this instance conforms to this rule. It is unlike the case where the injured party declared that he had been killed for nothing. This was purely his opinion and inference. Here the injured man said that he and the accused were engaged in play, and that the shooting was an accident. This, in our opinion, was the statement of a fact, more than the giving of an opinion, and the court properly permitted it to be proven. Ky. Ct. App., Nov. 14, 1889. Commonwealth v. Matthews. Opinion by Holt, J.

GIFTS-INTER VIVOS.-C., a married woman, having some $6.000 in her name in a savings bank, in accordance with a previously expressed intention directed the bank teller to transfer $1,500 to each of three nieces, which he did, charging her account with $4,500. On her desire that the bank-books should be so made that the money could not be drawn during her life, the teller indorsed on the pass-books: "Only Mrs. C. has power to draw." C. and her nieces wrote their names in the signature book, the word "Trustee" being added to that of C. by the teller. The books were given to C., who, during her life, declared that she was trustee as to this money for her nieces. The nieces accepted the gifts in the life-time of C. Held, a valid gift inter vivos, and that, owing to the express declaration of trust by C., no cessation of control over the property given was necessary. The facts bring the case within any rule which has been laid down in regard to the validity of gifts inter vivos. The courts of last resort in Massachusetts and in New York differ from each other in regard to the absolute necessity of an acceptance of the gift of the donee (Gerrish v. Institution, 128 Mass. 159; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134), but there can be no doubt that the donees in this case knew of and accepted the gifts. The authorities unitedly declare that the gift may be made by delivering to the donee, or by the creation of a trust in a third person, or in the donor; and that, where there is an express declaration of trust in the donor, the rule which requires cessation of control and dominion by the donor over the personal property which is given, is not applicable. Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264; Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422; Scott v. Bank, 140 Mass. 157; Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512; Boone v. Bank, 84 N. Y. 83. U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Conn., Oct. 5, 1889. Miller v. Clark. Opinion by Shipman, J.

NOTES.

N Moss v. Sanger, Supreme Court of Texas, in his closing argument counsel was allowed to say: This is a deliberate scheme to swindle and defraud, gotten up by a Jew, a Dutchman and a lawyer," describing one party as "the old he-Jew of all, who, no doubt, planned the whole thing. All Jews, or Dutch Jews, and that is worse. dict should be reversed appari rig dence that the langung might have jury.

CT

that the ver

m the evi

Judiced the

We find the fooing wills of judges and lawyer have been prove during the past year, 1889 Lord Fraser, of Session, Edinburgh, £47.000;\M❤ Eneas J. Mentre, County Court judge, £44,785; Mr Arundel Rogers, County Court judge, £2,800; Mr. T. H., Barlow, London magistrate, £20,000; Sir Fred. Pollock,

Bart., Queen 3 Rem mbinda 9.7A R. Meury Pollock, Master of High Court of Justice, £11,000; Mr. H. B. Ince, Q. G., £19,784; Mr. R. Moon, barrister £309.050; Mr. Walker, barrister, £178,000; Mr. W. Morris, barrister, £70,000; Messrs. W. E. Surtee of Seaton Carewharrister. £52,464; E. Thompson Lincoln's-inn, £,000 J. Blackburn, J. P., Lincoln