CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTER-STATE COMMERCE-ACCOMMODATIONS FOR PASSEN

GERS.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, MARCH 3, 1890.

LOUISVILLE, N. O. & T. RY. Co. v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.

The act of Mississippi, March 2, 1888, providing that all railroads carrying passengers in this State, other than street railroads, shall provide equal, but separate accommodation for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger-cars for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger-cars by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations, since it operates only on the carriage of passengers from one point to another within the State, is not an interference with inter-State commerce.

IN

error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.

The Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Company was indicted for neglecting to provide separate accommodations on its trains for white and colored persons, as required by act of March 2, 1888. From a judgment of conviction, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, where the judgment was affirmed. 6 South. Rep. 203. Defendant brings error.

W. P. Harris, for plaintiff in error.

T. M. Miller, attorney-general of Mississippi, for defendant in error.

BREWER, J. The question presented is as to the validity of an act passed by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi on the 2d of March, 1888. That act is as follows: "Section 1. Be it enacted, that all railroads carrying passengers in this State, other than street railroads, shall provide equal, but separate, accommodation for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger-cars for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger-cars by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations. Section 2. That the conductors of such passenger trains shall have power, and are hereby required, to assign each passenger to the car or the compartment of a car, when it is divided by a partition, used for the race to which said passenger belongs, and that, should any passenger refuse to occupy the car to which he or she is assigned by such conductor, said conductor shall have power to refuse to carry such passenger on his train, and neither he nor the railroad company shall be liable for any damages in any court in this State. Section 3. That all railroad companies that shall refuse or neglect, within sixty days after the approval of this act, to comply with the requirements of section one of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be fined not more than $500; and any conductor that shall neglect to, or refuse to, carry out the provisions of this act, shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than $25, nor more than $50, for each offense. Section 4. That all acts and parts of acts in conflict with this act be, and the same are hereby, repealed; and this act to take effect and be in force from and after its passage." Acts 1888, p. 48.

The plaintiff in error was indicted for a violation of that statute. A conviction in the trial court was sustained in the Supreme Court, and from its judgment this case is here on error. The question is whether the act is a regulation of inter-State commerce, and therefore beyond the power of the State; and the cases of Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, and Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 118 id. 557, are specially relied on by plaintiff in error. It will be observed that this indictment was against the company for the violation of section 1, in not providing separate accommodations for the two races, and not against a conductor for a violation of

section 2, in failing to assign each passenger to his separate compartment. It will also be observed that this is not a civil action brought by an individual to recover damages for being compelled to occupy one particular compartment, or prevented from riding on the train; and hence there is no question of personal insult or alleged violation of personal rights. The question is limited to the power of the State to compel railroad companies to provide, within the State, separate accommodations for the two races. Whether such accommodation is to be a matter of choice or compulsion does not enter into this case. The case of Hall v. De Cuir, supra, was a civil action to recover damages from the owner of a steamboat for refusing to the plaintiff, a person of color, accommodations in the cabin specially set apart for white persons; and the validity of a statute of the State of Louisiana prohibiting discrimination on account of color, and giving a right of action to the party injured for the violation thereof, was a question for consideration. The steamboat was engaged in inter-State commerce, but the plaintiff only sought transportation from one point to another in the State. This court held that statute, so far as applicable to the facts in that case, to be invalid. That decision is invoked here; but there is this marked difference: The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana held that the act applied to inter-State carriers, and required them, when they came within the limits of the State, to receive colored passengers into the cabin set apart for white persons. This court, accepting that construction as conclusive, held that the act was a regulation of inter-State commerce, and therefore beyond the power of the State. The chief justice, speaking for the court, said: "For the purposes of this case we must treat the act of Louisiana of February 23, 1869, as requiring those engaged in inter-State commerce to give all persons travelling in that State, upon the public conveyances employed in such business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of the conveyance, without distinction or discrimination or account of race or color. Such was the construction given to that act in the courts below, and it is conclusive upon us as the construction of a State law by the State courts. It is with this provision of the statute alone that we have to deal. We have nothing whatever to do with it as a regulation of internal commerce, or as affecting any thing else than commerce among the States," And again: "But we think that it may safely be said that State legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon inter-State commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration, in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without, or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the State, it must necessarily influence his conduct, to some extent, in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the State, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect, in a greater or less degree, those taken up without, and brought within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the State must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterward, if the law is enforced." So the decision was by its terms carefully limited to those cases in which the law practically interfered with inter-State commerce. Obviously, whether inter-State passengers of one race should, in any portion of their journey, be compelled to share their cabin accommodations with passengers of another race, was a ques

tion of inter-State commerce, and to be determined by Congress alone. In this case the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute applied solely to commerce within the State; and that construction, being the construction of the statute of the State by its highest court, must be accepted as conclusive here. If it be a matter respecting wholly commerce within a State, and not interfering with commerce between the States, then, obviously, there is no violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Counsel for plaintiff in error strenuously insists that it does affect and regulate inter-State commerce, but this contention cannot be sustained. So far as the first section is concerned, and it is with that alone we have to do, its provisions are fully complied with when to trains within the State is attached a separate car for colored passengers. This may cause an extra expense to the railroad company; but not more so than State statutes requiring certain accommodations at depots, compelling trains to stop at crossings of other railroads, and a multitude of other matters confessedly within the power of the State.

No question arises under this section as to the power of the State to separate in different compartments inter-State passengers, or to affect in any manner the privileges and rights of such passengers. All that we can consider is whether the State has the power to require that railroad trains within her limits shall have separate accommodations for the two races. That affecting only commerce within the State is no invasion of the powers given to Congress by the commerce clause.

In the case of Railway Co. v. Illinois, supra, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, said: "If the Illinois statute could be construed to apply exclusively to contracts for a carriage which begins and ends within the State, disconnected from a continuous transportation through or into other States, there does not seem to be any difficulty in holding it to be valid. For instance, a contract might be made to carry goods for a certain price from Cairo to Chicago, or from Chicago to Alton. The charges for these might be within the competency of the Illinois Legislature to regulate. The reason for that is that both the charge and the actual transportation, in such cases, are exclusively confined to the limits of the territory of the State, and is not commerce among the States, or inter-State commerce, but is exclusively commerce within the State. So far therefore as this class of transportation, as an element of commerce, is affected by the statute under consideration, it is not subject to the constitutional provision concerning commerce among the States. It bas often been held in this court, and there can be no doubt about it, that there is a commerce wholly within the State which is not subject to the constitutional provision; and the distinction between commerce among the States and the other class of commerce, between the citizens of a single State, and conducted within its limits exclusively, is one which has been fully recognized in this court, although it may not be always easy, where the lines of these classes approach each other, to distinguish between the one and the other. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 id. 460." The statute in this case, as settled by the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi, affects only such commerce within the State, and comes therefore within the principles thus laid down. It comes also within the opinion of this court in the case of Stone v. Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307. We see no error in the ruling of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi, and its judgment is therefore affirmed.

HARLAN, J. (dissenting). The defendant, the Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railroad Company, owns and operates a continuous line of railroad from Mem.

phis to New Orleans. If one of its passenger trainsstarting, for instance, from Memphis to go to New Orleans-enters the territory of Mississippi, without hav ing cars attached to it for the separate accommodation of the white and black races, the company and the conductor of such train is liable to be fined as prescribed in the statute, the validity of which is here in question. In other words, it is made an offense against the State of Mississippi if a railroad company engaged in inter-State commerce shall presume to send one of its trains into or through that State without such arrangement of its cars as will secure separate accommodations for both races.

In Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, this court declared unconstitutional and void, as a regulation of interState commerce, an act of the Louisiana Legislature which required those engaged in inter-State commerce to give all persons travelling in that State, upon the public conveyances employed in such business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of the conveyance, without distinction or discrimination on account of race or color. The court, speaking by Chief Justice Waite, said: "We think it may safely be said that State legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon inter-State commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration, in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without, or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the State, it must necessarily influence his conduct, to some extent, in the management of his busi ness throughout his entire voyage. This disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the State, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree, those taken up with out, and brought within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the State must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterward, if the law is enforced. It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi passes through or along the borders of ten different States, and its tributaries reach many more. The commerce upon these waters is immense, and its regulation clearly a matter of National concern. If each State was at liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could not but be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship. Each State could provide for its own passengers, and regulate the transportation of its own freight, regardless of the interests of others. Nay, more; it could prescribe rules by which the carrier must be governed within the State in respect to passengers and property brought from without. On one side of the river or its tributaries he might be required to observe one set of rules; and on the other, another. Commerce cannot flourish in the midst of such embarrassments. No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a State line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regula tions by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business; and, to secure it, Congress, which is untrammelled by State lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be."

It seems to me that those observations are entirely

pertinent to the case before us. In its application to passengers on vessels engaged in inter-State commerce, the Louisiana enactment forbade the separation of the white and black races while such vessels were within the limits of that State. The Mississippi statute, in its application to passengers on railroad trains employed in inter-State commerce, requires such separation of races, while those trains are within that State. I am unable to perceive how the former is a regulation of inter-State commerce, and the other is not. It is diffi cult to understand how a State enactment requiring the separation of the white and black races on interState carriers of passengers is a regulation of commerce among the States, while a similar enactment forbidding such separation is not a regulation of that character.

"to

my judgment, the statute in question might properly be held to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, I dissent from the opinion and judgment in this case upon the ground that the statute of Mississippi is, within the decision in Hall v. De Cuir, a regulation of commerce among the States, and is therefore void.

I am authorized by Mr. Justice Bradley to say that, in his opinion, the statute of Mississippi is void as a regulation of inter-State commerce.

CONTEMPT-REPORTER EAVESDROPPING.

NEW YORK OYER AND TERMINFR, MARCH 31, 1890.

MATTER OF CHOATE.

A newspaper reporter, who conceals himself in the jury. room, and remains there during the deliberations of a jury, with intent to publish an account of their discussion and the result in a newspaper, and so publishes the same, is guilty of a criminal contempt of court committed in the immediate presence of the court and summarily punishable.

Frederick R. Coudert, for respondent.

John R. Fellows, district attorney, for the people. BARRETT, J. "It is a duty imposed upon all courts to preserve order in court, and see to it that its proceedings are not interrupted," said Judge Mason in People, ex rel. Greeley, v. Court of Oyer and Terminer, 29 How. Pr. 18, "or that the respect and authority due to the court are not impaired. And the statute to enable the court to discharge this duty, confers the necessary power upon the court."

In the matter at bar there is no substantial dispute as to the character of the respondent's act. It was undoubtedly a contempt. The principal question is whether such contempt was committed during the sitting of the court, and in its immediate view and presence. If it was so committed, it is punishable as a criminal contempt, for it certainly tended to interrupt the proceedings and to impair the respect due to the authority of the court. The respondent's act was not only a contempt, but an exceedingly gross violation of professional propriety. He deliberately prepared for the invasion of the jury-room, secreted himself there in advance, and supplied himself with paper upon which to take stenographic notes of what he might hear. He actually took such notes while the jury were deliberat ing, and although, upon his discovery, he delivered these notes to the court, he refused to promise secrecy, and-notwithstanding our admonition that his conduct was highly improper, and that it was his bounden duty to keep what he had heard to himself--he subsequently published his recollections of the debate. All this tended, to quote the language of Finch, J., in Peo

officers are sworn not to permit any person to speak to or communicate with them, nor to do so themselves, unless it be by order of the court. Code Crim. Proc., § 421. The conduct of the respondent was a deliberate violation of the statute, and of those just principles which, from time immemorial, have been established to secure the independence and impartiality of ju

rors.

The question remains whether this plain contempt was committed in the immediate view and presence of the court. It certainly was committed during the sitting of the court. The sitting of the court was continuous while the jury was deliberating. There was no adjournment or suspension of the sitting. The judge was actually upon the bench in the court-room during the earlier part of these deliberations. Later on the judge retired to the judges' chambers in the same building and on the same floor with both the court-room and the jury-room. But the court was at all times in session and remained so until after the rendition of the verdict. The contempt was not committed in the immediate view and presence of the judge. The judge however is not the court. A court has been well defined to be "an organized body, with defined powers, meeting at certain times and places for the hearing and decision of causes and other matters brought before it, and aided in this, its proper business, by its proper officers, viz., attorneys and counsel, to present and manage the business, clerks to record and attest its acts and decisions, and ministerial officers to execute its commands and secure due order in its proceedings." Burr. Dict.

Lord Coke describes it to be "a place where justice is judicially administered." Referring to this definition, Mr. Waite (Prac., vol. 1, p. 221) says that the term 'place" must be understood figuratively, for a court is properly composed of persons consisting of the judge or judges and other proper officers, united together in a civil organization and invested by law with the requisite functions for the administration of justice.

This is a correct view of the subject. The court is clearly an organization invested by law with certain functions for the administration of justice. A contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of any constituent part of that organization, during the sitting of the court, and tending to interrupt the proceedings of such constituent part, is a contempt in the immediate view and presence of the court. This was expressly held in Bergh's Case, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 284. The particular act there under consideration was the delivery to the grand jury of an aspersive letter from an unofficial person. This was deemed contemptuous behavior committed during the sitting of the court. "I think," said the learned recorder, "that the term 'behavior' may cover the writing and delivery to the grand jury of a contemptuous and insulting letIt is clear, from the elementary writers, and from what the Court of Appeals implied in the Hackley Case, 24 N. Y. 78, that the grand jury-room is an eu

ter.

largement of the court-room and part of the court sitting. Handing to the petit jury, a letter containing remarks upon the case pending before them, has been at nisi prius adjudged a contempt, the jury for convenience being outside of the court-room proper, it is true, but legally and technically, nevertheless, a part of the court sitting; aud both the grand and petit jury-rooms were merely extensions of the court apartment, and are under equal jurisdiction."

In Commonwealth v. Crans, 3 Penn. L. J. 453, the court said it was "clear that à grand jury are as much attached to the court as a petit jury. * * * In contemplation of law a grand jury are supposed to be personally present in court; ** * * they differ from a petit jury only in this particular-the latter hear both sides of the case, but both receive legal information from the same tribunal."

Mr. Rapalje, in his work on Contempts, section 67, says that the grand jury, being merely an appendage to the court, the refusal by a witness to answer questions put by them is a contempt of the court by whose order the grand jury was impanelled. For this proposition he cites many cases in this and other States, notably People v. Naughton, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 421; People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74, and People v. Fancher, 4 Thomp. & Cook, 476.

In People v. Naughton, Mr. Justice Pratt held that the grand jury was a constituent part of the Court of Oyer and Terminer, and that its proceedings were a part of the proceedings of that court. See page 423.

In People, ex rel. Hackley, v. Kelly, 21 How. Pr. 54, the Supreme Court of this department at General Term held that the grand jury was an adjunct of the court as well as the petit jury. It was there insisted that the commitment was illegal because the contempt did not occur in the presence of the court, but in the grand jury-room before the jury as an independent body. Leonard, J., answered this contention by saying that "when summoned, sworn and organized the grand jury are a constituent part of the court for the performance of the functions and duties devolved upon the court, as much as a body of twelve petit jurors impanelled for the trial of a person charged with crime. ** * * When the witness has been brought before the grand jury to testify he is for the time in the custody or under the control of the court and the grand jury. He stands in the same relation to the court as a witness on the stand before the court and a petit jury."

It will be observed that the reasoning in many of these grand jury cases proceeds upon the analogy to the petit jury. That the latter body is directly and immediately a constituent part of the court, and the petit jury-room an adjunct to the court, is treated throughout as a postulate admitting of no question. This becomes entirely clear when we free our minds from the popular notion that the judge is the court. He is a constituent part of the organization, but he is not the court. Nor is the court-room the court, nor the jury-room, nor the petit jury. The court is the totality of the constituent parts. It consists of the entire judicial organization for the trial of causes, and it is immediately present whenever and wherever-from the opening to the adjournment of the sitting--these constituent parts are actually performing the functions devolving upon them by law.

If the judge happens to leave the bench and the court-room for a few moments, while counsel is summing up to the jury, and during his absence an assault is made upon the speaker, can there be a doubt that a criminal contempt is thereby committed? This is not because the act is done in the court-room, but because it is done in the court. The court is in session and present, though the magistrate is temporarily absent. And further, the jury may decide in the court-room in the presence of the judge, or they may retire to another

room to deliberate, or they may even be left in the privacy of the court-room itself-all persons in the latter case, including the judge, being excluded. Wherever they may be, so long as they are deliberating and performing the functions required of them by law, the court is there present, and a contempt then and there committed is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court.

This conclusion is in precise accord with the view taken by the Supreme Court of the United States of the Federal statute relating to contempts. In Matter of Savin, 131 U. S. 267, the court examined the question as to when and where a court may be said to be present, and the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan seems to be directly in point. "We are of opinion," said that learned judge, "that, within the meaning of the statute, the court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set apart for its own use, and for the use of its officers, jurors and witnesses; and misbehavior any where in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the court. It is true that the mode of proceeding for contempt is not the same in every case of such misbehavior. Where the contempt is committed directly under the eye or within the view of the court, it may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts and punish the offender without further proof and without issue or trial in any form (Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 309); whereas, in cases of misbehavior of which the judge cannot have such personal knowledge, and is informed thereof only by the confession of the party or by the testimony under oath of others, the proper practice is by rule or other process to require the offender to appear and show cause why he should not be punished. 4 Bl. Com. 286. But this difference in procedure does not affect the question as to whether particular acts do not, within the meaning of the statute, constitute misbehavior in the presence of the court. If, while Flores was in the court-room waiting to be called as a witness, the appellant had attempted to deter him from testifying on behalf of the govern ment, or had there offered him money not to testify against Goujon, it could not be doubted that he would have been guilty of misbehavior in the presence of the court although the judge might not have been personally cognizant at the time of what occurred. But if such attempt and offer occurred in the hallway, just outside of the court-room, or in the witness-room where Flores was waiting, in obedience to the subpoena served upon him or pursuant to the order of the court, to be called into the court-room as a witness, must it be said that such misbehavior was not in the presence of the court? Clearly not.'

The case of People, ex rel. Munsell, v. Court of Oyer and Terminer, 101 N. Y. 245, does not conflict with these views, It was there conceded that the respondent's act was not a criminal contempt, as such contempts are defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, section 8. It was however an exceedingly dangerous contempt, and should be enumerated among the criminal contempts, for the act would probably have entitled the defendant to a new trial in case of conviction. Code Crim. Proc., § 465, subdiv. 2. If the verdict in that case had been the other way, the defendant, under the reasoning of the court, could doubtless have secured the juror's punishment as for a civil contempt. But his misconduct was not committed in the presence of the court or in the presence of any of its constitu ent elements. It was entirely outside of and apart from the court and its judicial machinery. It con sisted in the juror's visiting the scene of the affray unaccompanied by his fellows, and without the order of the court. Such an act was not enumerated among criminal contempts, and the statute expressly limits the power to punish ex proprio mota to such enumer ated contempts. The court held that the act was not even a civil contempt which the people could punish,

because the people had not suffered in their pecuniary interests. But, as previously observed, the defendant, if put to expense by the necessity for a new trial, might have invoked the statute as to civil contempts. The

case

certainly not in point as to the question now under consideration, and does not in any wise affect the present conclusion. That conclusion is that the respondent was guilty of a criminal contempt, and that such contempt was committed in the immediate view and presence of the court.

It follows that a commitment should issue. As to the extent of the punishment, I apprehend there can be no question. The maximum authorized by statute is wholly inadequate. The offense, as we have seen, was a grave one. It evinced a total disregard of what is due to the people in the decent and orderly administration of justice. No repentance has been exhibited, no apology offered, no expression of regret vouchsafed. The determination has been to do the wrong, to do it deliberately, and to persist in it defiantly.

The respondent is committed to the county jail for thirty days, and a fine is imposed of $250. Filed March 31, 1890.

PUBLIC RECORDS-RIGHT TO EXAMINE.

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, DEC. 28, 1889.

BURTON V. TUITE.

Act of Michigan of 1889, number 205, provides that the officers having the custody of any county, city or town records shall furnish proper and reasonable facilities for the inspection and examination of the records and files in their offices, and for making memoranda or transcripts there from, to all persons having occasion to make examination of them for any lawful purpose. Held, that the examination of city tax-sales books, made up by the receiver of taxes, and by him handed over to the city treasurer, could not be refused on the ground that they were not public records, although there is no express statutory provision that such books shall be kept.

An abstractor cannot be denied access to such books on the ground that he is simply seeking information for private gain.

Henry A. Chaney, for relator.

John W. McGrath, for respondent.;

MORSE, J. The relator asks for the writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to permit him to inspect and examine the records and files in the city treasurer's office at Detroit, and to furnish proper and reasonable facilities for such inspection and examination, and for making memoranda and transcripts from such files and records, in compliance with act number 205, Public Acts, 1889. The act in question reads as follows: "That the officers having the custody of any county, city or town records in this State shall furnish proper and reasonable facilities for the inspection and examination of the records and files in their respective offices, and for making memoranda or transcripts therefrom, during the usual business hours, to all persons having occasion to make examination of them for any lawful purpose; provided that the custodian of said records and files may make such reasonable rules and regulations with reference to the inspection and examination of them as shall be necessary for the protection of said records and files, and to prevent the interference with the regular discharge of the duties of such officer; and provided further that such officer shall prohibit the use of pen and ink in making copies or notes of records and files." Pub. Acts 1889, p.

286.

Relator shows in his petition that he is engaged in the abstract business in the city of Detroit, and has

invested a large sum of money in said business. That his business requires that he should know what taxes, levied by the city of Detroit, are liens upon property of which he is furnishing abstracts, and by whom such liens, if any, are held. That when lands are sold for unpaid taxes the sale is conducted by the receiver of taxes. A statement of such sales in book form is made by the receiver, and turned over to the city treasurer, in whose custody it thereafter remains. When sales are redeemed or city bids sold, such redemption is minuted in this book. That it is necessary in said relator's business to frequently consult this book. If proper facilities were granted him, he would not need to consult the same more than ten minutes in any one day. That the prevailing rule and custom is, in all the city and county offices, to permit all persons to have free access to the records therein, and he, himself, has ordinarily been allowed this privilege without obstruction or restraint, except in the case of the respondent, who is city treasurer of the city of Detroit. That said respondent has frequently refused to permit your relator to inspect the salesbook above referred to, as have also his subordinates; and if at times an inspection of such records has been granted, it has always been accompanied with insulting language, implying that relator was taking time which belonged to the public, and that he must hurry, or that the books would be taken from him; and this too, although no other parties were present to be waited upon or attended to, and though much more time was consumed by said treasurer in making such complaints than would be necessary for relator to inspect and make such memoranda as he needed if he could have access to the records without unreasonable interruption. A clerk would be detailed to see that the relator did not mutilate the records, with instructions not to permit relator to take the books. But more frequently relator has been told by said city treasurer and his subordinates that he could not see the records. Respondent has followed this obstructive course for a long time, to the great annoyance and discomfort of relator, and in face of the fact that there was posted in his office a notice to the effect that all information desired by the public would be promptly and cheerfully furnished. That respondent at one time informed relator that it was a matter of money with him, and that if relator would pay him $25 per month, relator could have what access he pleased to the records in said treasurer's office. July 2, 1889, relator called at the treasurer's office at about 11 o'clock, A. M., and requested the privilege of inspecting some of the sales-books. Respondent asked if the information wanted was for relator's private business. Relator replied that Richard M. Coon was the owner of lot 24, in Wessons' section of the Thompson farm, in the city of Detroit, and that he had employed relator to see if certain tax-sales which had been previously made were still held by the city or disposed of, and if disposed of, to whom. Respondent requested relator to write out what he wanted on a piece of paper, which he did. The paper was handed to a clerk, who was called by respondent to wait on relator. The parcel of land had been sold for six successive years, and it became necessary to inspect six different sales-books. That the statement which relator had made for the clerk, a copy of which he retained, informed the clerk the number of the book required, the page of the book, and the line on the page which he desired to inspect. That said clerk produced four of the books required, and they were hastily inspected by relator, but he was not permitted to handle them. During the examination, which could hardly have occupied ten minutes, respondent himself sat by, discussing the general subject of relator's rights, and apparently in no wise hurried by the pressure of official duties. That after relator had inspected the fourth volume, said clerk –