credit to a third person, who represents that he is buying for himself, can on discovering that defendants directed the actions of the purchaser, and that the goods were purchased for, and delivered to, them, hold them liable for the unpaid purchase-money, as undisclosed principals. Second Division, Dec. 3, 1889. Kayton v. Barnett. Opinion by Follett, C. J. Reversing 5 N. Y. Super. 78.

BANKS-AGENTS-ESTOPPEL-DURESS-APPEAL.-(1) Where payment of a debt is made to a bauk on account of representations made by its vice-president, the bank is estopped to deny that the vice-president acted in the matter as its agent. Krumm v. Beach, 96 N. Y. 398. (2) Money paid by a wife in settlement of her husband's debt, upon a threat by the creditor to arrest the husband if the debt was not paid, may be recovered back, though there was lawful ground for arresting the husband. Insurance Co. v. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 614, was a case where the defendant was held to be estopped to deny the validity of a mortgage. In Haynes v. Rudd, 83 N. Y. 251, and 102 id. 372, the decisions went upon the ground that the note was given to compound a felony, and the contract was for that reason illegal. Smith v. Rowley, 66 Barb. 502, was decided on grounds similar to Haynes v. Rudd. In Solinger v. Earle, 82 N. Y. 393, plaintiff gave the note in suit to induce the defendant to sign a composition of debts of a firm of Newman & Bernhard. The note was transferred to a bona fide holder, and having been compelled to pay it, plaintiff brought the suit to recover from defendauts the amount paid. The court held the contract was illegal, and the same rule that would have protected plaintiff in an action on the note by the payees protected the defendant in resisting an action to recover back the money paid on it. Farmer v. Walter, 2 Edw. Ch. 601; Knapp v. Hyde, 60 Barb. 80; Dunham v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224; Quincey v. White, 63 id. 370, were actions in which the contract was made by the person against whom the duress was claimed to have been exerted. It is not an accurate use of language to apply the term "duress" to the facts upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover. The case falls rather within the equitable principle which renders voidable contracts obtained by undue influence. However we may classify the case, the rule is firmly established that in relation to husband and wife or pareut and child, each may avoid a contract induced and obtained by threats of imprisonment of the other, and it is of no consequence whether the threat is of a lawful or unlawful imprisonment. Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9, is a leading authority on this question. In that case an assignment of a life insurance policy was obtained by threats to prosecute the plaintiff's husband criminally for embezzlement. The husband whose life was insured having died, the action was brought to determine the ownership of the money due from the insurance company. Judge Smith, who delivered the opinion of the court, says: "The assignment from the plaintiff to the defendant was most clearly extorted by a species of force, terrorism and coercion which overcame free agency; in which fear sought security in concession to threats and to apprehensions of injury. It was made as the only way of escape from a sort of moral duress more distressing than any fear of bodily injury or physical constraint.

A deed executed at such a time, under such circumstances, should be deemed obtained by undue influence, and ought not to stand." Five judges appear to have concurred in the part of the opinion quoted. Judge Denio concurred on the ground that the policy was not assignable, and Judge Wright dissented. The case was cited as an example of duress of person in Peyser v. Mayor, etc., 70 N. Y. 501, and as an authority for avoiding a note obtained by duress in Osborn v. Robbins, 36 N. Y. 371. It has frequently been cited in

the Supreme Court (Fisher v. Bishop, 36 Hun, 114; Haynes v. Rudd, 30 id. 237; Ingersoll v. Roe, 65 Barb. 357; Schoener v. Lissauer, 36 Hun, 102), and in other States, and in the text-books, and has thus become a leading authority upon the question under discussion. It is nowhere suggested in that case, either in the facts or in the opinion, that it was necessary, to sustain the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, that the threat must have been of an unlawful or illegal arrest. For all that appears, the husband was guilty of the charge made, and on that assumption it is peculiarly like the case at bar. Other authorities sustain the same principle. In Haynes v. Rudd, 30 Hun, 237, it was said: "We think that when threats of a lawful prosecution are purposely resorted to for the purpose of overcoming the will of the party threatened by intimidating or terrifying him, they amount to such duress or pressure as will avoid a contract thereby obtained." This statement of the law was not disturbed by this court, the reversal being put on other grounds. In Schoener v. Lissauer, 107 N. Y. 111, a bond and mortgage was obtained from the mortgagor by the threat that unless it was given, his son, who was charged with embezzlement, would go to State's prison. The mortgage was set aside, and this court sustained the judgment. After stating the facts it was said by Judge Rapallo: "On the merits this judg. ment is sustained by Bayley v. Williams, 4 Giff. 638; affirmed, L. R., 1 H. L. 200, and Davies v. Insurance Co., 8 Ch. Div. 469." The first case cited by Judge Rapallo fully sustains the recovery in the case at bar. In Harris v. Carmody, 131 Mass. 51, a mortgage was obtained from a father on the threat that his son, who was charged with forging his father's name to notes held by the plaintiff, would be sent to the State prison. It was held that the father could avoid the mortgage on the ground that it was made to relieve the son from duress. See also Taylor v. Jaques, 106 Mass. 291. In none of the cases cited was it suggested that the threat which induced the making of the contract was of an illegal prosecution, or an unlawful arrest, and in most of them it appears that the person charged with an of fense was guilty. The principle which appears to underlie all of this class of cases is, that whenever a party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct and interest of another, contracts thus made will be set aside. 1 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 239-251; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ -942, 943; Lomerson v. Johuston, 44 N. J. Eq. 93; Ingersoll v. Roe, 65 Barb. 346; Fisher v. Bishop, 36 Hun, 112; 108 N. Y. 25; Barry v. Society, 59 id. 587. In the last case cited it was said: "Where there exists coercion, threats, compulsion, and undue influence, there is no volition. There is no intention or purpose but to yield to moral pressure, for relief from it. A case is presented more analogous to a parting with property by robbery. No title is made through a possession thus acquired." It was not error therefore for the court to deny the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no evidence that the money was paid under duress. Upon the evidence it was a question of fact whether the agreement was executed and the money paid in consequence of threats and undue influence. Dunham v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224. If the money was paid by the plaintiff through fear produced by Mr. Castre's representations, that if the claim was not settled her husband would be arrested and impris oned, the payment was not a voluntary one, and the defendant obtained no title to the money received. (3) In an action to recover money so paid, where the defendant acquiesces in submitting to the jury the question of plaintiff's ratification of the transaction, he cannot, by taking a general exception to the instruction concerning ratification, raise in the appellate court the question whether the court should have held as matter of law that the plaintiff had ratified the

transaction. Smedis v. Railroad Co., 88 N. Y. 15; Doyle v. Infirmary, 80 id. 634. Second Division, Deo. Opinion 3, 1889. Adams v. Irving National Bank. by Brown, J. Affirming 22 Jones & S. 556.

CONVERSION-HARMLESS ERROR-RES ADJUDICATA. -(1) In an action for the misappropriation of bonds held by defendant as collateral, the refusal to allow proof that the plaintiff received the proceeds of such bonds is not prejudicial error, where there is no offer to prove that the plaintiff received such proceeds without parting with any new consideration. (2) Where a plaintiff, suing for a money judgment, prays that a judgment held by the defendant against him be stayed, pending suit, on account of defendant's insolvency, a new trial will not be granted defendant for errors alleged to have occurred in admitting evidence as to the collateral issue of defendant's insolvency. (3) Where matter pleaded as a defense is ruled out as not constituting proper subject of defense, and plaintiff obtains judgment, such judgment is no bar to a subsequent suit on the cause of action formerly pleaded as a defense. Second Division, Dec. 10, 1889. De Graaf v. Wyckoff. Opinion by Potter, J. Affirming 41 Hun, 646, mem.

CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-ALIBI.-(1) Where the only question in a murder trial is whether the defendant was the person who committed the murder, and three eye witnesses who were previously acquainted with the defendant positively identify him as the murderer, and it is also proved that shortly before the murder defendant had had an altercation with the deceased, judgment of conviction will not be reversed on appeal, though several witnesses swear to an alibi, and though the witnesses for the prosecution were unintelligent and illiterate. (2) In a murder trial, after instructing the jury that "if there is in this case a reasonable doubt it will be your duty to acquit," and "if upon the whole evidence there is not a reasonable doubt it will be your duty to convict," the judge instructed the jury that "an alibi, when established to the satisfaction of the jury, is as conclusive a defense as can possibly be interposed; it need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but it should be established to the satisfaction of the jury." Held, that the charge taken as a whole, was correct. Dec. 10, 1889. People v. Stone. Opiniou by Ruger, C. J. Peckham and Gray, JJ., dissenting.

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DAMAGES-EVIDENCE- OPINION -PHOTOGRAPHSPHYSICIAN-WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE BY ATTORNEY.

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(1) In an action for personal injuries, plaintiff's witness, having testified in his behalf as to his condition from the time of the injury down to the time of the trial, and given the names of the doctors who had treated him was, on cross-examination, asked if plaintiff had been treated by any physician especially skilled in this class of cases, and answered that he had had only those mentioned, and it appeared that they were ordinary country practitioners. It further appeared that there was an eminent physician in New York, skilled in the treatment of such cases. Held, that defendant thereby tendered the issue as to whether plaintiff had made use of the means reasonably within his means to cure himself, and that on that point it was competent for plaintiff and his wife thereafter to testify that he was dependent on his earnings for the support of himself and wife. (2) Code of Civil Procedure of New York, section 834, provides that a physician or surgeon shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. Section 836 provides that said section applies to every examination of a person as a witness, unless the provision thereof is expressly waived by the patient. Held, that

such provision is waived where the patient's attorney calls the physician as a witness, and states that as his attorney he waives the privilege. The Code of Civil Procedure provides that a clergyman, or other minister of any religion, shall not be allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline, enjoined by the rules of practice of the religious body to which he belongs. § 833. And that a person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient iu a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. § 834. And that an attorney or counsellor at law shall not be allowed to disclose a communication made by his client to him or his advice given thereon, in the course of his professional employment. § 835. Section 836 then provides: "The last three sections apply to every examination of a person as a witness, unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived by the person confessing the patient, or the client." So that under the provisions of the later section, there must be an express waiver by the patient in orderŝto make the testimony competent. The question then is, can such express waiver be made by an attorney of a person in his lifetime? The death of the client would undoubtedly terminate such agency, and no one would then be permitted to speak for him, and the prohibition provided for by the Code would then doubtless continue forever. Westover v. Insurance Co., 99 N. Y. 56. But although dead, he may leave behind [him evidence which indicates an express intention to waive the privilege; as for instance, where he requests his attorney to sign the attestation clause of his will, he by so doing expressly waives the provisions of the statutes, and makes him a competent witness to testify as to the circumstances attending its execution, including the mental condition of the testator at the time. In re Colman, 111 N. Y. 220. Ruger, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, says: "It cannot be doubted that if a client, in his life-time, should call his attorney as a witness in a legal proceeding to testify to transactions taking place between himself and his attorney while occupying the relation of attorney and client, such an act would be held to constitute an express waiver of the seal of secrecy imposed by the statute; and can it be any less so when the client has left written and oral evidence of his desire that his attorney should testify to facts learned through their professional relations upon a judicial proceeding to take place after his death? We think not." If the calling of an attorney as a witness in behalf of his client is an express waiver of the seal of secrecy imposed by the statute, is not also the calling of a physician as a witness by his patient such a waiver? It is true that these remarks of the chief judge may not have been necessary in the decision of that case, and may have been made by way of illustration; still the force of the argument is such as to commend itself to us as a correct and just interpretation of the statute. As we have seen, the physician was not only called as a witness on behalf of the patient, but his counsel who was conduct. ing the trial in his behalf in open court expressly waived the prohibition of the statute. The attorney, in conducting the trial, stood in the place and stead of his client, representing him as his duly-authorized agent. All that properly related to the conduct of the trial devolved upon the attorney. It was for him to determine what should or should not be presented as evidence, and it appears to us that he must be deemed to so far represent the client as to be authorized in his behalf to waive the privilege, and remove the seal of secrecy to the evidence that he in his judg ment saw fit to offer for and on behalf of his client. Mark v. City of Buffalo, 87 N. Y. 184. (3) A physician testifying for plaintiff, being asked to state what in his

opinion would be the result of the disease in the natural course, gave his opinion. Being then asked to state the length of time that the plaintiff may live, in the natural and ordinary course of events, stated that he could only give the probability from the history of other similar cases, and this he was permitted to do. Held, that the evidence was not objectionable, as being too speculative. Griswold v. Railroad Co., 44 Hun, 236; affirmed, 115 N. Y. 61, and was again considered by us in the case of McClain v. Railroad Co., 116 id. (4) A photograph of plaintiff, showing the manner in which his limbs had been contracted, is admissible in evidence, after a physician has testified that it was taken in his presence, and correctly represented the condition of the limbs. Archer v. Railroad Co., 106 N. Y. 589-603. See also Wilcox v. Wilcox, 46 Hun, 32-38; Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213-224; Hynes v. McDermott, 82 id. 50. Second Division, Dec. 17, 1889. Alberti v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. Opinion by Haight, J. Follett, C. J., and Potter, J., dissenting. Affirming 43 Hun, 421.

EXECUTORS-ACCOUNTING-SURROGATE'S POWERS.Under the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, section 2472, which gives the surrogate power to control executors, settle their accounts and enforce the pay. ment of debts and legacies, a surrogate has no jurisdiction, in settling the accounts of an executor, to order a legatee to repay to the executor money which has been paid him in excess of his just share. Dec. 10, 1889. In re Underhill. Opinion by Peckham, J. Affirming 6 N. Y. Supp. 133.

INSURANCE-REFORMATION.-In an action to reform a tontine insurance policy, brought after the tontine period had expired, the complaint averred that the defendant represented that the cash value of the policy would amount to a certain sum at the end of the tontine period. Held, that in the absence of any mutual mistake, such representation [would not warrant a reformation of the policy, so as to make it contain an absolute covenant as to the amount of such cash value. These policies have been the subject of consideration in this court, and notably in the recent cases of Bogardus v. Insurance Co., 101 N. Y. 328, and Uhlman v. Same, 109 id. 421. The character of such policies is described in the opinions in those cases as involving the amount of the fund out of which the dividend shall be paid to the surviving holder in uncertainty, and hence creating a liability on the part of the company to him under such a policy which was necessarily contingent, and could only be determined when, at the end of the dividend period, the aggregate of the fund, from accretions, interest, etc., could be ascertained for division among the survivors. When the assured accepted the policy he was chargeable with the knowledge of its terms and provisions. Ignorance is not pleaded, and ignorance of the legal effect of the contract would not be an excuse. The knowledge imputable to him and to the plaintiff involves a comprehension of the contents of the policy and, equally, of the contingent nature of the option available to the holder upon the expiration of the tontine period. The assured was bound to know that the liability of the company, on that plan of insurance, was contingent upon several elements, and indeterminable in advance. This was indicated to him, not only by the nature of the engagement itself, but the preliminary memorandum only represented estimated results. His position here is at war with his position as defined by the complaint. He now argues as though there had been a mutual intent that a certain sum should be paid, while the com. plaint, on its face, makes out a case of a contract of assurance, the outcome of which, in the respect discussed, was essentially contingent upon events not possible of forecasting. He engaged in a plan of in

surance which presented the possible chance of a return to him of a dividend, in certain contingencies, which would represent considerably more than his payments of premiums, and which he entered into on certain estimates of results furnished him by the company. Now I think we may assume that the defendaut's officers made these estimates as liberal as it was possible, and that they represented the chances in as favorable a light as they could. That is quite possible, and probable, but that assumption would not affect the question. The results of such a plan of assurance were matters of opinion, and they are not considered as important in equity. The avenues of inquiry were equally open to the parties, and probably the experience of the officers was of more use to them than to the general public. Their statements of what the assured might possibly gain under that plan do not amount to misrepresentation, and if the assured accepted the policy relying upon them, and the result is not as supposed or estimated, that presents no ground for relief. It was, and in the very nature of the plan could only be, problematical or speculative. The figuring out of the chances of the assured, in the chances of all of his class, could only be based on hypothetical facts and figures. The case of Maher v. Insurance Co., 67 N. Y. 283, is inapplicable as an authority for the plaintiff. Dec. 3, 1889. Avery v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. Opinion by Gray, J. Affirming 5 N. Y. Supp. 278.

MARINE-SEAWORTHINESS-CONTRACT OF AFFREIGHTMENT - CARGO. (1) Where a vessel, during fine weather, sprang a leak forty-eight hours after leaving port, and several witnesses testify that the vessel was seaworthy when she left port, the question of seaworthiness, in an action against the underderwriters, is properly one for the jury. (2) In an action on a policy of marine insurance for loss of freight, where a bill of lading signed by the master is introduced in evidence without any exception being taken thereto, the defendant cannot object, on appeal, that there was no proof of a valid contract of affreightment. (3) In such an action, where the cargo was alleged to be melado in casks, and witnesses testified, from external appearances, that the casks contained melado, and other witnesses testified regarding the leakage from these casks which seemed to indicate that they were not filled with melado, the question of the nature of the cargo may properly be left to the jury. Second Division, Dec. 3, 1889. Palmer v. Great Western Ins. Co. Opinion by Follett, C. J. Affirming 22 Jones &

S. 503.

JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION-STATEMENT.-Under the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, section 1274, which provides that a statement for judgment by confession must state concisely the facts out of which the debt arose, a statement that recites that the debt is a balance due plaintiff of various sums loaned and advanced by him to defendant during a period of nearly two years is too indefinite to support a judgment. Dec. 3, 1889. Wood v. Mitchell; Parkinson v. Mitchell. Opinion by Earl, J. Reversing 6 N. Y. Supp. 948,

mem.

LEASES ASSIGNMENT.-A tenant for the life of another assigned his lease after its termination, neither party knowing that the lease had expired. The assignee took possession, and obtained a new lease from the reversioner. Held, that the original lessee could not compel an assignment to him of the second lease to secure the unpaid consideration of his assignment; the relation between him and his assignee being merely that of vendor and vendee. From this relation, the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to the second or renewal lease; or, in other words, that the defendant Ramsdell was, in taking the new lease, the plaintiffs'

trustee or agent, and made the new lease for the benefit of the plaintiff. I do not think the defendant Ramsdell owed the plaintiff any allegiance or duty of that character. In Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 54, it is said by the court, in discussing such relations, that 'the relation of landlord and tenant in no sense exists be. tween vendor and vendee." Osterhout v. Shoemaker, 3 Hill, 513-518: "He [the grantee] takes the land to hold for himself, and to dispose of it at pleasure. He owes no faith or allegiance to the grantor; and he does him no wrong when he treats him as an utter stranger to the title." It has been often held that the grantor in fee may purchase in an outstanding or hostile title to his grantor, and fortify his own defective title, and thus make good to himself what his grantor's deed, with its covenants, failed to do. Kenada v. Gardner, 3 Barb. 589. Was it ever claimed that a grantor under a deed containing the fullest covenants, but which conveyed no title to him because the grantor had none, could be compelled to give the title which such grantee had purchased from another to his grantor, who took his money, but gave him nothing for it? Or to state a case more nearly resembling the case under consideration, that a grantor who had no title, and so conveyed to his grantee none, might nevertheless compel such grantee to convey to him the title he purchased of another, so that the grantor might have good security for the payment of a mortgage which the grantee had given to his grantor, to secure the purchase-money, but whose deed conveyed nothing to the grantee? It was found, and not disputed-indeed, it was alleged in the complaint that at the time the plaintiff assumed to contract to sell the premises to defendant the former lease had expired; and that there was no legal right in the lessee or assigns to compel a renewal; and that the renewal depended upon the option of the lessor, and that option depended upon such terms, as to the amount of rent and character of the lessee, as should suit the landlord, though preference was generally given the tenant in possession, if he had the qualifications, and would assent to the terms dictated by the landlord as to the amount of rent and duration of the term of the new lease. If any duties spring from a contract in these circumstances, I should expect that one of them would be that the vendor who held the lease, and must have known that it had expired, or nearly 80, and had sold it for $800, should himself have undertaken to have it renewed. But, if the vendor was not disposed to do this, he should, at least, have reminded his vendee, who had no knowledge, or means of knowledge, at hand as to the termination of the lease, and should have induced the defendant, the vendee, to procure the renewal of the lease. But the plaintiff took no agreement from the defendant to do so, but waited until the defendant had obtained a new lease, at a rent more than double that of the old lease, and for a term of only ten years, and then demanded that the defendant should assign it to him, to secure the payment of the purchase-price. Second Divison, Dec. 10, 1889. Hibbard v. Ramsdell. Opinion by Potter, J. Affirming 41 Hun, 640, mem.

MARRIAGE-ARTICLES OF SEPARATION-DIVORCEALIMONY.-(1) A contract between husband and wife, executed after separation, through the medium of a trustee, whereby the husband agrees to pay to the trustee, during the wife's life, a certain amount each month for her support, and the wife and trustee agree to save the husband harmless from any further liability for her support, is valid. Marriage is favored in the law, and as a contract not to marry is against public policy and void, so too is a contract between husband and wife to be divorced, or in the happening of a future event to live apart. But while a contract to separate in the future is void, it is now too well settled, both in England aud this country, to admit of discus

siou, that after a separation has taken place a contract may be made, through the intervention of a trustee, which is effective to bind the husband to contribute the sums therein provided for the future support of the wife. 1 Bish. Mar. & Div., §§ 637, 650; Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige, 483; Magee v. Magee, 67 Barb. 487: Pettit v. Pettit, 107 N. Y. 677; Calkins v. Long, 22 Barb. 97. The contract of separation is also valid, so far as relates to the indemnity given to the husband by the trustee. Such covenants are mutual and dependent. Wallace v. Bassett, 41 Barb. 92; Dupre v. Rein, 7 Abb. N. C. 256. The argument that upon the granting of the decree of divorce, there was a failure of consideration to support the agreement is without force. The consideration for an agreement of separation fails, and the contract is avoided, when separation does not take place, or where, after it has taken place, the parties are reconciled and cohabitation resumed. Neither of these events happened. The suggestion that the subsequent violation of the marriage vow by the defendant may be treated as vitiating the separation agreement does not require extended consideration, for it is without potency. Because of the marriage relation, the husband was bound to support his wife. This legal obligation constituted the basis for a settlement of their affairs, and the making of an agreement by which it should be definitely determined how much he should be obliged to contribute and she entitled to receive from him for her support. After its making, it was not in the power of either party, acting alone and against the will of the other, to do an act which would destroy or affect that contract. The act of adultery did not of itself subvert the marriage contract. It enabled the wife, through the aid of the courts, to relieve herself from the legal restraints of the marriage tie. But she need not have availed herself of that privilege. She might have determined to condone the offense. Condonation is favored in the law. The wrongful act of the husband, then, did not of itself avoid even the marriage contract. Much less was it potent to affect a contract founded, not upon a promise to faithfully observe the marriage vows, but, instead, upon a legal obligation to support and maintain the wife. Neither did the act of the wife, in availing herself of the husband's wrong to free herself from matrimonial bonds, affect the separation agreement. At the time of the execution of the agreement husband and wife had separated. It was fully determined that they should not live together again. In that situation the wife demanded, and the husband conceded, a separate support. The agreement provided, not merely for her support during their joint lives, but also that in event of death, his estate should contribute a like support each year, so long as she should live. By its terms the parties attempted a severance and settlement of their relations toward each other, in all respects save one, which should last for all time. They were powerless to dissolve the marriage tie, and, of course, did not attempt it. But they did make a settlement which was intended to separate them forever, as absolutely as it was in their power to do. The language of Chief Judge Ruger, in delivering the opinion of the court in Carpenter v. Osborn, 102 N. Y. 559, is applicable to the agreement here: "There is no express or implied condition in the contract that the plaintiff should continue to remain the wife of John Carpenter, but the obligation to pay interest was to continue unconditionally during her natural life.' No attempt was made to shorten the period of payment, should divorce or marriage thereafter result. It is written that the death of the wife shall constitute the event which shall terminate the agreement, and the court will not attempt to read it as if it affirmed oth erwise. (2) The obligation to make such payments is not annulled by a subsequent decree of divorce. Stew Mar. & Div., § 191; Grant v. Budd, 30 Law T (N. 3.)