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One of the greatest weaknesses in U.S. foreign policy is the lack of adequate planning for peace. Because of its leading world position, our country has been unable to escape involvement in successive crises in world affairs. Our Nation's leaders have been so preoccupied with short-term policies and ad hoc measures demanded by such crises that they have not taken the time, or set aside the relatively small amount of funds necessary, to plan for peace. Foresight, advance precautions, and adequate preparation can and should both minimize the likelihood of the occurrence of crises and enable our Nation's leaders to deal practically with them when they come.
We took a big step when, with the other victorious nations, after the grim lesson of World War II, we set up the United Nations. But in spite of all the support the United States has given this organization we have not provided enough political strength and authority to enable it to keep the peace. I do not need to quote here the headlines and news stories of the past weeks about our involvement in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. The President's own words succinctly point out our failure, even in this 20th year of the United Nations, in the task of making the U.N. the instrument for peacekeeping it was meant to be. In his message to Congress May 4, 1965, speaking of our engagement in Vietnam, he said: “There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours.
The answer is simple. There is no one else who can do the job.”
In a world which cries out for effective international arrangements for providing general security, a unilateral policy is neither politically acceptable nor feasible. As James Reston, of the New York Times, said, on the same May 4, “The Johnson doctrine, if carried out, could require more marines than the President has under his command."
I have been sitting recently in the gallery at some of the meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission that is now in session. In the course of his statement in the opening general debate in this 114-nation body, Lord Chalfont, the British Minister of State for Disarmament, referred to the specific objectives his
government was supporting, namely
The conclusion of an international agreement on the nondissemination of nuclear weapons ;
The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty;
Partial measures such as President Johnson's proposals for a freeze on the production of nuclear delivery vehicles, the establishment of observation posts, or some combination of similar proposals ;
New impetus to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee; and as the fixed ultimate aim, the achievement of general and complete disarmament.
Lord Chalfont spoke eloquently with that realistic sense of urgency that does not expect immediate miraculous attainment of the goal but which insists on steady movement toward it.
“Unless we do something to bring this mad arms race to a halt before it is too late, we may go down in history as the age in which great scientific discoveries were shamefully wasted because we could not overcome our bitterness, our pride, and our suspicion of one another. We may have to decide whether we want our children to enjoy what Winston Churchill called the broad sunlit uplands of a peaceful world or whether we want them to spend their lives wretchedly and painfully putting together again a civilization torn apart because we were too blind or too lazy or too cruel to preserve it. There is not as much time left as many people think."
I have also been attending the current meetings of the Special U.N. Committee of 33 on Peacekeeping Operations. This, as you know, is the Committee set up by the General Assembly to find a solution to the crisis in the United Nations which has kept the 19th General Assembly from its normal functioning. This crisis, which is regarded by many exerts as the most serious the U.N. has encountered in its 20 years of existence, is the result of the lack of planning for peace of which I spoke earlier and which Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 is designed to remedy. In this Committee on April 25, 1965, Mr. Astrom, the Ambassador of Sweden, said:
** * * our task is not made easier by the fact that the subject matter which we are to investigate has never been clearly defined. The term 'peacekeeping' is, of course, not to be found in the charter, and although it is used in the unanimously adopted resolution of the General Assembly setting up our Committee, there are obviously various interpretations of the term. It seems to the Swedish delegation that our work would be facilitated if, as a first step, we could agree on what a peacekeeping operation is and what it is not."
I refer to this particular passage from among all the very complex legal and technical debate that is going on in the Committee of 33, to underline the problem to which the concurrent resolution directs itself. The crisis in the 19th General Assembly is not, as everyone now realizes, primarily a financial one. The crisis has been brought about by the fact that the U.N. Charter, drawn up during World War II, endeavored to provide the kind of collective security measures that would be needed against breaches of the peace an international function entirely new in historical practice. But even those able persons who drafted the charter did not foresee the type of operations which would be demanded by such actual situations as developed in the Congo, in the Middle East, or in Cyprus, and they therefore did not set forth clear, unambiguous provisions for meeting them politically, militarily, or financially.
Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 refers, in its 5th preliminary paragraph, to the 14th General Assembly resolution of November 20, 1959, which adopted "the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.” The General Assembly expressed the hope at that time that “measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."
The U.S. Government took an important step toward implementing this resolution in submitting to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva on April 18, 1962, its outline of "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament." The first objective of that treaty, as outlined, is:
"To insure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
But, though this is now the avowed goal of U.S. policy as a means to achieve international peace and security, it is as yet so sketchy a draft, and so far removed from the actual current policies, that it cannot be said to affect U.S. foreign policy in any way commensurate with the urgency of the task of establishing the working rules of peace.
This outline treaty is indeed quite elaborate in its provisions for military arms control and reduction, and in regard to the setting up an international disarmament organization. It is much less precise in proposals for establishing a United Nations peace force to take the place of national armies; and it is very general and unclear in providing for peaceful settlement of disputes. Much scholarly research by private institutions, universities, and nongovernmental organizations has been devoted to the implications and requirements of the generally and completely disarmed world we have to agree on if we are to survive. I hope the U.S. Government will now set its mind to these problems with a real determination to work them out.
This is why this resolution is so important.
All of the four problem areas I have referred to-(1) the unilateral attempts of the United States to defend freedom and justice by itself, (2) the United Nations search for agreement on practical steps in disarmament, (3) the United Nations constitutional dilemma over arrangements for peacekeeping operations, and (4) the need for deliberate progress toward general and complete disarmament-all of them are hampered hy the lack of detailed and specific long-range planning, and therefore by a lack of a clearly defined policy in regard to the goal to be achieved.
I have also been following last week's meetings of the Security Council. There our unilateral policy, so easily caricatured as “big stick,” has continually been contrasted with the explicit provisions of both the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States. The U.S. representative has been put in a difficult position, though I must say that he defended his case most nobly with his wit.
Should not the United States of America be the first to stand, with all the strength and character of its traditions and its abilities, for a 20th century policy of strict adherence to, and strong implementation of, international agreements, and the extension of international rights and responsibilities into new areas as rapidly as possible?
But we need to have this 20th century policy developed into practical detail, as this resolution would assist in doing.
In disarmament, again, what American politician or political body is going seriously to consider "general and complete disarmament” unless and until security for our lives and interests can be guaranteed by some reliable means? And the same question applies to the political attitudes of other armed nations, too. There will not be an end of the arms race, I am convinced, until there is agreement on effective measures for keeping the peace and for the peaceful settlement for disputes. And there will not be such agreements or the end of the arms race until people have been shown and become convinced that they can be protected and the peace can be kept by some better agents than their own national arms. The naturally military preoccupations of the Defense Department will not convince them of any such thing. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has so far been too much limited to arms reduction within a continuing arms system to inspire any such new convictions or understanding. A new approach is needed, such as is the purpose of this resolution.
This new approach must encompass, as does the concurrent resolution, the three fields of disarmament, peacekeeping, and peaceful settlement of disputes, which are inseparably essential to the establishment and maintenance of practical and lawful peace. The United Nations Charter, as presently understood and followed, has not yet produced effective authority in any of these three areas. It has done good pioneering work in all three, but not enough, and, at the age of 20, the United Nations has reached a point where, to continue to grow as the world's instrument of international order, it must strengthen itself in each of the three. This calls for more study and planning. All nations are called to contribute to this planning, with the same determination that went into the conference at San Francisco and which guided the preliminary conference which preceded it. This new planning, or replanning in these specific areas of the Charter's competence might result in amendments to the United Nations Charter ; it might lead to revision of the charter; it might lead merely to new and clearer and stronger interpretations and implementations of the charter as it is. In any case the planning must be done, and I hope that this country will contribute its best leadership potential to this planning. This concurrent resolution can provide the means.
In regard to the text of the concurrent resolution itself, I should like to suggest only two slight changes. At the beginning of section 2 (line 6, page 4) where "The President is hereby requested to formulate * * *” would it not be stronger to spell out that he is asked to appoint a special commission or agency-similar, perhaps, to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but separate from it, and from the Defense Department to help him formulate proposals? I would hope the President would appoint to such a group individuals who have devoted much time, effort, and thought to the task of building the institutions of a peaceful tomorrow.
Lastly, beginning at line 8, page 5, I suggest that the question the President is asked to consider, in the sentence which begins in line 12, page 4, would be more flexible and appropriate if the text were revised to read:
"* * * achieved through the fullest development of the possibilities of the United Nations Charter, through amendment or revision of the United Nations Charter, by a new treaty, or by more than one of these in combination.”
I urge, on behalf of the committees I represent, that the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate, adopt this concurrent resolution.
Senator CLARK. I understand that Mr. Stanley Andrews has agreed to postpone his statement until tomorrow, for which we are very grateful to you, Mr. Andrews.
Therefore, our last witness today will be Mr. John H. Eberly, of the Church of the Brethren, in Washington, D.C.
Mr. Eberly, would you come forward. Sorry to have kept you waiting so long. I appreciate your patience. We will put your testimony in the record in full. I will have to go in about 7 minutes to cast mv vote. The bell will ring and then I have 5 minutes to get there. So I will not interrupt you. You just go ahead in your own way.
STATEMENT OF JOHN H. EBERLY, WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE
FOR THE CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN
Mr. EBERLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize my paper.
EDUCATION FOR PEACE IS NECESSARY
We very much favor doing everything in the direction that we think resolution 32 points, but we believe that the problem is also basically, No. 1, a recognition of moral values. We believe that this has a place in this kind of consideration, and that as we believe such moral responsibility rests on individuals, we think there is also such a code that ought to apply to nations.
Two, that to secure peace by educating the world for peace, that the world must be educated for peace as well as providing the necessary instrumentality. We are not so sure but what this education for
peace of the two might be the more important.
Three, already in this testimony I have heard reference made to the fact that we talk peace so much more easily than we practice it, and we think there is a practical approach to this whole problem that we begin to emphasize putting into practice what we have preached so well. Peace is something like happiness, that you don't pursue directly as much as you pursue it through working for the things that make for peace.
Senator CLARK. Perhaps we never catch up with it.
No. 4, we believe that there are certain erroneous premises on which our national thinking and practice operates. One of these erroneous premises or ambivalents is that the way to peace is accomplished by military exercises. We believe that peace has its own processes, and that these processes must be pursued.
Another ambivalence is that diplomatic relations is severed with those countries with whom we are in disagreement. I would like to point out that a time when relationships ought to be strengthened and furthered is in times of disagreement. This is especially true in private and more individual relationships. Another ambivalence it seems to me that we have taught and practiced too long has to do with a balance of power in the world, and this is essentialy competition and not cooperation, and expresses itself in unilateral action, buildup of armaments, and so on.
A fifth point that summarizes what I have tried to write is that the world be educated to a global unity in which nationalism and its attending patriotism give way for something international.
Someone has aptly pointed out that should our global world be threatened by an attack from a world in outer space, that such world cooperation and patriotism would be suddenly embraced by all. Nationalism can give way without any loss of fervor or value to the larger unit of national states. This new order is needed now because our world is threatened by a common enemy, self-destruction as a result of our own sharp disunity.
Mr. Chairman, we want to support resolution 32 and hope that the Congress will refine for our Nation and for the world the best world organization for peace possible.
(The statement referred to follows:)
TESTIMONY BY JOHN H. EBERLY, WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE CHURCH
OF THE BRETHREN
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am John H. Eberly, speaking in behalf of the Brethren Service Commission of the Church of the Brethren in support of the planning-for-peace resolution. The Church of the Brethren is not a large denomination, having somewhere around 230,000 members in the United States and in India, Nigeria, and Ecuador. The church maintains membership in the World Council of Churches and in the National Council of Churches. It has carried on active programs throughout the world in material relief, student exchanges both on the high school and college levels, and a youth volunteer program since 1948, with an average of around 300 young people annually serving both in the United States and abroad.
The Brethren have considered peace a cardinal tenet of their faith from the beginning of their history. We take rather literally the teachings of the Judeo-Christian tradition that the time can and must come when “swords will be beat into plowshares and spears into pruning hooks."
We consider peace to be essential in three areas—peace with God or inner peace, peace with one's neighbors, and peace among nations in the world. The broader peace to which Resolution 32 is addressed cannot be fully achieved without personal morality, individual integrity, and good will for one's fellow men. However, we believe this moral basis of peace, all peace, cannot be considered only an individual matter but we also insist that governments must be equally moral.
I know that a common standard and definition of morality among nations will be hard to come by, but this must not deter any nation from following what it has learned to be honorable for itself and to put that into practice as much as it can in dealing with others. It will be discovered that honorable conduct is more universally recognized and accepted once a man or nation is committed to it.
We support Resolution 32 because it seems to get at the matter of peace both in the psychological buildup for peace in the world and in providing the necessary instrumentality for it. It is so obvious that no program can succeed without popular support in some measure. It is also obvious that the people may desire ever so much to have peace but be handicapped by lack of adequate means. It seems to us that both an educational program and an adequate organization must work close together in achieving world peace.
There is a tendency on the part of individuals and governments to stop with words and not proceed to put these words into practice. There is no subject that lends itself to more than and nicer words than does peace. The world has been for some time arrayed into two opposing and hostile camps, and it cannot be said which side talks peace more than the other. We are in favor of talking and we must have the words of peace, but what has been lacking is action favoring the things that make for peace. Events in the world are the result of this readiness to talk peace but at the same time to practice war.
There is an ambivalence in modern thinking and practice regarding war and peace. I refer to such theories as military preparedness—the way to peace, or negotiation from military strength, and the claims for nuclear deterrence. These may get some results that are desirable for the moment but these have a dangerous and false character. The present policy of the United States and most of its people is to entrust our peace to the military and to military proresses. Here is where the overwhelming bulk of national resources and national security is invested.
There is certainly a separation of war and peace in history, in the human mind and in actual fact that these assumptions violate. Peace is another way of life and is to be achieved by its own processes, and these cannot be the same processes that are common to war and the military. We do not secure real and lasting peace by armaments though we do recognize limited need for force in maintaining basic world order. Such force must be administered by a multilateral organization if it is to have any peacekeeping value.
A second ambivalence relates to diplomatic relations. There is no support in modern progressive public relations to support the termination of diplomatic relations as a means of working out a difficult disagreement. It is during times of such lack of communication that suspicion, hatred, and military buildup takes place which prolong and make more difficult an eventual settlement