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between the Soviet Union and the United States which might lead to the breakup of the United Nations.

Conciliation efforts have not succeeded but they have not finally failed. It seems a pity that in a period of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was not possible to find practical means and measures of meeting the United Nations' deficit so that the Assembly could get on with its work without being bogged down in legalisms. With a little give and take a practical settlement might have been reached without resolving the controversial legal issues which have been unduly and unnecessarily exploited. Neither the Court's advisory opinion nor article 19 need stand in the way of a practical settlement. To reach a practical settlement it is not necessary to accept or reject the Court's opinion.

It is important to recall just what the Court did and did not advise: Not that the General Assembly may not finance peacekeeping by voluntary contributions, indeed both UNEF and ONUC are partially financed by voluntary contributions; not that the General Assembly may not authorize states particularly interested to assume the preponderant burden as was the case in Korea and later in Cyprus and Yemen. The Court merely advised that the General Assembly had the charter power, and had exercised it in the case of UNEF and ONUC, to impose obligatory assessments to defray the cost of peacekeeping.

But the Court did not decide that at this stage of international organization in the world where states are still inordinately jealous of their sovereignty that it was wise statesmanship to finance peacekeeping on the basis of obligatory assessments. A political body whose powers are essentially recommendatory should hesitate, particularly in the absence of Great Power unity and an overwhelming consensus, to require sovereign states to finance actions which they oppose and which they cannot be required to participate in or assist directly. It is frequently asserted that the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations will not be undertaken if there is no power of obligatory assessment. I doubt this. Peacekeeping will not and should not be authorized unless the states supporting such action are willing to support or to find support for it. Obviously much of the social and economic work of United Nations and its specialized agencies could not and would not be carried out on other than an essentially voluntary basis.

It is no accident that both the United States and United Kingdom last summer (1964) proposed to the Working Group of the Assembly, which was studying methods for financing peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures, a special procedure for handling such financing in the General Assembly. They joined in proposing that in the future in apportioning expenses for peacekeeping operations the General Assembly acts only on the recommendation of a special finance committee which should include the permanent members of the Security Council and a relatively high percentage of member states in each geographical area that are large financial contributors to the United Nations. They further proposed that such recommendation be made only on a two-thirds vote of the committee membership. (U.N. Doc. A/AC 113/30, Sept. 14, 1964.) These proposals 1 am sure, are designed not simply to offer some protection in the future to the Soviet Union but to other large contributors including the United States and the United Kingdom against being assessed for operations which they oppose and in which they cannot be forced to participate directly. At this stage of international organization, it is neither wise statesmanship nor practical politics to expect States to be able to get substantial appropriations from their national legislatures to finance international operations to which they are opposed. At this stage of international organization states must learn to cooperate voluntarily before they seek to enforce cooperation from recalcitrant states.

The long period of watchful waiting during which the 19th Assembly did nothing, clearly indicates that the member States do not want the future of the organization to depend upon whether the application of article 19 to the Soviet Union under the present state of accounts is or is not automatic. They do not want to offend the United States which has been the financial mainstay of the United Nations and the political champion of its expanding role in world affairs. On the other hand they recognize that the United Nations cannot be a worldwide organization for peace if the Soviet Union is to be deprived of its vote. The members do not want the United Nations to be stalled in its tracks. They want to find a way to get on with its work.

Had a way not been found to adjourn the Assembly until next September (1965), the President of the Assembly would undoubtedly have refrained from ruling on his own responsibility on the automatic application of article 19. He would undoubtedly have asked the advice of the member States. They also would have sought a way to avoid making a decision on application of article 19. If need be, a majority might have voted to make this an important question requiring a two-thirds vote under article 18(3). In that case it would have been unlikely that any decision could command a two-thirds vote and efforts to find an accommodation or compromise would have had to be resumed.

A new Committee of 33 has been established by the Assembly and is instructed in consultation with the President and Secretary General to review the whole question of peacekeeping operations, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the organization and report by June 15, 1965. It is to be hoped that during the adjournment the Committee of 33 will find a way out of the morass. It really should not be difficult if the Committee recognizes its job is to break the deadlock and not to vindicate a theory. The legal questions need not stand in the way of an acceptable and workable accommodation. The Committee need not question the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. It need not decide whether the application of article 19 is or is not automatic. The Committee might well recommend that, in light of the practical difficulties encountered which have paralyzed the work of the 19th session, the Assembly should reconsider the nature of the assessments levied for UNEF and ONUC. It might suggest that without prejudice to its charter powers and without prejudice to the advisory opinion of the Court, the Assembly should declare the assessments to be recommendatory and nonmandatory while urging all States to meet their share of such assessments. The States which voted for these assessments should naturally feel morally bound to meet their share. Should some States fail to meet their quota, for reasons which to them seem compelling, they should be urged to contribute a substantially equivalent amount to other operations of the United Nations so that the overall costs of the United Nations may be equitably shared by its members. Should there remain a deficit in meeting the costs of UNEF and ONUC, a special appeal should be made for voluntary contributions to make up the deficit.

If the Assembly is prepared to recognize the unwisdom at this stage of international organization of attempting to make its assessments for special peacekeeping operations obligatory, there should be reason to hope that the Soviet Union and France would voluntarily meet their assessments or make substantially equivalent contributions to other essential activities of the United Nations. In the absence of special circumstances, States which do not contribute to special peacekeeping operations should not be entitled to a voice in the administration of such operations. Of course, it may be a bit messy to reconsider the mandatory character of a partially executed plan of assessments. But it is better to offend the purists than to let the Assembly be stalemated.

It is to be regretted, as I have indicated, that in a period of relative detente between the West and the Soviet Union a negotiated settlement has been so difficult to achieve. It is particularly regrettable that the work of the Assembly should have been stalled over the financing of peacekeeping operations because it has been in the field of peacekeeping as an aid to peaceful settlement that the most promising developments in the United Nations in recent years have occurred. It was somewhat reassuring to note that the cold war debate was less acrimonious than usual and that the membership as a whole calmly exerted their influence to mediate the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union and to prevent a self-defeating confrontation over article 19. Despite the unsuccessful attempt of Albania to precipitate the confrontation, the many new, small, and weak members acted with a sense of responsibility and restraint. The admission of many new small States has created problems which cannot be ignored. But the seriousness of these problems can be greatly minimized if the larger States take the lead in developing practices and procedures which encourage and promote the use of the Assembly not as a forum for fighting cold wars, but for ending them.

With the admission of many new and relatively weak states it becomes theoretically possible for the General Assembly to vote for action for which the voting majority would bear little or no responsibility or burden. It must be remembered, however, that action of the General Assembly is recommendatory and not mandatory. Its effectiveness must depend upon its appeal to the judgment and interests of states. Indeed, democratic states cannot be expected to

assist actively in carrying out programs to which their people are strongly opposed. It must be recognized that voting in the Assembly on the basis of the sovereign equality of states does not automatically reflect world power, world wealth, or world wisdom. Member states may be expected to give good faith consideration to the Assembly's recommendation, but they are not bound to act against their own better judgment nor to ignore the fact that a numerical majority may in some instances not be truly representative of informed world opinion.

When the cold war was at its height there was excessive emphasis on voting and a misguided attempt to exaggerate the significance of a mere numerical majority. At this stage of international organization a vote which requires action can become effective only if it moves to action states which have the will and power to act. A vote will command respect not by the mere number of states back of it but by the worldwide feelings or sentiments it reflects, by the worldwide response or reaction to events it evokes, and by the influence it brings to bear on the actions of the states to which it is addressed. Many closely divided votes may only serve to strengthen divisions rather than to develop a consensus.

Small states cannot expect to dictate to the more powerful states what they must do. On the other hand small states also have their rights, and large states cannot claim the right to act in areas in which small states are concerned without explaining and justifying their action. As President Roosevelt stated in his last state of the Union message on January 6, 1945, when the charter of the United Nations was being drafted: “We cannot deny that power is a factor in world politics any more than we can deny that power is a factor in national politics. But in a democratic world, as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good." And the power of which President Roosevelt was speaking was power which was something more than transient military force.

For the United Nations to function effectively with its present membership at this state of international organization, greater reliance must be placed on procedures for peaceful settlement through conciliatory processes. Less reliance should be placed on voting on volatile political issues which in the absence of a clear consensus cannot be resolved by a vote.

In emphasizing the flexibility of the charter and its adaptability to “exigencies"-to paraphrase the remarks of Justice Holmes in reference to the American Constitution, "which could not have been completely foreseen by the most gifted of its begetters"-I do not wish to rule out all charter amendments. I only warn that we must exploit the potentialities of the present charter in order to develop a broader and deeper feeling of worldwide community which must precede any meaningful charter change. As we broaden the areas of consensus, we increase the possibility of strengthening the charter by amendement.

Amendments to the charter enlarging the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council have been proposed by the 18th General Assembly (resolutions 1991 A and B (xviii) Dec. 17, 1963). The Security Council amendment would enlarge the Security Council to 15 members. Of the 10 nonpermanent members, 5 would come from Africa and Asia, 1 from Eastern Europe, 2 from Latin America, and 2 from Western Europe and elsewhere. The Economic and Social Council amendment would enlarge ECOSOC to 27 members, of which 9 would be elected each year for 3-year terms. Seven of nine elected each year would come from Africa and Asia, one from Latin America, and one from Western Europe.

A larger Security Council and ECOSOC would appear desirable in order to reflect a broader spectrum of world opinion. But it would seem to me that if the Security Council is to be enlarged there should be provision to insure that not less than one-third of its membership are drawn from a middle group of states which, while not among the original permanent members of the Council, are large financial contributors. This middle group might constitute a class of additional permanent members without power of veto or at least an additional class of members eligible for successive reelection. This middle group should include states like India, Japan, Brazil, Italy, Germany, and, possibly Nigeria.

Moreover, if the Security Council is to be enlarged in order to obtain a more balanced representation it would seem to be desirable if not necessary at the same time to provide for a better balanced distribution of voting power in the General Assembly. In light of the great disparity of power between the relatively small number of large States and the large number of small States some change in the distribution of voting power in the Assembly is important to maintain the influence of the General Assembly and to give meaning and power to its resolutions. It is likewise important to maintain the capacity of the As

sembly to act responsibly-to represent power as well as numbers-when the veto forestalls action in the Security Council. But it is not easy to find any acceptable principle of weighted voting to impose on the principle of sovereign equality of States. A dual voting system perhaps affords the best way of reconciling the sovereign equality of States with a responsibly balanced power structure. It might conceivably be possible if and when the great powers consent to an enlarged and better balanced Security Council that the smaller powers would concurrently consent to a dual voting system in the General Assembly whereby ordinary resolutions in the General Assembly would require a double majority vote a majority of all members and a majority of those States in the Assembly which are represented on the enlarged Security Council. Then important resolutions of the Assembly would require a two-thirds majority of the whole membership and a two-thirds majority of those States in the Assembly which are members of the Security Council. This is a form of weighted voting which avoids the need for weighing the votes of individual States. It should create a better relationship between the Security Council and the Assembly and at the same time increase the effective influence of the Assembly on the Security Council.

But desirable as some amendments may be, we must not let the obstacles in the way of attaining them blind us to the potentialities of the present charter which is and was designed to be adaptable to changing conditions and unforeseen exigencies. The means which may be most effective for carrying out the charter purposes when the great powers are working together may not be the most effective means when they are in conflict. The most effective means of carrying out the charter objectives at one stage in the growth of international organization may not be the most effective means at a different and more advanced stage. The charter is broad in scope and allows a wide measure of choice of means. It is for each generation to have the wisdom and imagination to choose the appropriate means and procedures for keeping the peace in its time.

At the present time the important thing is to find the means which enable the member States to cooperate to the maximum extent to keep the peace within the frame and law of the charter. The important thing is not to impose the will of a majority of States on a minority of States but to provide an environment and a procedure for composing or containing differences among States before they erupt into war. The peaceful settlement of disputes requires not armies but wisdom and vision. Long ago in the days of Solomon, it was said that "Where there is no vision the people perish." Let us hope that in this nuclear age vision is not lacking when without vision life on this planet may cease to exist.

Mr. COHEN. I will do that.

I appear, as you have stated, at the request of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy to express their wholehearted support of this resolution. The committee has found in its work for a sane nuclear policy that the establishment of institutions to keep the peace and to provide procedures for peaceful settlement is an essential part of their work. You cannot have a sane nuclear policy in a world that does not have some institutions that lend themselves effectively to the maintenance of peace.


We have recently experienced serious international crisis after international crisis. The use of force in international affairs which was supposed to have been outlawed by the Charter of the United Nations seems to have been lost sight of or found in practice by many of the great powers not to work to their satisfaction. The result is, I think, that very serious questions have to be decided unilaterally in an emergency almost overnight. I am sure those responsible for those decisions in the past, whether they be in Vietnam or in Cuba, have not been happy with their past, with the necessity of making overnight deci

sions that might affect the welfare of our Nation for generations to


But such decisions cannot be avoided unless we review, as this resolution provides, our plans for peace. It is one thing if we deliberately forsake the effort to establish peace on a collective international basis. It is another thing if we revert consciously to unilateral action and anarchy in the field of international affairs. I do not think that condition is wanted by anyone on serious reflection. Certainly not by any responsible leader in our country.


Another thing that speaks most loudly for this resolution is the disproportionate resources we are devoting to the building up of military power to those resources that we are devoting to building up institutions to maintain the peace and to provide for peaceful settlement. We have, not only in government but more or less on the fringe of government, institutions like the Rand School, like the Institute for Defense Analysis, great contracts given to our universities throughout the country, and the great majority of these contracts deal with the problem of military power directly or indirectly.

I am sure that is a great deal of constructive thought that can be tapped in this country for the building of peace if we go after it, and that is your task and our task.

Senator CLARK. May I interrupt for a moment, Mr. Cohen, to point out that when the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which has been under some attack here today-perhaps some of it justifiedundertook to use its relatively small resources to have some studies done along the lines of planning for peace, it came under serious criticism from members of this committee, and as a result of the fact that a majority of the members of this committee thought its activities were quixotic and utopian, the request of the President for a 4year continued organization, and authorization of $55 million, was cut down in committee to 2 years and $20 million, and only because the House stood firmer was some part of that authorization restored.

I make that comment because it seems to me that we have a real obligation in this committee and in the Senate to recognize the validity of what you are saying.

Mr. COHEN. I only would urge reconsideration of some of your committee's action, and reconsideration not just in the sense of restoring past requests for appropriation, but consideration of the best way of procedure. I think your present resolution has the advantage of centering responsibility on the White House for the development of these studies, that is the Disarmament Agency is in sort of an ambiguous and equivocal position as it moves into the diplomatic area. Most of their studies in some ways have been related to arms control, and while the committee for which I speak in my own interest is not foreign to the field of arms control, there are many aspects of the international situation that go quite beyond arms control, and I hope special attention to these problems, with the authority of the White House back of them, will be productive of great results.

Senator CLARK. Again to intervene only briefly in support of the Agency, I think they have done a first-class job in connection with the

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