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Diem. With the backing of Dulles, the Diem regime refused to permit the free elections of 1956 by means of which the Geneva accords had provided for the reunification of North and South Vietnam.

In both Laos and South Vietnam, the Dulles policies failed. In Laos, the leftist Pathet Lao insurrection led to civil war, to the overthrow of the pro-Western government, and to the precarious reestablishment of a neutralist government under Souvanna Phouma. In South Vietnam, the Diem government failed to win the allegiance of a people deeply divided by religious and regional cleavages. The oppressive, police state rule of a Catholic mandarin urban clique led to a rebellion in which, being the most militant and best organized of the dissident forces, the Communist Vietcong gained the leadership. This rebellion continued to grow in strength after Diem was overthrown and a succession of military dictatorships likewise failed to enlist the support of the majority of the populace.

The Kennedy-Johnson administrations have been trapped into continuing the Asian policies of Dulles. Under President Kennedy, the United States sent an increasing number of American military personnel to Vietnam in the guise of military advisers. This was a further violation of the Geneva accords which forbade the stationing of foreign military personnel in the neutralized countries. Under President Johnson, U.S. troops became overtly active participants in the conflict and their numbers were increased. Faced, nevertheless, with a continuing rise in the Vietcong insurgency and a continuously deteriorating political situation in Saigon, the Johnson administration decided, in February 1965, to carry the war to North Vietnam on the theory that the rebellion could be finally subdued only if North Vietnam ceased to aid, supply, and direct the South Vietnamese insurgents. A State Department white paper attempted to demonstrate the validity of this theory.

The known facts contradict much of the white paper.

It is true that Hanoi has violated the Geneva accords by supporting both Pathet Lao and the Vietcong. But it cannot be denied that the United States, too, has violated the agreements.

As for the arming of the guerrillas and the infiltration of cadres from the North the amount of arms supplied to the Vietcong by Hanoi has so far been vastly less than that furnished to Saigon by Washington. The Vietcong's most effective source of arms has been the capture of American weapons surrendered or abandoned by the halfhearted South Vietnamese Government forces. It is at least doubtful whether North Vietnamese infiltrators have been as numerous as the American personnel sent to the aid of Saigon. Moreover, the Communist infiltrators from the North are Vietnamese-not Western foreigners-and a major cause of the Saigon government's weakness has been its growing dependence upon what Asians consider neocolonialist or neoimperialist American support.

As for the contention that the Vietcong insurrection is directed by Hanoi which, in turn, is directed by Peiping, this Pentagon-State Department fiction can be believed only by one who is wholly unfamiliar with the historical background of Indo-Chinese relations with China. The Vietnamese people of both north and south fought for and gained their independence from European colonial rule. They will fight for their independence against any attempt on the part of China to reestablish its ancient overlordship. Ironically, much as the French handed over an essentially nationalist revolution to Communist leadership, so we may now be driving a reluctant Hanoi into the arms of Peiping.

It is high time to shake off the misconceptions of the past and the policies which derive from them.

We know now that there is no global Communist monolith. We know that there is a wide cleavage between the two great Communist powers. The Soviet Union has become more of a "have" than a "have-not" nation; through fear of nuclear war, it has become less aggressive; it has not abandoned the "Socialist" struggle against "capitalist imperialism," but it now seeks to transfer that struggle out of the military and into the politico-economic arena. China, still largely a "have-not" nation, rejects "peaceful coexistence" as a surrender to "capitalist-imperialism."

Our discriminating anticommunism prevents the Soviet Union from taking a strong hand in establishing the sovereign independence of the Indo-Chinese States. Our present policy drives not only Hanoi but Moscow toward Peiping. We have failed to learn to distinguish among aggressive, nonaggressive, and independently neutralist Communist governments. Yugoslavia has a Communist government, but Yugoslavia is certainly not a threat to the peace of Europe. A Titoist Vietnam, with its independence and neutrality underwritten by the United

States, the Soviet Union, India, and the United Nations, would be no menace to peace in Asia. It would, in fact, be the strongest possible barrier to Chinese expansion in the southeast.

Some of President Johnson's advisers apparently believe that war with China is inevitable and that we had better have it now than later. It is heartening that the President rejects this view. But it is disturbing that one of the President's closest advisers still talks not about halting aggression but about halting communism in Asia. On February 18, 1965, shortly after the bombing of North Vietnam began, Defense Secretary McNamara said: "The choice is not simply whether to continue our efforts to keep South Vietnam free and independent but, rather whether to continue our efforts to halt communism in Asia."

President Johnson has made it abundantly clear that he earnestly and sincerely seeks peace. He will not be able to achieve peace unless he unequivocally repudiates the bankrupt Dulles doctrine and rejects the specious pretenses by which the Pentagon and the State Department have sought to rationalize our past failure and to justify the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Nor will the President achieve the peace he earnestly seeks so long as he refuses to negotiate with the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam as well as with Hanoi. The war which he seeks to end began as and still is a civil war; it cannot be ended without talking to the indigenous leaders of the revolt as well as to their external supporters.

Beyond the need for developing concretely the generous and constructive approaches to the stabilization and betterment of all of southeast Asia, which the President wisely and eloquently suggested in his April 7 address at Johns Hopkins University, three specific modifications of U.S. policy are now required: 1. Willingness to include rebel leadership in negotiations for a cease-fire and a peace settlement.

2. Willingness to support all-Vietnamese free elections on the sole condition that the sovereign independence and neutrality of an all-Vietnamese Government, no matter what its ideological complexion, be guaranteed by the major powers, including China and the Soviet Union. (This would prove our sincerity in claiming that we want nothing more than the reestablishment of the Geneva Accords of 1954-a sincerity open to question because of Washington's reluctance to see Vietnam reunified for fear that an all-Vietnamese Government might be Communist-dominated, as, indeed, it probably would be.)

3. Cessation of attacks upon North Vietnam: Even if the bombing of North Vietnam were to be wholly successful in interdicting the flow of men and material to the Vietcong, it would not end the Vietcong insurrection. The insurgents have ample manpower and would continue to capture American weapons from the Saigon Government's forces so long as that Government remained unrepresentative and foreign supported. On the other hand, the bombing of North Vietnam alienates our friends and the unalined neutral countries, stiffens Communist resistance and solidarity, and prevents the Soviet Union from playing its part in keeping southeast Asia free from Chinese domination.

These three modifications of Washington's present policy may reasonably be expected to be welcomed by most of the world's nations, including the unalined nations, the Soviet Union and those Communist governments which follow Soviet leadership.

In the present state of exacerbated Chinese-American relations, Peiping may well reject this or any other proposal coming from Washington. But, if Peiping does reject a proposal embodying the above three points, it will demonstrate the falsity of its claim to being the protector of all liberation movements from American imperialism. The proposal would show the world that the United States stands squarely on the side of all nations seeking independent sovereignty, no matter what their ideology, provided only that they refrain from aggression against other nations.



Mr. WARBURG. 2. Largely because of our escalation of the war southeast Asia, progress toward a relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union has been arrested. Unless last year's promising progress is resumed, it is unlikely that any meaningful agreements in the direction of disarmament can be reached.

3. Failure to achieve a relaxation of tensions between Washington and Moscow, and our failure to take the initiative in seeking an allEuropean security agreement and a settlement of the German problem have given President de Gaulle the opportunity to enter into a flirtation with Moscow which may well have serious consequences. (In repeated testimony before this committee over the years, and in many published writings, I have warned against this eventuality and urged a drastic modification of our obsolete European policy, most recently in a pamphlet "Time for Statesmanship"-sent to the members of this committee last January.)

4. Whereas progress in abating East-West tensions in Europe might have resulted in an agreement with Moscow to embargo shipments of arms to the turbulent Middle East, the recent deterioration of relations between Washington and Moscow has resulted in the opposite development. Moscow is now sending or offering arms to some of the Arab States, and the United States has recently reached the decision to supply arms to both sides in the explosive Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Senator CHURCH. May I say that that is not contrary to established American policy. We are supplying arms to both sides in the Pakistan-Indian dispute and to both sides in the Greek-Turkey dispute though both countries have come to the edge of war frequently in the past several years. This is merely in line with policy well established. Now we extend the principle to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Senator CLARK. It does not necessarily mean the policy is right. Senator CHURCH. I did not want you to get that inference from my remark.


5. The escalation of the war in Vietnam has further exacerbated our already hostile relations with the Chinese People's Republic, thereby raising new obstacles toward bringing China into the disarmament talks and into cooperation in establishing institutions capable of preserving peace.

6. Finally, our intervention last week in the Dominican crisis has raised new doubts as to our Government's determination to establish enduring peace through the creation of a law-abiding community of nations.

It is now clear that President Johnson's decision to send troops into the Dominican Republic was due not only to the normal desire to protect the lives and property of United States and other foreign nationals but also to a political purpose-namely, to prevent a Communist takeover of the Dominican revolution.

This action clearly contravened article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States which forbids any member to send its armed forces into the country of another member for any reason whatsoever. The violation might have been overlooked by our Latin American neighbors and by other nations, had the action been taken solely to protect foreign residents, but the President's frank avowal of an additional political purpose raises a question which goes to the heart of the resolution that we are discussing here today. That question is:

How does the United States intend to relate to the world? Does it intend to rely upon the kind of laws and institutions with the creation

of which this resolution is concerned? Or does it intend in the absence or even in the presence of such laws and institutions to assert the right to use its military power to defend what it conceives to be its own interests when it conceives these interests to be threatened?

The essence of the resolution we are discussing is that the United States intends to foster the growth of a world community governed by international or supranational law; that an essential element in this law shall be to prohibit the interference by any one state in the affairs of another; and that, pending the creation of such a law-abiding community, all nations, great or small, shall abide by this fundamental principle.

President Johnson's recent statements, on the other hand, imply that the United States intends to revive the Monroe Doctrine, plus something like Theodore Roosevelt's well-known corollary to that doctrine-namely, that Latin America lies in the sphere of vital interest of the United States and that the United States will use armed force, if necessary, to prevent any social revolution in Latin America from being inspired or taken over by Communist leaders hostile to the United States. It is clear that the President would prefer to have Communist attempts to seize power thwarted by the concerted action of the members of OAS but, failing such concerted action, the United States will, he says, not hesitate to act alone.


Now it is quite possible to make a case, as Walter Lippmann recently did, for the contention that diplomacy aimed at reducing tensions in the world must recognize that all the major powers have vital interests in areas close to their own territories and that, in such areas, they will not tolerate hostile governments. But, if this is to be the basis of our diplomatic search for peace, what, Mr. Chairman, are we doing in Vietnam? How do we reconcile a U.S. or an OAS Monroe Doctrine for this hemisphere with an attempt to create and maintain governments hostile to China on China's doorstep? How do we reconcile a sphere of influence policy with our assumption of global responsibility for the containment of communism?

Our adventures in southeast Asia and in the Caribbean contradict each other; and both seem to me to contradict the essential elements of the resolution we are considering.

I believe in the essential elements of this resolution. That is why I am supporting it. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency thinks the time not right for specific proposal. I disagree. The framers of the resolution are profoundly right in asking the President at this time to define clearly what he thinks the relation of the United States to the world should be.

In my judgment, the whereas clauses of this resolution might well include an additional clause pointing out that our interventions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic have raised legitimate doubts as to the objectives of the United States and the compatibility of these objectives with the creation of a law-abiding world community of nations; and that these doubts must be dispelled.

I thank you for this opportunity to present my views.
Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you very much, Mr. Warburg.

Senator Church?

Senator CHURCH. I want to say, Mr. Warburg, I appreciate having your statement. I always read your writings in the field of foreign policy with a great deal of interest. I concur in what you have said that there is an essential contradiction in the way in which we conduct our policy in the Caribbean and our policy in southeast Asia. I personally feel that the United States does have interests of such special importance in the Caribbean that the policy there might very well differ from policy in Asia or in Africa or in some more distant part of the globe, particularly in view of the Cuban experience 2 years ago when the island was converted into a Russian missile base, and the safety of the American Nation was directly endangered. However, I find it hard to reconcile our assertion of right in the Caribbean with the doctrine that seems to govern American policy in southeast Asia.

Mr. WARBURG. This is my point.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, I understand it, and I only want to say I think that your point is logically irrefutable. As you know, I have had misgivings about the policy in southeast Asia. As to the Caribbean, I feel that the President asserted an American prerogative in the sea which washes our southern shores, and I am hopeful now that we will proceed with the discharge of the special responsibility we have assumed through our intervention in the Dominican Republic to see to it that free elections are speedily held so that the process of self-determination can give the people of that independent country an opportunity to form a government of their own choice.

If we do, then I think that we can stand before the American republics and before the world in having in fact restored the process of selfdetermination which either a military junta or a Communist government would never give the people of the island. If we fail to do that, then I think the charge of gunboat diplomacy can be revived against this country and that charge would in that circumstance be warranted.

So what happens in the coming weeks and months will either vindicate the steps that the President has taken in the Caribbean or cause tremendous problems in our relationships with the other American republics in the years to come.

I did not want to make a speech, but I simply wanted to put my views again on record with respect to the Dominican situation.

Mr. WARBURG. May I make a point on what you have just said? Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. WARBURG. If we had not been so lax in preparing the ground, having plans, the OAS would have been in a position to do its job, and we would not have to do it. This is a beautiful example of how our planning always lags behind what is happening in the world.

Senator CHURCH. I think I agree with that. I think that this Dominican crisis points up the weakness in the machinery of the OAS, and I personally should like to see us attempt now to change that machinery in such a way that the American Republics will be able to cope with problems of this kind on a basis of collective responsibility rather than on the basis of unilateral American action.

I think that perhaps the Congress itself, through a sense of the Congress resolution, might be able to give us a push in that direction. Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Clark.

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