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ernment, we have an opportunity to take a new look at virtually every field of international cooperation from the problem of a peace force to the problem of a world weather watch or the international telecommunications business.

Senator CLARK. Do you not think there is some value in having encouragement for all of these efforts from the Congress of the United States? That, of course, is in effect what this resolution is intended to do.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think there is no doubt that it is helpful to be encouraged in this and to have a restatement of the basic goal of American policy. As I say in the statement, the purpose of our present activities is described in the Resolution, "to support the President in his efforts to achieve peace and disarmament under legally effective controls and to develop international institutions capable of permanently keeping the peace."

That is practically a job description of your two Government witnesses this morning, among others.

Senator CLARK. I assume that you do not have any difficulty with the preambles to the resolution, do you? They are largely statements of fact.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, I think there may be a little editing and possibly some additional references that are also helpful.

Senator CLARK. Would you give us the benefit of your thinking on that, not now, but at a later time?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I would be glad to.

Senator CLARK. Then I take it you agree with section 1, and perhaps your principal problem is with section 2. Perhaps you would let us know what you would like to have done to section 2.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think it is the specific task that is established for the President in this rather special frame that excludes almost everything we are now doing because it excludes organic growth of international organization.

Senator CLARK. I do not have any objection-I am sure the other members of the committee would not, maybe I should not speak for them-in including in section 2 organic growth. Personally I take a very dim view of its practicality, but certainly it is an alternative, and there is no reason in the world why it should not be stated.

Mr. CLEVELAND. It may be-it is so far at least-the only available alternative for making progress in a world that contains the Soviet Union and a few others who believe more passionately in unfettered national discretion than is probably technologically feasible any more. Senator CLARK. If you will excuse my saying so and I know you will take it in the lighter vein in which it is intended-I think your arguments are probably those which were made at the Constitutional Convention called in Philadelphia in 1787 in support of the Articles of Confederation and in opposition to the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, I would not be surprised, but I think that I would also suggest that if we take that analogy, that those who argued within the first 10, 20, or 30 years of the U.S. Constitution that the thing to do was to scrap the whole document and start all over again were perhaps not so well advised as those who said:

This is a pretty flexible document. Why do we not see what kind of a country we can build under this document?

Senator CLARK. Again you are stating what I did not state as though I had stated it. I do not have the slightest desire, and I am sure none of the members of the committee do, to scrap the U.N. Charter. We just think it can stand some revision on reasonably drastic grounds.

You will remember the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation. It was decided after they gave it some pretty careful thought-the kind of thought we would like to have given by the executive branch under this resolution-that it would be better to start afresh.

Now the conclusion at this time might be quite different, but I think our problem is that we are afraid this sort of timid approach will not get us anywhere in time to save the world from destruction.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, I share the sense of urgency, and the worry that technology, particularly nuclear technology and delivery possibilities and so forth and proliferation of nuclear weapons, may move out from under us. But I do not think the primary limiting factor is the absence of intellectual activity in the executive branch of the U.S. Federal Government.

I think that the primary problem is the difficulty of getting other countries to go even the first few steps, let alone the 17th or 170th step.


Senator CLARK. Let me take mild issue with you so you can have an opportunity to rebut. I do not doubt that the intellectual activity in the executive branch is substantial and able and continuous. What bothers me is that from where I sit and I may not sit in the right place your activity is directed almost entirely to ad hoc solutions of immediate and pressing problems, to the next crisis in the United Nations, whether it be article 19 or a meeting of the Security Council to condemn us for our Dominican activity. But there is very little longrange planning being done, and you tell me that I am wrong, either in your part of the State Department or in the policy planning staff or the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, because you are so intent on brushfires at the next meeting in Geneva.

You can remember the day-though this was before you came in the Government-when we went to a disarmament conference in Geneva in complete disarray because my good friend and yours, Fred Eaton, who had been brought in to head our delegation, came down here and said, "What do you want me to do?" and everybody said, "I do not know."

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think we have made an enormous amount of progress though since then. I think that was indeed a scandalous state of affairs, as I am at liberty to say so because I was not in the Government at the time. But I really do not think that it correctly describes what is going on in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and in my office and in other offices of the State Department, to say that we do not do a lot of long-range planning. We do not publish a great deal of long-range planning. But some of the long-range planning sees the light of day as judgments about how to handle a current crisis in such a way as to leave a residue of international machinery that was not previously there. If you will look at the his

tory-as you have, I am sure-of each of the crises that the U.N. has handled, I think that you will agree that at least in the last 4 years with which I am intimately familiar, each of these crises has been handled quite consciously from the point of view of trying not only to settle the specific tactical problem that was involved, but trying also to use the crisis to develop precedents, to develop law, to develop institutions which would make it less likely that the same kind of crisis would create the same kind of violence the next time around.

Even in the current Dominican affair, there has been a lot of talk over a long period of time about the possibility of regional peace forces, but the occasion of the Dominican thing has now been taken to try this out in the real world. Both Ambassador Bunker and the Secretary of State have already said publicly that they would hope the thinking that goes into this specific matter might lead to some discussion of the possibility of a more perfect system of peacekeeping machinery in our own hemisphere.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, sir. I do not want to cut you short. Do you think you have had a fair chance to express your views? Please do anything further you want.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think, assuming that the the statement is going to be part of your record in any case, I am certainly satisfied if you


Senator CLARK. You are content to let it go at that.

Thank you very much, Mr. Cleveland. I am deeply grateful to you. I know that you will take the criticism in the spirit in which it is intended, which is really to say that I think you are doing a wonderful job down there, and I hope you stay a long time.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Thank you, sir.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Fisher, you will come forward, please?


Mr. FISHER. You have my prepared statement. Senator CLARK. Which will be printed in the record. (Mr. Fisher's statement in full follows:)


Mr. Chairman, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency warmly welcomes the support which Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 gives to the President's "efforts to achieve peace and disarmament under legally effective controls and to develop international institutions capable of permanently keeping the peace.' Moreover, we believe that the resolution is useful in restating the necessary relationship between comprehensive disarmament and the establishment of effective means for verification and for keeping the peace.

The overall goals sought by the resolution are disarmament and peace. These have been the best hopes of mankind almost since the beginning of recorded history. They were recently well articulated by the Congress when the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created, and I quote:

"An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law, and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully."

President Johnson has repeatedly given strong support to these objectives. He is responsible for the submission to the 1964 sessions of the Geneva Dis

armament Conference of more concrete proposals for safeguarded and realistic agreements than have been made to any such conference in any year since World War II. He has instructed the Agency to leave no stone unturned in its search for new proposals to submit to the Geneva Conference when it reconvenes in 1965, as we hope it will.

By word and deed he has repeatedly expressed his support for the Agency and the objectives of disarmament and peace. This is amply demonstrated by the memorandum submitted to this committee on April 29 by Secretary Rusk. Section 2 of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 requests the President to formulate proposals for the establishment of an international authority to keep the peace under conditions of general and complete disarmament. Since 1962 the Geneva Conference has had before it a U.S. proposal entitled "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." This plan has been amplified in statements by U.S. representatives to the Conference in 1962, 1963, and 1964. The plan and the statements contain numerous U.S. proposals which seem to me to be of the kind described in the resolution as relating to "international machinery for the supervision of disarmament and the maintenance of peace."

Specifically, the resolution calls first for proposals for an "International Disarmament Organization." The U.S. plan contains several pages of proposals concerning an International Disarmament Organization, and statements have been made on it by the U.S. representatives. Of course, the exact nature of any international organization responsible for monitoring a disarmament treaty will depend upon the nature of the disarmament steps agreed upon, the parties, and the kind of verification system to be utilized. Proposals cannot, therefore, be too detailed until a greater consensus has been achieved on these matters. We are, however, giving continuing study to the kinds of organization which might monitor a comprehensive test ban treaty, a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic bombers and missiles, major arms reduction measures and comprehensive disarmament. Such studies have been and are being made by ACDA staff and by ACDA contractors. For instance, we have just begun a study on the subject by a group of experts in the practical problems of international organizational arrangements-including a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Second, the resolution calls for proposals for a World Peace Force. The U.S. plan contains proposals in each of its three stages relating to a U.N. Peace Force. Given the lack of consensus that exists on this subject at the present time, little use would probably be served in being more specific now. We are continuing, however, to give time and attention to staff and contract studies on this subject. Not long ago, for example, the Agency entered into a contract for detailed exploration of the experience of a recent U.N. Peace Force,

Third, the resolution calls for proposals for world tribunals for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes not settled by negotiation. The U.S. plan calls for utilization of arbitration, mediation, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly, or other peaceful means in addition to negotiation. It contains several specific provisions with respect to the International Court of Justice. It has been my observation that many institutions for peaceful settlement of international disputes already exist, but that what is lacking is the political will of most nations to use them. Under these circumstances, additional proposals for new institutions would not seem particularly useful. The executive branch continues, however, to give a great deal of attention both to particular trouble spots where peaceful settlement is needed and to general proposals providing for greater utilization and effectiveness of peaceful settlement procedures.

Fourth, the resolution urges proposals for other international institutions for enforcement of world peace under the rule of law. The U.S. plan calls for measures to strengthen the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations itself; for the progressive development of rules of international conduct relating to disarmament; and for the establishment of a U.N. Peace Observation Corps. The Peace Observation Corps would consist of a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. In this connection, the Agency has received a thorough and helpful contract study of the actual experi. ence with peace observation arrangements since 1920.

The U.S. plan is serving two useful functions at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. First, it makes clear the U.S. position that comprehensive dis

armament could not be established or maintained except in a peaceful world. The plan is, in fact, a road map of the route to general disarmament, showing the steps which would have to be taken along the way to improve procedures for keeping the peace. These steps would clearly require considerable change in the existing practices and attitudes of nations.

Second, by showing this clearly for all to see, the plan and the debate it has produced, have demonstrated the unreality of the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament in 4 years. In essence, that proposal was: Lay down your arms and there will be peace. It provided little in the way of inspection to see that the Soviets gave up all their arms, and less in the way of effective procedures to maintain the peace after we had given up ours.

The Soviets charge that U.S. proposals designed to strengthen the charter are in fact violations of it. They insist that their 'principle of unanimity" applies to peaceful settlement of disputes, peacekeeping institutions, and apparently even to any international organization which would monitor compliance with a disarmament agreement. They even insist on the right of Communist countries to pursue their objectives in a disarming world through so-called "wars of liberation."

The debate on these subjects at Geneva has been instructive, if not productive of agreement. By pointing to the areas of disagreement, it has helped the Conference in its search for areas where agreement might yet be possible. In so doing, it has, in my judgment, contributed in a small way to the achievement of the test ban treaty and the other first-step measures already taken.

Let us not ignore the significance of these steps. As President Johnson said to the conferees at Geneva as they concluded their deliberations last year: "Already the world is somewhat safer because of the efforts of the nations represented here. The air we breathe is no longer being contaminated by nuclear tests. Nuclear weapons are being kept out of space. Announcements have been made that planned production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons is being limited. Better means of emergency communication exist to help prevent an unintended nuclear exchange. For the first time, friends and adversaries alike have taken steps together to bring the nuclear arms race under control.

"Limited as they are, these achievements are cause for some satisfaction. They followed 16 years of postwar disarmament talks which produced neither agreement nor the basis for agreement."

Senator CLARK. I am happy to welcome Mr. George Bunn, your counsel. I have read your statement so you need not repeat it.


I would like to know whether you support this resolution or whether you do not, what if any changes we should make in it, and perhaps you might comment as to whether you agree in part, whether you agree with the Liberty Lobby and Americans for National Security in their opposition to this resolution.

Mr. FISHER. Well, I think at the outset, Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that I have to disagree with my distinguished colleague, Harlan, in his expression of relief that at this time we are under attack by the people who are working for peace. I feel no such feeling of relief. In fact my feeling is quite the opposite. This is activated a little bit by the fact I sort of infer from the remarks made today and the ones I read yesterday-the assumption that our attitude on this matter can be ascribed to one of two motivations.

One is that we are not interested in peace, and, the second, that we are afraid of somebody. Neither of these exactly commend themselves to my appreciative perception.

Senator CLARK. If the committee dealt in motivations, I apologize for it. It should not have. We should never deal with motivations. I think what we are interested in is the outward divisible sign of the inner and spiritual part. The criticism I think was largely directed,

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