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There are limitations, of course, to regional peacekeeping capability. NATO, for example, was unable to cope with the conflict in Cyprus. On the other hand, the Organization for African Unity, which is only just getting organized, already has helped put out two brush-fire wars, between Morocco and Algeria and between Ethiopia and Somalia.
And in the period immediately ahead we shall be working hard with our neighbors in this hemisphere to develop a ready capability on the part of the Organization of American States to deal with crises quickly.
It seems obvious on the face of it that if regional organizations can settle disputes within a regional community, so much the better.
But near neighbors 'sometimes cannot negotiate a cease-fire, or mediate a settlement. Courage and objectivity are sometimes proportional to distance from the problem. The necessary power to dampen conflict, or the will to use such power as does exist, are not always present in the region, or in the regional security organization. And in most of Asia there is no inclusive regional security organization anyway.
That is why we have recourse so often-on a dozen major occasions in 20 years—to the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations.
The goal of world peace and world order and social progress and human rights is all there in the charter-a luminous goal that the nations of this world could agree to adopt only with the close memory of great agony and in the false dawn of a new age.
At this point it all seems a long way down the road, but the goal is clear. And the way to get there is clear enough, if complex. It is to work everlastingly at the tough, practical jobs of strengthening U.N. machinery for keeping the peace and for peaceful settlement-improving U.N. machinery for development assistance working at technological tasks within world agenciesof extending the reach of international law and the writ of the International Court—and negotiating persistently for international agreements for the regulation and reduction of armaments.
In each of these categories of tasks, there is a record of hard-won progress. In each, there are discernible “next steps" to be negotiated. In each, there is a mixture of obstacles and opportunities. And in each, the United States cannot move forward by itself—for it must move in agreement with others. In bilateral diplomacy, it used to be said that it takes two to tango. The modern dance of multilateral diplomacy requires much more complex choreography.
It is surely true that the U.S. Government, over the past 20 years, has been second to none in inventing, sponsoring, supporting and working through the international agencies which make up the existing system of world order—and on which we will have to build if we are some day to secure peace in a disarmed world. Our most familiar posture in the international community is to be somewhat out in front of the most cooperative of our colleagues—urging the others to join us in taking the next step. But there is no point in the U.S. Government being so far in front that we lose touch with the parade.
We send delegations every year to more than 500 international conferences to work cooperatively at the world's business.
We are dues-paying members of 53 international organizations.
We typically provide 40 percent of the financial resources of the international development agencies.
We have supported every U.N. peacekeeping mission-have made a number of proposals for strengthening the machinery which have been adopted—and have been a leading exponent of a flexible call-up system which provides the peace forces when the U.N. membership decides to use them.
The lesson of all this is that the building of world order is a process of dynamic growth. Progress comes mostly at moments of crisis ; if each crisis is skillfully handled, a residue of international machinery and experience is left behind, to help prevent the next similar crisis.
The lesson is that we need, not a new U.N. Charter, but the will and the skill to make maximum use of the extraordinary flexible charter we already have.
And the lesson of the 19th General Assembly is that the international community had not reached the point where it was ready to apply a legal sanction written clear in an international treaty, interpreted by the International Court of Justice, and adopted by the Assembly in accordance with its own procedures.
The constitutional crisis in the United Nations will be worked out somehow by negotiation; we can only hope enough members of the U.N. will want to strengthen, not weaken, the organization's capacity to act for peace.
So we hold high the goal and we slog down the road toward international order-just as rapidly as others can be induced to travel with us.
None of this is meant to imply a complacent conviction in the executive branch that we are doing everything that could be done to get as quickly as possible from where we are to "peace under conditions of general and complete disarmament effectively guaranteed by adequate inspection and controls."
Quite the contrary : We are actively in the market for the best ideas to help the President “in his efforts to achieve peace and disarmament * * *"-efforts which President Johnson has called “the assignment of the century."
The President has recently established a Cabinet committee and helped bring into being a National Citizens Commission, to review the state of international cooperation. To do this work, 28 Government committees, and 28 parallel groups of private experts, have been formed in fields ranging from international law to meteorology. They are to recommend next steps beyond the current boundaries of cooperation, in every major field of human endeavor.
This is how the United States is celebrating International Cooperation Year, and the 20th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter-by working hard on plans for more and better international cooperation. The work of these committees will be brought together at a White House Conference, already scheduled by the President for November 29 to December 1 of this year.
Mr. Chairman, we share the goal of this resolution with unqualified conviction and we salute the objective of making it clear to one and all where the U.S. Congress stands on the issues of peace and disarmament.
We share a high sense of urgency about getting on with the job of creating a workable system of world order.
We share in the disappointment that the nations which cohabit this planet move ponderously when we think they should move more quickly, in a straighter line, toward goals that seem both desirable and inevitable to most Americans.
And we share with the sponsors of this resolution an uncomfortable feeling that there must be something else that we ought to be doing or saying or thinking about, to speed up the organic growth of world order at one or another of the levels where world order is organized.
We therefore welcome with open minds a dialog with this committee on steps toward world peace and world disarmament.
Senator CLARK. The hold of this Senator on the Chair is pretty tenuous. It could be taken away from him any minute that door opens.
Mr. CLEVELAND. Let me just make two points of philosophy, if you will, and then say a word about the resolution itself.
The thrust of this statement is that there are many roads to world order and indeed that world order consists of a lot of different things, not just what is done by world organizations. Most of the peace is preserved by neighbors being reasonably neighborly to each other. Regional organizations have importance, and I think in many ways a growing importance, although there are problems. A principle of international relations is that courage is directly proportional to distance from the problem ; that sometimes makes it hard for near neighbors to be most useful third parties in international disputes.
Senator CLARK. If this is an implied criticism of Senators, I agree Mr. CLEVELAND. I would not dream of criticizing Senators, especially in a Senate hearing.
SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO RESOLUTION
The point that I tried to make in the statement is a point that seems to me to be left out of the options and alternatives that are suggested for the President in Senate Concurrent Resolution 32. The resolution asks the President to work at these matters of peace and disarmament and to consider whether we can best make progress by amending the present Charter of the United Nations or by negotiating a new treaty.
This seems to me to leave out what may turn out to be the most important option of all, which is the organic growth of the Organization within the really remarkably flexible document that already serves it as a charter.
I would hope that whatever is done by the committee in connection with this resolution, the possibility of the organic growth of world order would not be so lightly tossed aside as it seems to me it is in the present text of the resolution.
Senator CLARK. That might involve, Mr. Cleveland, an amendment to section 2 to state a third alternative? Section 2 presently is an either/or, and your suggestion is that maybe we do not need to do anything organizationally, but merely assist in the evolution of the present charter without passing a provision which in your opinion might very well serve the objectives which you seek. Is that your thought?
Mr. CLEVELAND. I am not saying we should not do anything organizationally. Indeed we have tabled and are defending in the Geneva disarmament talks an outline of what amounts to a supplementary treaty.
Senator CLARK. Actually what we are suggesting at Geneva is within reasonable striking distance of the second alternative, is it not, which is stated in section 2 on page 4 of the proposed resolution in lines 12 running down to line 9 on page 5?
Mr. CLEVELAND. That section has some of the elements of our treaty outline, especially in the later stages of disarmament. International Disarmament Organization which has been proposed in our treaty outline is essentially a verification operation. The peacekeeping side of the problem we would expect to approach by growth and development of the United Nations itself.
Senator CLARK. Well, except the peace force is called for in the treaty, is it not?
Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes, but the arrangements that are envisaged represent a development of the United Nations from where we are, rather than a wholly separate structure.
Senator CLARK. Perhaps you would comment on why in your judg, ment it would not be wise to deal with the disarmament process, we can ever get agreement, through a group of nation states which have a personal interest because they are a nation of states with substantial military potential, rather than to throw the thing back to the General Assembly. How many are there in the assembly now, 105!
Mr. CLEVELAND. 114.
Senator CLARK. 114, many of whom have no significant military power at all, and yet if you give them a vote in this regard, it seems to me you are moving beyond a pragmatic solution. I wonder if you would comment on that.
Mr. CLEVELAND. It was never contemplated in the charter, and it is not contemplated today, that the kind of enforcement action that would represent an important part of the task of a world peace force would be under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly. That kind of action was quite specifically reserved to the Security Council which is, of course, a smaller body, 11 now, 15 if we ratify the charter amendments that have just been reported to the Senate by this committee.
Senator CLARK. Yet within the Security Council as it is to be increased—as I hope it will be, because I hope we will ratify that charter revision provision-you have from time to time nations whose military potential is not particularly effective, whereas at the 18-Nation Conference you have most if not all of the countries who have an effective military potential, do you not?
Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, there are a good many that do not have very much, and there are a good many others that are not there which represent considerable potential in terms of regional disturbances.
PROBLEM OF LIMITED WAR
So far, the experience is that it is the regional problems, the local disputes, that are creating most of the difficulty. The world is not dying of a nuclear thrombosis but it seems to have broken out with the measles in the world.
Senator CLARK. And yet that threat is ever present, is it not, and it is the major threat that the nuclear potential of the contending parties will be exercised, and therefore would you not agree that the elimination of nuclear armaments is one of the matters of primary importance in arriving at any meaningful disarmament agreement !
Mr. CLEVELAND. This is, of course, a central objective of U.S. policy, to achieve disarmament under appropriate inspection and controls.
Senator CLARK. Actually it is a central objective of Russian policy, too, is it not, because their treaty also provides for the elimination of nuclear weapons ?
Mr. CLEVELAND. It is not clear to me that they have gone very much beyond a propaganda ploy in their plan, and of course this is what we argue about in Geneva.
Senator CLARK. But they have taken a treaty which calls for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in 4 years, have they not?
Mr. CLEVELAND. Without the kind of inspection and verification that would make it possible for major powers to do so major a thing.
Senator CLARK. I quite agree that that is the great weakness in their plan. Nevertheless, it does call for strict international control of disarmament processes, does it not?
Mr. CLEVELAND. That is the old principle of watching a bonfire rather than watching the new manufactures.
Senator CLARK. I quite agree. Yet I hesitate to accept your assumption that the Russian plan is mere propaganda, whereas our plan is totally and completely sincere. It seems to me if you start with that basic assumption, you are obviously going to come out with no agreement.
Mr. CLEVELAND. That is not what I said. I said that theirs is mostly propaganda. The criterion of the content of propaganda in this business is the willingness of a nation involved to talk seriously
about how to get to general disarmament from where we are now; that is, to talk about the next practiced steps to take. Now, to some extent and on limited matters the Soviet Union has been willing to take some next steps—the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the General Assembly resolution against bombs in orbit, the hot line, and so on, but not very many steps and not very often and not with the sense of urgency that seems to us to be required by the potential threat of nuclear weaponry in a turbulent world.
Senator CLARK. I think I have taken you on a digression, and I apologize for it. Let me get back to your views on the resolution.
SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY
Mr. CLEVELAND. The second point that I make in the statement is this: I think it is fair to say that the United States is nearly always ahead of most other countries in trying to develop new and better international organizations. Our typical posture is pulling others along, trying to get others to contribute enough to make it a truly international thing rather than something with an international cover that is essentially a U.S. operation.
Senator CLARK. Let me ask you if you have not felt somewhat inhibited in that regard by your fear that the congressional reaction toward moving ahead in an international organization way might be adverse ?
Mr. CLEVELAND. I must say that my own experience in the last 4 years, in this business here in Washington, is that whenever an issue has been presented to the Congress, the results have been overwhelming support of going ahead. I think that was the experience on the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. There was quite a lot of discussion and noise about it.
Senator CLARK. There sure was.
Mr. CLEVELAND. But it got a rather healthy vote. That was also the experience on the U.N. loan in 1962, which passed the Senate by a margin of more than 3 to 1; and the House of Representatives by a margin of about 2 to 1.
I do think that the noise has as it was intended to have some inhibiting effect. Anything that the Congress can do to encourage the executive branch to move ahead toward the kind of goals that are stated here is fine.
Senator CLARK. Then why not pass this resolution?
Mr. CLEVELAND. The difficulty with the resolution is that it poses a particular procedure for the President which overlaps with a good deal of what is already going on, some of which I have referred to in my statement which I would like to summarize in a moment.
Perhaps some sense-of-the-Congress type of thing would be more effective. The Secretary of State is quite prepared to work with this committee in the kind of review and process that characterized the working together of the executive and the legislative branches at the time of the Vandenberg resolution you will recall.
Senator CLARK. I am sure, and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament will correct me if I am wrong, that the chairman of this committee and a very large number of its members would welcome from the State Department or from ACDA any amendments or changes in this resolution which you would be prepared to suggest.