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May 10, 1965.

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Although I will not be able to testify on Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, I appreciate the opportunity to offer a statement for the record, as requested by Senator Clark. The resolution addresses itself to the means through which we move to a more effective and more secure international order. There is no more important subject and, as one who is continually absorbed on a day-to-day basis with this question, I am glad to send you my views.

In submitting proposals for general and complete disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1961, and in presenting an outline of basic treaty provisions to the 18-Nation Geneva Conference the following April, President Kennedy established the objectives toward which this country wished to move. President Johnson, in transmitting the U.S. proposals to the 18-Nation Conference last year, reaffirmed these objectives. Indeed, in his January 18, 1964, response to Khrushchev's year-end message, he had urged that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. lay new proposals before that Conference in pursuit of the objective, among others, of moving toward general disarmament.

The precariousness of the peace which exists under the worldwide weight of armaments-with small wars in one area capable of escalating quickly into big wars that would engulf our planet-dictates the urgency of our getting on with verified disarmament arrangements and with building the international institutions which will make a disarmed world more possible.

I do not need to point out the difficulties we have encountered in getting the Soviets to discuss the types of institutional and inspection measures which we believe essential to any genuine disarmament. We can be grateful for such important agreements as the limited nuclear test ban, the hot-line agreement and the U.N. resolution against placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. But we must, I believe, press on with our arms control and disarmament proposals in the hope that "the general opinion of mankind" and the pressures of international events will convince the Soviets, as well as others who are reluctant to take this road, that in this direction lies the realization of mankind's common interest-a common interest in survival.

It will of course be necessary for those who would promote their political and military objectives through widespread international subversion to become convinced that these tactics are obsolete and have no chance of success. It will also be necessary for international and regional institutions to develop prompter ways of coping with these tactics of subversion. These are of course the basic issues which are engaging our attention in southeast Asia and the Caribbean.

Under section 2 of the proposed resolution, the President is requested to formulate as speedily as possible specific and detailed proposals for the establishment of an international authority to keep the peace under conditions of general and complete disarmament effectively guaranteed by adequate inspection and controls. He is requested, in formulating such proposals to consider whether the development of effective international machinery (and corollary measures) may best be achieved by revision of the U.N. Charter, by a new treaty, or by a combination of the two.

It would in my judgment be unwise for the United States at this time to open up the question of general charter revision. There has been a widespread agreement among the membership on the two amendments enlarging the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. But to open up now, in the present international political context, the question of a broader revision of the charter would only, I fear, result in a weakening of the present instrument.

I would welcome, as I am certain my colleagues would, proposals for strengthening the United Nations and other international institutions, so that they will better serve the cause of peace. I would think it most productive, however, for the focus of these efforts to be on specific measures through which the peacekeeping, the peaceful settlement, and the economic and social activities of the U.N. could be strengthened-and on means through which all these activities could be financed on a more reliable basis. I am confident that there are meas

ures which can be taken in all of these fields, under the present charter, which would take us toward the goals we seek.

With respect to your suggestion of a new treaty to replace the present United Nations Charter, I feel that to advance any such proposal would be unwise. Indeed, as I have often said, if we did not have the present charter, we would have to create one and it would be far more difficult now than it was in the twilight of the last war at San Francisco. In short, I don't believe we can start again but we can keep on considering, examining, and reexamining what machinery we have with a view to improving it.

I am glad that the Foreign Relations Committee is having hearings on this resolution, providing an opportunity for a general airing on the significant issues that it raises. On previous occasions, such as the hearings on the Vandenberg resolution, the Foreign Relations Committee has performed a similar important service. The public discussion of these matters cannot but help assist in creating a climate of opinion, which makes it more possible to move forward on disarmament negotiations and the development of regional and U.N. peacekeeping machinery.

With warm regards.



It may seem strange to some people that after voting last week for an appropriation to support military action in South Vietnam, I testify today in favor of planning for peace.

It does not seem so to me, for it is my fervent hope that by planning for peace today we will not have to vote funds for war tomorrow.

The philosophy behind the resolution is quite simple. We should plan for peace as hard as we prepare for war.

Man often has warred to make peace, but the goal, other than on a temporary basis, has eluded him.

Why? Is it because war is inevitable? I do not believe that. I dare not believe that, for the next major war will not just be hell, it will be the end of life as we know it on earth.

We have no choice but to believe a just and permanent peace is possible. True, history has not been encouraging, but never before has man been faced with the same threat of extinction.

Perhaps lasting peace has eluded us because we have expected it to happen somehow, by chance, like a lost butterfly flitting down a dingy street, bringing a brief moment of fragile beauty. But the butterfly does not stay and flies off to die before the cold weather sets in.

I don't know why, but some quarters consider planning for peace subversive. These people, refusing to learn from history, believe only in building alliance after alliance until the world is entwined in a spiderweb-sensitive network which translates the slightest ripple into tidal waves of devastating dimensions.

I cosponsored this resolution because I believe we must do more than prepare to war. We must exhaust all means to establish world understanding and respect, and then we must find new ways to continue the search.

We cannot afford to do less.

In the words of John F. Kennedy, we have begun, we have taken a small step. We have a nuclear test ban treaty, the hot line, the United Nations is still in business, there was a thaw in the cold war. Now, more than ever, we must increase efforts to establish world order.

I see films of a great military parade in Moscow, and my heart is heavy. I read we are to have the largest draft call in recent months, and I am sad. We do not seem to have made much lasting progress. Events creep in their petty pace from day to day toward the last syllable of recorded time.

Let it not be said that our todays will be the yesterdays lighting fools to dusty deaths.

Let it not be said that we sought only sound and fury signifying nothing. Let it not be said that we did not hear the bell tolling for us.

Rather, let us take another step toward the great desire of all mankind-world peace.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Cleveland, I appreciate very much your willingness to come down here and testify this morning. We are happy to have your views. I have had an opportunity to read your prepared statement which will be printed in full in the record. I have no doubt that you have been advised of the somewhat critical comments of the State Department's position on this resolution, which were made yesterday. Perhaps you have seen Senator Aiken's comments in the Washington Post this morning.

While I think your statement is a useful summary of your wellknown and most ably stated views, we have to proceed by very small steps in this overall area. I thought perhaps instead of reading or summarizing your statement, which I will be very happy to listen to if that is the way you wish to proceed, you might want to move into the substance of that matter. If you do not, I want to give you complete flexibility. Is the State Department supporting this resolution, or is it not, or do you prefer not to move into that area? The time is yours, sir. I want to turn you completely free to do as you see fit.


Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear at your invitation on this resolution. It is, I must say, a pleasure to defend the Department of State from charges that we are cooperating too little. We spend a good deal of our time defending ourselves against charges that we are cooperating too much with the rest of the world.

Senator CLARK. I thought that you would not mind being put in that position.

Mr. CLEVELAND. It is a pleasure. I will take your advice and suggestion which, coming from the Chair, I regard as a directive not to read this statement.

(Mr. Cleveland's statement in full follows:)


Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am very glad to come at your invitation to discuss Senate Concurrent Resolution 32. The aim of the resolution is to support the President in his efforts "to achieve peace and disarmament under legally effective controls and to develop international institutions capable of permanently keeping the peace." Helping the President move toward these goals is, of course, a daily preoccupation of a good many of us in the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and elsewhere around the Government.

The question, of course, is not whether we want to move toward these goalsthat is easy. The difficult question is how do we get there from where we have to start-which is here, and today.

"Here" is a world of international ironies.

It is a world with 20 million men under arms and military budgets of $120 billion-which has trouble finding 20,000 men and $120 million for international peacekeeping by the United Nations.

It is a world in which the big powers urge the smaller powers to stay away from nuclear weapons, yet feel they have to build their own nuclear stockpiles for their own national purposes-or for the common defense.

It is a world in which the small nations complain that the nuclear powers are not getting on with disarmament, while they themselves negotiate for the best deal in a squadron of jet fighters or a package of secondhand howitzers and flamethrowers.

To talk about disarmament without talking about political disputes is to talk about only part of the problem. I shall not try to answer the chicken-and-egg question whether political settlements or arms control agreements come first. We have to work at both, all the time.

No disarmament negotiation in the foreseeable future is likely to be the last one; bargaining about arms control will be a feature of international diplomacy for as far as we can see into the future. And no great peace conference can weld the world into amiable solidarity; international bargaining about borders and trade and human rights and self-determination will be an enduring feature of the political landscape, too.

We can thank our stars that the United Nations has been able to damp down a series of dangerous conflicts which otherwise could have raged out of control. But, somehow, we are better at discouraging violence than we are at encouraging settlements that endure. Korea, Kashmir, the Congo, Cyprus, and the ArabIsrael conflict bear witness.

But stopping bloodshed has not settled the basic problems that cause the bloodshed, and could bring on a renewal of mutual murder.

The same is true of the relations between the great powers. The nations that know the most about nuclear armament have looked deeply into the dangersand have signed nuclear test bans, and started talking about reducing the quantum of fissionable materials in the world. But the problems which created the nuclear arms race-the thwarted ambitions of which a divided Berlin and a divided Korea are the continuing symbols are not settled, merely stalemated.


The central problem of international relations in our time was once summarized by President Eisenhower in a memorable phrase: "There is no alternative to peace."

So the central problem of diplomacy in our time is to devise a system in which nations can share their freedom of action with others-a system in which nations can find national security in international guarantees and international institutions.

I think it is fair to say that the U.S. Government knows this, and practices it nearly every day in bilateral relations, in helping to build international organizations, and in negotiating about arms control and disarmament.

I think it is fair to say that the Government of the Soviet Union lags well behind the United States in applying to its foreign policy the simple idea that in the presence of modern technology, national security can only be assured by international arrangements.

It is still impressed, perhaps as some people in every nation are still impressed-with the obsolescent idea that a nation can assure its own destiny by its national efforts alone. That is our inherited wisdom; but in the nuclear age, it is more heritage than wisdom.

Thus on the fundamental arrangements for "permanently keeping the peace," the two most powerful nations in the world remain something like a generation apart in their thinking-even while they are only minutes apart as the missile flies.


In this kind of world, the process of creating a tolerable order requires us to work at several levels-and through a wide variety of institutions—and with a mix of techniques at one and the same time. It is not a very precise process— nor is it amenable to precise planning. Indeed it is often quite messy and involves a multitude of grubby tasks.

Nonetheless we can plot out the major avenues toward a workable system of international order; and we can identify a rough hierarchy of levels at which order can be organized.

The first level-and it is all too easy to overlook-is the nation-to-nation level. Treaties of peace and friendship agreements for joint use and development of resources-settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or judicial recourse-joint instruments, joint ventures, joint control boards—add up to the first level of international order.

Most nations do in fact maintain a tolerable system of orderly relations with their neighboring states. But some conflicts need the attention of friends and neighbors not directly involved in the dispute. So we work also on the regional level, where increasingly elaborate mechanisms have been created during the postwar years.

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There are limitations, of course, to regional peacekeeping capability. NATO, for example, was unable to cope with the conflict in Cyprus. On the other hand, the Organization for African Unity, which is only just getting organized, already has helped put out two brush-fire wars, between Morocco and Algeria and between Ethiopia and Somalia.

And in the period immediately ahead we shall be working hard with our neighbors in this hemisphere to develop a ready capability on the part of the Organization of American States to deal with crises quickly.

It seems obvious on the face of it that if regional organizations can settle disputes within a regional community, so much the better.

But near neighbors sometimes cannot negotiate a cease-fire, or mediate a settlement. Courage and objectivity are sometimes proportional to distance from the problem. The necessary power to dampen conflict, or the will to use such power as does exist, are not always present in the region, or in the regional security organization. And in most of Asia there is no inclusive regional security organization anyway.

That is why we have recourse so often-on a dozen major occasions in 20 years to the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations.

The goal of world peace and world order and social progress and human rights is all there in the charter-a luminous goal that the nations of this world could agree to adopt only with the close memory of great agony and in the false dawn of a new age.

At this point it all seems a long way down the road, but the goal is clear. And the way to get there is clear enough, if complex. It is to work everlastingly at the tough, practical jobs of strengthening U.N. machinery for keeping the peace and for peaceful settlement-improving U.N. machinery for development assistance-working at technological tasks within world agenciesof extending the reach of international law and the writ of the International Court-and negotiating persistently for international agreements for the regulation and reduction of armaments.


In each of these categories of tasks, there is a record of hard-won progress. In each, there are discernible "next steps" to be negotiated. In each, there is a mixture of obstacles and opportunities. And in each, the United States cannot move forward by itself-for it must move in agreement with others. In bilateral diplomacy, it used to be said that it takes two to tango. The modern dance of multilateral diplomacy requires much more complex choreography.

It is surely true that the U.S. Government, over the past 20 years, has been second to none in inventing, sponsoring, supporting and working through the international agencies which make up the existing system of world order-and on which we will have to build if we are some day to secure peace in a disarmed world. Our most familiar posture in the international community is to be somewhat out in front of the most cooperative of our colleagues-urging the others to join us in taking the next step. But there is no point in the U.S. Government being so far in front that we lose touch with the parade.

We send delegations every year to more than 500 international conferences to work cooperatively at the world's business.

We are dues-paying members of 53 international organizations.

We typically provide 40 percent of the financial resources of the international development agencies.

We have supported every U.N. peacekeeping mission-have made a number of proposals for strengthening the machinery which have been adopted-and have been a leading exponent of a flexible call-up system which provides the peace forces when the U.N. membership decides to use them.

The lesson of all this is that the building of world order is a process of dynamic growth. Progress comes mostly at moments of crisis; if each crisis is skillfully handled, a residue of international machinery and experience is left behind, to help prevent the next similar crisis.

The lesson is that we need, not a new U.N. Charter, but the will and the skill to make maximum use of the extraordinary flexible charter we already have. And the lesson of the 19th General Assembly is that the international community had not reached the point where it was ready to apply a legal sanction written clear in an international treaty, interpreted by the International Court of Justice, and adopted by the Assembly in accordance with its own procedures.

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