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to the United States putting larger sums into the United Nations until all members pay their quota under the present arrangement.

I said at the outset this resolution was "too much too soon." Let us examine in conclusion the "too soon." Military strength of the United States has already been weakened by more than 16 individual actions taken by the Secretary of Defense. Last Thursday's paper carried the following item:

Gen. John P. McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, told a National Press Club luncheon yesterday he was convinced a new heavy bomber must be developed to replace the 10-year-old B-52. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has refused so far to commit the Pentagon to such a project.

And U.S. News & World Report asked recently:

"Is Vietnam a 'junkyard' for U.S. arms?" and tells of planes so old that they fall apart in the air, a shortage of bombs, first-aid kits, radio equipment, grenades, and even bullets so old and wrong sized that they will not fire.

The daily papers headlines tell us of Americans dying in Latin America, in Asia. Is this the time to press for disarmament? It is our belief that this is the time to press forward with renewed military strength. It is probable that only our nuclear strength serves as a deterrent to the Soviet and Red China Governments. They are the ones who declare their purpose to be world domination. They are the ones seeking in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to establish new fields for their economic and political expansion.

Do we then reject the hope and desire for peace in our times, as the proponents of this resolution would have you believe? No; emphatically no. It is our belief that when the United States demonstrates its will to peace backed by an overwhelming military strength, the other nations will be ready for negotiations. They presently disbelieve our will to stand up for our own traditions and look upon our military strength as weakening under a decaying American society, lost in its own material riches and luxuries.

They point to films and books emanating out of the United States which portray our military as Fascists or desirous of governing power. The present peace movement in this Nation has libeled the principles and motives of our military leaders and thus created, as the Soviets would have them do, a distrust of military leadership in the United States.

When the time for negotiations comes, it will be the President of the United States and the heads of state in the other nations who will negotiate. In modern times, summit meetings, not negotiation through ponderous and slow-moving organizations, achieve results. We sincerely believe such a time will come.


In the meanwhile, we urge the rejection of this resolution since it steps over the boundaries made by the Constitution which gives the President exclusive control of foreign affairs. Let us not burden him with a "sense" resolution from the Congress which makes no sense in this time of tension. Rather let the Congress, in the proper context of constitutional power, provide him with the funds, armed forces, and resources which will give him the necessary leverage in dealing with nations which seek our destruction.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Andrews. I appreciate your coming here. You will understand that my failure to question you does not indicate any agreement with the point of view which have indicated.


Mr. ANDREWS. I would not expect you to agree, Senator, but I thank you for the courtesy of reception this morning.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, sir.

The next witness is Prof. Emile Benoit, representing Americans for Democratic Action.

Professor Benoit, we are very happy to have you here. I have been a rather avid reader of some of your books and articles on disarmament, particularly in reference to the economic implications. I see you have a pretty long statement. It will be printed in full in the record at this point, and I would like to ask you to highlight it, if you will, so we can have a little time to develop the matter in colloquy.


Mr. BENOIT. Thank you, Senator. I will try to do that.

My name is Emile Benoit. I am professor of international business in Columbia University. In the course of my career, I have been senior economist in the U.S. Department of Labor, attaché in the U.S. Embassies in London and Vienna, economist with the McGrawHill Publishing Co., and consultant to the U.S. State Department, to the U.N. Secretariat, to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and to the Department of Defense. Under a Ford Foundation grant, I direct a research program on international economics of disarmament and arms control.

I am testifying on behalf of Americans for Democratic Action of which I am a vice chairman.

I would like to express my unreserved support of and admiration for Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 which seems to me one of the most valuable resolutions ever to have been proposed in the Senate. The heart of the resolution, as I understand it, is that the President is requested to develop and publicize specific and detailed proposals for international peacekeeping machinery to accompany general and complete disarmament, including an international disarmament organization, a permanent world peace force, and tribunals for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. He is also asked to decide whether this machinery may best be obtained by revising the U.N. Charter, by a new treaty, or by combining both approaches. The resolution also requests that he urge other governments to initiate similar studies and proposals.

Senator CLARK. Professor Benoit, I guess your qualifications and experience are all in your prepared statement. Thank you.

Mr. BENOIT. The usual approach to the issue of spelling out the implications of general and complete disarmament is almost wholly negative. On this view, there is little to be gained and possibly a good deal to be lost by formulating detailed recommendations with respect to peacekeeping machinery. I use the term rather broadly to cover all mentioned in the resolution. The view assumes that dis

armament is not a practicable proposition in the foreseeable fu


Senator CLARK. That did not seem to have been the view of President Kennedy, did it?


Though it may be useful as a general policy objective from a propaganda viewpoint, or as a means of encouraging continued negotiations which may be incidentally useful even though they fail to achieve their announced objectives.

There is no possibility of achieving their goal. It is thought sometimes, however, that such negotiations may bring about useful exchanges of viewpoints, strengthen confidence, and facilitate progress on lesser and incidental issues.

Senator CLARK. A very eminent Member of the U.S. Senate said the other day he thought those who were advocating general and complete disarmament were pretty close to being escapists.

It occurred to me that possibly the escapists were in the other camp who thought if we did not get some kind of general and complete disarmament, we could not in the long-run avoid an all-out nuclear war. I wonder how you would react to that observation of mine.


Mr. BENOIT. I think that is fundamentally the position I would take. However, I do think—and I would like to develop this pointthat there are really problems which no one has yet solved in having general and complete disarmament.

Senator CLARK. And which I think perhaps you would agree do require a lot of good hard prior planning.

Mr. BENOIT. Exactly, and I would even go a little further and say basic research and original thinking and exploration of novel problems which have never really to my knowledge been faced by anybody.

Senator CLARK. Of course, one of the problems which confronts us is that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was set up to do just that kind of research. Then when they proposed to do it, they came under vast criticism from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for wasting their money. One purpose of this hearing is to try to persuade my colleagues on the Committee that perhaps they spoke a little hastily in that regard.

Mr. BENOIT. I think if it served that purpose, this would be itself a major advantage and a great benefit of such a resolution.

I myself have been disappointed that the ACDA has not felt it possible to explore these really central problems any more than at least I know that they have.

Senator CLARK. Actually you have done some work for the Agency, have you not?

Mr. BENOIT. Yes; on the economic aspects. It is observed by such people trying to deal specifically with the problems of peacekeeping and peace enforcing machinery that there is little consensus even in the United States as to how such machinery would be established and how it would work, and there is likely to be even more heated disagreement on these matters when these issues are raised in international negotiations.

Senator CLARK. Actually there have been informal discussions of these problems at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, have there not, and if an indication of what you say is right, we have not even got a consensus out of our Western friends at that conference as to what kind of peacekeeping institutions it would be wise to incorporate in any treaty of general and complete disarmament?

Have you kept in touch with that?

Mr. BENOIT. I have read the published statements on this. Senator CLARK. There are some unpublished statements which I would hope to be able to get declassified in the reasonably near future.

Mr. BENOIT. That would be very useful, Senator. I think there is certainly likely to be violent objections in the Soviet Union to the limitations of national sovereignty which would be required to make such international peacekeeping machinery operate effectively. Those who take the position I am referring to argue that it is best to allow the uncertainties and obscurities regarding peacekeeping machinery to persist rather than to imperil the continuance of negotiations by prematurely introducing issues on which there is likely to be the strongest division of opinion.

While I sympathize with those who are reluctant to imperil the possibility of immediate negotiating gains by clarifying the meaning of what they are negotiating about, I do think that a more fundamental view of the possibilities supports the value of the more explicit approach of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32.


Senator CLARK. I wonder if you would comment on this observation. The two major-not the only-but the two major disagreements between the Soviet Union and ourselves which make meaningful progress toward general and complete disarmament unlikely in the immediate future are first their almost phobia with secrecy, fear of espionage or unwillingness to open their country to any kind of effective inspection verification, and, second, their entire lack of interest in international peacekeeping machinery such as a permanent international disarmament organization, a permanent United Nations or international peace force, and the development of institutions of law and equity and other types of jurisprudence which would be essential if the nations are going to disarm in order to solve political problems. Is that about right?

Mr. BENOIT. I fully agree. I think the first concern about inspection security is somewhat readily explicable in terms of the kind of military forces and establishment they have that relies upon secrecy as a very important part of its

Senator CLARK. Yet I would suggest that they are really pretty obviously misguided in that situation, first because we really have pretty good intelligence as to what they have and where they are. This is being made easier all the time, as scientific publications which are not classified tell us, in addition to the espionage potential of satellites, and they know pretty much what we are up to also.

So it seems to me that it is a rather obsolete one except on their part. Mr. BENOIT. Well, the crucial element is the location of their strategic bases. If that could be targeted perfectly by our forces, I be

lieve that there would be some reduction in their security, or so they believe. If we could convince them to the contrary, this would be a very major step forward.

Senator CLARK. If we could convince them that we know where they are anyway, that would be a major step forward.

Mr. BENOIT. Yes; that is what I mean.

Senator CLARK. Let me say immediately that I do not know where they are and I am speculating, not revealing secret intelligence.

Mr. BENOIT. The first point to bear in mind is that there is very little consensus even within the United States as to what such peace enforcement and peacekeeping machinery would be like and how it would work.

Senator CLARK. If any.

Mr. BENOIT. If any.

Senator CLARK. As the previous witness indicated.

Mr. BENOIT. This lack of consensus inside the country casts a real pall of uncertainty over the whole goal of general and complete disarmament, and leads to some posibility of lack of belief in our sincerity in negotiating.

Senator CLARK. Would you therefore agree that one of the most important things we can do is to bring forward the basic arguments in support of GCD, to engage in an educational process not only throughout the country but within the Congress.

Mr. BENOIT. I think this is the most fundamental thing that can be done, and it is only by clarifying some of the obscurities that are involved in the system, in our official disarmament proposals, in stage two and stage three.

Senator CLARK. This is difficult to do if, in fear of the Congress or in fear of the Pentagon or in fear of certain segments of opinion in the United States, both the Arms Control Agency and the State Department run for the fallout shelters as soon as anybody suggests they ought to be a little bit bolder.


Mr. BENOIT. I do think that the principle has to be established and accepted that in view of the fantastic change in the military situation resulting from modern arms, that there will probably be required a somewhat proportionate change in the international institutions which control war, that we cannot expect by a simple application of the sort of things we have done in the past to achieve control over anything this powerful.

Senator CLARK. Would you develop that thought a little?

Mr. BENOIT. I do not myself propose to have the solutions or wish to discuss possible solutions, but I do feel that we are facing the need for high-grade innovation in our political institution building. We have to be prepared to think boldly and along really wholly new lines. This requires some research and analysis of the type that simply has not existed in the past to my knowledge.

Senator CLARK. Do you think that bold thinking need necessarily all be secret or could not a good deal of it be shared with the American people?

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