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lieve that there would be some reduction in their security, or so they believe. If we could convince them to the contrary, this would be a very major step forward.
Senator CLARK. If we could convince them that we know where they are anyway, that would be a major step forward.
Mr. BENOIT. Yes; that is what I mean.
Senator CLARK. Let me say immediately that I do not know where they are and I am speculating, not revealing secret intelligence.
Mr. BENOIT. The first point to bear in mind is that there is very little consensus even within the United States as to what such peace enforcement and peacekeeping machinery would be like and how it would work.
Senator CLARK. If any.
Mr. BENOIT. This lack of consensus inside the country casts a real pall of uncertainty over the whole goal of general and complete disarmament, and leads to some posibility of lack of belief in our sincerity in negotiating.
Senator CLARK. Would you therefore agree that one of the most important things we can do is to bring forward the basic arguments in support of GCD, to engage in an educational process not only throughout the country but within the Congress.
Mr. BENOIT. I think this is the most fundamental thing that can be done, and it is only by clarifying some of the obscurities that are involved in the system, in our official disarmament proposals, in stage two and stage three.
Senator CLARK. This is difficult to do if, in fear of the Congress or in fear of the Pentagon or in fear of certain segments of opinion in the United States, both the Arms Control Agency and the State Department run for the fallout shelters as soon as anybody suggests they ought to be a little bit bolder.
CHANGE IN AGENCIES DEALING IN INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE SUGGESTED
Mr. BENOIT. I do think that the principle has to be established and accepted that in view of the fantastic change in the military situation resulting from modern arms, that there will probably be required a somewhat proportionate change in the international institutions which control war, that we cannot expect by a simple application of the sort of things we have done in the past to achieve control over anything this powerful.
Senator CLARK. Would you develop that thought a little?
Mr. BENOIT. I do not myself propose to have the solutions or wish to discuss possible solutions, but I do feel that we are facing the need for high-grade innovation in our political institution building. We have to be prepared to think boldly and along really wholly new lines. This requires some research and analysis of the type that simply has not existed in the past to my knowledge.
Senator CLARK. Do you think that bold thinking need necessarily all be secret or could not a good deal of it be shared with the American people?
Mr. BENOIT. I think it has to be shared not only with the American people but with the people of other countries. I have been so bold as to suggest in the final paragraph here that possibly something like an international commission would be required, or something at least that would utilize the great abilities of the Congress and of other groups within our population who are accustomed to thinking about problems of law and of the molding of institutions.
I do not think this thing can be pursued simply as a matter of traditional diplomacy.
Senator CLARK. You do not think the 18-Nation Conference at Geneva is a pretty good forum for us to be exposing our views a little bit more candidly than we have so far?
Mr. BENOIT. I think such forums are valuable, Senator, but we will achieve agreements on the problems of disarmament only if someone has first got an adequate solution, which I do not think anybody has.
Senator CLARK. This would indicate the desirability of encouraging groups such as the President's White House Conference on Ways and Means of Peace and the World Law Conference which will be held in Washington this fall to hopefully get a maximum amount of publicity and providing for a good many stimulating seminars and talks, would it not?
Mr. BENOIT. That sounds very constructive. I would like to emphasize the importance, however, of devoting substantial time and funds to the rather lonely pursuit of the most difficult aspects of the problems, by individual thinkers. I think that this will require a pooling of a great amount of really original thinking. It is not the kind of thinking that is likely to be hammered out initially in committee; though often the required ideas have been generated and worked out in detail, they will obviously have to be hammered out further in committee.
Senator CLARK. Now the normal way to do that would be, through ACDA contracts with individuals or groups who have expertise in this area?
Mr. BENOIT. That would be the desirable way, had the ACDA an adequate program and adequate funds to do this sort of thing. However, it seems to me it is required to be done on a scale much vaster than anybody has envisioned.
Senator CLARK. Would you have any suggestions in terms of dollars as to what you think would be an adequate authorization or appropriation for the kind of research you have in mind?
Mr. BENOIT. I regret, Senator, I have not given that matter thought.
Senator CLARK. Now, turning to the resolution, do you have any specific suggestions for amendments or changes ?
DEFECTS OF THE RESOLUTION
Mr. Benoit. I hestitate to suggest a specific other form, but it does seem to me that the resolution is possibly deficient in assuming that the President can come up with the answers, and rather quickly. The problems seem to me much more profound and would require for their solution a rather major research program first, and second, the convening of a lot of people who have a wide range of capabilities.
Senator CLARK. The important thing is to get going.
Mr. BENOIT. Yes, and from that point of view think this is marvelous, but I would like to see the thing approached in terms that provide funds and that devote the capabilities of the Congress and others to work cooperatively on the problem.
Senator CLARK. Of course you cannot kill too many birds with one stone, and the problem is where do you start and where do you cut off. I deeply deplore the action of the Congress in cutting down the President's recommendation for the authorization both in time and money of ACDA, but that is over the dam for another year or two.
As you say, these problems are not going to be solved overnight, but that is where I think a pragmatic approach could be made next time that comes up. It may be too late by then.
Do you have anything else, Professor ?
Senator CLARK. Thank you ever so much. Your testimony has been most helpful.
(Mr. Benoit's statement in full follows:)
TESTIMONY OF EMILE BENOIT Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Emile Benoit. I am professor of international business in Columbia University. In the course of my career, I have been senior economist in the U.S. Department of Labor, attaché in the U.S. Embassies in London and Vienna, economist with the McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., and consultant to the U.S. State Department, to the U.N. Secretariat, to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and to the U.S. Department of Defense. Under a Ford Foundation grant, I direct a research program on international economics of disarmament and arms control.
I am testifying on behalf of Americans for Democratic Action of which I am a vice chairman.
I would like to express my unreserved support of and admiration for Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 which seems to me one of the most valuable resolutions ever to have been proposed in the Senate. This resolution requests the President to develop and publicize specific and detailed proposals for international peacekeeping machinery-including machinery for adjudicating disputes, for inspection, and for peace enforcement—to accompany general and complete disarmament. He is also asked to decide whether this machinery may best be obtained by revising the U.N. Charter, by a new treaty or by combining both approaches. The resolution also requests that he urge other governments to initiate similar studies and proposals.
The usual official attitude to the issue of trying to spell out the peacekeeping implications of general and complete disarmament is almost wholly negative. It is argued that there is little to be gained and possibly a good deal to be lost by formulating detailed recommendations with respect to peacekeeping machinery. The view implicitly, or explicitly, assumes that disarmament is not a practicable proposition in the foreseeable future, though a commitment to it may be useful as a general policy objective from a propaganda viewpoint, or as a means of encouraging continued disarmament negotiations which may be incidentally useful even though they fail to achieve their announced objectives. For example, such negotiations may provide useful exchanges of viewpoints, strengthen confidence, and facilitate progress on lesser and incidental issues.
The objections on this view to trying deal specifically with problems of peacekeeping machinery are that there is little consensus even within the United States as to how such machinery could be established and how it would work, and that there is likely to be even more heated disagreement on these matters when these issues are raised in international negotiation. In particular there is likely to be strong objections from the Soviet Union to limitations of national sovereignty required to make such machinery operate effectively. Advocates of this viewpoint argue, therefore, that it is best to allow the uncertainties and obscurities in this area to persist rather than to imperil the continuance of negotiations by prematurely introducing issues on which there is likely to be the strongest division of opinion.
While I sympathize with those who are reluctant to imperil the possibility of immediate negotiating gains by clarifying the meaning of what they are negotiating about, I do think that a deeper view of the possibilities supports the value of the more explicit approach of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32. This is true, I think, because the immediately urgent objective is promoting a better understanding both in the United States and in other countries of what the real issues and problems of disarmament and arms control are. It is only as we achieve a fundamental advance in our thinking to correspond with the enormous change introduced into the objective situation by the new weapons that we can have any hope of working out changes in national and international institutions capable of coping with the dangers we now confront. I doubt whether it will be really helpful to continue negotiations about general and complete disarmament while hiding in the second and third stages of our disarmament proposal the major obscurities and unsolved controversial issues buried in our vague proposals on peacekeeping machinery.
If these latent obscurities and uncertainties were made explicit we would no doubt be made more aware of the fact that some who now passively accept the notion of general and complete disarmament would then repudiate it rather than accept the peacekeeping machinery required to make it operate. We would also no doubt find that our disagreements with the Soviet Union in negotiations would be shifted away from procedural or design issues (such as which measures are to be included in which stage of general and complete disarmament) to more fundamental substantive issues about the kind of peaceful world which general and complete disarmament was supposed to preserve.
Bringing these disagreements out into the open would, on the whole, be a healthy development, since it is a lurking sense of such basic unsettled controversial issues which, I think, gives international disarmament negotiations such a feeling of formalism and futility. There might be more willingness to compromise on the preliminaries if there were more hope of finding common ground at the succeeding stages.
I think it would give a vastly healthier tone to the whole discussion if it were focused on the genuine issues underlying disarmament negotiations because there would then be real content in the differences expressed rather than a frustrating round of discussions which appear, for the most part, repititous, trivial, and largely irrelevant. Only after the really fundamental questions have been raised and openly discussed can one achieve any feeling as to how far apart the major protagonists really are. Moreover, it should not be assumed that the proposals in the back of the negotiators' minds for the solution of the basic problems are in fact the only real alternatives available. Indeed, in my own view, none of the usual solutions that have been put forward in various unofficial proposals are at all adequate to meet the actual problems we face. Extensive research and the development of new proposals will, I think, be necessary before technically satisfactory solutions will be found on which a consensus could be achieved even with the United States. It is hopeless to expect to negotiate with other countries on matters upon which there is no real unity of views within the United States, and the Soviet Union cannot take seriously our intent to negotiate seriously on such matters.
The basic unsolved issues underlying disarmament are essentially those involved in the substitution of a supranational inspection and defense establishment, for national defense establishments, and the transfer to this supranational inspection and defense establishment of the essential obligations to enforce not only the continued disarmament of the nation-states but also their continued politicomilitary security, in short, a substitution of supranational security guarantees for security based on the nations' own defense forces. The key problems here are two: (1) The assurance that the protection of national independence and security by a supranational force would be adequate, impartial, and just, and (2) the assurance that the supranational force would not increase its legal powers beyond the limited powers given to it to carry out its assigned duties, nor go beyond its permitted powers in carrying out its duty.
These are extremely difficult problems. I feel personally that none of the solutions so far offered-including those of men for whom I have great respect and sympathy such as Grenville Clark and Lewis Sohn-offers anything like a dependable, satisfactory, and workable solution. To be sure, such a solution could be more readily envisaged if the peoples of the world felt toward one another even the same degree of sympathy and mutual confidence that is to be found within the population of many of the individual nations. Regrettably,
however, this is not the fact, and solutions for international peacekeeping and enforcement will have to incorporate novel features to adjust to the difficult situation created by the deficiencies of sympathy and confidence among peoples. There is even the grim possibility that there does not exist any feasible solution to the problem in the present stage of humanity, and that disarmament is in fact unachievable until men's attitudes toward men in other societies have greatly changed. If this is indeed the truth, it would be better, in my mind, to become aware of it so that we do not dissipate our energies and enthusiasms in negotiations which are inherently bound to fail. Rather we should be trying to find out in this case how to live with less danger in an environment of continuing arms races or at least of stabilized deterrents. However, it is because of my faith that there is likely to be a genuine solution to the problems of disarmament which we may discover if we set our minds to it, that it seems to me worthwhile to raise explicitly the controversial issues that are involved.
Perhaps the most basic reason for Resolution 32, however, is that the general public has still not really become aware of the fact that disarmament has become the national policy. The facts of the continuing arms race, not to speak of our well-publicized involvements in military actions in various parts of the world, offer what appears to be overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
I do not myself see any necessary paradox or insincerity in vigorously pursuing a properly safeguarded disarmament agreement, and at the same time taking such unilateral military and diplomatic measures as may be necessary to preserve our security until such agreement is achieved. Indeed, failure to take such measures might, I think, hinder rather than advance the prospects of successful disarmament negotiation—though this view is not shared by many in ADA. It is not surprising, however, that the public finds it all rather puzzling, and that our unilateral military initiatives can be readily construed by hostile propaganda as indicating that despite our allegations, we are not willing, even under properly safeguarded international institutions, to forgo the use of military force to protect our national interests. As such a time as this, it is wise, I think, to redouble our efforts to demonstrate the primacy of our concern for peace. This cannot be done by reaffirming our willingness to disarm and to negotiate welcome as these assurances may be. In this field, as in so many others, actions provide more credible signals than words. Others will judge that if we were serious about the possibility of concluding a disarmament agreement we would be much concerned about how our freedom and security would be reliably preserved under such an agreement, and would be devoting a good share of our best brains and energy to investigating these matters.
Please note that I am not suggesting the passage of Resolution 32 as a propaganda ploy. I feel that in a democracy with the right of free criticism such ventures rarely, if ever, work. Rather I am advocating a genuine search for disarmament solutions because I feel that solutions probably do exist and can be found, and that only by embarking on a major national discussion of the issues involved can be true national interest in superseding the present unilateral national defense system be fully elicited, confirmed, and driven home to our own citizens. Only after this has happened, will it be possible to convince other nations that we really mean what we say in advocating general and complete disarmament.
Such a national debate could also help to give the public a more balanced view of the full range of national security policies, and help avoid the danger of exaggerated responses in future diplomatic and military confrontations. National survival will increasingly depend on public awareness of the interdependence that now links us with our adversaries, invalidating many of the cherished lessons of historical experience, and requiring novel methods of controlling and progressively limiting international conflict. To do this successfully we will need not only cool nerves, a stout heart, and an awareness of our essential valties and traditions, but a clear vision of what we are trying ultimately to obtain, and a coherent and realistic strategy for its attainment. Such a vision and such a strategy require the abandonment of a simplistic black and white version of what is happening in the world, and of irrational oscillation between a cold war atmosphere and exaggerated expectations of what is to be achieved by a mere detente, or by gestures of international friendship. It is realistic to recognize that the problems we confront are stubborn, and unprecedently difficult, and will not be exercised by good will or by traditional diplomacy. We should not expect to be able to solve them by anything less