So an infant may bind himself apprentice to a trader, and, CH. VII. s. 4. after his death, to his executors-provided they carry on the same trade, in the same place (s). A contract by an infant to serve for wages, and enabling the master to stop the work at his pleasure, and to retain the infant's wages during the stoppage, is inequitable and void, as not being beneficial to the infant (t); and a clause that the master shall not be liable to pay wages during a turn out is so detrimental to the infant as to vitiate the whole contract, and not to be enforceable under the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 90, s. 6 (u). Where, however, an infant agreed to serve his master for five years at weekly wages, but subject to a proviso that-if his master should cease to carry on his business, or find it necessary to reduce operations at his works, either temporarily or permanently, from being unable to obtain materials, or in consequence of any accident, or of strikes or combinations of workmen, or from any cause over which he had no control-he should have power to discharge the infant, upon giving him fourteen days' notice: it was held, that if these provisions were, at the time, common to labour contracts, or were, in the then condition of trade, such as the master was reasonably justified in imposing as a just measure of protection to himself, and if the wages agreed to be paid was a fair compensation for the infant's services, the contract was binding upon him (x). Contracts with Infants (Beneficial). Stoppage of wages during strike or turn out, &c. A contract by an infant "out of" the Employers' Liability Contract "out of" Act, 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42, in consideration of receiving the Employers' benefits of an insurance fund against accidents established and Liability Act. contributed to by his employers, has been upheld as being for his benefit (y). infants. Lemprière v. Notwithstanding the Infants' Relief Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Vict. Leases to c. 62, s. 1, a lease made to an infant is voidable only (z), and if he occupies and enjoyed, he is chargeable with the rent (a). But, Lange. in such a case, the lessor cannot claim to have the lease declared void, and, at the same time, to make the infant liable for use and occupation (b). On the other hand, where an infant agreed to become tenant of a house and to pay a certain sum of money for the furniture therein, and he paid part of that sum and occupied (8) Cooper v. Simmons (1862), 7 H. & N. 707. (1) R. v. Lord (1850), 12 Q. B. 757. (u) Corn v. Matthews, [1893] 1 Q. B. 310, C. A., approving Meakin v. Morris (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 352, and R. v. Lord, ubi sup., and distinguishing Leslie v. Fitzpatrick, ubi sup. (x) Leslie v. Fitzpatrick (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 229. Followed in Fellows v. Wood Beneficial CH. VII. s. 4. the house and used the furniture for some months, it was held that though the agreement might be set aside and the infants' promissory note for the balance cancelled, the infant could not recover back the money which he had paid (c). with Infants. Leases by infants. Gavelkind. Infant may be A lease by an infant was, at common law, voidable only, and not void (d). And the validity of such a lease does not seem to be affected by sect. 1 of the Infants' Relief Act, 1874. But the lease of an infant, to be good, must be his own personal act; and if he appoint a person to make a lease, it does not bind him, neither does his ratification thereof bind him (e). An infant of fifteen, owner in fee of gavelkind land can, by the custom of Kent, sell and convey the land by feoffment (ƒ). It is enacted by the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, 59 & 60 Vict. c. 25, s. 34, that the rules of a friendly society or branch may provide for the admission of a person under 21 years, but above one year of age as a member, and that any such member may, if he is over 16 years of age by himself, and if he is under that age by his parent or guardian, execute all instruments and give all acquittances necessary to be executed or given by the rules, but may not be a member of the committee, manager, or treasurer; by the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 39, s. 32, that a person under 21, but above 16, may be elected a member of any such society, the rules of which do not prohibit such election, and may execute all instruments, and give all necessary acquittances as such Trade union. member; by the Trade Union Act Amendment Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict. c. 22, s. 9, that a person under 21, but above 16, may be a member of a trade union subject to rules; and by sect. 38 of the Building Societies Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 42, that any person under 21 may be admitted as a member under that Act, the rules of which do not prohibit such admission, and may give all necessary acquittances, but during his nonage may not vote or hold office. Under the last named of these enactments it has been held by the House of Lords in Thurstan's case (g), that an infant is not enabled to borrow money from his society by means of advances on mortgage of his property, and that such a mortgage is rendered absolutely void by sect. 1 of the Infants' Relief Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62 (g) (p. 144, ante); and this decision appears to be of general application. Building society. Mortgage by infant member void. Thurstan's case. (c) Valentini v. Canali (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 166. (d) Per Lord Mansfield, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, Zouch v. Parsons (1765), 3 Burr. 1794; Ashfield v. Ashfield (1628), Sir W. Jones, 157; Bac. Abr. Leases (B.); per Buller, J., Maddon v. White (1787), 2 T. R. 159; 1 R. R. 453. (e) Per Parke, B., Doe d. Thomas v. Roberts (1847), 16 M. & W. 778. (f) See Precedent in Davidson, vol. ii., and notes thereto. Such conveyances by infants under the custom are in actual use at the present time in Kent. (g) Thurstan v. Nottingham Perma Beneficial Contracts. Contracts with Infants. Infant may be shareholder in a railway So, an infant may be a shareholder in a railway company CH. VII. s. 4. or other company incorporated under the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, sect. 79 of which provides that "if any shareholder be a minor, he may vote by his guardian or by any one of his guardians," who may vote either in person or by proxy. And it is no defence to an action in the statutable form (h) for calls on railway shares, company; that the defendant was an infant at the time the calls were made; unless it appear, either that he has derived no advantage from the shares, and that he is still a minor; or that he has actually repudiated the contract (i), in which case money paid on allotment therein followed by registration may be recovered by the infant (k). So, the transfer to an infant, of shares in a joint-stock company, or joint-stock with the intention that he should take a beneficial interest in company. them (l), is voidable only (m). But such a transfer would seem to be voidable at the option of the company, as well as at the option of the infant (n). The signature of an infant to the memorandum of association of a company is the signature of a "person" within the meaning of sect. 6 of the Companies Act, 1862, which requires such memorandum to be signed by seven or more persons," and the subsequent avoidance of his contract does not invalidate the registration of the company (o). 66 contract for marriage. An infant may sue, but may not be sued for a breach of promise Infant may of marriage. The age of consent to the marriage itself is 14 for a boy and 12 for a girl, but even though that age may not have been reached, the marriage is not void, but may be consented to when both parties are of the age for consent. [See post, Ch. XVIII.]. At common law, a marriage settlement, or contract for marriage settlement by an infant, like any other contract, can be avoided if nent Benefit Building Society, [1902] 1 (h) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 26. (i) North Western Railway Company v. M'Michael (1851), 5 Ex. 114; and see Newry and Enniskillen Railway Company v. Combe (1849), 3 Ex. 565; Leeds and Thirsk Railway Company v. Fearnley (1849), 4 Ex. 26; Cork and Bandon Railway Company v. Cazenove (1847), 10 Q. B. 935; Birkenhead, &c., Railway (k) Hamilton v. Vaughan - Sherrin () See per Mellish, L.J., Merry v. Nickalls (1872), L. R., 7 Ch. A. 733, 752. (m) Per Ld. Selborne, C., Gooch's case (1872), L. R., 8 Ch. A. 266; per Wood, L.J., Capper's case (1868), L. R., 3 Ch. 458. Semble, that if the company, at the time of the transfer, was in the course of winding-up, such transfer would be void. Id. (n) Per Ld. Selborne, C., Gooch's case (1872), L. R., 8 Ch. 266. (0) Laxon & Co., In re, [1892] 3 Ch. 555. or for a marriage settle ment. Marriage settlement. CH. VII. s. 4. it was to his or her disadvantage (p), but by the Infants' Settlement Contracts Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43, a male 20 years old, and a female with Infants (Beneficial). 17 years old, may, by sanction of the Court, validly and irrevocably settle; but this must be the free act of the infant, otherwise such settlement can be avoided by the infant when he comes of age (q); or when of age, he or she, when discoverte, may expressly or tacitly ratify it, but if he or she, after accepting benefits under it, tries to avoid it, a case of election arrives, and he or she must take either under it or against it (r). Repudiation. "Next friend." Guard. at Lit. Discovery. Compromise. Real rank, &c., not appearance, to be considered. An infant is bound by a contract to settle after-acquired property unless he repudiate the contract within a reasonable time, and a repudiation four years after contract came too late (s). An infant sues by next friend and defends by guardian ad litem (t). Neither as plaintiff nor defendant can he be interrogated (u), or compelled to make discovery of documents (x). The compromise of actions by or against him requires approval of the Court; but cannot be enforced on his advisers (y), and though made in good faith will be set aside if not for his benefit (z). (d) What are not "Necessaries." In determining what are and what are not necessaries for an infant, the law regards the real rank, and the actual circumstances of the party; and does not trust merely to the appearance he assumes in society (a). And if credit be given to an infant for articles which, although they may appear to be necessary for him, are not so in reality, the infant is not responsible. So that if, at the time credit was given to the infant, he was already provided, no matter from what quarter, with sufficient necessaries of the kind then supplied, he would not be liable, although the plaintiff was not, at the time, aware of the fact (b). And, in conformity (p) Kingsman v. Kingsman (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 122, C. A.; Milner v. Lord Harewood (1816), 18 Ves. 259, Lord Eldon, L.C.; Cooper v. Cooper (1888), 13 App. Cas. 88; Burnaby v. Equitable Reversionary Interest Society (1885), 28 Ch. D.416; Duncan v. Dixon, 44 Ch. D. 211. (q) Seaton v. Seaton (1888), 13 App. Cas. 61; 35 Ch. D. 21; Re Leigh (1888), 40 Ch. D. 290, C. A. ; and cf. Swift v. Wenman (1870), L. R., 10 Eq. 15. (r) Codrington v. Codrington (1875), L. R., 7 H. L. 854; Seaton v. Seaton (1888), 13 App. Cas. 61; Cooper v. Cooper (1888), 13 App. Cas. 88; Hamilton v. Hamilton, [1892] 1 Ch. 396. (8) Carter v. Silber, [1892] 2 Ch. 278, C. A.; see also Jones, In re, Farrington v. Forrester, [1891] 2 Ch. 461. (1) See R. S. C. (1883), Ord. XVI., rr. 16, 18, 19, 21; and notes thereto in the Annual Practice. (u) Mayor v. Collins (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 361. (x) Curtis v. Mundy, [1892] 2 Q. B. 178. (y) In re Birchall (1880), 16 Ch. D. 41, C. A. ; and see Norman v. Strains (1880), 6 P. D. 219. (z) Rhodes v. Swithenbank (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 577, C. A. (a) Wharton v. M'Kenzie (1844), 5 Q. B. 606; Brooker v. Scott (1843), 11 M. & W. 67. (b) See Bainbridge v. Pickering (1780), 2 W. Bl. 1325; Brayshaw v. Eaton (1839), 7 Scott, 183; Foster v. Redgrave with this view, it has been held that there is no rule of law, making it incumbent on a tradesman to institute inquiries as to the situation and resources of an infant, before giving him credit; although the total absence of such inquiry might afford matter of strong observation to the jury (c): unless where parties, by their conduct, had rendered such inquiry unnecessary (d). CH. VII. s. 4. Contracts with Infants (Nonliability). In order to show that the articles, in respect of the price of If defendant which the action is brought, were not necessaries, the defendant plied, not may give evidence that he was already supplied with sufficient necessaries. necessaries of that kind, and it is immaterial whether or not the plaintiff tradesman was or was not aware of the fact that defendant was sufficiently supplied (e). It has also been laid down, that an infant is not liable for repairs Contracts for done to his house (ƒ); and that he is not bound by an agreement repairs, &c. to refer a dispute to arbitration (g), nor by the recitals in a deed made during infancy (h). So the law considers that an infant has not sufficient discretion to carry on any trade or business; and, consequently, he is not liable for the hire of a place, used for the carrying on of a trade (i); nor for goods supplied to, or work done for him, in order to enable him to carry on, or in the course of any trade, occupation, or calling, carried on by him, either alone or in partnership with another person (k). And "there is nothing illegal or improper in an infant carrying on trade, thousands of infants do so every day, and the man who deals with an infant on credit, trusts the infant's honour to pay him" (1). So where goods, consigned to an infant, are delivered to a carrier before the infant comes of age, but they do not reach him until after that period, he is not liable (m). And where an infant entered into a contract, to become a partner in trade with another person at a future day, and deposited with him a sum of money, (1868), L. R., 4 Ex. 35, n. (8); per Ld. Kenyon, C.J., Ford v. Fothergill (1794), Peake, 301; 3 R. R. 695. (c) Brayshaw v. Eaton (1839), 7 Scott, 183. (d) Daltan v. Gib (1839), 7 Scott, 117. (e) Johnstone v. Marks (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 509, Ld. Esher, M.R., and Lindley and Lopes, L.JJ.; affirming Barnes v. Toye (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 410, dissenting from Ryder v. Wombwell (1868), L. R., 3 Ex. 90; and following Foster v. Redgrave (1867), L. R., 4 Ex. 35, n. ; and Brayshaw v. Eaton (1839), 7 Scott, 183. (f) Anon. (1702), 3 Salk. 196. Sed qu. he is punishable for permissive waste; id. (g) Bac. Abr. Infancy (1), 3; Russell on Arb., p. 18 et passim. (h) Milner v. Lord Harewood (1810), 18 Ves. 259 and 274. (i) Per Tindal, C.J., Lowe v. Griffith (1835), 1 Scott, 458. (k) Whywall v. Champion (1738), 2 Str. 1083 Goode v. Harrison (1821), 5 B. & Al. 147. But it has been held, that if he use goods (supplied to him in his trade) as necessaries for his household purposes, he is liable; per Hullock, B., Tuberville v. Whitehouse (1823), 1 C. & P. 94. (1) Per Jessel, M.R., in Ex parte Jones (1881), 18 Ch. D. 109, C. A. (m) Griffin v. Langfield (1812), 3 Camp. 254. Debts contracted in trade or business |