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persons operating any such railroad, or master or owner of any boat or vessel, or owner or custodian of or person having control over such cattle or other live stock within such infected district, who shall knowingly violate the provisions of section 6 of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by

or by both such fine and imprisonment.
[U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3184.]

In order to promote the exportation of live stock from the United States," the Commissioner was directed to "make special investigation as to the existence of pleuro-pneumonia, or any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, along the dividing lines between the United States and foreign countries, and along the lines of transportation from all parts of the United States to ports from which live stock are exported, and make report of the re-imprisonment for not more than one year, sults of such investigation to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall, from time to time, establish such regulations concerning the exportation and transportation of live stock as the results of said investigations may require" (8 4 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3183]); and that "to prevent the exportation from any port of the United States to any port in a foreign country of live stock affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, and especially pleuro-pneumonia," the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to take such steps and adopt such measures, not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, as he might deem necessary. § 5 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3183].

By another section of the act all railroad companies within the United States, or the owners or masters of any steam or sailing vessel or other vessel or boat, were forbidden to receive for transportation or transport from one state or territory to another, or from any state into the District of Columbia, or from the District into any state, "any live stock affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, and especially the disease known as pleuro[145]pneumonia; nor shall *any person, company, or corporation deliver for such transportation to any railroad company, or master or owner of any boat or vessel, any live stock, "§ 9. That it shall be the duty of the sevknowing them to be affected with any con-eral United States district attorneys to tagious, infectious, or communicable dis- prosecute all violations of this act which ease; nor shall any person, company, or cor- shall be brought to their notice or knowlporation drive on foot or transport in pri-edge by any person making the complaint vate conveyance from one state or territory to another, or from any state into the District of Columbia, or from the District into any state, any live stock, knowing them to be affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, and especially the disease known as pleuro-pneumonia: Provided, That the so-called splenetic or Texas It may be here stated that by the act of fever shall not be considered a contagious, February 9th, 1889, the Department of Aginfectious, or communicable disease within riculture was made one of the Executive the meaning of sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this Departments of the government, and placed act, as to cattle being transported by rail to under the supervision and control of a Secmarket for slaughter, when the same are un-retary of Agriculture (25 Stat. at L. 659, loaded only to be fed and watered in lots on the way thereto." § 6 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3184].

"§ 8. That whenever any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease affecting domestic animals, and especially the disease known as pleuro-pneumonia, shall be brought into or shall break out in the District of Columbia, it shall be the duty of the commissioners of said District to take measures to suppress the same promptly and to prevent the same from spreading; and for this purpose the said commissioners are hereby empowered to order and re-[146] quire that any premises, farm, or farms where such disease exists or has existed, be put in quarantine; to order all or any animals coming into the District to be detained at any place or places for the purpose of inspection and examination; to prescribe regulations for and to require the destruction of animals affected with contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, and for the proper disposition of their hides and carcasses; to prescribe regulations for disin fection, and such other regulations as they may deem necessary to prevent infection or contagion being communicated, and shall report to the Commissioner of Agriculture whatever they may do in pursuance of the provisions of this section. [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3184.]

Other provisions of the act are as follows:

under oath; and the same shall be heard before any district or circuit court of the United States or territorial court holden within the district in which the violation of this act has been committed." [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3185.] 23 Stat. at L. 31, chap. 60 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 299).

chap. 122, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 285), and that by the act of July 14th, 1890, the Secretary was vested with all the authority which by the above act of May 29th, 1884, was conferred upon the Commissioner of Agriculture. 26 Stat. at L. 282, chap. 707.

"87. That it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Agriculture to notify, in It is quite true, as urged on behalf of the writing, the proper officials or agents of any defendant, that the transportation of live railroad, steamboat, or other transportation stock from state to state is a branch of incompany doing business in or through any terstate commerce, and that any specified infected locality, and by publication in such rule or regulation in respect of such transnewspapers as he may select, of the exist-portation, which Congress may lawfully ence of said contagion; and any person or prescribe or authorize, and which may prop

erly be deemed a regulation of such com-propriated by Congress could be used in merce, is paramount throughout the Union. conducting the required investigations, and So that when the entire subject of the in such disinfection and quarantine meastransportation of live stock from one state ures as might be necessary to prevent the to another is taken under direct national spread of the diseases in question from one supervision, and a system devised by which state or territory into another. Congress diseased stock may be excluded from inter- did not intend to override the power of the [147]state commerce, all local or state regula- states to care for the safety of the property tions in respect of such matters and cover- of their peoples by such legislation as they ing the same ground will cease to have any deemed appropriate. It did not undertake force, whether formally abrogated or not; to invest any officer or agent of the Departand such rules and regulations as Congress ment with authority to go into a state and may lawfully prescribe or authorize will without its assent take charge of the work alone control. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. of suppressing or extirpating contagious, 1, 210, 6 L. ed. 23, 73; Morgan's L. & T. R. infectious, or communicable diseases there & S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 prevailing, and which endangered the health U. S. 455, 464, 30 L. ed. 237, 241, 6 Sup. Ct. of domestic animals. Nor did Congress Rep. 1114; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. give the Department authority by its offi S. 299, 317, 41 L. ed. 166, 173, 16 Sup. Ct. cers or agents to inspect cattle within the Rep. 1086; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. limits of a state, and give a certificate that New York; 165 U. S. 628, 631, 41 L. ed. should be of superior authority in that or 853, 854, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Missouri, other states, or which should entitle the K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626, owner to carry his cattle into or through 42 L. ed. 878, 882, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; another state without reference to the reaRasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198, 200, 45 sonable and valid regulations which the latL. ed. 820, 821, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594. The ter state may have adopted for the protecpower which the states might thus exercise tion of its own domestic animals. It should may in this way be suspended until na- never be held that Congress intends to sutional control is abandoned and the subject persede, or by its legislation suspend, the be thereby left under the police power of the exercise of the police powers of the states, even when it may do so, unless its purpose But the difficulty with the defendant's to effect that result is clearly manifested. case is that Congress has not by any statute This court has said-and the principle has covered the whole subject of the transporta- been often reaffirmed-that "in the application of live stock among the several states, tion of this principle of supremacy of an and, except in certain particulars not iu- act of Congress in a case where the state volving the present issue, has left a wide law is but the exercise of a reserved power, field for the exercise by the states of their the repugnance or conflict should be direct power, by appropriate regulations, to pro- and positive, so that the two acts could not tect their domestic animals against conta- be reconciled or consistently stand togethgious, infectious, and communicable dis-er." Sinnott v. Davenport, 22 How. 227,

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states.

eases.

243, 16 L. ed. 243, 247. The certificate An examination of the animal industry given to the defendant by Assistant Inspectact will make this entirely clear. Three or Hart of the Bureau of Animal Industry distinct subjects are embraced by that act. was in itself without legal weight in ColoOne is the ascertainment through the Agri- rado. As said in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. cultural Department of the condition of the v. Haber, above cited: "While the states domestic animals of the United States, the were invited to co-operate with the general causes of contagious, infectious, or com-government in the execution and enforcement municable diseases affecting them, the best of the act, whatever power they had to promethods for treating, transporting, and car-tect their domestic cattle against such dising for animals, the means to be adopted eases was left untouched and unimpaired *by [149] for the suppression and extirpation of such the act of Congress." Hence, it was decided diseases, particularly that of contagious in that case that the animal industry act pleuro-pneumonia, and to collect such information on those subjects as will be valuable to the agricultural and commercial interests of the country. Congress did not assume to declare that "the rules and regulations" which that Department might adopt as necessary "for the speedy and effectual suppression and extirpation of said diseases" should have in themselves, or apart from the action of a state, any binding force upon the states. They were to be certified to the executive authority of each state, and the co-operation of such authorities in executing the act of Congress invited. If the authorities of any state [148] *adopted the plans and methods devised by the Department, or if the state authorities adopted measures of their own which the l Department approved, then the money ap

did not stand in the way of the state of
Kansas enacting a statute declaring that
any person driving, shipping, or transport-
ing, or causing to be shipped, driven, or
transported into or through that state, any
cattle liable or capable of communicating
Texas or splenetic fever to domestic cattle
should be liable to the person injured there-
by for all damages sustained by reason of
the communication of said disease or fever,
to be recovered in a civil action. We there
held that the Kansas statute did nothing
more than establish a rule of civil liability,
in that state, affected no regulation of in-
terstate commerce that Congress had pre-
scribed or authorized, and impaired no right
secured by the national Constitution.

Another subject embraced by the act of
Congress related to the exportation from

ports of the United States to ports in for- | His knowledge as to the actual condition of eign countries of live stock affected with the cattle was of no consequence under the contagious, infectious, or communicable dis- state enactment, or under the charge made. eases, especially pleuro-pneumonia; and in relation to that matter the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to take such steps and adopt such measures, not inconsistent with the act of Congress, as he deemed nec essary. As the present case is not one of the exportation of live stock to a foreign country, it is unnecessary to consider what power, if any, remained with the states, after the passage of the animal industry act, to suppress or extirpate diseases that in fact affected live stock, which it was the purpose of the owners to export.

Our conclusion is that the statute of Colorado as here involved does not cover the same ground as the act of Congress, and therefore is not inconsistent with that act; and its constitutionality is not to be questioned unless it be in violation of the Constitution of the United States, independently of any legislation by Congress. The latter question we now proceed to examine. Certain principles are well settled by the One is that former decisions of this court. the purpose of a statute, in whatever language it may be framed, must be determined derson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 268, sub by its natural and reasonable effect. Hen-[151]

548. Another is, that a state may not, by. its police regulations, whatever their object, unnecessarily burden foreign or interstate commerce. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. Y, Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 472, 24 L. ed. 527, 531. Again, the acknowledged police powers of a state cannot legitimately be exerted so as to defeat or impair a right secured by the national Constitution, any more than to defeat or impair a statute passed by Congress in pursuance of the powers granted to it. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210, 6 L ed. 23, 73; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 625, 626, 42 L. ed. 878, 882, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488, and authorities cited.

Still another subject covered by the act is the driving on foot or transporting from one state or territory into another state or territory, or from any state into the Dis-nom. Henderson v. Wickham, 23 L. ed. 543, trict of Columbia, or from the District into any state, of any live stock known to be affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease. But this provision does not cover the entire subject of the transporting or shipping of diseased live stock from one state to another. The owner of such stock, when bringing them into another state, may not know them to be diseased; but they may, in fact, be diseased, or the circumstances may be such as fairly to [150]authorize the state into which they are about to be brought to take such precautionary measures as will reasonably guard its own domestic animals against danger Now, it is said that the defendant has a from contagious, infectious, or communica- right under the Constitution of the United ble diseases. The act of Congress left the States to ship live stock from one state to state free to cover that field by such regu- another state. This will be conceded on all lations as it deemed appropriate, and which hands. But the defendant is not given by only incidentally affected the freedom of that instrument the right to introduce into interstate commerce. Congress went no a state, against its will, live stock affected farther than to make it an offense against by a contagious, infectious, or communicathe United States for any one knowingly to ble disease, and whose presence in the state take or send from one state or territory to will or may be injurious to its domestic another state or territory, or into the Dis- animals. The state-Congress not having trict of Columbia, or from the District into assumed charge of the matter as involved in any state, live stock affected with infectious interstate commerce-may protect its peoor communicable disease. The animal in-ple and their property against such dangers, dustry act did not make it an offense against the United States to send from one state into another live stock which the shipper did not know were diseased. The offense charged upon the defendant in the Is the statute of Colorado liable to the state court was not the introduction into objection just stated? Can the courts hold Colorado of cattle that he knew to be dis- that upon its face it unreasonably obstructs eased. He was charged with having the exercise of the general right secured by brought his cattle into Colorado from cer- the Constitution to ship or send recognized tain counties in Texas, south of the 36th articles of commerce from one state to anparallel of north latitude, without said cat- other without interference by local authortle having been held at some place north of ity? Those questions must be answered in said parallel of latitude for at least the the negative. The Colorado statute, in eftime required prior to their being brought fect, declares that live stock coming between into Colorado, and without having procured the dates and from the territory specified from the state veterinary sanitary board a certificate or bill of health to the effect that his cattle, in fact, were free from all infectious or contagious diseases, and had not been exposed at any time within ninety days prior thereto to any such diseases, but had declined to procure such certificate or have the inspection required by the statute.

to that end do not go beyond the necessities
taking care always that the means employed
of the case or unreasonably burden the exer-
cise of privileges secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States.

are ordinarily in such condition that their presence in the state may be dangerous to its domestic animals; and hence the requirement that before being brought or sent into the state they shall either be kept at some place north of the 36th parallel of north latitude for at least ninety days prior to their importation into the state, or the

owner must procure from the state veteri- | stitution of the United States, the judgment [152]nary sanitary board *a certificate or bill of is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Brewer dissented from the opinion and judgment of the court.

ED. H. REID, Appt.,

health that the cattle are free from all infectious or contagious diseases, and have not been exposed to any of said diseases at any time within ninety days prior thereto. As there is no evidence in the case as to the practical operation of this regulation upon shippers of cattle, as it does not appear otherwise than that the statute can obeyed without serious embarrassment or ROBERT J. JONES, Sheriff of the County unreasonable cost, the court cannot assume arbitrarily that the state acted wholly without authority or that it unduly burdened the exercise of the privilege of engaging in interstate

be

v.

of Arapahoe, State of Colorado.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 153, 154.)

commerce. The ac- Habeas cused seems to have been content to rest his defense upon such grounds as arose upon the face of the local statute, without reference to any evidence bearing upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the particular methods adopted by the state to pro. tect its domestic animals. He seems to have been willing to risk the case upon the simple proposition-based upon the words of the state enactment and upon the act of Congress, reinforced by certain regulations made by the Agricultural Departmentthat the local statute was inconsistent with that act, and with the general power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

corpus-in Federal courts remedy in state courts.

Habeas corpus in favor of a person who has
been convicted and sentenced in a state
court for an alleged violation of the crim-
inal statutes of the state will not be granted
by a Federal court on the ground that he is
held in violation of the Federal Constitution,
where the case presents no exceptional facts
which will take it out of the rule that he
must ordinarily first take his case to the
highest court of the state in which the judg
ment can be reviewed, and if unsuccessful
therein, bring it to the Supreme Court of the
United States by writ of error.

[No. 147.]

As, therefore, the statute does not forbid
the introduction into the state of all live Argued October 24, 1902. Decided Decem-
stock coming from the defined territory,-
that diseased as well as that not diseased,-
but only prescribes certain methods to pro-

ber 1, 1902.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

teet the domestic animals of Colorado from APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Colo-
contact with live stock coming from that rado to review a judgment dismissing an
territory between certain dates, and as those application for a writ of habeas corpus.
methods have been devised by the state un- Affirmed.
der the power to protect the property of its
people from injury, and do not appear upon
their face to be unreasonable, we must, in
the absence of evidence showing the con-
trary, assume that they are appropriate to
the object which the state is entitled to ac-
complish.

One other objection to the Colorado statute must be noticed, namely, that it is inconsistent with the clause of the Constitution declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. This position is untenable. The statute is equally applicable to citizens of all the states. No discrimination is shown. No privileges

are granted to citizens of Colorado that are [153] denied *to citizens of other states.

Kim

mish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 222, 32 L. ed.
695, 697, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 407, 9 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 277.

The principle is universal that legisla-
tion, whether by Congress or by a state,
must be taken to be valid, unless the con-
trary is made clearly to appear; and as the
contrary does not so appear, the statute of
Colorado is to be taken as a constitutional
exercise of the power of the state.

Perceiving no error in the judgment to the prejudice of the plaintiff under the Con

Messrs. John H. Denison and William M. Springer argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Ralph Talbot and W. H. Wadley and Assistant Attorney General Beck, filed a brief for appellant.

Mr. Frederic D. McKenney argued the cause for appellee. Mr. Charles C. Post filed a brief for appellee.

For contentions of counsel see their briefs as reported in Reid v. Colorado, ante, 108.

*Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin-[154] ion of the court:

After the appellant Reid had been con-
victed and sentenced, as shown in the case
just decided, he was arrested upon a mitti-
mus sued out by the state. He immediate-
y obtained a writ of habeas corpus from
the circuit court of the United States for

the district of Colorado. But that court,
upon hearing, remanded the prisoner to the
custody of the state authorities, and dis-
missed his application to be discharged.

NOTE. On the jurisdiction of the United
States courts on habeas corpus-see Re Reinitz
(C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 4 L. R. A. 236, and note.
See also notes to State ex rel. Cochran v.
Winters (Kan.) 10 L. R. A. 616; Re Huse, 25

c. C. A. 4; and Tinsley v. Anderson, 43 L. ed.
U. S. 91.

He thereupon prayed and was allowed an
appeal to this court.

The merits of this case have been fully
considered in case No. 269 [Reid v. Colo-
rado, 187 U. S. 137, ante, 108, 23 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 92]. But if this had not been, we
should dismiss the present appeal; for one
convicted in a state court for an alleged vio-
lation of the criminal statutes of the state,
and who contends that he is held in viola-
tion of the Constitution of the United
States, must ordinarily first take his case to
the highest court of the state in which the
judgment could be reviewed, and thence
bring it, if unsuccessful there, to this court
by writ of error; that only in certain ex-
ceptional cases, of which the present is not
one, will a circuit court of the United
States, or this court upon appeal from a
circuit court, intervene by writ of habeas
corpus in advance of the final action by the
highest court of the state. Ex parte Roy-
all, 117 U. S. 241, 251, 29 L. ed. 868, 871,
6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734; New York v. Eno, 155
U. S. 89, 39 L. ed. 80, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30;
Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499, 502,
45 L. ed. 639, 640, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455, and
authorities cited.

The judgment is affirmed.

See same case below in Appellate Division, 56 App. Div. 625, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1140, and in Court of Appeals, 166 N. Y. 602, 59 N. E. 1123.

Statement by Mr. Justice Harlan:

The plaintiff in error, the Home for Incurables, filed its petition in the supreme court for the city and county of New York, alleging that at the date of the confirmation of a certain assessment for a sewer in East 184th street from Vanderbilt avenue west to Washington avenue, etc., it was the owner of certain lots affected thereby in ward number 1, block number 3,064, the 24th ward of the city of New York;

That on the 22d of January, 1900, that assessment was confirmed by operation of law and the title thereof duly entered, with date of entry and of confirmation, in the record of titles of assessments confirmed, whereby such assessment became a lien upon such lots; and,

That the assessment, together with an interest certificate certified by the comptroller of the city of New York to the board of assessors, was irregular, excessive, and voidable, for reasons set forth in the petition.

*The petition alleged, among other things,[156]. that "so much of the act of the legislature of the state of New York, known as § 868

[155]*HOME FOR INCURABLES, Plff. in Err., of the New York city consolidation act of

v.

CITY OF NEW YORK.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 155-158.) Error to state court-Federal question

certificate of judge of state court.

1. A judgment of a state court cannot be reviewed in the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that it denied a right, title, privilege, or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution, where it does not appear on the face of the record that such right, title, privilege, or immunity was specially set up or claimed in the state court. 2. A certificate of the chief judge of the highest state court that a Federal question was involved is not properly a part of the record, and is insufficient in itself to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of the United States to review a judgment of the state court or to determine Federal questions which do not appear from the record to have been brought to the attention of that court.

[No. 86.]

Argued and Submitted November 12, 1902.
Decided December 1, 1902.

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

1882, as purports to authorize and direct.
the making of such interest certificate and
the assessment of the amount thereof here-
in, is in violation of the Constitution of the
state of New York in that said portion of
said act authorizes the taking of private
property without just compensation, and
said portion of said act purports to author-
ize an unlawful exercise of the power of
taxation."

The petitioner prayed that the assess-
ment be vacated or reduced, and that the lien
or liens created thereby or by any subse-
quent proceeding be canceled and discharged
or reduced so far as the same affected the
above lots.

The case was heard upon the stipulation of facts in the supreme court and the relief asked by the petitioner was denied. Upon appeal to the appellate division of the supreme court the action of the court of original jurisdiction was confirmed. The case was then carried to the court of appeals of the state, and the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

Upon writ of error to this court, it has been assigned for error that the judgment of the state court was in violation of the provisions of the 14th Amendment of the

I State of the United States, also,

ment of that court affirmed by the Appel late Division of the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeals. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

NOTE. On writs of error from United States Supreme Court to state courts-see notes to Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 37 L. ed. U. S.

267; Kipley v. Illinois ex rel. Akin, 42 L. ed. U. S. 998; and Re Buchanan, 39 L. ed. U. S.

884.

the judgment deprived the home of the
equal protection of the law and of its prop-
erty without due process of law.

The record contains a certificate by the
chief judge of the court of appeals of New
York to the effect that in this proceeding
the Home for Incurables claimed in the
courts of the state that "the imposition of
all or a part of the assessment on its land
as set forth in the record herein was in vio-

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