An agent may not entrust his duties to another without his principal's consent. Any unauthorized delega tion of his authority binds the agent and not the principal, even though the latter is benefited thereby. Page 34a, No. 1410.
One may make another his agent by ratifying the latter's assumption in a transaction, and thereby become liable to the latter and to a third person with whom the latter dealt; and such ratification may when a person, without authority in fact from his principal, pretends to represent the principal, and to employ a sub-agent, or may occur where there is no intermediary. A ratification by a principal of the unauthorized acts of his agent may be shown by carrying out the con- tract made by the agent with an- other and accepting the benefits therefrom; but there can be no rati- fication without action by the prin- cipal, with knowledge of the facts. Where one apparently clothes another with authority to represent him generally, or in a particular line of business, he is bound by contracts made by the latter within the scope of apparent authority, including the making of sub-agency contracts. Whether one was the agent of another
in the sale of corporate stock, so as to justify a recovery from the latter for services rendered, held, under the evidence for the jury.
Where the issue was whether defend- ant directly or through an agent employed plaintiff as agent to sell corporate stock, and there was evi- dence that a general agent of de- fendant, with authority to employ agents, or assuming to have such authority, employed plaintiff, who rendered services in selling the stock, and defendant claimed that plaintiff acted for the benefit of the corporation or the agent, and not for him, a charge that if plaintiff, without authority from defendant, Imade a contract for the benefit of defendant, who with full knowledge of the facts accepted the benefits, he was liable to plaintiff, but if de- fendant did not employ plaintiff, nor authorize anyone to employ him, and the contract made by plaintiff was not for defendant's benefit, and he did not ratify it, but it was for the benefit of the corpora- tion, or of a third person, the ver- dict must be for defendant, suffi-
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Con.
ciently submitted the issue. Page 71a, No. 1432.
If one holds another out to the world and accredits him as his agent, he is bound by that person's acts done within the scope of the agency thus given him. In such cases the ques- tion is, not what authority was intended to be given to the agent, but what authority was the third person dealing with him justified from the acts of the principal in believing was given to him.
Where a contract between a
piano dealer and defendant furnish- ing the money to pay for pianos procured from manufacturers obli- gated the dealer to pay the price to defendant, and interest thereon, out of the first moneys collected on con- tracts of sale made by the dealer as agent, but, with the consent of de- fendant, the dealer retained the first money paid on contracts as his compensation for selling, and also appropriated to his own use money belonging to defendant, the court could compel the dealer to account for the amount of the misappropria- tion, and give the dealer credit for commissions provided for in the con- tract. Page 61a, No. 1426. Whether or not an act is within the scope of an agent's apparent author- ity is to be determined, under the foregoing rule, as a question of fact, from all the circumstances of the transaction and the business. Page 72a, No. 1433.
Knowledge acquired by an agent be- fore the existence of his agency, or as to matters outside the line of his duty as agent, is not notice thereof to his principal; it being necessary, in order to bind the latter, that such knowledge be acquired in trans- acting the business of the principal. Knowledge acquired by the agent in transacting the business of his prin- cipal is constructive notice to the principal, regardless of his actual knowledge; the agent being identi- fied with the principal in law. The rule charging a principal with notice of facts coming to the agent's knowledge in discharging the agency is not one of evidence, but of sub- stantive law, though actual knowl- edge of the principal is a fact of evidence, and hence it is immaterial that through self-interest it is ap- parent that the agent will not in fact communicate his knowledge to the principal.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Con. It is an agent's duty to inform his principal of every material fact within his knowledge upon the sub- ject of his agency, which may affect the principal's interests, and it will be presumed that he has done so, but such presumption may be re- butted by showing that such in- formation was not present in the agent's mind when executing the agency. Page 111a, No. 1457. In an action for the specific perform- ance of a contract for the sale of land entered into by vendor's agent, defenses that the agent exceeded his authority are affirmative and must be pleaded.
A real estate agent was given, by written contract, power to enter into written contracts for the conveyance of land owned by his principal. Held, that while Rev. St. (Mo.) re- quired the agent to be authorized in writing to enter into contracts for a conveyance, such contract need not be recorded or acknowledged in ac cordance with section 2816, provid- ing that every letter of attorney containing a power to convey real estate as agent shall be acknowl- edged and recorded.
Where an agent, having the power to sell land, entered into a contract providing that his principal should pay interest on earnest money de- posited by the purchaser, the princi- pal cannot complain that the agent thereby exceeded his authority, where the purchaser has made no claim for the interest.
As the law disregards small things, an agent's agreement to pay a very small interest on earnest money, de- posited to bind a contract for the sale of land, will not invalidate the contract, though the agent was not authorized to agree to such pay- ment.
Where a contract authorized real estate agents to contract for the sale of their principal's land by satis- factory deed, a contract of sale pro- viding for the execution of a war- ranty deed was not in excess of the agent's authority.
Where a principal enters into a con- tract of agency, powers essential or usual to those granted are implied, but a substantial departure from both express and implied power will not bind the principal, and hence, where a principal gave an agent power to enter into a contract for the conveyance of land without fix-
No agreement of sureties on a note, among themselves, that, if all of them were not bound, none of them should be, would affect the rights of the payee, unless he had notice of the agreement, and that it had been violated prior to or at the time that he took the note and parted with the consideration.
Where a note, when presented to the payee, had on it the names of five signers, four of whom were sureties for the principal maker, but the name of one of such sureties had been erased, the payee, in the ab- sence of knowledge or notice to the contrary, was entitled to presume that such erasure had been made with the consent of the other sure- ties; the mere fact of such erasure being insufficient to put the payee on notice that it had been made without the consent of the other sureties, and released them from liability.
Where the payee of a note signed by four persons as sureties, before tak- ing the note and parting with the consideration, had notice that the
- Con. name of D., one of the sureties, had been erased without the consent of V., who had previously signed, and that he was not to be bound unless D. was, V. would be released; and if the subsequent signers signed after the name of D. had been erased such erasure would not of itself affect their liability, but if it was effective to release V., and it was agreed that such subsequent signers should only be bound on con- dition that V. remained, and the payee had notice of the fact at or before it took the note and parted with the consideration, then such release of V. would also release such subsequent signers. Page 53a, No. 1421.
An agreement by a creditor with the principal debtor, which extends the time of payment or suspends the right to enforce the debt without the surety's consent, discharges surety.
A company executed its negotiable note, payable to its own order and signed by defendant as accommoda- tion indorser, which note was in- dorsed to plaintiff, and before it
wrote due the company plaintiff it would give its new note with its president's indorsement, to which plaintiff replied that it pre- ferred to have defendant indorse them, and returned the notes for his indorsement. The company sug- gested that plaintiff hold the old note with defendant's indorsement 66 as collateral until the new notes are paid," and that the indorsement of its president had been left on the notes as proposed. Plaintiff re- tained the notes without replying. Held, that the agreement did not reserve plaintiff's right to proceed against defendant on the old note, so that defendant was discharged; Negotiable Instruments Law, provid- ing that one secondarily liable is discharged by any agreement by the holder to extend the time of pay ment or postpone his right to en- force the instrument, unless the right of recourse be expressly re- served.
The obligation of a surety such as an accommodation indorser will not be extended beyond its strict terms. Page 169a, No. 1491.
A common carrier is not required by the common law to provide passen- ger or freight depots, but may be required to do so by statute. Page 59a, No. 1425.
The Railroad Commission must have express authority for its acts under the Railroad Commission Act, as no authority will be implied. Page 59a, No. 1425. Railroad Commission Act (Ore.), § 12, requires every railroad to furnish reasonably adequate service, equip- ment, and facilities, and section 28 provides that upon complaint that any service in the transportation of persons or property is inadequate notice must be given the company complained of which may file an an- swer, whereupon a hearing shall be ordered; and, if it be found that the service is inadequate, the commis- sion may make a reasonable order as to the service. Held, that the Railroad Commission, upon proper investigation, may make an order re- quiring a railroad company to erect a passenger waiting room and freight depot at its station.
The Railroad Commission may require a railroad company to maintain an agent at the depot to enable the public to transact business with him; the word "service" as used in the act including the maintenance of a station agent.
In an action by the state against a railroad company for a penalty for a violation of an order of the Rail- road Commission requiring the erec- tion of a passenger and freight depot, evidence that defendant had not employed any one at the sta- tion with whom shippers could ne- gotiate for transporting freight was admissible. Page 59a, No. 1425. The words "regular station," as used in Railroad Commission Act (Ore.), § 22, requiring every railroad to provide and maintain adequate and suitable depot and toilet buildings at its regular stations where an agent is maintained, means a place established on the road where trains
are regularly stopped to receive and discharge passengers and freight, and where the carrier keeps an agent for the transaction of business, so that, in an action against a railroad company for a penalty for failure to construct a depot building pur- suant to an order of the Railroad Commission, it may be inferred, from an averment that the station is a "regular station," that defend- ant maintains an agent there. Since Railroad Commission Act (Ore.),
§ 31, provides that any service pre- scribed by the commission shall be prima facie reasonable; until found otherwise in an action for that pur- pose, the reasonableness of an order of the Railroad Commission prescrib- ing service can only be assailed in a proceeding under section 32, au- thorizing any railroad affected by an order of the commission to com- mence suit against the commission- ers to vacate the order, on the ground that the service required is unrea- sonable; so that, in an action by the State against a railroad company for a penalty for noncompliance with an order requiring the erection of a depot, the complaint need not allege that the erection and main- tenance of a depot was essential, nor state the volume of railroad business transacted at the station, since the order of the commission, not having been vacated, established prima facie the reasonableness of such service. Page 59a, No. 1425 REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS: While the reformation of a contract involves its attempted enforcement as reformed, rescission only involves the abandonment of a contract which the parties did not intend to make, and, while a party cannot have a contract reformed for a mistake which is not mutual, he can have it rescinded for a mistake on his part only; there being no contract be- cause of a want of meeting of the minds of the parties. Page 124a, No. 1463.
A retail piano dealer and a third per- son may enter into a contract where- by the third person shall pay manu- facturers for pianos procured, and obtain title to them, to be sold by the dealer as agent; and the igno- rance of the manufacturer does not affect the rights of the parties and those dealing with them. Page 61a. No. 1426.
SALES Continued. Where, in a defense to a suit on prom- issory notes, the defendant pleads that there has been a total failure of consideration, because the notes were given for a machine which, by reason of defects, was wholly worth- less; and the defendant has testi- fied that it was worthless because, at the time the suit was filed, the machine was so out of fix that it could not be operated, it is proper for the court to admit testimony tending to show that the machine had been repaired, and had been successfully used and operated, since the suit was filed. The fact that a machine may not be capable of op- eration without repair does not necessarily render the machine to- tally worthless, and the fact that it did successfully operate when the repairs were made, irrespective of the time when they were made, tends to show that the machine was not in fact without some value. Page 80a, No. 1438.
Where there is a special contract of sale, and the contract has been breached by the seller to the injury and damage of the purchaser, he may set up the contract and its breach and the damages sustained resulting as a proximate consequence of such breach by way of set-off to the claim for the value of the goods, but a party may not purchase and retain the goods of another, and, when sued for their value, set up a breach of contract in the sale and purchase to defeat payment. Page 123a, No. 1462. The unconditional delivery by a seller of goods to a common carrier, to be transported and delivered to the purchaser, to whom the bill of lad- ing was sent, constituted a delivery to the purchaser, which passed the title, even though the purchaser had not accepted the goods at the time a receiver in insolvency was ap- pointed for it, who received them in its behalf.
A "sale" is the transfer of the prop- erty in goods to another for an agreed price, and generally the title or property in the thing transferred passes to the purchaser as soon as delivery is made according to the terms of the contract. It is not necessary that the price agreed upon be paid to constitute a sale; but credit may be extended for the agreed price, and the title will pass as fully and effectually as if the consideration had been paid before
the delivery, if delivery is actually consummated, unless a different in- tention is manifested by agreement or otherwise. Page 126a, No. 1464. The passing of title to an article sold ordinarily depends upon the actual intention of the parties; and if they intend to pass title an actual change of possession of the goods is not essential to invest the buyer with title.
If there is a valid unconditional sale, with an understanding by both parties that the title to the prop- erty, which is then present, shall pass to the buyer, the sale is com- plete, though the seller retains actual possession of the property as bailee of the buyer. Page 172a, No.
Between the parties to a sale of specific
goods, especially where the price has been paid, a presumption arises that the title has passed, without a de- livery of the goods.
Such a presumption does not ordi-
narily arise as against creditors or innocent purchasers from the vend- or; but as to such third parties there must be not only a formal de- livery to the vendee claiming the goods, but there must be an actual and visible change of possession. Where a commercial transaction,
which should ordinarily be com- pleted promptly, is not completed within four months, and neither party has done anything within that time to complete the same, either party may treat the contract as re- scinded. Page 173a, No. 1495.
Where a seller sold and shipped at different times eight car loads of veneer to a furniture company on credit, having been informed by the company before any sale that it was continuing its business only by virtue of an extension of time by its creditors, there was no such fraud or misrepresentation as entitled the seller to rescind the sale and re- claim the last car load, which was the only one unpaid for, on the ap- pointment of a receiver for the pur- chaser. Page 126a, No. 1464.
SALES WARRANTY:
It being implied as a part of an ex- ecutory contract of sale that the goods will be of merchantable qual- ity, if they are not, the purchaser has a right to rescind.
On the failure of a buyer to return or offer to return the goods, it will be conclusively presumed that the goods were fit and suitable, or, at least that he was satisfied with their quality. Where a buyer on rescinding a con- tract of sale makes his offer to re- turn the goods subject to the con- dition that the seller shall reim- burse him for express charges paid, there is no valid tender, and hence no rescission of the contract. Page 128a, No. 1465.
The maker of a promissory note, not due for more than a year, may pur- chase it, a definite day being fixed for payment of the price; the maker of a note net yet due, contracted with the seller to purchase it at a discount, and the seller attempted to collect the full amount, the maker could set off damages arising from breach of contract in the action brought by the holder of the note. Page 1, No. 1389.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Where vendor and purchaser have agreed that the purchaser might
« iepriekšējāTurpināt » |