commencement of, the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, under or by virtue of any of the acts, or parts of acts, repealed. (Re R. W., 9 Law Tim. Rep. 757.)

BANKRUPTCY.-24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, ss. 76 and 90-Judgmentdebtor summons-Privilege of Parliament-Debt contracted, or liability incurred, after the passing of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861.By s. 90 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, the judgment-debtor summons must be a summons in respect of a debt contracted, or of a liability incurred, after the passing of the Act; but, held: That arrears of interest accruing due after the passing of the Act upon a debt secured by bond, is a liability incurred within the meaning of the Act, and upon which a judgment-summons may issue also; that the provisions of the 76th section do not extend to a judgmentdebtor having privilege of Parliament. (Exp. Gray, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 121.)

CONTRACT-Agreement under seal-Extent of obligations underPartnership-Notice-Acquiescence.-The obligations created by an agreement under seal cannot be extended as against persons who have succeeded to the business of a firm, who were originally parties to the agreement, unless evidence of express notice to, and acquiescence by, those persons as to the excess of liability alleged to be provided for by such agreement is distinctly given. Where, therefore, a railway company covenanted to do certain works, the charge for which was not to exceed £2,000, and the extra charges for which, with the knowledge and consent of the other parties to the agreement, did, in fact, exceed £4,000, the original parties, having subsequently assigned all their interest in these works to persons who succeeded them in their business, and no notice proved that the new partnership had acquiesced in this extra outlay: Held, that such succeeding partners were not liable to the excess beyond the £2,000, the extent of liability under the agreement. (Simpson v. South Yorkshire Railway Co. 9 Law Tim. Rep. 47.)

DISENTAILING DEED-Fines and Recoveries' Act-Estate tail in copyholds-Enrolment. The provisions of the Fines and Recoveries Act (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74) as to the enrolment, within six months of their execution, of deeds to bar equitable estates tail, are applicable to copyholds; and, unless such a deed, affecting copyhold hereditaments, be entered upon the court rolls of the manor within six months after its execution, it is absolutely void. (Gibbons v. Snape, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 132.)

HIGHWAY.-Surveyor's liability for accident caused by non-repair, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50.-A surveyor of highways appointed under the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, is not liable to an action for damages in consequence of an accident caused by his neglect to repair the highway. (Young r. Davis, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 145.)

LEASE-Timber-Covenant to keep in repair-Exception-Damages. -Where a lease contained a covenant on the tenant's part to keep the demised premises and all improvement thereon, in repair, and also an exception by the landlord of all timber trees growing on the premises, and a reservation of a right of ingress on the premises, and the tenant suffered the timber to be cut down: Held, that the landlord could not recover damages against the tenant for the cutting down of the timber, in an action on the covenant to keep the premises in repair. (Allen v. Carver, 9 Law Tim. Rep, 55.)

LEGACY-Forfeiture of.-Where a legacy is bequeathed to trustees, in trust for a legatee, with a clause of forfeiture in a particular event, and followed by a gift over of the legacy thereon, it would seem that such a clause may be enforced at any time before the legacy is paid. A testator, by a codicil to his will, bequeated legacies to A. and B., and declared that, if any person interested under his will and codicil, or either of them, should attempt to set them, or either of them, aside, he should forfeit his interest thereunder, and it should sink into the residue, of which he had disposed by the will. The testator died, and his will and codicil were duly proved. A. survived the testator, and by his will appointed B. his executor and residuary legatee. B., as such executor and residuary legatee, instituted a suit in the Probate Court to recal the probate of the original testator's will and codicil: held, legacy forfeited. (Stevenson and Abington, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 74.)

MORTGAGE-Judgment-Constructive notice-Solicitor and client. -The doctrine of constructive notice only applies where a solicitor acts as the adviser of his client. Where, therefore, he merely performs a ministerial act, such as in getting certain deeds executed, he does not come within the rule. In order that the knowledge of an agent may affect a principal, the knowledge must not only be derived from the particular transaction, but it must be material to the transaction. A solicitor advising his client to take a transfer of a legal mortgage, is not bound to inform him of a subsequent judgment. (Wyllie v. Pollen, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 71.)

PATENT-Prolongation applied for-Petitioner's merit and remuneration-Accounts required-Opposition to prolongation.-On an application to the Privy Council for prolonging a patent, the Court will not try the validity of the patent; and though it will not extend a patent which is manifestly bad, it will not entertain questions of doubtful validity. The proper questions for the Court to consider are, the degree of merit to be attributed to the petitioner, in respect both of the novelty and utility of his invention, and the amount of remuneration he has received or secured. On the latter point the petitioner must produce satisfactory accounts, so as to show what profits were, in a large sense, attributable to the patent;

and he is not entitled to deduct from profits any loss by feolish or imprudent bargains, or hasty compromises of litigation. And where he manufactures his own invention, he is not entitled to deduct two-thirds as manufacturer's profits, and count only the other third as the profit alone attributable to the patent. (Re Hills' Patent, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 101).

PUBLIC COMPANY-Conveyance by married woman-Lands Clauses Act, s. 7-Conversion-Acquiescence.-By the 7th section of the Lands Clauses Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, it is provided that "it shall be lawful for all parties being seised, possessed of, or entitled to any such lands or any estate, or interest therein, to convey or sell, or release the same to the promoters of the undertaking, and to enter into all necessary agreeinents for that purpose; and particularly it shall be lawful for all or any of the following parties so seised, possessed, or entitled as aforesaid, so to sell, convey, or release (that is to say) all corporations, tenants in tail, or for life, married women seised in their own right, or entitled to dower, &c., and the power so to sell and convey, or release as aforesaid, may lawfully be exercised by all such parties, &c., and as to such married women, whether they be of full age or not, as if they were sole and of full age," &c. Lands were devised by will to A. for life, remainder to a husband and wife, their heirs and assigns for ever. By a deed in pursuance of the Lands Clauses Act, which was executed by the tenant for life, the husband and the wife, but not acknowledged by the wife, the lands were conveyed in fee to a railway company. The purchase money was invested in Consols, and the dividends paid to the tenant for life. The husband died, then the wife died, having bequeathed her personalty by will, but intestate as to real estate; and, lastly, the tenant for life died. Upon the death of the tenant for life, the heir at law of the wife claimed the fund as realty. Semble, the interest of the wife was such an interest as would pass under the 7th section of the Lands Clauses Act, as being the estate or interest of "a married woman seised in her own right." But if this were not so, it was held that the heir at law could not claim the fund as realty, inasmuch as he did not seek to impeach the conveyance to the company, but only to impress upon the purchase money the character of land. The sale to the company having been treated by all parties as valid, and the purchase money having been dealt with by those who claimed under the wife as money, it was held that the legatees under the wife's will were entitled to the fund, and not the heir at law. (Cooper v. Gostling, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 77).

REHEARING-Additional evidence-Same witness-Bill of review. -The Court will in no case allow additional evidence to be adduced on a rehearing, where the persons to supply such evidence have been

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS.

witnesses at the original hearing of the cause.

9 Law Tim. Rep. 131.)

(Glover v. Daubeny,

SETTLEMENT Power of appointment-Appointment in favour of persons not the objects of the power set aside.-By a marriage settlement power was given to husband and wife to appoint real estate to the children of the marriage. They appointed to two of their sons in fee, on the understanding that they would resettle the property in favour of children of the marriage, and also in favour of remoter issue (grandchildren) not objects of the power, which they did: Held, that this was a fraud upon the objects of the power, and the appointment set aside, although no corrupt motive was alleged or proved. (Prior v. Prior, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 78.)

SHIPPING Charter party-Authority of shipbroker to bind skipowner--General and particular agency.-A shipbroker, employed by a shipowner, has no such general authority as will enable him to charter the ship for a voyage in a manner contrary to instructions expressly given to him by the owner, although such instructions have not been communicated to the parties dealing with him. (Spaight v. Beyerheb, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 31)

SHIPPING-Chartering ships-Sale of cargo-Lien on proceedsCosts. If the consignee of a cargo charters a vessel for the shipment of it, and properly incurs expenses in relation thereto, he is entitled to a lien on the cargo, and the proceeds arising from a sale of it. If a person other than the consignee has advanced money for the shipment of the cargo, with the consent of the principal, he is entitled to a lien on the proceeds, if he can stop them before they come to the hands of the shipper. A., living in St. John's, employed B., in London, as his agent for the sale, in England, of certain deals then in New Brunswick, and authorised him to arrange, by sale, on contract or charter, for the removal of all the deals, B. duly chartered several vessels for the removal of the deals, and some of the cargoes reached England, and were sold here. A., however, consigned one of the cargoes to C., by whom it was sold, and realised £615. B. had incurred some expenses in chartering the vessels, which had not been paid by A. B., therefore, filed a bill against A. and C., praying specific performance of the agreement with him; a declaration that he was entitled to a lien on the proceeds of all the cargoes for his expenses, and for his commission for damages for the breach of contract by A.; and to be allowed to add those damages to his lien Held, that B. was not entitled to specific performance of the agreement; but that he had a lien for his expenses and for his pecuniary losses (but not for unearned profits) on the proceeds of all the cargoes, and that he was entitled to arrest the £615 on account thereof, before it came to the hands of A. C. supported the case made by A., instead of acting merely as a stakeholder:

:

Held, that he was not entitled to costs. (Young v. Neill, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 9.)

TRUST-Will-Power to lease-Fraud on power-Notice of trust. -J., by will, devised certain lands to P. and W., as trustees, for the use of E., on E. attaining twenty-one. The will gave power to the trustees to lease the lands for any term of years at the best yearly rent, without taking any fine or premium, and so as to reserve a power of re-entry on non-payment of rent. There was also power to appoint any other fit person or persons to be trustees in the place of the trustees, if desirous of being discharged. Soon after death P. and W. appointed R. sole trustee, to hold on the trusts of the will. R. let the lands, for twenty-one years, to B., at a rent specified, but five years' rent to be paid in advance. There was some dispute as to whether the lands in question passed by the devise: Held, that the lease was a breach of trust, and not authorised by the power; and whether the lands passed by the devise or not, R. was, ex facie, a trustee for E.; moreover, that, in the circumstances, B. must be taken to have had sufficient notice of the trust to have put him on his guard. (Booth v. A'Beckett, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 68.)

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.-Sale under decree of Court-Noncompliance with formalities-Objections to title of purchaser.-Where, for any reason, the execution of a final decree of Court in a suit fails, or is set aside, and the proceedings, as regards that execution, are taken off the file, the whole suit is not discontinued thereby, nor are the further proceedings for the same purpose considered as taken in a new suit. After an estate has been sold by auction under a decree of Court, the purchaser's title is not to be attacked merely on the ground that the holder of the decree had not complied with all the statutory formalities for the conduct of such sale; as, for example, the want of due notice of sale; and the burden of proof of such compliance is not on the purchaser. In selling by auction under a decree of the Court, if a person bid for others, and his bidding be refused, on account of his not giving a deposit, or any satisfactory references, the sale cannot afterwards be impugned on the ground that the estate was sold under its value. (Singh v. Singh, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 129.)

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Specific performance-Reference as to title-Motion by defendant-Consolidated order 20.-A defendant to a vendor's suit for specific performance cannot move for reference as to title. But where notice had been given to rescind the contract on the ground that the vendor had not made a good title in time, the Court will make no reference as to title until it has decided upon the validity of that notice. (Reed v. The Dom Pedro North Del Rey Gold Mining Co., 9 Law Tim. Rep. 132.)