BANKRUPTCY.-Trust deed-192nd and following sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861-Application for leave to issue execution notwithstanding deed-Alleged misdescription of debtor-Omission of costs in the computation of value.-The description of the debtor in a deed executed under the 192nd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, should be as full and complete as in bankruptcy; but where no person has been misled by an alleged insufficiency of description, the Court declined to give leave to issue execution upon a judgment obtained by a non-assenting creditor. A deed, under the 192nd section, is not vitiated by reason of the omission in the computation of value of the amount of costs in an action in which judgment was recovered after the execution of the deed. (Re Wheeler, 11 Week. Rep. 988.)

Release from custody-Consolidation Act, s. 112-Capias to hold to bail. Where a debtor is arrested under a writ of capias to hold to bail, and he afterwards becomes a bankrupt, before making any attempt to get rid of the writ, the Court of Bankruptcy will decline to release him, but will leave him to apply to a judge of a Court of Common Law. (Re Godoy, 11 Week. Rep. 988.)

COSTS.-Administration suit, liberty to parties to attend proceedings in.- Where several parties in the same interest have liberty to attend the proceedings in an administration suit, they should not appear separately, and if they do only one set of costs will be allowed. (Stevenson v. Abington, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 719.)

Party served with petition and appearing entitled to his costs.This point has been frequently so decided, and the following case is only another illustration of it: A fund being carried to the separate contingent account of an infant, and the costs of the defendant being paid, and such defendant having no interest in the fund in Court, a petition is presented, on the infant's attaining twenty-one, for payment out; and an affidavit being made to prove the payment of such costs, and a short affidavit in answer, the defendant appears by counsel, notwithstanding a notice not to appear: Held, that she is entitled to her costs. (Rudge v. Weedon, 11 Week. Rep. 819.)

DISENTAILING DEED.-Petition Exhibit—Attesting witness.— A railway company having taken lands which were entailed, and paid the purchase money into Court under the Lands Clauses Act, it became necessary to execute a disentailing deed as to that portion, but it was made to embrace other and much larger properties. A petition was then presented to have the purchase money paid out of Court, and an abstract of the disentailing deed was set out in the petition, and its execution proved by the attesting witness: Held, that the deed must either be fully set out or made an exhibit. (Re Field, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 722.)

EVIDENCE.-Cross-examination of witness-Order of the 5th Feb., 1861-Notice to produce witness.-The 19th rule of the Orders of the 5th Feb., 1861, makes fourteen days' notice necessary only where the party taking out the subpoena wishes the other side to produce the witness, but if he chooses to produce his own witness no notice is necessary, but the subpoena to cross-examine may be issued after the expiration of the fourteen days. (Cox v. Stephens, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 721.)

FEME COVERT.-Equity to settlement, extinction of by death of feme covert Children no equity.-Where a married woman files a bill to enforce her equity to a settlement, and dies before decree, the equity is extinguished, and does not enure to the benefit of her children. (Wallace v. Auldjo, 11 Week. Rep. 972.)

INJUNCTION.-Prayer for-Not granted on application of codefendant.-In Wright v. Atkins (1 Ves. and B. 311) it is said :"Generally, if the bill does not pray for an injunction, the plaintiff cannot move for an injunction under the prayer for general relief." This being so, it follows that before decree a Court of Equity will not grant an injunction to restrain an action at law on the application of one defendant against his co-defendant. (Russell v. London, Chatham, &c., Rail. Co., 11 Week Rep. 983.)

MORTGAGE.-Equitable priority-Registration in Middlesex7 Anne, c. 20-Consolidating several incumbrances-Legal estate.— An equitable mortgage, being in the nature of an agreement to execute a mortgage, and as such enforceable in equity, is within the purview of the Middlesex Registry Act, 7 Anne, c. 20, and therefore a memorandum, not under seal, accompanying an equitable deposit, is capable of registration. In the absence of express evidence to the contrary, the deed, or memorial, &c., entered as first in number upon the register, is entitled to priority over a deed, &c., entered subsequently upon the same day. A mortgagee who, although second in point of date, has obtained priority under the Registration Act, 7 Anne, c. 20, by earlier registration on the same day, is entitled to consolidate his mortgages as against another equitable mortgagee, prior in date but subsequent in registration, of whom he had no notice. The possession of the legal estate is not requisite for the purpose of enabling an equitable first mortgagee to consolidate his charges as against the mortgagor, and subsequent equitable incumbrances. (Neve v. Pennell, 11 Week. Rep. 986).

Statute of limitation-Right to redeem-Acknowledgment-3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 26, s. 28.-A letter from a mortgagee who had been in possession of a mortgaged property for more than twenty years, without payment or acknowledgment of the right of the mortgagor to redeem, addressed to the solicitor of a subsequent incumbrancer, who applied to have the arrears of an annuity granted to him by the

original mortgagor raised out of the mortgagee property, and for an account of rents received by the mortgagor in possession, in the following words :-"I deny the claim of your client; I need only add that if he were entitled to the amount it would be of no use, as the rents and profits of the estates have never been sufficient to pay the interest of the first charge referred to in your letter," was held not to amount to an acknowledgment within the 28th section of the 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 26, of the right of redemption of the subsequent incumbrancer. (Tompson v. Bowyer, 11 Week. Rep. 975.)

PARTNERSHIP.-Bankruptcy-Joint and separate creditors-Priority-Costs. As the examiners frequently ask questions as to the respective rights of the joint separate creditors of partners becoming bankrupts, we have thought it might be useful to notice, at greater length than usual, a recent case upon the subject. It appeared that of two partners, one died possessed of large property, and the survivor became bankrupt. A creditor of the partnership proved his debt under the bankruptcy, and received a dividend; and the whole of the bankrupt's estate being thereupon exhausted, it was held, that the joint creditor was entitled, under an administration decree, to come in upon the estate of the solvent partner, for the balance of his debt, only after the separate creditors had been paid, and not pari passu with them. Where a joint creditor comes in to take the benefit of a decree to administer a separate estate, unless under extraordinary circumstances, the executor is entitled to his costs before the joint creditor has anything. But where a creditor, suing for his own debt against executors who deny assets, obtains a decree to pay his debt and costs, and assets are found, the creditor is entitled to costs in priority to the executors. (Lodge v. Prichard, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 722.) In his judgment, V. C. Stuart said, "Where there are two partners, and one has become bankrupt and the other, a solvent partner, has died before the bankruptcy; and where there are joint debts of the partnership; where, also, there is to be in bankruptcy an administration of the joint estate, and in the Court of Chancery an administration of the separate estate of the deceased partner, I consider it settled most clearly, not only by the case of Gray v. Chiswell (9 Ves. 116), but by subsequent decisions, that the joint creditors, who have received only part payment out of the joint estate under the bankruptcy-although they may come in as separate creditors upon the estate of the deceased partner-cannot come in pari passu with the separate creditors of the deceased partnerCowell v. Sikes (2 Russ. 191), unless upon very close examination, seems to disturb this view, but, in fact, it does not. The judgment of Lord Gifford in Cowell v. Sikes (2 Russ. 191) affirms the principle upon which Gray v. Chiswell (9 Ves. 116) was decided. He says, The only authority on which it has been attempted to support the

petition is the case of Gray v. Chiswell (9 Ves. 116), where creditors having joint demands against two persons, of whom the survivor became bankrupt, were permitted to prove against the estate of the one who was dead, and to come in for payment of what was due to them upon the surplus which remained after satisfying the separate debts. There the Lord Chancellor did not permit the joint creditors to come in pari passu with the separate creditors, and that part of the order which is relied upon as furnishing a precedent here, does not seem to have been opposed.' Lord Gifford, as might be expected, stating that this was what was decided in Gray v. Chiswell (9 Ves. 116), does not affect to disturb it; and Lord Eldon, before whom the case of Cowell v. Sikes (2 Russ. 191) came, upon a petition which was not regularly a petition of appeal, gave his final judgment in these terms: In the circumstances of this case, the proceedings at law, and the state of the funds, I think the creditor may prove against the separate estate;' which he no doubt may. But does that prove that he is to be paid pari passu with the separate creditors? It certainly does not. I find, in a case of Ridgway v. Clare (19 Beav. 111) before the present M. R., the principle is laid down exactly in the same terms as in Gray v. Chiswell (9 Ves. 116). At p. 116 of the 19th volume of Beavan, the M. R. says: "Suppose the surviving partner insolvent, either there is a bankruptcy or an insolvency, in either of which cases the case of Gray v. Chiswell (9 Ves. 116) is precisely in point, and there the joint creditors must resort, in the first instance, to the joint fund, and can only come against so much of the separate estate as will remain after paying the separate creditors.' That is a very recent decision, and affirms the principle so clearly that, in my opinion, it ought not to be disturbed. The surprise of Lord Eldon and Lord Thurlow in the earlier cases was that joint creditors were allowed to come in at all. In this case I have no doubt upon the subject."

A

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.-Duplicate of book.-Courts of Equity always afford to a party regularly before it every facility for obtaining such discovery as may enable him to substantiate his claim. duplicate copy of a book relating to trust affairs was permitted by new trustees to remain with the representative of a deceased trustee as his receipt for deeds, &c., delivered by them on their application some years afterwards: Held, that they were entitled to the possession of the book. (Bowen v. Pearson, 11 Week. Rep. 819), PETITION OF RIGHT. Petition of right-Pleading-General traverse-23 & 24 Vic. c. 30, ss, 2, 3, 6 and 7.-To a petition of right containing many allegations, some of which were material and more immaterial, the Crown pleaded a general traverse of all the allegations: Held, a good plea, the Crown having a right to deny, in general terms, the whole of the statement relied upon by allegations. (Tobin v. Reg., 8 Law Tim. Rep. 730.)

SERVICE ABROAD. · Administration suit-Shares in a public company-Service on defendant out of the jurisdiction-Motion to discharge, order for-Affidavit.-A creditor filed a bill for the administration of his deceased debtor's estate, but the bill did not state specifically of what the estate consisted. The defendant, the executrix-had not proved the will, but had gone abroad. An order was made for serving her with process out of the jurisdiction; after which she entered a conditional appearance, and moved to discharge the order for service as irregular. The plaintiff, in opposition to the motion, filed an affidavit to show that the testator's property consisted of (inter alia) shares in a public company. Upon the motion being heard, it was held that a motion to discharge an order for service of process on a party out of the jurisdiction requires no affidavit to support it. Although the bill did not show that the testator's property comprised shares in a public company, still, as the fact of their existence was made apparent in the suit, and they were clearly within the 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 82, the service effected upon the defendant out of the jurisdiction was perfectly regular. Cookney v. Anderson, 7 Law Tim. Rep. 491; and s.c. on appeal, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 295, observed upon. (National Prov. and Investm. Assoc. v. Carstairs, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 717.)

SETTLED ESTATES.-Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act (19 & 20 Vic. c. 120) s. 37-Consent of married woman.-Where all parties interested in an application under the above Act, including the trustees of the settlement of a married lady, consented to the application, the Court dispensed with her separate examination, under the 37th section of the Act. (Re De Tabley, 8 Law Tim. Rep. 719.)

SURETY.-Loss of collateral security by neglect-Discharge of surety. -A surety being entitled to all collateral securities, the creditor is bound to preserve them; and if, through his negligence, the securities are lost, or are not properly protected, as by notice to trustees, &c., where necessary, the surety is discharged. (Strange v. Fooks, 11 Week. Rep. 983.)

SWEARING.-Profane cursing-Conviction-Duplicity—19 Geo. II. c. 21. By the 19 Geo. II. c. 21 (an Act more effectually to prevent profane cursing and swearing), s. 6, it is enacted that "If any person shall profanely curse or swear, and shall be thereof convicted before any one Justice of the Peace, he shall forfeit and lose the respective sums hereinafter mentioned, ie, every day labourer, common soldier, common seaman, or common sailor, 1s.; every other person under the degree of a gentleman, 2s.; and every person of or above the degree of a gentleman, 5s. And in case such person shall after conviction offend a second time, every such person shall forfeit and lose double, and for every other offence after a second conviction, treble the sum first forfeited by any offender for profane swearing