other person), and his heirs, provided that, if a certain intended marriage should take effect, the land should then be held to the use of C. and his heirs. So A. might covenant to stand seised to the use of himself and his heirs until his brother should marry, and then to the use of him and his heirs. The interest thus given to C., or to A.'s brother, differed from a contingent remainder, not only as an equitable necessarily differs from a legal estate, but also in this, that, instead of depending on a preceding particular estate, and coexisting with it as an ulterior part of the same fee simple, it sprang up independently at a distance of time, in defiance, rather than evasion, of the rule that the operation of every conveyance must be immediate, or, at least, if it did depend upon a particular estate, it was upon one of a new kind, unknown as such to the law, namely, a fee simple of limited duration, which the common law might allow to subsist by itself, but would by no means admit of a remainder after it, because a fee simple was the greatest possible estate; and whatever qualifications might be annexed to it, it was a fee simple still. But, without regard to such technical scruples, it was settled that, in equity, a deferred or future interest might be created in the first instance, the grantor retaining, or a third person taking, not a particular estate, as for a certain number of years, for life or in tail, but the entire inheritance, determinable only on the happening of that event (if it happened at all) upon which the future interest (called a springing or shifting use) was to arise." As to No. X. (p. 146), relative to the person by whom a covenant to produce deeds should be entered into, in order that it may run with the land, Mr. Dart (Vend. 502, 3rd ed.) observes :-"The right to enforce them at law, against an alienee, may perhaps depend upon his having the estate of the original covenantor;" as to which see Dart, p. 504, and Horsey's Cornish's Purchase Deeds, 75. As to the latter part of No. XI. (p. 147), it may be observed that it seems strange to many that a husband is entitled to receive his wife's chose in action during her life, and to give a valid discharge for it; but if the wife dies without the husband having received the money, he cannot give a discharge for it in his own right, but must make himself representative to his wife, and as such representative only is he entitled to the money, and not qud husband, and, by consequence, the money becomes subject to the wife's debts but so the law is clearly settled. As to No. XII. (p. 147), the case referred to as pending before the M. R. has since been reported under the name of Lechmere v. Brotheridge, to be found in the "Weekly Reporter" for 27th June, 1863, and which is so important that we purpose to notice it elsewhere.

Equity-The Questions and Answers in this division will be found ante, pp. 149-153. As to No. 1 (p. 149), it may be observed that text-writers give different accounts of the origin of the introduction

of equity jurisdiction into our system of judicature. Lord Hale, Blackstone, and Wooddeson in substance agree that two things gave original jurisdiction, or, at least, contributed to its enlargement :1. The committing of particular petitions in Parliament, not there determined, unto the determination of the Chancellor. 2. By the invention of uses (that is, trusts). But, as Story (Equity Jurispr. pl. 48) observes, it appears, from the proceedings published by the Record Commissioners, that the chief business of Chancery in early times did not arise from the introduction of uses of land. The ancient petitions appear to have been presented in consequence of assaults and trespasses, and other outrages cognisable at common law, but for which redress was not obtainable, in consequence of the protection afforded to the offender by powerful or official personages; so that, in effect, the equitable jurisdiction was originated to remedy defects in common law proceedings, being the same ground which now constitutes the principal reason of its interference, viz., that a wrong has been committed for which there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy in the common law courts. And in this way great strength is added to the opinions of some, that its jurisdiction is, in reality, the residuum of that of the Commune Concilium, or Aula Regis, not conferred on other courts, and necessarily exercisable by the Crown, as a part of its duty and prerogative to administer justice and equity. The introduction of uses or trusts, though it did not found, gave extended operation to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (Eunom. Dial. 3, s. 60; 3 Black. Com. 52; 1. Woodd. Lect. 174, 176, 178, 182). As to No. II. (p. 149) it may be observed that interpleader jurisdiction was exercised at common law long prior to the "late alterations in common law procedure," by which it is presumed the examiners referred to the Common Law Procedure Acts, having been introduced by the 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 58 (1 Exam. Chron. 125, 163; 2 Id. 15, 21, 76, 202.) And that as to specific performance of contracts reference is made to the provision in the C. L. P. Acts, 1854, ss. 68, 69, whereby in cases where a person is personally interested in the fulfilment of any duty, he may bring an action to claim a writ of mandamus commanding the defendant to perform such duty, which provision many text-writers considered enabled courts of law to compel the specific performance of agreements, but the Courts have decided otherwise, holding that their jurisdiction is limited to such duties as might, prior to the C. L. P. Act 1854, have been enforced by a prerogative writ of mandamus (Benson v. Pa., 6 Ell. and Bl. 273; 4 Law Chron. 273; Pract. Com. Law, 306–308.) Where, therefore, the duty is in the nature of a mere personal contract its specific performance will not be enforced at law. (Norris v. Ir. L. Co., 27 Law Journ., Q. B., 118; 4 L. C. 273, 274; 6 W. R.

55; F. Bk. 258, 264.) The part of above answer referring to compelling discovery, relates to the provisions in the C. L. P. Act 1854, 8s. 50-56, for the inspection and furnishing copies of documents, and the examination of either party to the suit on interrogatories. (F. Bk. 273; 11 W. R. 595; Sol. Journ. 1863, p. 489.) As to that part of the answer relating to relief against breaches of covenant, reference is to be made to the C L. P. Act 1860 (23 & 24 Vic. c. 126), by s. 1 of which, in the case of an ejectment for a forfeiture in non-payment of rent, relief may be given by a common law court or judge in a summary manner on payment of rent and costs, and no new lease is requisite; by s. 2, in the case of ejectment for a forfeiture for non-insurance against fire, summary relief may be given by a common law court or judge where courts of equity can relieve under the 22 & 23 Vic. c. 35, s. 4 (1 Exam. Chron. pp. 137, 170) and upon such terms as would be there imposed (see 2 Law Chron., N.S., 178, 179; Stephen's Com. Law Proced. Act 1860, pp. 40-49). As to that part of the answer relating to the specific delivery of chattels, by the C. L. P. Act 1854, s. 78, a court of common law or a judge thereof has power, if thought fit, upon the application of the plaintiff, to order that execution shall issue for the return of the chattel, without giving the defendant the option of retaining it upon paying the assessed value, and that if the specific chattel cannot be found, the Sheriff shall distrain the defendant by all his lands and chattels until he surrenders it, or, at the option of the plaintiff, that he levy the assessed value (see F. Bk. 248, 249; 1 L. C. 161; 24 L. J. C. P. 78). And further it is directed by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 (189 & 20 Vic. c. 97, s. 2), that in actions for breach of contract to deliver specific goods for a price in money, upon the application of the plaintiff, the jury shall by their verdict find what sum the plaintiff would have been liable to pay for the delivery of the goods, and what damages the plaintiff would sustain if the goods should be delivered to him under the execution, and what damages if not so delivered, and if judgment is for the plaintiff, the Court or a Judge, at their discretion, may, upon the application of the plaintiff, order execution to issue for the delivery, on payment of such sum (if any) as shall have been found to have been payable by the plaintiff, of the said goods, without giving the defendant the option of retaining them upon paying the damages; and if the goods or any part of them cannot be found, the Sheriff shall distrain the defendant by his lands and goods until he deliver such goods, or, at the option of the plaintiff, cause to be made of the defendant's goods the assessed value or damages or a due proportion thereof. (Pract. Com. Law, 188, 189.)

The other Questions and Answers in Equity do not require any further notice, the answers being very full and explicit.

Bankruptcy.--The Questions and Answers in this division will be found ante, pp. 153-157. As to No. I. (p. 153) it is easy to bear in mind the date of the Act now regulating bankruptcy proceedings, viz., 1861, and the title of the Act is, "An Act to amend the Law relating to Bankruptcy and Insolvency in England," but the Act may be cited as "The Bankruptcy Act, 1861" (1 Exam. Chron. 208). From No. II. (p. 154) it is seen that whether the debtor applies against himself or a creditor applies for a protection against his debtor the course of proceeding is by petition; but there are other accompanying proceedings, which vary according as the debtor or creditor petitions. From No. III. (p. 154) it is seen that all persons are subject to the bankruptcy laws, that is, whether the parties be traders or non-traders, so that the distinction formerly existing between these classes as to the form is taken away, though some minor differences in detail and effect still exist.

Criminal Law.-The Questions and Answers in this division will be found ante, pp. 157, 158, and 161-164. It will be seen that the questions are so technical and so devoid of reference to principles or even general doctrines that we could not usefully add anything here to what is stated in the Answers already furnished.

(Trinity Term, 1863.)

SOME of the questions at the Examination in Trinity Term last were of a very difficult character, particularly those in the division of conveyancing: it may be said that a few were positively objectionable both in form and substance, and we hope that the examiners will not be so unjust as to give similar ones at any subsequent examination. What could articled clerks be expected to make out of Nos. II., III., VI., VII., VIII., IX., and XI. (pp. 176-177) We are satisfied that many conveyancing counsel would, without the aid of their books, have gone wrong on some of these points, with which, however, it may be thought to be their province to be acquainted; but no such thing can be said of solicitors, and much less of mere candidates for that position.

Common Law.-The Questions and Answers in this division will be found ante, pp. 172-176. As to No. I. (p. 172) relative to the liabilities of infants, we may remark that as the examiners are now often asking similar questions, it will be desirable that the student should make himself familiar with the law upon the subject, which the perusal of what we have said ante, pp. 22, 172, 195, will enable him to do in a short compass. No. II. (p. 172) is by no means clearly expressed, and we felt great difficulty in framing an answer. It will be seen that the question does not specify the nature of the act done by his sub-agent, namely, whether a tort or a contract; it

speaks of the principal being "bound" not "liable" for the act of the sub-agent so that we think our answer must be considered as one of the kind required by the question. As to No. III. (p. 173) it is, we presume, understood that a person not an executor or duly appointed administrator intermeddling with the goods of a deceased person, is termed an executor and not an administrator de son tort.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS.

ACCIDENTAL DEATH.-Lord Campbell's Act-Ground of actionLoss of probable advancement in life from death of parent-9 & 10 Vic. c. 93.-A father was killed by the negligence of the servants of a railway company, and he left a widow and nine children, on whom his property (which was large) devolved, in pursuance of the marriage settlement, and there was evidence of reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit to the family beyond that resulting from the property the survivors came into possession of at the death, had the father not been killed Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Q. B.), that this was a sufficient cause of action under Lord Campbell's Act. (Pym v. Gt. North. Kail. Co., 8 Law Tim. Rep. 734.)

ATTORNEY.-Lien-Execution, effect of-Double remedy.-A solicitor's lien for costs on a fund in Court is not discharged by taking his client in execution under a ca. sa. (O'Brien v. Lewis, 11 Week Rep. 973.)

ATTORNEY.-Bonus to solicitor beyond his costs-Bargain between attorney and client.-Where a client agrees with his solicitor that in case of his recovering a certain property, he shall have £5 per cent. of commission in addition to his costs, that is illegal, and will be disallowed, although it forms part of a settled account. (Pince v. Beattie, 11 Week. Rep. 979.)

APPEAL.-Suspension of part of decree.-Under a decree (no further consideration being reserved) certain deceased parties are held to have been entitled to part of the fund in Court, and immediate payment is directed to their legal personal representatives. The decree is appealed against, but before the order directing payment is drawn up, or administration taken out to the deceased parties or petition of appeal lodged, a motion is made to suspend the execution of the order, as to those parties, pending the appeal: Held, that on the intended appellants undertaking, bond fide, to present their petition of appeal within a week after the passing and entering of the order now sought to be stayed, the proceedings might be stayed for one week, and on the presentation of the petition of appeal pending the appeal. The costs of the motion to be paid by the parties making it. (Portarlington v. Damer, 11 Week. Rep. 869.)