The able with imprisonment for not more than two years, or by fine, or by both, and forfeiture of the articles and vessels so marked. 4th section creates two offences 1. Selling, uttering, or exposing for sale, or for any purpose of trade or manufacture (or causing or procuring, &c.), any chattel or article with any forged or counterfeited trade marks which he shall know to be such. 2. Selling, &c. (as above), any chattel, &c., with the trade mark of any other person applied or used falsely or wrongfully, or without lawful authority or excuse, knowing such trade mark of another person to have been so applied or used as aforesaid. And these offences will be complete, whether such trade mark shall be on or about such chattel or article, or in, upon, about, or with any such bottle-stopper, &c. (as above), or other thing in, upon, about, or with which it is sold or exposed for sale. The punishment for these offences is payment of a fine equal to the entire of the property so sold, and of a further sum not exceeding £5, nor less than 10s., recoverable before two justices of the peace. It will be observed that guilty knowledge is necessary to constitute these offences. The 5th section defines a false, forged, or counterfeited trade mark within the meaning of the Act, to be "every imitation of any trade mark which shall be made, applied or used with intent to defraud, or to enable any other person to defraud, or which shall cause a trade mark with such alteration or addition, or such imitation of a trade mark, to resemble any genuine trade mark, so or in such manner as to be calculated or likely to deceive, and every act of making, applying, or otherwise using such addition to or alteration of a trade-mark, or imitation of a trade mark, done with intent to defraud, or to enable any other person to defraud, shall be deemed a forgery and counterfeiting." Sec. 6 enacts, that any person having sold, &c., any chattel, &c., with any forged or counterfeited trade mark, or with the trade-mark of any other person used without lawful authority or excuse, shall be bound, upon demand in writing delivered to him, or left at his last known dwelling-house, or at the places of sale, by or on the behalf of the person whose trade mark has been so forged, counterfeited, or used without authority or excuse, to give to the person so requiring, or his attorney or agent, within forty-eight hours after such demand, full information in writing of the name and address of the person from whom he shall have purchased or obtained such chattel or article, and of the time when he obtained it. If that information is not given accordingly, any justice of the peace, on information on oath of such demand and refusal, may summon the party, and on being satisfied that the demand ought to be complied with, may order such information to be given within a stated time, and on failure to comply the party is to forfeit the sum of £5. (To be continued.) EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. (Hilary Term, 1863). COMMON LAW. I. A. enters into a verbal contract with B. for a year as a servant, to commence from the date of the contract, and into another contract with C., to commence at a future time. Can either, or both, of the contracts be enforced by action at law? ANS. As by the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4, no verbal promise is sufficient to ground an action upon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof, unless there be some note or memorandum of the agreement made in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person by him lawfully authorised (F. Bk. 206; 5. W. R. 512; Com. L. Princ. 168-171), in the case first put the contract could been forced, but not in the second. (See Bracegirdle v. Heald, 1 B. and Ald. 722; Snelling v. Huntingfield, 1 Cr. M. and R. 20; Com. L. Princ. 170). II. What is the meaning of nudum pactum as applied to contracts, and will it make any difference if the contract be by deed or not by deed? ANS. By law a consideration is an essential ingredient in every contract, and therefore a promise not under sealwithout a consideration is regarded as nudum pactum, but contracts under seal, however, are held of themselves to import a consideration, and so no proof thereof is required, whilst in simple contracts a consideration must be proved; for the law presumes that no man will put his seal to a deed without some good cause or consideration. (Will. Pers. Prop. pp. 66, 80, 4th ed.; Com. L. Princ. 131, 134; F. Bk. 206, 211; 1 Exam. Chron. 185, 222; 2 Id. 4.) III. If money be won on a wager, can it be recovered } ANS.-By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, are null and void, and no suit can be brought or maintained in any Court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person, to abide the event on which any wager has been made. This enactment does not, however, apply to any subscription, or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute C for or towards any plate, prize or sum of money to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, sport, pastime or exercise. (See 3 Law Chron. 157; F. Bk. 312; Irwin v. Burke, 28 Law Tim. R. 9.) The statute does not preclude a party who repudiates a wager before the event is ascertained from recovering back from the stakeholder the amount of his deposit. (Martin v. Hewson, 1 Jur. N. P. 214; 1 Law Chron. 380.) The statute makes gaming and wagering contracts void, but not illegal; therefore the payment of losses under such contracts is not illegal. (Knight v. Cambers, 1 Jur. N. L. 525; 2 Law Chron. 55; see further 4 Law Chron. 105). IV. If bills or notes be given for money due on a gaming security, can an action be maintained on them under any and what circumstances? ANS.-Securities for money won by gaming, or lent for gaming or betting, were formerly utterly void; but by 58 Geo. 3. c. 93, and 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 41, such securities are not to be utterly void, but are to be taken to have been given for an illegal consideration; they are, therefore, now void only as between the parties, but valid in the hands of any innocent holder to whom they may have been transferred, without notice of the illegality of the transaction in which they originated. (Will. Pers. Prop. p. 86, 4th ed.; Com. Law Princ. 111.) V. Is an infant liable for necessaries supplied to him, and does it make any difference if he is living under the parental roof or not? ANS. An infant is liable on contracts for necessaries suitable to his station in life and actually supplied to him without fraudulent intention on the part of the tradesman. But an infant living under his parent's roof is not ordinarily liable for the price even of necessaries ordered by him, as the law assumes that these are provided for him. (Smith's Man. C. L. p. 43; F. Bk. 33.) Where living away from home no inquiry as to the necessity of the articles is necessary, nor is it material that the infant was in fact supplied sufficiently. (Rosc. Evid. 428, 9th ed.) VI. Is a father liable for any, and what, necessaries supplied to his infant child? ANS. The father of an infant to whom goods are supplied is liable only where an actual authority from him to his son is proved, or circumstances appear from which such an authority can be implied, and it seems that the mere moral obligation, arising from the relation of parent and child does not, per se, afford any legal inference of a promise to pay a debt even for necessaries. (Shelton v. Springett, 11 C. B. 452; Rosc. Evid. 368; see Law v. Wilkin, 6 Ad. and El. 718.) VII. A debt is contracted by a woman before marriage, and afterwards she marries: against whom should the action be brought; and what is the liability of the husband if the wife dies before the action is brought? he ANS.-As fully explained in 2 Exam. Chron. 277, and ante, pp. 1, 2, the action must be brought against husband and wife jointly, but the liability of the husband for contracts entered into by his wife before coverture is conditional, for although during the marriage he is liable jointly with her upon all contracts made "dum sola,” yet cannot be sued alone, even upon a subsequent express promise by himself, unless there be some new consideration for the same accruing to him or causing an inconvenience or delay to the creditor. After the wife's death, the surviving husband is only liable as her administrator, that is, to the extent of the assets in his hands in case he takes out administration to reduce her outstanding personal estate into possession. (Walf. Part. Actions, 941, 1021; Com. L. Princ. 26, 27; F. Bk. 110; 16 Jur. 934; 2 Law Chron. 56.) VIII. To an action for goods sold and delivered, the defendant pleads never indebted, as alleged; can he, under such plea, on the trial prove payment for the goods as a defence; and if not, can the plaintiff recover though the money has really been paid? ANS.-The defendant will not be allowed to prove payment under a plea of never indebted, as by the Plead. Rule of Hil. T. 1853, pl. 14, payment is not in any case to be allowed to be given in evidence in reduction of damages or debt, but must be pleaded in bar. The plaintiff could therefore recover the price of the goods. IX. What are the stages in the proceedings in an action for goods sold where the defendant pleads that he never ordered or received the goods? ANS.-The plaintiff issues a writ of summons, specially indorsed with particulars of his demand. Either the defendant appears or he does not; in the latter case, the plaintiff signs final judgment; if he intends to appear he should do so strictly, within eight days after service, inclusive of the day of service. The plaintiff then delivers his declaration, indorsed with a notice for the defendant to plead in eight days, otherwise judgment. The defendant within the eight days, or an extended time, pleads the general issue "never indebted." The plaintiff joins issue upon this plea, which completes the pleadings, and delivers a copy of the issue to the defendant, with notice of trial indorsed, enters the record, and sets the cause down for trial in the ordinary way. (See 2 Exam. Chron. 111, 193.) X. Within what time must a writ be served, and if not served within that time, what must be done to prevent it becoming unserviceable? ANS.-A writ of summons remains in force for six months only, from the day of the date thereof (including the day of such date), unless any defendants therein named have been served therewith, but it may be renewed at any time before its expiration for six months from the date of such renewal, and so from time to time, during the currency of the renewed writ, by being marked with a seal, bearing the date of the day, month and year of such renewal. (C. L. P. Act. 1852, s. 11; Com. Law Pract. 65.) XI. What indorsement must be made on a writ of summons after service, and within what time? ANS.-Within three days after service the person effecting it must indorse on the writ the day of the month and week of the service thereof, otherwise the plaintiff will not be at liberty to proceed further; in case the defendant does not appear every affidavit of service of writ must mention the day on which such indorsement was made. (C. L. P. Act., 1852, s. 15; Com. Law Prac. 64). XII. What is the distinction between pleading and demurring? ANS.-A pleading either denies the facts contained in the opposite party's last pleading, or admits and avoids them, and in either case aises an issue of fact triable by a jury or judge, whilst a demurrer admits the facts stated to be true, but denies their sufficiency in point of law, thereby raising an issue of law determinable by the Court alone. (1 Exam. Chron. 127, 163; Com. Law Pract. 131, 301; F. Bk. 270.) XIII. What is long and what short notice of trial? ANS. By the C. L. P. Act, 1852, ss. 97 and 98, ten days' notice of trial is to be given in all cases whether at bar or nisi prius, in town or country, unless otherwise directed by the Court or a Judge. By Rule Hil. T. 1853, pl. 35, the expression "short notice of trial," in all cases means four days. (1 Exam. Chron. 105, 125, 163; 2 Id. 24). XIV. What are the principal enactments of the Bills of ANS. By the Act referred to, which is the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67 |