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the deed, and by will gave to trustees legacies to erect a church and schools on the site. During L.'s life the piece of ground, which was worth about £3 a-year, lay undisturbed, and L. made some use of it. It being alleged that the deed, taken along with the user, the will, and the donor's conduct, was a fraud on the Mortmain Act, and was void: Held, that the facts were not sufficient to show any agreement not to act on the deed during S.'s life, and that the deed was valid (Fisher v. Brierley, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 37).

PARTNERSHIP.-Dissolution of-Expiration of term-Partnership at will.-Penal clauses in written articles of partnership cannot be assumed to have been renewed under a partnership carried on at will at the expiration of the original partnership term, and therefore, where it was provided by written articles that the term should be for seven years, and that if either partner neglected the business the other partner should be at liberty to give notice of dissolution, and take the benefit of the partnership: Held, that the provision applied only to the partnership existing during the term, and not to a partnership at will subsequently carried on (Clark v. Leach, 8 Law Tim. Rep, N. S., 40).

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-Revocation of authority-Effect of a commission-Complying with terms of employment to earn commission. The defendant employed the plaintiff to negotiate a loan on some of the defendant's property, plaintiff to be paid commission if he procured the loan, but none if he did not. Before the plaintiff had done anything in the matter, the defendant wrote to him, varying the terms on which he would accept the loan. The plaintiff endeavoured to obtain it on the latter terms, but failing to do so, obtained an offer for a loan on the terms of the first authority, which the defendant refused to accept: Held, that as the first authority had been revoked, the plaintiff was not entitled to commission for what he had done, neither was he entitled to claim for his services in endeavouring to procure the loan under the substituted terms, inasmuch as he did not obtain it under those terms. Held, also, that the plaintiff might have treated the revocation of the first terms of his employment as a breach of contract, and have had his action thereon against the defendant (Toppin v. Healy, 11 Week. Rep. 466).

PUBLIC COMPANY.-Cost-book principle-Transfer of shares — Liability of transferee.-A transferee of shares in a company conducted on the cost-book principle takes his shares with their past as well as future liabilities; the deed of settlement of the company containing a provision for the transfer of shares. Such liability is independent of any special contract between the transferor and the transferee. The rule is not affected by the circumstance that the transferor is one of the creditors of the company; and the shares in

the hands of the transferee, and the transferee personally, become liable, on a deficiency of the assets of the company, to contribute towards the payment of the debt of the transferor (Taylor v. Iffel, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 148).

Winding up-Contributor-Purchase of shares by companyAcquiescence-Ultra vires.-Acts ultra vires by a company cannot be inferred to have been done legally merely from acquiescence or delay in questioning the transaction. In other words, if a company has no power to do a particular thing, that power cannot be added to the company by the agreement of the shareholders, nor can it be inferred to have been done legally merely from acquiescence or delay. But if a company has power to do an act, and there be only requisite a particular formality, such as the consent of a general meeting, their acquiescence may be inferred by delay, and the Court would impute a knowledge of it to every shareholder. A shareholder transferred his shares to one of the directors of a company as part of the terms of a compromise of an action against such company. The deed of settlement contained no power to purchase shares from shareholders. The transfer of the shares was duly entered in the books of the company and the return made to the Registration office, but no public meeting had been held sanctioning the transaction: Held, that, from lapse of time, the shareholders must be taken to have acquiesced in the transfer, and the assignor of the shares was not, therefore, liable as a contributor (Exp. Grady, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 98).

SETTLEMENT.-Construction-Interest on portion—Interest severed from principal-Time of payment-Vesting (see ante, pp. 97, 98). -The question as to the time when portions become payable is one of construction, and when, according to that construction, the period has arrived when the portion is directed to be raised and paid, this must be done, although it can only be done by a waste of property, and sale or mortgage of a reversionary term. A portion is not properly said to be payable by trustees until two things have occurred namely, when the time appointed for raising has arrived, and when the person entitled is able to give a discharge; but a portion is often said to be payable to a child so soon as the event has happened which gives the child a vested interest in it (Massy v. Lloyd, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 122).

SHIPPING.-Freight-Advances under charter party-BottomryPriority-By a bottomry bond on future freight, the whole freight is hypothecated, except what may be subsequently paid in pursuance of a prior contract. As against the holder of a bottomry bond on freight, a loan of money to the master for the use of the ship, though such loan is authorised by a charter-party, is not a payment on account of freight unless the charter party stipulates that the amount shall be

deducted on settlement of freight. A charter-party stipulated that the charterers' agent should in the course of the voyage advance money for the necessary ordinary disbursements of the ship, and that such advances should be deducted on settlement of freight. The master gave a bottomry bond on ship, cargo to be shipped, and freight to be earned under the charter-party. The bondholder had notice of the terms of the charter-party, and, after the execution of the bond, various sums of money were advanced to the master. Part of the cargo subsequently shipped was, in order to pay ship's debts, sold in the course of the voyage. In computing the amount of freight payable by the charterers: Held, first, that they were entitled to deduct advances made for necessary ordinary disbursements; second, but not extraordinary disbursements; third, that no freight was payable upon the portion of the cargo sold; fourth, that the value of the cargo sold must not be deducted from the amount of freight due upon the other portions of the cargo (The Salacia, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 91).

SOLICITOR.-Bill of costs-Taxation-Gross sum-Explanation of Cannot claim larger sum than charged.-Where an unexplained gross sum is charged in a bill of costs, the client may, before taxation, require the solicitor to furnish an explanation of such sum, which the latter is bound to give, and the explanation may then be used by both parties on the taxation; if, however, the client does not call for such an explanation, the solicitor is still entitled to supply it on the taxation, but he cannot make use of such explanation to claim a larger sum than the item originally inserted in the original bill, and sought to be explained. A bill of costs delivered by a solicitor to a railway company contained an item of £525, charged generally in respect of business done during upwards of a year. On the taxation, the solicitor produced a rider, containing the particulars of the business so transacted during that period, and the total amount of the items in the particulars was £789, instead of £525, as charged in the bill. The taxing master allowed £521. A petition to review the taxation was dismissed (Re Tilleard, 11 Week. Rep. 476; 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 142).

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.-Privileged communications-Death of client.-A solicitor was examined as a witness touching confidential communications made to him by a deceased client, with reference to an alleged fraud committed by her in concert with the defendant, her surviving husband. The solicitor declined to produce letters written to him by the client about the time of the alleged fraud. The solicitor was not a party to the suit, and there was no allegation connecting him with the alleged fraud: Held, that the letters were protected from production by the privilege between solicitor and client (Charlton v. Coombes, 8 Law Tim. Kep., N. S., 81).

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS.

SETTLEMENT BY INTENDED WIFE.-Pending treaty for marriage.-Fraud-Acquiescence.-Until lately there have been no cases of a husband being successful in his suit to set aside a settlement executed by his wife prior to the marriage, as being in derogation of, and a fraud on, his marital rights, although the courts have always professed to be ready to lend their assistance in a proper case. It must be borne in mind that a settlement made by a woman shortly. before her marriage, without the privity of an intended husband, is neither at law nor equity absolutely voidable. On the contrary, it is prima facie good, although it will be set aside upon evidence being adduced that it was a fraud practised on the husband. Each case depends upon its own circumstances; and it certainly cannot be laid down as a rule that every alienation by an intended wife of her property during the treaty for the marriage, where the husband is no party to the conveyance, is fraudulent. Yet deception and fraud would be assumed where it appears that the husband was designedly kept in ignorance of it; but in every case the Court will inquire into the circumstances. And there are some dicta to the effect that such a settlement may be supported where the apparent deception can be explained, and it is shown that the transaction was reasonable and untainted by misrepresentation. Of course, no question will arise unless the settlement be made during the treaty of marriage, or, at least, the courtship; and, as might be expected many of the cases have turned upon this point. In the following case of Downes v. Jennings, the facts were as follow:-In 1852, S. and F. (a widow) became engaged to be married. F. was at that time in the receipt of an annuity, which was made determinable upon her marrying in the lifetime of A. In consequence of this provision they agreed to live together as husband and wife, without going through the ceremony of marriage, until the death of A. released the latter from the forfeiture of her income by marriage. A. died in 1857, but the parties were not married until May, 1859. It appeared that for eighteen months before the marriage. they had lived separate, only meeting occasionally, the friends of the lady desiring to sever the connection. In August, 1859, S. discovered that six weeks previously to the celebration of the marriage, F. had made a settlement upon her relations of certain other property belonging to her, and in 1862 he filed his bill to set aside the settlement. Under these circumstances the Master of the Rolls held, on the evidence, that, notwithstanding the temporary separa

tion of the parties, the agreement to marry was still subsisting at the time of the execution of the settlement; and that as it was executed pending the treaty for and in contemplation of a future marriage without the knowledge of the husband, it was a fraud on his marital rights. The peculiarity of this case is that the engagement commenced in 1852, and that the parties, after living together for five years, separated for more than a year before they married, and that during the interval the intended wife executed the settlement which formed the subject of the husband's complaint in the suit. The Master of the Rolls was of opinion that the evidence showed the engagement or treaty for marriage was continuous throughout. His Honour, therefore, had no difficulty in applying the general rule, and decreed the settlement to be set aside on the ground that it was a fraud on the husband's marital rights (Downes v. Jennings, 11 Week. Rep. 522). In another case, before V. C. Stuart (Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S, 109), it appeared that a settlement of a legacy of stock was executed by a lady, containing no reference to any future husband or children, the ultimate trust of which was in favour of such persons as, under the Statutes of Distribution, would have become entitled at her decease if she had died possessed thereof intestate and without having been married. Two months afterwards she was married to the plaintiff. It was established in evidence, that prior to the marriage the husband knew of the existence of a settlement, but was incorrectly informed as to its contents. It also appeared that the wife did not perfectly understand that a future husband would be excluded of his marital right. The wife died, leaving no issue of the marriage. The settlement was set aside as against the husband, although during the coverture, and until after the wife's death, he made no further inquiries (Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 109).

SHIPPING. Damage to cargo-Remedy in the Admiralty Court— Nude assignee Amount of damages Reference.-Whenever, through the neglect or misconduct of those on board the vessel, goods shipped have received damage, prima facie the shipowner is responsible. In the absence of notice to the contrary, and when the charter party does not amount to a demise of the ship, a shipper of goods is justified in supposing that the master is the agent of the shipowner alone for the purpose of agreement as to the carriage of goods. With respect to damage to goods, the High Court of Admiralty possesses no right of action not previously existing at common law. A nude assignee, not having at common law any right of action for damage to goods so assigned to him, has no remedy in the High Court of Admiralty. Before the Admiralty Court will decree damages, the amount must have been ascertained by a reference to the registrar and merchants (The St. Cloud, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 54).

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