as of the buyer-of the party by whom goods were to be supplied as well as of him to whom they were to be supplied-under the 17th section; or of the party to be guaranteed as well as of him who is to guarantee, under the 4th. Unless this be done, oral evidence must be had recourse to, and the risk incurred that a party may be sued by one with whom he had never intended to have any transaction-a matter of the greatest importance under many supposable circumstances. Their Lordships do not agree with the Chief Justice in the distinction which he labours in his very able judgment to establish between the present case and that of Williams v. Lake. They think that case, although upon the 4th section, a direct authority in the present; and it was not disputed by the learned Chief Justice or the counsel here but that it was well decided. It is certainly in conformity with many previous decisions, which they think it unnecessary now to introduce into this judgment. They refer, however, specially, to the judgment of Blackburn, J., in which he illustrates strikingly from the facts before him the mischiefs of a contrary decision (Williams v. Byrnes, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 72; 11 Week. Rep. 487.)

Title to exchanged lands.-The noble author has modified the statement contained in the previous editions of his work respecting lands exchanged under an Inclosure Act, viz., that the title of the person holding the estate is the only one relating to it. But as such exchanges are only authorised to be made with the consent of persons having certain specified interests in both estates, the abstract is imperfect unless it discloses so much of the title to the estate taken in exchange as will be sufficient to show that the transaction was within the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, the estate taken in exchange is liable to the uses of the estate given in exchange. The noble author therefore properly, but somewhat inconsistently, directs that the titles to both estates must be produced.

Every document to be abstracted.--The present edition of Lord St. Leonards' work repeats the opinion expressed by him in previous editions, that in respect of abstracts of title," the solicitor should abstract every document upon which the title depends, or upon which any difficulty has arisen. Wherever he begins the root of the title, he ought to abstract every subsequent deed" (p. 407). This direction, if literally interpreted, might lead to much confusion. A vendor may possess documents showing that a prior owner, who purchased apparently on his own account, was in fact a trustee or had notice of certain trusts. The effect of such documents is completely neutralised by a sale of the lands affected by the trusts to a purchaser for value without notice. Cui bono, therefore, to incumber the abstract with an array of mere dragon's teeth which can only operate as seeds of future litigation? But any document affecting the legal estate should of course be abstracted.

VENDORS AND PURCHASERS.

Enrolling bankruptcy proceedings.-Mr. Jarman (1 Jarm. Conv. 97) and Mr. Dart (p. 211) consider that, in respect of cases of bankruptcy, the adjudication and appointment of assignees, if not enrolled, ought to be entered on record by the vendor, and at his expense. Lord St. Leonards (p. 542), very contrary to the usually cautious tenour of his precepts, is of opinion that where the bankrupt joins in the conveyance, and there is no reason to suppose that the adjudication will be disputed by third persons, this "cannot" be The force of the negative, we think, can only be supported on the assumption that the adjudication cannot be disputed. The mere absence of present reason to suppose that the adjudication will be disputed does not certainly afford sufficient warranty for dispensing with the ordinary prudential expedients. For the property in question may not belong either to the bankrupt or to the assignees; and the invalidity of the commission may let in the title of third parties.

necessary.

Waiver of objections to title by acts of ownership after possession.In respect to acts amounting to a waiver of objections to the title, the noble author observes (p. 290) that "acts of ownership, after an authorised possession, are of no importance." Lord St. Leonards surely cannot mean that an act of ownership effecting an alteration of the essential qualities of the property, or of any portion thereof, would not constitute a waiver. In p. 254 of the treatise before us, we find an account of the case of Donovan v. Fricker (Jac. 165), in which a purchaser in possession was compelled, on the contract being rescinded, to reinstate a private house which he had converted into a shop. The noble author's impression regarding this case shows that he does not strictly concur in the generality of the proposition at the head of this paragraph. And, in point of fact, the case of Donovan v. Fricker was decided on the ground of fraud on the part of the purchaser, so that the noble author's views regarding its supposed principle were really derived aliunde, and therefore disprove his observation regarding the unimportance of acts of ownership after posses

sion taken.

Title depending on Statute of Limitations.-The noble author is of opinion (p. 389) that a purchaser can be compelled to take a title depending upon the Statute of Limitations, and he so decided in a He has not, case in Ireland, Scott v. Nixon (3 Dru. & W. 388). however, informed us that actual proof of the fact of adverse possession may in some cases amount to an impossibility. For instance, in the case of an alleged missing will, the right of the heir of the testator, no doubt, becomes barred by the lapse of forty years from the death of his ancestor, for the right of the heir clearly then accrued. But if the lost instrument be supposed to have put the property in settlement, the statute will be but a slight protection,

K

for limitations may have been created under which a right of action may not arise for a remote period.

Purchaser of a non-existent estate. -A curious extension of the rule caveat emptor appears in the work before us. The noble author inclines to the opinion that the purchaser of a non-existent estate, such, for instance, as a barred remainder, or an annuity after the death of the cestui que vie, will not obtain the aid of the Court, and quotes Lord Eldon as having expressed the same views. Various cases, even at law, however, have decided that the purchase-money may be recovered back as having been paid without consideration : Chapman v. Speller (14 Q. B., 621). Equity surely is not to be outstripped by law in its regard to justice. The point, indeed, was decided in Hitchcock v. Giddings (4 Pri. 135), though not conclusively so in the opinion of Lord St. Leonards.

One of two intending purchasers desisting on parol promise of other to buy for their joint benefit.-A nice question is noticed by the noble author (p. 700), whether if one of two persons who have entered upon a treaty for the purchase of an estate desists, the other promising, by parol, to buy it for their joint benefit, such a contract could be enforced, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds. Lord St. Leonards thinks it cannot. Mr. Dart (p. 597) is of the opinion that such a case can be treated as one merely of fraud on the part of an agent. We altogether concur with this opinion, but consider it necessary to observe that all cases of this description, to be valid, must admit of being viewed as involving an agency, and not merely contracts directly relating to the estate.

LAND REGISTRY ACT.

In the recent edition (the 7th) of Lord St. Leonards' Handy Book on Property Law, the following remarks occur on the Land Registry Act and Office. His Lordship objects to the Act on the ground that it will directly or indirectly impose heavy and unnecessary expenses on owners of land. He stigmatises the ad valorem duty upon registration as a covert and vexatious scheme of taxation. He reminds landowners that "all the costs of examinations, comparings, searches, fees to examiners, conveyancing counsel, &c.," are to be borne by them. Even after the title has been shown to be good and marketable, "the exact" description of the land to be registered, the statements of the persons entitled, and the charges affecting the lands, open the door to new expense and risk, even to the extent of appeals to the Court of Chancery from the decisions of the registrar. He says, there is nothing more difficult in very many cases than to

make out the identity of lands, and to reconcile an old description with their present state. Now, you must fully establish the identity of the lands with the parcels or descriptions contained in the titledeeds, and the registrar has power by such inquiries as he shall think fit, and, of course, at your expense, to ascertain the accuracy of the description, and the quantities and boundaries of the land, and, except in the case of incorporeal hereditaments, a map or plan must be made and deposited as part of the description. These requisitions are somewhat alarming-old witnesses, surveyors, mapmakers, &c., will be required. The map is sure to be expensive in many cases. The general order as to maps is a stringent one. An accurate map or plan of the property is to be deposited in the office when directed; it is to be made in such form, and on such scale, and in such manner, in all respects, as shall from time to time be directed, and shall contain the names of all the owners and occupiers of the lands bounding or immediately adjoining the property. The question of boundaries may involve you in litigation with your neighbours; for although no question might arise upon your boundaries in the usual course of things, yet if you claim an indefeasible title in the boundaries as you describe them, you may expect your neighbours to be alarmed and anxious about their rights, just as you yourself would be if your neighbour were the applicant. It would not be pleasant to find that he had, by the description of his boundary which you had neglected to verify, acquired a portion of your flower-garden or a slice of your park. A dispute about boundaries has often led to a protracted and expensive litigation. The framer of the Act felt this so strongly, that a clause provides that if there shall be any disputed question of boundary between the applicant and any proprietor of adjoining land which shall not have been previously determined by any competent authority, it shall be competent for the parties, or either of them, to object in writing to the determination of such question by the registrar or by a Judge of the Court of Chancery under the Act; and if any such objection shall be made, the registrar shall specify upon the record of title the existence of such disputed question of boundary, and that the registration is made subject thereto. This, therefore, establishes the question in dispute, and renders an action or suit unavoidable. His Lordship ridicules the idea of advertising for persons to dispute your claim to ownership. It is, he says, a public invitation to "all and sundry" to come in and dispute your title. Accordingly, any person may attend and show cause against the registration, or claim that the same should be subject to any conditions or reservations. The registrar is to decide on such objection or claim, or may refer the same to the Judge of the Court of Chancery. If the registrar decide, either party may appeal from his decision to the said Court,

so that once more you are in the Court of Chancery--inevitably if the registrar send you there, and probably if he himself decide. In either case you will be no longer contesting a point of law with an official of the Court, but you will have a real, and it may be a prolonged and severe contest with an adversary who disputes your title. You may perhaps by this time think that it would have been better not to have disturbed the sleeping lion, but to have rested content with a title which, but for your own invitation, no one would have challenged. If you are defeated, you will of course no longer be entitled to claim registration. Your title, if even you do not lose your estate, will be, in the language of our early law-books, damned, and you will probably have to defend your title against an adverse claimant as best you may. How often have our best-informed judges cautioned men against producing their title-deeds unless compelled to do so. In a case before Lord Kenyon, where a man upon a subpona duces tecum, took his box of title-deeds into Court, the learned Judge desired him to sit down on his box, and allow no one to open it. Be not, however, cast down overmuch, for if you are aggrieved by an order made by a Judge in Chancery, you may appeal to the Court of Appeal in Chancery; nor need you stop there; for any order made by the Court of Appeal on such an appeal is made subject to reversal or modification by the House of Lords, in like manner as decrees made by the Court of Chancery. What can a man desire more? A claim to be registered seems the surest, whilst it is the readiest mode of obtaining an early introduction into the Court of Chancery, and may even carry a man on to the House of Lords.

DYING WITHOUT ISSUE-COPYHOLDS.

OUR readers are aware that prior to the Wills Act (by s. 29 of which the words "die without issue," or "die without leaving issue," are thereafter to be construed to mean die without issue living at the death of the party to whose issue reference is made) those words, in general, referred to a general failure of issue. The following case will afford an opportunity of explaining this, and the effect of the use of those words in the case of copyholds parcel of a manor in which entails are not permitted. A devise was, prior to the Wills Act, made of copyholds; say, Whiteacre to A. and his heirs; if he died without issue, then to B.; but, after the death of A. and B., if they both died without issue, to C. Also a devise of other copyholds; say, Blackacre to the testator's daughter M., and also to her children; but in case she died without issue, then to N.; but if M. and N. both died without