nants in the lease; in the latter case, as there is no privity either of estate or contract (as to the meaning of which see 1 Exam. Chron., p. 224; ante, p. 5) between the original lessor and the mortgagee, the latter loses the benefit of the covenants in the lease (2 Crabb's Conv., p. 1175, Shelf.; see Exam. Quest., p. 16, No. IX. ; 3 Law Chron., p. 388; Key, Conv., pp. 77, 78). There is often a difficulty arising in dealing with the reversion of a day, or other period retained by the mortgagor, either from the omission to declare any trust of it, or from the declaration not sufficing to bring the case within the Trustee Acts (re Probert, 22 Law Journ., Ch. 948; Morgan, 21). And there have been cases where, from inattention to the form of the security, and having been treated in particulars or contract of sale, as an assignment, the title has been considered defective and the contract not enforceable, for a purchaser is entitled to assume that the lease is an original lease, and not merely an underlease; and where property is sold as held on a lease for a specified term, which turns out to be an underlease for the same term, all but three days, a Court of Equity will not enforce specific performance of the contract (Madeley v. Booth, 2 De G. and Sm., 718; 1 Crabb's Prec., 627, Shelf.). As to No. II. (p. 26), it must be borne in mind that, in a case prior to the 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77, if B., C., and D. were appointed executors, and B. only proved the will, and he appointed Z. his executor and died in the lifetime of C. and D., or either of them, Z. was not the representative of the original testator; and if C. and D., or either of them, did not take probate, Z. could not; but there must have been an administration cum testamento annexo de bonis non to the original testator (Toller's Execut. 118; Salkeld, 311). As to No. III. (p. 26), it may be observed, as to the right of a mother of a person dying intestate, without children, widow, or father, such mother would, prior to the 1 Jas. II., c. 17, s. 7, have become entitled to the whole of her child's personal property, in exclusion of the brothers and sisters of such child; but by that statute if, after the death of a father, any of his children shall die intestate, without wife or children, in the lifetime of the mother, every brother and sister, and the representatives of them, shall have an equal share with them. And it has been decided that, upon the intention of the statute, if the intestate child leave a wife, as well as brothers and sisters, and a mother, one moiety is to be divided among the latter (2 P. Vill., 344). Thus it is the statute which confers a right on the brothers and sisters in derogation of the exclusive common law right of the mother; she is in the first degree to her child, whilst the brothers and sisters are in the second degree, the computation of degrees of kindred being according to the rules of the civil laws, i.e., upwards and downwards through the common progenitor (Burt.

Comp. pl., 1408 n.). As to No. IV. (p. 27), we have been favoured with a communication in which it is said, "I observe that you have classed leaseholds for lives among personal property. A lease for life or lives being a freehold is a real estate, and would, I presume, pass to the testator's heir at law. If a lease for years determinable on lives, it would then be merely a chattel interest.' By the term "leaseholds for lives" (used by the examiners) is meant, leases granted for years determinable on lives, and which, as our correspondent admits, constitutes a chattel interest. It is not to be assumed that a lease, or estate for the life of another, would pass to the heir; it may be limited either to the heirs or the executors of the party Where it comes to the hands of the latter (or administrators) it is assets, applicable in the same manner as personal estate (1 St. Com. 449, 4th ed.: F. Bk. 158). It has lately been decided that estates pur autre vie, are neither estates of inheritance nor descendible freeholds; that there might, before the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, be contingent remainders in such estates without any prior estate to support them; that where an estate pur autre vie is granted to one for life, with remainder to his heirs or executors, the remainder is a mere possibility of interest into which the estate for life cannot merge; and that such possibility of interest is taken by the heir or executor as a special occupant (Pickersgill v. Grey, 5 Law Tim. N.S., 706). The reader will note this case in his copy of Stephen's Com. L. (vol. i., p. 44), where the heir is said to take a descendible freehold, citing a number of authorities. As to No. IX. (p. 28) it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the distinction between forfeiture and escheat, and between freeholds and copyholds as to the person entitled. Escheat arises from the feudal relation; forfeiture independently thereof (see Key, Conv., 89). Escheat of freeholds is to the crown; of copyholds, to the lord of the manor (F. Bk. 160). It is also assumed that the student is familiar with the maxims as to bastards (See Maxims, pp. 15, 30, 70, 100, 125). In reference to No. X. (p. 29), it may be observed that the word reversion is often used generically in reference to future interests in realty, as when it is said the acts of the tenant for life cannot bind the reversioner, or the reversioner may sue for waste, &c., in which and similar instances a remainder-man is included, being, in fact, in the place of the party who would, but for his interest, be the actual reversioner. As to that part of No. XIII. (p. 30), which relates to a de vise of copy holds to three trustees, it may be remarked that, if two of the three trustees should renounce or di claim all their right to be admitted to the copyholds, one fine only would be payable, as thereby the non-disclaiming trustee would become the only person entitled to be admitted, and on his admission would become sole tenant, with a liability to pay such a fine as a single tenant ought

to pay (Wellesley v. Withers, 1 Jur., N.S., 707). As to No. XIV. (p. 30), it is to be borne in mind that the statute there referred to applied to two things: 1, to restrict the granting of leases; 2, to prevent the charging of benefices, even though made for the life only or the incumbency of the mortgagor. The giving of a warrant of attorney leads to a judgment, and a judgment is a charge on lands, including a benefice; nevertheless, the Courts have held a warrant of attorney by a clergyman to be valid, and also the judgment and execution thereon, although it is obvious that the benefice thereby becomes charged; it is even notorious that the warrant of attorney is used as a means of avoiding the operation of the statutes forbidding a charge. Should, however, the creditor be foolish enough to allow it to appear on the face of the warrant of attorney that it was given with the intention of charging the benefice, it would be void (Flight v. Salter, 1 B. and Adol. 673). We have elsewhere considered this doctrine and the cases at great length (See 1 Law Chron. pp. 209, 214). As to No. XV., it may be added that deeds by which debtors voluntarily make provisions for payment of their debts may be defeated by the grantors revoking same before they are communicated to the creditors (Garrard v. Laverdale, 3 Tim. 1; 2 Russ. and Myl. 452; re Fletcher, 24 Law Tim. 204). This subject has been by us before fully noticed in 1 Law Chron. 167, 170.

As to

The questions on equity (pp. 31, 35) were unobjectionable, though Nos. I., VIII., and X. might possibly be objected to. No. VIII. is also highly technical, and we think few can have known anything of the matter. We have answered the questions so fully that little seems now to be required in the way of remark. No. II (p. 31), the reader is supposed to be aware that bills merely for discovery are not so frequent as formerly, as now courts of law can give discovery both of documents and other matters (See F. Bk. 273). As to No. III., it is, we suppose, known that Courts of Equity refuse to enforce contracts where the circumstances attendant thereon are not of such an objectionable nature as to entitle the party to be relieved therefrom, specific performance being discretionary (F. Bk. 281, 282; 16 Jur. 422). As to No. IX. (p. 33), it is the usual practice of the Court of Chancery, on directing a sale, to order the purchase money to be paid into Court; but sometimes this is not done, though it is better for the purchaser that his money should go into Court. With reference to No X. (p. 34), after more fully considering the terms of the question, we have no doubt the case would be considered within the Acts referred to, as some effect must be given, as we have before stated, to the clauses relative to trustees' receipts (2 Law Chron., N.S, 78, 80; 1 Exam. Chron. 31, 32, 78, 133, 167). The legatees would not, therefore, have any

claim either on A. B. or the estate sold to him. As to No. XIV., it is to be understood that, except where the amount is very small, a Court of Equity will not part with money in its hands belonging to a feme covert (not being her separate estate), unless she is examined, and consents to its being paid out to her husband (1 Daniell's Pract. Headlam, 95; Whitworth's Eq. Preced. 549, 551).

There is nothing to object to in the Bankruptcy questions (pp. 31, 41) put by the Examiners, being chiefly founded on the late Act, though some of the questions required a knowledge of other matters. The answers do not require any elucidatory remarks.

The same observations may be made as to the Criminal Law questions (pp. 40, 42). It will be seen that they are chiefly upon the Consolidated Statutes, some of which contain very important variations from the repealed statutes, and yet some of the published answers to these questions altogether ignored the existence of the new Acts and the repeal of the previous Acts, which were cited just as if the Legislature had not given them their quietus. As No. IV. is a new provision and its existence unknown, the question was boldly answered in the affirmative, with a reference to a statute which had nothing to do with the matter, that being regulated by the 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 31 alone. It will be necessary for future candidates to bear in mind the Consolidation Acts, and to give them such a perusal as will enable them to furnish answers bearing on their provisions. We gave references to Stephen's Com. and our First Book, where the repealed enactments might be found.

THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATIONS.

At the last Michaelmas Term examination the Examiners recommended the following gentlemen, under the age of 26, as being entitled to honorary distinction :

PEARLESS, JAMES RICHARDSON, aged 22, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Pearless, of East Grinstead, Sussex.

CORNISH, HERBERT HENRY, aged 21, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Cornish and Chilcott, of Tavistock; and Messrs. Rodd and Cornish, of Penzance.

TILL, WALTER JOHN, aged 21, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Drummonds, Robinson, and Till, of Croydon.

LINDO, ARTHUR, aged 22, who served his clerkship to Mr. Nethaneel Lindo, of London.

The Council of the Incorporated Law Society accordingly awarded the following prizes of books:

To Mr. PEARLESs, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clifford's Inn.

To Mr. CORNISH, one of the prizes of the Incorporated Law Society.

To Mr. TILL, one of the prizes of the Incorporated Law Society. To Mr. LINDO, one of the prizes of the Incorporated Law Society. The examiners also certified that the following candidates, whose names are placed in alphabetical order, passed examinations which entitle them to commendation:

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ANSDELL, THOMAS FERGUSON, aged 23, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Ansdell, of St. Helen's, Lancashire; and Messrs. Walker and Smith, of Chester.

GREATWOOD, FRANCIS Ross, aged 22, who served his clerkship to Mr. Alexander Waddington, of Usk; and Messrs. Thomas White and Sons, of London.

GUSH, WILLIAM FREDERICK, aged 22, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Walters and Son, of London.

MILWARD, ROBERT HARDING, aged 23, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Penn Allcock, of Birmingham; and Messrs. Fallows and Son, of London.

The Council have accordingly awarded them certificates of merit. The Examiners have further announced to the following candidates that their answers to the questions at the examination were highly satisfactory, and would have entitled them to prizes or certificates of merit if they had been under the age of 26:

HOLMES, JOHN, aged 30, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Crosley and Burn, of London.

WILTSHIRE, CHARLES HENRY, aged 28, who served his clerkship to Mr. George Edward Sharland, of Gravesend.

EDELSTON, THOMAS, aged 31, who served his clerkship to Mr. Thomas Harris, of Preston.

At the last Hilary Term Examination the Examiners recommended the following gentlemen, under the age of 26, as being entitled to honorary distinction:

1. ADDISON, JOSEPH, aged 21, who served his clerkship to Messrs. J. and J. H. Linklater and Hackwood, of London.

2. INSKIP, JAMES, aged 22, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Bevan, Girling, and Press, of Bristol; and Mr. John White, of London.

3. FAWCETT, WILLIAM RHODES, aged 21, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Fawcett and Garbutt, of Yarm; and Messrs. Bell, Brodrick, and Bell, of London.

4. RICKETTS, WILLIAM TYLER, aged 21, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Latham, of Sandbach.

5. CHALK, EDMUND, aged 21, who served his clerkship to Mr. George Hicks Seymour, of York.

The Council of the Incorporated Law Society accordingly awarded the following prizes of books :