"Elementary View of a Suit in Equity," which is a small book of about 300 pages, price 7s., written in a very intelligible manner, and by the aid of which a very good general knowledge of equity practice may be obtained. Those who have not read any other work will do well to give it a second and very careful perusal, as for the purpose of the examination it will not be necessary to read any other work, unless the student is disposed to go further. The only drawback to the utility of Mr. Hunter's work is that there is but one edition, and that so far back as 1858, and consequently some portions do not represent the actual state of the practice, such as the rather important head of Evidence, which, we may mention, has been affected by the orders of 1861 (see Vol. I., pp. 107, 134, 168).. The best and most complete book of Equity Practice is that by Mr. Sydney Smith, a new edition of which is in the press, and when it appears we will mention the price. It is rather expensive, and is also a large work for a student to set about mastering. It is, however, very readable. The work which many students read, and certainly one of great utility to the practitioner, is Mr. Ayckbourn's "Practice," of which a new edition has very recently appeared, price 218., without the forms.

Equity Principles.-Proceeding now to the Principles of Equity, in contradistinction to the Practice, the student who has not yet obtained any acquaintance with this branch of his profession may be recommended to peruse the first portions of Chapter XXXIV. of our First Book, or of Chapter XIV. of Book V. of Stephen's "Commentaries," from which he will gather sufficient to indicate the essential distinctions between the equity and common law jurisdictions. It must be borne in mind that some recent statutes have conferred concurrent jurisdictions in some cases where before jurisdiction was confined to one class of Courts, or, as the phrase is, one side of Westminster Hall. Thus, a jurisdiction in interpleader, which was formerly a purely equitable doctrine, has been conferred on courts of common law (1 Exam. Chron., pp. 125-163); these latter courts may now issue injunctions in certain cases (F. Bk., p. 265), give relief against forfeitures (2 Law Chron., N.S., p. 178), afford discovery of documents, and of facts by means of interrogatories (F. Bk., p. 273); whilst now courts of equity are enabled to try causes by juries where questions of fact arise, and to assess damages in cases of breach of contract, where an injunction or specific performance is applied for (21 & 22 Vic. c. 27; 33 Law Tim. p. 8). And some other instances of assimilation of jurisdiction will be met with by the student in the course of his reading, our only object here being to call his attention to the course of recent legislation. It will be borne in mind that it is an invariable rule or maxim of courts of equity that their jurisdiction is not ousted by the Legislature conferring a like jurisdiction

on courts of common law; to do that there must be negative words, or, in other words, the equitable jurisdiction must be expressly taken away (see F. Bk., p. 281; 3 Law Chron. 184).

It is usual to advise the student to read Smith's "Manual of Equity Jurisprudence," as a first book, and probably this is not bad advice, where some acquaintance has already been made with the general principles; and if not, it must be admitted that it is difficult to find a work so complete as Mr. Smith's. Being only an abridgment of two other works (Story and Spence), it has the fault of such works in being too methodical and precise for mere students, requiring much more attention than they are willing, or, in some cases, able to afford. There is a little work by Mr. Haynes, entitled "Outlines of Equity," which will be found more interesting, and be satisfactory to beginners. There is but one edition, which appeared in 1858, price 10s. The work purports to be "A Series of Elementary Lectures, Delivered at the Request of the Incorporated Law Society," and has the further recommendation of having been selected as one of the works for the Intermediate Examinations, under the 23 & 24 Vic., c. 127. This latter fact will be a strong inducement with many to study the work. The student may now take up Mr. Smith's "Manual," of which the last edition (the sixth) appeared in 1861, price 12s. Some persons prefer to read the larger works upon which the "Manual" is founded, namely, Story and Spence's "Equity Jurisprudence," asserting that the latter are more interesting, and more easily understood than the former, but we do not think the generality of students will back the assertion. The "Manual" should be read more than once, being, indeed, a work requiring this more than most others. It is on a second or third perusal that the reader will be best able to appreciate Mr. Smith's labours, and to derive advantage therefrom. Should the student really find, on an attempted perusal of the work, that he cannot understand it sufficiently to make it worth his while to persevere, we would recommend him to try a work which has been always highly spoken of, and would probably have superseded Smith, had its author lived to superintend another edition. We refer to the late Mr. Adams's work on "Equity," of which, however, there is but one edition, and that not very recent.

Those students who desire to pursue their studies in Equity to a greater extent than already indicated, must have recourse to the two larger works of Spence and Story on "Equity Jurisprudence." Mr. Spence's work is in two volumes, published at intervals, and, unfortunately, now some time ago; the first volume is mostly antiquarian or historical, and may be passed over; it is sold separately, price 31s. 6d. The second volume sells for 42s., and contains a vast mass of learning, and it is to be regretted that the

premature and painful death of the author has deprived the profession of the chance of ever seeing a second edition by so competent a person. It is certainly preferable to Story's work, but it must be borne in mind that it is not complete, inasmuch as it is confined to the jurisdiction arising out of contracts. The other work, namely, that by the late Mr. Justice Story, is in two volumes. It is well known to be an American work, and it has had to make its way in this country against prejudice which has not been confined to the bar, but has extended to the bench, one judge having actually forbidden its being cited in his court. There is no doubt that the mixture of American and English doctrines and authorities is rather embarrassing, but except to this extent it is a very useful work. Perhaps the frequent citations from the civil lawyers, in the original Latin, will be objected to by many, particularly those who have not a good acquaintance with, not merely classical Latin, but what is frequently embarrassing even to classical Latinists, the Latin of the civilians. An extremely useful work is that known as White and Tudor's "Leading Cases in Equity," of which a second edition has lately appeared, price 63s. It follows the plan of the "Leading Cases on Common Law," of the late Mr. J. W. Smith, and is certainly worthy of being placed beside it. Of course it has the same defect as the other in not embracing the whole circle of equitable doctrines.

HILARY TERM, 1862 (pp. 21-42).

We now come to the questions in Hilary Term which, with the answers, will be found ante, pp. 21-42. The Common Law Questions are of a very fair character, and such as it is reasonable to expect that the ordinary run of clerks should be able to answer. No. I. (p. 21) may, perhaps, be thought not quite fair, because it does not suggest the answer; but we do not think any complaint on this head would meet with much sympathy. It is desirable that articled clerks should habituate themselves to meet questions put in such a form, and not rely on having an indication of the kind of answer. The student will bear in mind that there are two kinds of interpleader at law, as explained in Vol. I., pp. 125, 126, and 163, to which the reader is referred, and that besides there is an interpleader in equity, as stated in Vol. I., p. 163; and see Key, Equity, pp. 85, 86. No. II. (p. 21) is so fully explained that we need not do more than state it is assumed that the reader is aware that, except by custom and by statute in particular cases, a chose in action, such as

an ordinary debt, a bond, &c., cannot be assigned so as to entitle the assignee to sue in his own name in a Court of Law (See F. Bk. 197, 198; Dixon v. Bo., 2 Jurist, N.S., 933; 7 Week. Rep., 615; 1 Law Times, N.S, 84). As to the party to sue on an assignment of a chose in action, see Exam. Quest., pp. 42, 46. As to No. III. (p. 21) the reader is supposed to be aware that for rent in arrear the goods of a stranger on the premises (unless thereon under the circumstances stated in No. V., p. 22, under the third head of privilege) are liable to be distrained, and consequently the goods of a lodger are so liable (F. Bk. 235; Exam. Quest. p. 137; Key, Com. L., pp. 8, 9). It should be added that Mr. B. Martin has ruled at Nisi Prius, where the goods of a tenant's lodger were distrained together, and the tenant's sold first, after notice from the lodger, and the tenant's goods turned out to be sufficient to satisfy the rent and charges, that the lodger was entitled to sue for an excessive distress (Wilkinson v. Ibbett, 2 Fost. and Finl., 300). The above is the marginal note of the reporters, and the italics are theirs. On looking at the body of the case there is nothing to warrant the supposition that a lodger's goods cannot be touched until his landlord's goods have been exhausted; the case merely affirms what was settled by Bail v. Mellor, 19 Law Jour. Ex., 279, namely, that where, in an action for an excessive distress for taking the goods of the plaintiff, it appears that of the goods taken part belongs to the plaintiff and part to a third party, the declaration may be amended by stating the illegal distress to have taken place with respect to the goods of the plaintiff and of the third party, and that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover some amount of damages, and that the other party whose goods were taken would also be entitled to maintain an action and recover damages; semble, that no joint action for excessive distress could be brought by the plaintiff and the third party. In Wilkinson v. Ibbett the landlord sold more than was necessary to satisfy his claim for rent; hence the decision that the lodger, whose goods were sold, could sue the landlord for an excessive taking. The case does not decide that, if the lodger's goods alone had been sold, and they had just sufficed to pay the rent in arrear and the costs of the distress, that the lodger could have recovered, which is what might be inferred from the marginal note above set out. As to No. VI. (p. 22), the reader will bear in mind that a tender to be good must (inter alia) be unconditional, and it is particularly in reference to that it was remarked that a tender is not often relied on for further information the reader can refer to Pract. Com. L., p. 134. As to No. VII. (p. 23), the references there made to 1 Exam. Chron., pp. 122, 161, and Pract. Com. L., pp. 132, 133, on the subject of set off will afford sufficient information. As to Nos. XI. and XII. (p. 24), the articled

clerk should endeavour to familiarise himself with the different periods of time for giving and countermanding a notice of trial, bearing in mind that the matter has been much simplified by the abolition of the differences which formerly existed between town and country causes. As to No. XIV. (pp. 24, 25), it is to be understood that formerly, when a cause was tried in vacation, judgment could not be signed and execution issued until the following term, unless the judge trying the cause directed speedy execution to be issued. This application was then of more importance than at present, as execution may now issue without any order in vacation: where, however, it is desired to have execution without waiting the fourteen days, application for speedy execution should be made, for which an affidavit stating facts showing ground for an early execution should be prepared and be ready. However, the party is not now, as formerly, restricted to an application at the trial, or even to the judge who tried the cause. It will be observed that in Com. L. Pract., p. 186, the time for signing judgment in vacation is not mentioned, but the omission is supplied at p. 217; that in Exam. Quest. and Ans., p. 6, No. XII., where the trial is had in vacation, it is erroneously stated that the successful party must wait until the fifth day of the ensuing term, that having been so under the old practice, unless where a certificate was granted for speedy execution. No. XV. (p. 25) requires that it should be known that it has always been a rule that execution could not, without revival, issue on an old judgment formerly a year and a day constituted an old judgment; now, it will be observed, the term is six years. So that, after judgment is signed, the judgment creditor may, at any time within six years thereafter, issue execution without any revival of the judgment, unless by means of death, &c., a revival becomes necessary (See Com. L. Pract, 232, et seq.). The subject of revival of judgment is one to which the student should give his attention (See Exam. Quest. and Ans., p. 136, No. VI.).

The questions in Conveyancing are open to some objections. Thus, there are two of them (p. 27), relating to the Middlesex Registry, of which it can hardly be expected that clerks in non-registry counties should have much, if any, knowledge. No. XIV. is a question raising very difficult points, and the way in which it is framed must have considerably added to the embarrassment of the clerks who were being examined. With respect to No. I. (p. 25), it will be necessary to bear in mind that, in taking a mortgage of leaseholds, the draftsman has to decide whether he shall take an assignment, that is, have the whole of the mortgagor's term, or content himself with an under-lease, that is, leave a reversion in the mortgagor, which may be of a single day, or for a longer period. In the former case the mortgagee becomes liable to the rent and cove