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mistakes is in not understanding the different effects arising from neglect to appear to a writ of summons, according as it has or not been specially indorsed. As we have before observed, where the writ is specially indorsed, and the defendant fails to appear, the plaintiff may forthwith sign judgment (though execution cannot be issued until eight days thereafter) for want of appearance, whilst, if the writ be not specially indorsed the plaintiff cannot sign judgment for want of a plea, but must file a declaration (see Com. L. Pract. pp. 60, 62, 76, 78; F. Bk. 264, 266). As to No. III. (p. 222), all that need be observed here is that though, in ordinary cases, a defendant may appear to a writ without leave, yet in the case of a writ under the Act giving summary remedy on bills and notes (see Com. L. Pract. pp. 69, 74; F. Bk. 212, 264, 265), leave must be obtained to appear by application to a judge, and the defendant may either pay into court the amount claimed, or make a satisfactory affidavit (2 L. C. 202; 4 Id. 264, 303). As to No. IV. (p. 222), in Selw. N. P. p. 320, 11th ed.), a bill of exchange is defined as being a written order from A. to B., directing B. (who has, or who is supposed to have, in his hands sufficient effects belonging to A.), to pay a sum of money to C. on order, or to C. or bearer, either at sight, or a certain number of days after sight, or after date, or at single, double, or treble usage, or on demand. Although regularly there ought to be three persons concerned in a bill of exchange, viz., drawer, drawee, and payee, yet there may be two only, that is, the characters of drawer and payee may be, and frequently are, united in the same person, as if A. draw a bill in this manner, "Pay to me or my order £ value received by myself." As to No. V. (p. 222) as we have elsewhere explained (Com. L. Princ. p. 132), the English law recognises only two species of contracts, viz., contracts by specialty and contracts by parol. Under the latter term are comprised written and oral contracts, there not being separate classes of oral and written contracts (Com. L. Princ. p. 136). In other words, if agreements are merely written, and not under seal, they are parol agreements. It is well established as a general rule that in parol agreements the law will not imply a consideration, bills and notes forming, as stated ante p. 222, an exception. Selwyn observes that Blackstone (3 Com.), in treating of assumpsit, has not either named, described, or even alluded to the consideration requisite to support an assumpsit, and what is more remarkable, the example put by him in order to illustrate the nature of the action is, in the terms in which it is there stated, a case of nudum pactum: "If a builder promises, undertakes, or assumes to Caius, that he will build and cover his house within a time limited, and fails to do it, Caius has an action on the case against the builder for this breach of his express promise, undertaking, or as

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sumpsit" (see 1 Roll. Abr. 9, line 41; Doct. and Stud. Dial. 2, ch. 24; and Elsee v. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143, that an action will not lie for a mere non-feasance, unless the promise is founded on a consideration). As to the exception of a guarantee, and the former and present state of the law thereupon, see Com. L. Princ. pp. 152, 154. As to No. VL, it is to be borne in mind (as fully explained in Com. L. Princ., pp. 149, 150), that if a person who incurs a debt promises to pay it, that is not a guarantee, but that if a person is about to incur a debt, and another person offers to become liable if the person incurring the debt does not pay, that is the case of a guarantee thus, there must be an original debtor, who must be a different person from him who guarantees payment, and the guarantee must be on the default of the other (3 L. C. 256; 4 Id., 22). The necessity for a writing arises out of the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. The consideration, if stated as it frequently is, though now not necessary, must not appear to have been a past consideration (Hood v. Graces, 10 Week. Rep. 85; Com. L. Princ. 153). As to No. XI. (p. 224), the term Privity of Contract" is used in various senses; thus it is said that in order to maintain assumpsit there must be a privity between the parties, meaning a privity of contract. Thus if I give a sum of money to my servant to pay a tradesman, the latter cannot maintain an action for money had and received against the servant (4 B. and Adol. 612). So where money or a bill or order productive of money is remitted by A. to B. with directions to pay C., the latter cannot maintain an action against B. for money had and received without something having been done by B. amounting to a privity or assent, independent of the mere receipt of the money; but where such assent has been given it becomes an appropriation irrevocable, except by the consent of all the parties, and for which an existing debt, though not then payable, is a good consideration (9 M. and W. 404; Selw. N. P. 101, 11th ed.; see further Com. L. Princ. 47). Selwyn (N. P. 517, 11th ed.), speaking of the action of covenant, says, "Where such action is founded on privity of contract it is transitory, and the venue may be laid in any county; but where the action is founded on privity of estate only it is local, and the venue must be laid on the county where the estate lies." It may be added, that by leave the trial may take place in a different county (Com. L. Pract. 122, 263; Com. L. Princ. 7). Privity of estate is said to be requisite on a release operating to enlarge an estate: thus, on a lease by A. to B. for life, who subdemises to C. for years, a release by A. to C. is inoperative (1 Steph. Com. 522, 4th ed.); but as we have before stated (vol. i., p. 84), there is little doubt the deed would operate as a grant. As to the rights and liabilities of assignees, they may be shortly stated as being in respect

of covenants running with the land; the former distinction as to the assignee being or not named has been much affected by the decision in Minshall v. Oakes, 27 L. J. Ex. 194; see the subject fully noticed in Com. L. Princ. 252, 259. As to No. XII., the reader will bear in mind that the statute of limitations may be prevented from applying to a claim by suing out and renewing process in the manner mentioned in Com. L. Pract. p. 65. The doctrine that time is not to be allowed to run against a plaintiff whilst there was no person in existence whom he could sue applies to both simple contracts and specialties (Sturgis v. Darell, 8 Week. Rep. 653).

The questions in Conveyancing (vol. i. p. 226, 230) are much more difficult than those relating to common law, some of them being much too recondite, such as those relating to the limits for future uses, supporting voluntary conveyances against purchasers and creditors, the results of breaches of conditions according as they are precedent or subsequent, the right of an annuitant by will to have the principal sum directed to be appropriated for the purchase of the annuity paid to him in lieu of the annuity, and whether a given annuity was perpetual or not. This last question in particular is objectionable, as having been the subject of a decision not likely to be familiar to articled clerks. As to No. I. (p. 226), it may be observed that the doctrine restricting future uses arising beyond a limited period of time is usually denominated the "rule against perpetuities," but it does not very happily describe what is meant by it: for it not only aims against persons rendering property absolutely inalienable, so that it should always remain in a certain line or family, but also against property being rendered inalienable beyond a certain period. The earliest attempted perpetuities were by the creation of estates tail, but these failed because the judges permitted the destruction of such estates by fines and recoveries. And as such estates are now, though by different means, destructible, springing and shifting uses limited after and depending on an estate tail are not open to an objection on the ground of perpetuity (Burt. Comp. pl. 784; Tudor's Real Prop. p: 361, et seq.) Of course an executory devise, or springing or shifting use, to arise after an indefinite failure of issue, is void as being contrary to the rule against perpetuities. Thus, if there be a gift to A. and his heirs, with a limitation over on the failure of the issue of B., a stranger, to C. and his heirs, it is evident that the issue of B. might not fail for centuries, and during that period the property would be inalienable, inasmuch as A. could not, in case it were an executory devise, or a shifting or springing use (as he might have done if it had been a limitation to himself and the heirs of his own body, which would have created an estate tail) bar or destroy the estate limited to C., and it is therefore void, as being too remote (1 Ld. Rayın. 526;

1 Salk. 233). As to No. II. (p. 226), the maxim applicable to the root of descent was "Seisina fecit stipitem," so that the last inheritor who obtained seisin became the root or stock of descent. What constituted this seisin is explained in the works on descent, particularly Watkins on Descents and Blackstone's and Sir Matthew Hale's chapters on descent in their respective works, entitled Commentaries, and History of the Common Law. The reader will bear in mind who are or not half blood, within the meaning of the old and the new laws of descents, respecting which a note will be found in our edition of Littleton's Tenures, s. 6, et seq. and notes. As to No. III. (p. 226), the reader will bear in mind that remainders are contingent in respect of the uncertainty either of the event happening, or of the person coming into existence during the continuance of the particular estate. In the case put by the examiners, the remainder being to the sons of B., and he having no sons on the death of the tenant for life, the remainder to them fails. It is not saved by the provision in the 8 & 9 Vic. c. 106, s. 8, which applies to the case of a premature determination of the preceding

In the case put the preceding particular estate expired in the regular course of things, namely, the death of A. Mr. Burton (Comp. pl. 32) expresses the rule as to the failure of a contingent remainder thus: "Whenever an ulterior estate comes into possession before the happening of the contingent event, the contingent remainder fails." Since the above act this requires to be qualified by the words, "except where the ulterior estate has been prematurely accelerated." Burton's second rule, namely, "that a contingent remainder of freehold must have a particular estate of freehold to support it," is still correct. As to No. IV. (p. 227), it is to be borne in mind that a married woman is capable of exercising a power of revocation or appointment of uses, a privilege which, says Burton (Comp. pl. 207), seems to have been unwarily bestowed upon her, through a supposed analogy to the power which the Common Law allowed her of acting as the mere instrument or attorney of another person (Co. Litt. 52a, 187b). It is usual in giving the power to a woman to state that she may, whether sole or covert, or before or after marriage, or notwithstanding her then present or any future coverture appoint; but these expressions are superfluous, and being very common, lead to misapprehension in the student's mind. They have also occasioned failures by a slight variation in the form, as "during coverture," which latter form confines the exercise of the power to coverture. No. V. (p. 227) requires that it should be known that, by the 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 106, s. 6, the old rule or maxim, "Hereditas nunquam ascendit" (Maxims, p. 78) has been abrogated, and the lineal ancestor permitted to inherit. As to No. VI. (p. 227), it may be observed that voluntary settlements are good

against purchasers from the heir or devisee of the settlor (see F. Bk. 167), and as against creditors where the settlor was not indebted to any extent at the time of the execution of the settlement Prid. Conv. 532, 533, 2nd ed.; F. Bk. 167; French v. French,.2 Jur., N. S., 162; Doe v. Rusham, 16 Jur. 359; 2 L. C. 405; 3 Id., 60, 220, 344, 345, 369). No. VII. refers to the difficult point arising out of the provision in the Inheritance Act that descents are to be traced from purchaser, that is the last (meaning the most remote) person who is proved to have inherited the same: if, therefore, the case of coparceners be not excepted from the Act (and it is silent on that subject) the result seems inevitable that, in the case put by the examiners, the son of the deceased daughter would take only a moiety of her share, and his aunt would take the other half. However, the point has been otherwise decided, upon the gratuitous assumption that the statute was not intended to apply to descents from a coparcener. With reference to No. VIII. (p. 228), it may be observed that conditions are either precedent or subsequent. Where the condition must be performed before the estate can commence it is a condition precedent; as if an estate be limited to A. upon condition that he marry B., the marriage is a condition precedent, and until that happens no estate vests in A. Where the effect of a condition is to defeat an estate already commenced, it is a condition subsequent ; as where a lease is made on condition that the lessee shall pay to the lessor on such a day a certain sum. Here the condition is subsequent and following the estate, and the performance thereof continues and preserves the same (1 Crabb's Convey. by Shelf. 620. With reference to No. IX. (p. 228), the reader will bear in mind that the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 105, on the one hand, leaves dower at the mercy of a husband, and subject to his debts, contracts, &c. ; whilst, on the other hand, it enlarges the subject matters out of which it can arise, giving it out of equitable estates (for, strange to say, equity, which pretends to favour married women, denied them dower out of equitable estates, whilst giving husbands curtesy thereout), and rights of entry or action without seisin (F. Book 128; Litt. ss. 35, 52, and Notes; 2 Bl. C. 126). Jointures are either legal or equitable a legal jointure requires so many niceties that it is rarely given; and it is the practice on a settlement to limit a rent-charge to the intended wife for her life, by way of jointure, to commence from the death of the husband, with powers of distress and entry, and generally with a term of years to a trustee for further securing the payment thereof (1 Crabb's Conv. by Shelf. 241; Burt. Comp. pl. 357, et seq.). As to No. X. (p. 229), we think it probable the Examiners meant to give the case of a rent-charge extending over lands A. and B., and a sale of A. only taking place; as to which, it is to be observed that, as a rent-charge issues equally out of every

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