of patents, and the violation of copyright, either by publication or theatrical representation; to suppress the continuance of public or private nuisances; and by the various modes of interpleader, restraint upon multiplicity of suits, or quieting possession before the hearing, to stop the progress of vexatious litigation. Mr. Eden winds up by adding that it would be difficult to enumerate all the instances; for in the endless variety of cases in which a plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief, if that relief consists in restraining the commission or the continuance of some act of the defendant, an injunction will be granted. As to No. IV., it may be observed that it is a maxim or rule that a trustee cannot be allowed to make any profit by the exercise of his duties of a trustee ; and this extends to a solicitor-trustee acting in legal proceedings for the trust estate (See 2 L. C., N. S., 13; re Overbury, 1 Law Tim. R., N. S., 103; 4 L. C. 50). However, in the case mentioned, vol. i., p. 232, the Courts have relaxed this rule so far as to allow the partner of the solicitor-trustee, on an arrangement between the two that the partner alone shall be entitled to the profits, to charge his costs, it being then the same as the employment of a stranger, in appearance, at least, though it is obvious that the arrangement will not, in general, be literally carried into effect. Of course it is competent for the author of the trust to declare that a solicitortrustee, acting in his professional capacity in execution of the trust, shall be entitled to his costs (3 Beav. 341); some care is required in framing the provision so as to embrace business done which a trustee in his ordinary character can and ought to do, such as attendances to transfer stock, make payments, correspondence, &c., very extensive words being necessary to enable a solicitor-trustee to charge for such matters (see Harbin v. Darby, 2 Law Tim. R., N. S., 531; 2 L. C. 127). In reference to No. VI., and to show that in some instances Courts of Equity give a feme covert the whole of a fund to which she is entitled under the doctrine of equity to a settlement, the reader is referred to the rather recent case of ex parte Davidson, 1 Law Tim., N. S., 277; 2 L. C., N. S., 64; confirming re Welchman, 1 Giff. 31; 33 Law Tim. R. 377; 1 L. C., N. S., 368, where the husband had received on the marriage a portion of the wife's property, and she afterwards became entitled to the sum of £500 Consols: the whole sum was settled on the wife as against the bankruptcy assignees of her husband. The cases of re Tubb, 8 Week. Rep. 270; 2 Law Chron., N. S., 101; and Ward v. Yates, 8 Week. Rep., 428; 2 Law Chron., N. S., 117, where the whole of a fund, less than £200, was directed to be settled on the wife, though in the one case the husband had become bankrupt, and the wife had incumbered the fund, and in the other the fund had been assigned in the latter case it appeared that the

husband had received large sums in his wife's right, and was unable to maintain her. As to No. XV. (p. 236), though, where a partnership cannot be conducted upon the footing originally contemplated without injury to the partners, a dissolution will be decreed, and so where the objects of the partnership have wholly failed, or there has been a misrepresentation, yet the mere fact that the business cannot be carried on profitably will not be a sufficient ground for equity decreeing a dissolution (Jauncey v. Knowles, 1 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 117; 2 Law Chron., N. S., 9; see Law Propos., p. 21, No. XI. ; 4 Law Chron., 171).

The Bankruptcy questions (vol. i., pp. 236-240) are of the usual character, being chiefly on the Act of 24 & 25 Vic., c. 134, of the provisions of which an analysis will be found in vol. i., pp. 208-218, and in the present number. No. II. (vol. i., p. 237) requires that it should be borne in mind that the bankruptcy laws are no longer confined to traders, but embrace both traders and non-traders. Nos. III., IV., and V. (p. 237) show that though the bankruptcy laws extend to all classes, there is still a distinction between traders and non-traders as to acts of bankruptcy. This has the effect of making this part of bankruptcy more complex than heretofore, and the student should pay particular attention thereto, as it will form a frequent subject for questions by the Examiners. From No. VI. (p. 237) it will be seen that a debtor, whether trader or not, may petition for adjudication against himself, and that no previous declaration need be filed, as was formerly required, so as to make, if none other existed, an act of bankruptcy; in fact the filing of the petition by the debtor is itself an act of bankruptcy (vol. i., pp. 211, 237). From No. VII. (p. 238) it will be observed that three requisites exist in the case of a trader, and two in the case of a non-trader, before a debtor can be adjudicated a bankrupt at the instance of a third person, and where all these do not exist there are no means by which he can be compelled to become amenable to the bankruptcy laws. It will be understood that the mode of proceeding mentioned in No. VIII. (p. 238) for making a member of Parliament a bankrupt is cumulative; for a member of Parliament may be made a bankrupt on acts which are acts of bankruptcy when committed by persons not members of Parliament. It will be noticed that the proceedings are not initiated in the Bankruptcy Court, but in one of the superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster (see Key, Bankr., pp. 13, 14). From No. IX. (pp. 238, 239) it will be seen that the County Courts have jurisdiction in bankruptcy; original or initiatory, where a debtor not residing within the metropolitan district, and not owing more than £300, petitions against himself; transferred, where ordered

by a district Court of Bankruptcy (1 Exam. Chron., pp. 209, 210). No. X. refers to the conditions on which trust deeds, &c., under the Act of 1861, are valid, and the student should make himself familiar therewith, as the subject will doubtless form the staple of questions at more than one examination. See in addition to vol. i., p. 239, what is said in the present number under the title of "New Bankruptcy Act." It will be understood, in reference to No. XI. (p. 239), that there is nothing to prevent a landlord distraining before the committal of an act of bankruptcy, and adjudication thereon, for six years' arrear of rent (see Wise, 384; 20 Law Tim., 267); but, if he does not make the distress till after an act of bankruptcy, he is confined to one year's rent, and, of course, he cannot get that unless he distrains before removal of the goods from the premises, for the statute does not give him a year's rent, but cuts him down to that limited period if otherwise in a condition to avail himself of his distress for a longer period. The proof for a proportionate part up to adjudication is new (1 Exam. Chron. p. 217). No. XIII. (p. 240) refers to the harsh doctrine of reputed ownership, by which the property of a third person, permitted by him to be in the possession of the debtor at the time of his bankruptcy, may become distributable for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors. (As to this and the distinctions see F. Bk., p. 219; 1 Law Chron. N.S. 23; 7 Week. Rep. 53). No. XIV. (p. 240) shows that the document by which a bankrupt obtains the benefit of the Bankruptcy Acts is an order of discharge, which has been substituted for what previously was termed a certificate of conformity (as to which see Key, Bankr. pp. 128, 129).

By some mistake one of the questions in this division, with its answer, was omitted at p. 240: the reader will bear in mind that it belonged to the Michaelmas Term Questions; it is as follows:

XV. State some of the rules to be observed by the Court in granting or withholding orders of discharge under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861 ?

ANS. By s. 159 of Act of 1861, if, on the hearing of any application for an order of discharge, the assignees or any creditor allege, and if (either with or without such allegation) the Court shall be of opinion that there is ground for charging the bankrupt with acts amounting to misdemeanour (s. 221), and if on a trial before a jury or the Commissioner alone, the bankrupt be convicted, the Commissioner may, in addition to the punishment awarded, wholly refuse or suspend the order of discharge for such time and on such conditions as he shall think fit. By s. 159, if the Court be of opinion that the bankrupt has traded by means of fictitious capital; or that, when any debts were contracted, he had no reasonable grounds of expectation of being able to pay them; or that (if a trader) he has, with intent to conceal, omitted to keep proper books of account; or ·

that (whether trader or not) his insolvency is attributable to rash and hazardous speculation, or unjustifiable extravagance in living; or that he has put any of his creditors to unnecessary expense by frivolous or vexatious defence to any action, &c.; the Court may either refuse an order of discharge or suspend it for such time as it thinks fit, or may grant it subject to any condition touching any subsequent salary, earnings, income, &c., or after-acquired property, or may imprison for not more than one year.

The Criminal Law questions (ante, pp. 1-3) were not of a very difficult character, as they did not descend into the minutiae of offences so much as on some former occasions. As to No. I (p. 1) it is to be understood that the Court of Queen's Bench is not the highest court of criminal jurisdiction, as the Court of Parliament, that is, the House of Lords, is above the Queen's Bench. See this explained in Key, Crim. Law, p. 2. As to No. II. (p. 1) the reader is referred to the account of ex officio criminal informations given ante, p 42, Ans. No. XIII. As to No. VIII., X., and X. see Law Dict. pp. 5, 6; First Book, 294; Key, Crim. Law. pp. 76, 77. As questions on accessories are very common the student would do well to attend to the distinctions. It is to be understood that the 11 & 12 Vic. c. 46, mentioned ante, p. 2, has been repealed and re-enacted as stated ante, p. 40, Ans. No. III. No. XI. as to burglary is more fully explained at p. 42, Ans. No. XV. The reader will bear in mind that the Consolidation Criminal Act referred to at p. 42, has repealed the prior acts relating to burglary. We omitted to state the reason, in answer to No. XII. (p. 3), why a person cannot be convicted of perjury on the evidence of one witness it is because, in the case of one witness only, it would be oath against oath, the offence having been the oath of the accused (4 Steph. Com. 484, 4th ed.; Key, Crim. L., p. 52.)

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EXAMINATION EXPERIENCES.

HAVING been a subscriber to your various publications for five years, in fact all through my clerkship, and noticing that you have been asking for the "Experiences" of candidates at the examinations, and having passed in last Hilary Term, I have much pleasure in furnishing you with the following statement for the benefit of those who may yet have to undergo a similar ordeal.

I was articled, when a few months over sixteen, to a solicitor who had scarcely any business, though he and his predecessors had formerly been more successful: his practice, like that of many other old established offices, having taken wings to itself, or, rather, having

been taken away by more active and attentive practitioners, who, coming fresh into the town, laid themselves out for business. Finding this to be the case, I determined to supply the deficiency in the best way I could, and, having been informed of your then publications, I became a subscriber, and carefully perused them, and followed out, as nearly as I could, the recommendations contained therein. There was a small library in the office, and I read such of the works as appeared to be likely to be useful to me. In default of real work, I obtained permission to examine the old papers in the office and read them through, and even copied such of them as I thought might be useful to me in practice. I thus filled a large book with forms of deeds and wills, some of them settled by counsel; and if they should never be of any use to me in practice, I feel that they have answered my purpose; for, in the first place, the copying kept me employed, and, in the next place, has given me some facility in the framing of similar documents. I took care, as I had plenty of time, to read as much as I could upon the law applicable to the forms I was copying, and thus I felt a degree of interest which otherwise I should not have experienced, as well as made considerable progress in the acquisition of professional knowledge. So soon as I felt myself capable of doing so with effect, I became a correspondent on moot points, and kept up an active correspondence with three or four others of your correspondents, and I feel that this was of essential service to me, being, in truth, quite a godsend in my lonely condition, for there was only a copying clerk in the office besides myself, and he could not discuss any points of law, though, I must admit, that I learnt from him many small details which will, I believe, be of assistance to me in business, should I ever be fortunate enough to obtain any. I only trust my correspondents obtained the same measure of benefit which I feel I did; but I should mention that I took pains both in getting up points and endeavouring to solve those sent to me. Had I been in an office of more business, I should not have been able to devote the time I did to this portion of my professional education. Having read your LAW CHRONICLE, and the various works contained therein, and also "Littleton's Tenures," the "First Book," "Principles of the Common Law" and "Practice of the Common Law," I took up Mr. Williams' two works on "Real and Personal Property," and afterwards tried " Burton's Compendium," but, finding it too difficult for me, I, by your advice, read "Hayes's Introduction to Conveyancing," and found it very useful. For common law, I relied on your two works, but having "Selwyn's Nisi Prius" in the office, I read it through, and think it was useful to me. For Equity, I read the second volume of Spence's work, though I found this very difficult, and I fear I did not thoroughly master it. For Equity Practice, I read carefully "Hunter's Elemen