taken. A summons under Sir George Turner's Act may now be taken out at any time after probate, or administration granted; this is by 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38.

10. An alien can enforce a trust in equity, as to personal estate. He can also enforce payment of the proceeds of any real estate, or chattels real, devised to trustees in trust for sale, and the produce to him (I fancied I had read a reported case bearing out the answer as to real estate.)

11. By 22 & 23 Vic. c. 35, trustees are empowered to invest on mortgage of real estate in the United Kingdom, or in Stock of the Bank of England, or Ireland, or East India Stock. By 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38, this provision is made retrospective. There is an ambiguity whether money could be invested on mortgage of lands in Scotland, as there is a clause in the Act that it shall not apply to Scotland. By 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38, and orders made in pursuance thereof, trustees, executors, or administrators, may invest on mortgage of freehold or copyhold estates in England or Wales, or on Bank Stock, East India Stock, 24 per Cent. Annuities, 3 per Cent. Annuities, New 3 per Cent. Annuities, Reduced 3 per Cent. Annuities, and Exchequer Bills. 23 & 24 Vic. c. 145, also gives trustees power to invest, but seems confined to settlements, wills, &c., executed after the operation of the Act.

N.B.-This is copied verbatim from my rough note; but I am not sure that I put all in my answer, as I remember writing part of the rough and leaving it for a time, and then adding some more presently, and that my mind was somewhat muddled as to which statute gave which power. I read supplement to Morgan's work, and also Hunter's Treatise, and the treatises in the Law Times on the Acts.

12. Courts of Equity now (as formerly) relieve on forfeiture for non-payment of rent upon payment of all arrears and costs. Proceedings should be taken within six months after the ejectment judgment. Courts of Equity by 22 & 23 Vic. c. 35 (and by 23 & 24 Vic. c. 126, Courts of Law also) are empowered to relieve against forfeiture for breach of covenant in not insuring, provided that, at time of application made, there is an insurance actually on foot, conformable to the covenant; but no one person will be relieved more than once on breach of the same covenant, and to that end a memorandum of the relief afforded is to be endorsed on the lease. The breach must have arisen from accident or mistake, and inadvertently, and not from wilful negligence. Bona fide purchasers for value, without notice (which, however, it is presumed, may be constructive as well as actual), are protected by the Act. After relief given, the lease is to be as valid as if no forfeiture incurred. The applicant must pay all costs, as well of any proceedings in ejectment as of the application.

13. The separate property of a married woman is not liable for payment of her debts generally, but is liable for those which she actually, or by necessary implication, charges thereon; as where, it is said, she gives a bond, or even a promissory note, which would otherwise have no operation.

14. The trustee will not be liable to repay the money if, at the time of payment, he had no notice (constructive, or actual, it would seem) that the donor of the power was dead, or had revoked it. This is under the provisions of, I believe, 22 & 23 Vic. c. 35; and, if not, of 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38, or c. 145. Formerly the trustee so paying would have been liable, though without notice.

15. Where the assets are legal, specialty creditors are entitled to priority; but where equitable, as where testator directs his debts to be paid out of his real estate, the simple contract creditors take pari passu with the specialty creditors. Mr. Williams, in his Treatise on Real Property, remarks, on this anomaly, that debtors can thus, by simply charging their real estates with the payment of their debts, put their specialty and simple contract creditors on a level.

N.B.-I am not sure as to the exact wording of this last clause as to Mr. Williams' book, the matter being so familiar to me that I did not enter it in my draft; but I believe I have given the

substance.

BANKRUPTCY.

[Vol. I., pp. 236-240.]

I DID not make any draft of the answers I furnished in bankruptcy, and as I have no copy of the questions, I can only speak from memory as to them, as well as the answers. I think I am right in stating that I answered eight or nine more or less correctly, and the others either very nearly or altogether wrongly. I will give just an outline, which I could fill up somewhat if supplied with the questions.

The question as to what traders subject to bankrupt lawsanswered fully. Acts of bankruptcy-answered pretty fully. Acts that render certificate void-ditto. Voluntary arrangements-pretty fully, but the proportion of assenting creditors (3-5ths and 6-7ths) not correctly stated, I believe. Act of bankruptcy of one partner, if the other could be made bankrupt thereon-Answer: Yes, if committed in relation to a co-partnership debt. The correct is, I believe, in the negative. Trader an M.P-answered correctly as to the time allowed and what M.P. must do ; but this stated as after being served with a summons from the Bankruptcy Court (instead of a writ of one of the Superior Courts).

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

(HILARY TERM, 1862.)

COMMON LAW.

I. A., having no personal interest in goods, is sued for them by both C. and D.; are there any, and what, means by which he can obtain protection?

ANS.-A should interplead; that is, should make an application to a Judge at Chantbers, by summons (or to the Court in which the action against the applicant is pending) after declaration, but before plea. The affidavit in support must show this, and that the defendant does not claim any interest in the subject-inatter of the suit; but that the right thereto is claimed or supposed to belong to some third party who has sued, or is expected to sue for the same, and that the applicant does not collude with such third party, and is ready to bring the subject-matter of the action into Court. (See F. Bk. 277; Will. Pl. 30; 3 Steph. Com. 664, 4th ed.; 1 Exam. Chron. 125, 126, 163.) Formerly the rights of the claimants must have been derived from a common source; but by 23 & 24 Vict. c. 126, s. 12, this is no longer requisite (See 2 Law Chron., N. S., 180, 181; 1 Exam. Chron. 126, where the Interpleader Act is set out).

II. Can the party entitled to a bond or bill of exchange which he has lost sue upon it, and how ought he to proceed? ANS.-Formerly no action would lie on a lost negotiable bill : the only remedy was in equity (1 Law Chron. 14; 23 Law Journ. Ex. 150), but now an action may be sustained at law, as by the 17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, s. 87, in an action founded upon a bill of exchange, or other negotiable instrument, the Court, or a Judge, may order that the loss of such instrument shall not be set up, provided an indemnity is given, to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge, or a Master, against the claims of any other person upon such negotiable instrument. (1 Law Chron. 162; 2 Td. 199; F. Bk. 212; see the distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable bills and notes, and as to destroyed bills and notes, noticed in Com. Law. Princ. 127, 128; also Exam. Quest. 100, 101.) The bond not being a negotiable instrument, an action might always have been brought on it, though it were lost. This follows from the distinction above alluded to as being explained in Com. Law Princ. 127, 128.

III. A. occupies apartments in the house of B., who being in arrears for rent, C., the superior landlord, distrains. Are the goods of A. liable to be distrained, and if so, has he any, and what, remedy against B.?

ANS.-The goods of A. may be distrained, and A.'s remely against B. will be by action on the case (3 Steph. Com. p. 343, 4th ed).

IV. For what debts is an infant liable?

ANS. An infant is liable for necessaries, such as food, dress, medicines, instruction, &c., actually supplied or afforded to him without fraudulent intention on the part of the supplier. In determining what shall be necessaries, regard is to be had in each particular case to the infant's degree or station in life. An infant is also, it is said, liable for such necessaries as are supplied to his wife and family; but not for goods supplied to himself, while living unmarried under the roof of his parent, by whom his wants were sufficiently provided for, and who gave no consent to the purchase. (Steph. Com. 61, 310, 4th ed.; F. Bk. p. 33.) As to an infant stating an account, or giving a bill of exchange, or promissory note, see Com. Law Princ. pp. 24, 93.

V. What goods are privileged from being distrained for rent? ANS.--Some goods are absolutely privileged, others sub modo only. Of the first sort are, 1. Animals feræ naturæ. 2. Whatever is in personal use or occupation at the time; this is to prevent a breach of the peace, as an axe with which a man is cutting wood, or a horse while a man is riding him ; but horses drawing a cart may (cart and all) be distrained. The exemption is by some writers placed among those of the second class. 3. Things delivered to a person exercising a public trade, to be carried, wrought, or managed in the way of his trade. 4. Things in the custody of the law, such as property already taken, damage feasant, or in execution. 5. Generally money, except it be in a sealed bag. 6. Everything which cannot be returned in as good a condition as when distrained, as milk, fruit, &c. 7. Things fixed to the freehold, as windows, doors, chimney-pieces, &c. (3 Steph. Com. 341, 345, 4th ed.; F. Bk. 235; Selw. N. P. 670, 673, 11th ed.) The following are privileged sub modo, that is if there be sufficient distress without them-beasts of the plough, and sheep, and instruments of husbandry, and the instruments of a man's trade or profession. (9 Jur. Dig. 69 k.) It may be observed that the distinction between an absolute liability and one sub modo is not always adhered to by text-writers (See Selw. N. P. suprà).

VI. What is the effect of a tender before action?

ANS.-The effect is, that if the plaintiff brings an action for a liquidated demand after a tender has been properly made, or the amount due, and the tender is pleaded by the defendant, and the amount paid into Court, if the plaintiff recovers no more than the amount of the tender, the defendant will be entitled to his costs of the action. (See Com. Law Pract. 133, 135.) On account of the nicety required to make a good legal tender, it is not often relied on, but the money is paid into Court on a plea of payment.

VII. State the general rule which governs the right of a defendant to a set-off in an action of debt.

ANS.-A set-off is a statutory right. (See Com. Law. Pract. 132, 133.) The debts must be mutual; the subject of set-off must be a legal and not a mere equitable debt; nor a claim sounding in damages, i. e., it must not be an unliquidated demand; the debt must be subsisting, therefore a debt barred by the Statute of Limitation cannot be set off; the debt must be actually due and payable at the commencement of the action, and such that it would have entitled the defendant to bring a cross action against the plaintiff (See more fully 1 Exam. Chron., 122, 161).

VIII. The Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 speaks of a garnishee; to whom is this term applied?

ANS.-The term garnishee is applied to any debtor of a judgment debtor, against whom an order is obtained under the 17 & 18 Vic. c. 125, s. 61, by which a Judge, upon the ex parte application of a judgment creditor, and upon affidavit that any other person is indebted to the judgment debtor, and is within the jurisdiction, may order that all debts owing or accruing from such third person (thereafter called the garnishee) to the judgment debtor, shall be attached to answer the judgment debt (See Law Dict. pp. 33, 34; Com. Law Pract. 254, 256, where the proceedings are fully explained).

IX. A garnishee disputing his liability, by what means is it to be established?

ANS.-By C. L. P. Act, 1854, where a garnishee disputes his liability, the Judge, instead of making an order that execution shall issue, may order that the judgment creditor shall be at liberty to proceed against the garnishee by writ, calling upon him to show cause why there should not be execution against him for the alleged debt, or for the amount due to the judgment debtor, if less than the judgment debt, and for costs of suit. The proceedings upon such suit are the same as upon a writ of revivor under the C. L. P. Act, 1852 (See Law Dict. 33, 34; Com. Law Pract. 254, 256). It may be added that by 23 & 24 Vic. c. 126, s. 29, whenever, in the proceedings, it is suggested by the garnishee that the debt sought to be attached belongs to some third person who has a lien or charge upon it, the Judge may order such third person to appear before him and state the nature and particulars of his claim upon such debt, and may make such order thereon as he may think fit. Those of our readers who have the works may add this to Law Dict. pp. 33, 34; Com. L. Pract. 254, 256.

X. It is necessary on a trial to put in evidence a deed dated more than 30 years ago. How is this to be done?

ANS.-A deed 30 years old, appearing in all respects to be regu