operation of the statute of limitations as to debts, &c., are curtailed; thus absence beyond seas or imprisonment of a creditor does not now entitle him to additional time for suing, nor will the fact of one or more joint debtors being beyond seas entitle the creditor to additional time as against the others (3 Law Chron. 89, 91; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 96).

Conveyancing.-The questions and answers will be found ante, pp. 142-147. No I. (p. 142) relates to the mode of making valid gifts to charitable uses-such gifts not being, indeed, against the policy of the law, but put under certain regulations for the protection of parties willing to dedicate their property to such uses. The statute commonly, but erroneously, called the Mortmain Act, the 9 Geo. II. c. 36, in effect requires that the gift to charity be by deed enrolled within six calendar months. Some provisions have been made besides those noticed 1 Exam. Chron. pp. 165, 166, by an Act of the last session. No. II. (p. 142) requires that it should be known that by a contract for sale of lands held in fee simple, such lands become personal estate in the hands of the vendor, and the purchase-money is converted into real estate; so that on the death of either vendor or purchaser, the land, or the price, as the case may be, passes to that kind of representative who would have taken the money or the land if the purchase had been completed in the party's lifetime (see 1 Exam. Chron. 105, 143, 187; also Law Dict. pp. 161-163, where the subject of equitable conversion is fully noticed; also 1 Law Chron. 247, 248). As Lord St. Leonards (1 Vend. & Purch. 171, 9th ed.) says: "Equity looks upon things agreed to be done as actually performed; consequently when a contract is made for sale of an estate, equity considers the vendor as a trustee for the purchaser of the estate sold, and the purchaser as a trustee of the purchase-money for the vendor. If the vendor die before payment of the purchase-money, it will go to his executors, and form part of his assets. The purchaser may devise the estate before the conveyance, and that although the estate is contracted for at a future day; and the devisee will be entitled to have the estate paid for out of the personal estate of the purchaser. The rule that an estate may be devised before it is conveyed or surrendered to the purchaser, has now become a land-mark, and could not be shaken without endangering the titles to half of the estates in the kingdom." As to No. III. (p. 142), it may be observed that conditions are, with respect to the effect of the vesting of gifts of estates, said to be either precedent or subsequent (see Law Dict. p. 151), and with respect to matters of contract they are said to be precedent, or concurrent, or independent, as explained in Law Dict. pp. 151, 152; Com. Law Princ. 259, et seq. Also, as to estates, there are said to be conditions implied and conditions expressed, as explained Law

Dict., 150, 151. In the late case of Wright v. Wilkin (10 W. R. 403), where the question was, whether the devise to the defendant of an estate, upon the "express condition" of paying the legacies within twelve months, enured to create an estate upon condition at common law, or simply burthened the defendant with the performance of certain trusts, it was stated and admitted by the plaintiff's counsel that formerly, and in the time of Lord Coke, the Courts of law construed conditions literally to enforce them, but that now, inasmuch as the Court of Chancery will enforce trusts, the same devise which would have been construed as creating an estate on condition, is to be treated as an estate with a trust attached; but it was said that this was not universally so, and was not so in the case in question, where, it was contended, the words were explicit to negative a trust, and to create an estate on condition at common law, the devise being of lands to the defendant upon the express condition that he should pay certain legacies within twelve months from the death of the testatrix. The defendant's counsel contended that, though formerly the Courts of law might have construed a devise strictly as an estate on condition, yet since the time of Charles II. Courts of equity have always relieved against forfeiture, on fulfilment by the devisee of the condition named. Thus the practice of equity being always to relieve, it followed that the Court of Chancery decided in favour of creating a trust, instead of a condition, as practically amounting to the same thing, citing 1 Sugd. Pow. 122, 7th ed. The Court considered that there were no means of arriving at the conclusion that it was the intention of the testatrix that the condition should operate as a forfeiture of the estate, and that the current of the cases was in favour of a contrary construction. Mr. Justice Williams said that Lord St. Leonards could hardly mean that a trust would be implied in all cases, whatever language might be used, and against the express intention of the testator. He, however, concurred that, looking at the will altogether, it was the better construction to hold the devisor as imposing a trust, and not a condition. No. IV. (p. 143) depends upon the different views which Courts of law and of equity take of mortgaged estates, for, after the day for payment is passed at law, the heir of a mortgagee, dying intestate, is looked upon as the party beneficially entitled to the estate, whereas in equity he is but a trustee of the legal estate for the personal representatives of the mortgagees, who on their part are bound to procure a reconveyance of the legal estate, on being paid the principal,interest, and costs. At law the mortgage is not regarded as a security, whilst that is its character in equity. However, it will be borne in mind that Courts of common law have statutory jurisdiction to compel a reconveyance of the mortgaged lands where an action of ejectment

has been brought by a mortgagee (C. L. F. Act, 1852, ss. 219, 220; 3 Law Chron. 307; Lawrence v. Hobgen, 26 Law Journ., Ex., 55). This may so far be considered as an exception to the doctrine that at law a mortgage is not looked on as a security, but then it is the creation of the statute law, and does not affect the statement, so far as the common law-strictly so called-is concerned, that is, the lex non scripta. As to No. VI. (p. 144), another mode in which the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property might have been extinguished would be, in case there was a power inserted in the mortgage, if prior to the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145 (1 Exam. Chron. 70-79), or if since that Act, not excluding its provisions, though there was no power of sale inserted in the deed (see sec. 11, stated 1 Exam. Chron. 75), by exercising the power of sale, and so disposing of the property to a purchaser, who would hold the same discharged from all equity or right of redemption, and though there was no express mention, as there usually is, in the power that the sale should be discharged or free from the equity or right of redemption. From the frequency of the use of the words "discharged from all equity of redemption," in the power of sale, it has been sometimes supposed that without the insertion of such words the purchaser would be subject to be redeemed, but this is not so; it is, however, an instance of the difficulty often occurring of ascertaining what is substance and what is mere verbiage in deeds. As to No. VII. (p. 144), it is not to be inferred that a protector to a settlement under the Fines and Recovery Act must have an estate for life absolutely; the protectorship is by the Act committed (subject to certain exceptions and provisions) to the person who is the owner, or who, but for an alienation, though absolute, and whether voluntary or involuntary, would have been the owner of the prior beneficial estate, or of the first of several prior beneficial estates, subsisting and created by the same settlement which created the entail, being an estate for years determinable on a life or lives, or any greater estate other than an estate for years-admitting, therefore, an estate for years determinable (i.e., by death), however short the term, but excluding an estate for years absolute, however long the term. It must be borne in mind that the protector of the settlement may have a larger estate than one for life, for the estate requisite to constitute such a protector may be an estate of inheritance in tail or in fee. Thus, where land is limited to A. in tail, remainder to B. in tail, remainder over, A. is the protector (re Blewett, 3 Myl. & K. 250). With respect to No. VIII. (p. 144), we presume most of our readers are aware of the doctrine established soon after the passing of the Statute of Uses, that the first use only is executed by the statute, and, consequently, that a superadded use is unexecuted, and is not recognised at law, but is in equity, being termed and treated as a

trust in favour of the person in whose favour such second use is limited (F. Bk. 177; 2 Law Chron. 195, 228; 3 Id. 167). Upon this subject the chief difficulty is to know which is the first and which the second use, and this depends upon the different effects of the conveyance used. Thus, some conveyances merely limit a use: such are bargains and sales and covenants to stand seised: the first limitation is a use and the statute executes it; any further limitation to another person is an unexecuted use, i.e., a trust; the other and more ordinary conveyances transmute the possession, that is, pass the seisin, and not a mere use, to the person named as grantee, &c., and upon such seisin a use may be limited which will become executed by the statute (see 1 Exam. Chron. p. 183). It is fortunate that these doctrines, which are so little understood, are not of much practical importance, for now as the immediate freehold of land lies as well in grant as in livery (F. Bk. 171, 179) a deed purporting to be a bargain and sale may operate as a grant, and so pass a seisin to feed a superadded use, and this might be the case with a covenant to stand seised, provided a pecuniary consideration appeared; but if no such consideration appeared the deed could have no other operation than what it purported to be (see F. Bk. 178, 179; 3 Law Chron. 166, 167; 20 Law Journ., C. P, 223; Law Dict. 48, 49). As to No. IX. (p. 145), we assume it is understood that where property or a life interest therein is limited to a feme sole, "for her separate use, without power to dispose of or anticipate same," she may, notwithstanding, make any disposition, either absolute or limited, thereof, because in the case of an unmarried woman neither law nor equity will recognise any such clog on the power of disposition, which, indeed, as a woman must be either sole or married, would amount to what the law is said to abhor, an absolute restraint of alienation or a perpetuity. We assume it is also understood that the restraint during coverture is only in equity, and is not recognised at law, and that equity brings the restraint into operation on every occasion of a marriage, and permits its cessation whenever the woman becomes discovert. As during discoverture the restraint ceases to operate, it is competent to the woman on her marrying or remarrying to settle the property free from or subject to the restraint, her settlement operating as an alienation by her during discoverture, so that it is thus competent for her to continue in the enjoyment of the property free from the restraint during her coverture, a matter which is not generally understood by unpractical persons. It may be thought by some that the answer given at p. 145 is not correct, inasmuch as Mr. Malins' Act would enable the married woman to dispose of her life interest (see ante, pp. 117, 118), but it will be seen, on reference to the Act, that it cannot apply to the question put by the examiners, as the life interest is stated to be limited to her separate use "without power

T

of anticipation," and it is expressly enacted that the Act shall not apply where the property (personal estate) is given to her "without power of anticipation" (ante, 118, 197). No. X. (p. 145) assumes that it is well understood that it is always perilous to sell real estate without a properly framed contract; for, first, unless there be a written contract signed by "the party to be charged therewith" or his agent, it could not be enforced, unless in certain special cases, such as fraud, admission in answer, part performance, &c. (1 Exam. Chron. 234; F. Bk. 206, 207; Princ. Com. Law 157-168, where the subject is fully explained). Secondly, the purchaser might make such requisitions that either the vendor would not be able to make a good title, or, if able to do so, would be put to such an expense as might, if not equal the amount of purchase-money, at least greatly diminish it. As to No. XI. (p. 145), it may not be known to all our readers what " executory uses are, for the term is not one in general use; it is another name for springing, shifting, or future uses. A use limited in futuro, independently of any preceding estate, is called a springing use (Sugd. Gilb. Uses, 153, 161). Such a use is also sometimes described as executory, because it is not executed by the Statute of Uses until it comes into use by the arrival of the period contemplated (see 1 Steph. Com. 546, 547, 4th ed). As to No. XII. (p. 145), relating to the passing of trust estates under a general devise, and which is often given by the examiners, we may remark that the case referred to at p. 146, as being in 6 W. R. 642, is re Arrowsmith, and was the case of a mortgage, and the legal estate was held to pass as being necessary, in order to give the trustee full dominion over the mortgaged estate. In the recent case of re Finney (6 Law Tim. Rep. 745), where a testator, being seised in fee of various estates in trust and on mortgage, devised all the residue of his real and personal estate, not by his will before disposed of, unto and amongst all his nephews and nieces, who were a numerous and unascertained class, not naming them, and made no mention in his will of the estates vested in him in trust and on mortgage, it was held that the devise, being made to an unascertained class, did not pass the trust and mortgage estates. As to No. XIII. (p. 146), we suppose it is understood that the assignee of a lease is liable on the covenants for any breach during the time of his assigneeship; in other words, that by assigning over he gets rid of liability for future breaches not, let it be remembered, for any previously committed (Com. Law Princ. 283-285). Though such is in theory the liability of an assignee, yet in practice it is rarely so limited, as, except where he takes from bankruptcy assignees mortgagees under a power, or trustees, he enters into a covenant to indemnify his assignor, and according to the number of assignments the chain of