to a person whom she named, this was held not to be a valid donatio mortis causa (Powell v. Kellicar, 7 W. R. 171). No. V. (p. 122) explains the little understood doctrine of election as arising out of (chiefly) wills, which is compendiously explained in Burton's Comp. pl. 1562-1564. He treats it as an instance of a constructive trust, and says it is grounded on the reasonable principle that a person who receives benefit from an instrument shall not be allowed to defeat any of its provisions in favour of others. The principle is recognised in some instances at law; in equity a widow is often put to her election where the testamentary or post-nuptial provision is not properly a jointure under the statute (F. Bk. 129). The general doctrine is that where a testator or other donor affects to give the property of A. to B., at the same time bestowing some other benefit on A., but without any express condition, the interference of equity becoming necessary will be afforded in order to give the fullest possible effect to the donor's intention. As to No. VII. (p. 122), relating to injunctions at law and in equity, it is, we suppose, understood that, until lately, courts of law had no jurisdiction to grant such writs, and, therefore, the maxim or doctrine that where originally an equitable production properly attached on account of the defect of the legal remedy, that jurisdiction is not affected by the courts of law subsequently being enabled to exercise jurisdiction, applies to the granting of injunctions (F. Bk. 281; ante, pp. 74, 75). The above is a principle of extensive application. No. VII. (p. 123) relates to a subject of considerable importance, namely, equitable waste, which chiefly arises where a tenant for life is expressly exempted from liability for waste, usually termed "without. impeachment of waste, or, shortly, sans waste;" at law such a tenant cannot be rendered liable, but courts of equity interpose and prevent the liberty being abused to the injury of those in remainder. As to No. VIII. (p. 123), it is to be understood that no equity to a settlement attaches on a married woman's right to a reversionary interest; the interest must be immediate. It has been seen (Convey. No. IX.) that by Mr. Malins' Act, a married woman may release and extinguish her right or equity to a settlement out of any personal estate to which she or her husband in her right may be entitled in possession under any instrument made after the 31st December, 1857. It should be borne in mind that the right of a married woman to have a settlement made upon herself and her children out of her personal property which is the subject of a suit in equity is totally distinct from her right by survivorship to such of her choses in action as have not been reduced into possession during the joint lives of herself and husband. The right by survivorship is a legal right applying equally to her legal and equitable interest; but her right to a settlement depends upon the peculiar

R

rule of courts of equity, which, standing in loco parentis, with regard to a feme covert, will not suffer the husband to take the wife's portion until he has agreed to make a reasonable provision for her and her children, unless they are satisfied that it is with her free consent that it is paid over to him. It is to be remarked that although the Court will in general oblige the husband to make a settlement upon his wife and children of any property which he may be entitled to in right of his wife for the recovery of which it is necessary to resort to a Court of equity, yet where there is no suit pending the husband is authorised to lay hold of his wife's property wherever he can find it. Thus there is no doubt that previously to a bill a trustee who is in possession of the wife's property, real or personal, may pay the rents of the real estate to the husband, or may hand over to him the personal estate, and the Court will not, upon bill filed, recall it (Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. R. 419; 1 Daniell's Chanc. Pract. 101, 102, 2nd edit.) As to No. X (p. 123), we assume it is known that a cause is "heard on bill and answer," where the plaintiff is satisfied that he can obtain a decree from the admissions obtained in the defendant's answer, without the aid of any evidence. As to No. XI. (p. 123), if a plaintiff requires evidence in support of his claim, he may either serve a notice of motion for a decree (having his evidence previously prepared), in which case he must not file a replication, or he files a replication, and afterwards enters into evidence, and sets the cause down for hearing in the usual With respect to No. XIII. (p. 124), it is to be understood that the way in which a plaintiff compels a defendant to put in a sufficient answer to a bill is by excepting to the answer, that is, pointing out in what respect the plaintiff alleges the answer is defective or insufficient. This is usually termed "exception for insufficiency;" there is another kind of exception, which is for scandal, and formerly, exception might be taken for impertinence, but this practice was abolished by the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 17, but the Court may direct the costs of the impertinent matter to be paid by the party introducing it, upon application made to the Court for that purpose (Ayck. Pract. 312, 6th ed.) As to No. XIV. (p. 125), inquiring what steps may be taken by a defendant if a plaintiff, after evidence is closed, does not set the cause down for hearing within the limited time (four weeks after evidence closed where an answer has been put in; three lunar months from appearance if no answer being required none has been put in), it is to be borne in mind that the defendant has, at least in the former case, his option of moving to dismiss the plaintiff's bill, and so getting rid of the suit, or of setting the cause down for hearing, but this last proceeding is rarely had recourse to, as a defendant is generally satisfied with being rid of the suit and obtaining his costs, without running

manner.

the risk of being defeated on a hearing brought on by himself. No. XV (p. 125) is so fully explained, vol i., pp. 134, 168, 169, that we must refer the reader thereto. The subject is one little understood by those who are not conversant with equity practice. Bankruptcy.-The questions and answers will be found ante, pp. 125–131. We presume few readers would be unable to answer No. I. (p 125), as to the principal bankruptcy statutes; or No. II. (p. 125), as to the persons now subject to the bankruptcy laws, because the discussions which took place on the passing of the last Act must have called attention thereto the chief feature of the Act being the abolition of the distinction between traders and nontraders as to the jurisdiction in bankruptcy over them, though in some matters of detail distinctions do apply according as the debtor was, or was not, a trader (1 Exam. Chron. pp. 212, 237). From No. III. (p. 126) it appears that a debtor may make himself a bankrupt, that is, petition for adjudication against himself; and from No. IV. (p. 126) it appears that a creditor may also petition, provided his debt is of a certain amount, varying according as there is one petitioning creditor or two, or more than two; beyond three creditors there is no difference in the amount, and in reckoning the creditors the members of a firm (see the amounts stated in vol. i., p. 238).

Criminal Law.-The questions and answers will be found ante, pp. 132-136. No. I. (p. 132) states the periods of the year at which Quarter Sessions are held, except in the county of Middlesex (F. Bk. 374, 375) the appeal from the sessions to the Court of Criminal Appeal is confined to questions of law, and does not extend to matters of fact (F. Bk. 348; Law Dict. 92, 99). As to No. III. (p. 133), it is to be understood that by the 20 & 21 Vic. c. 43, an appeal lies against any conviction or order of justices to one of the superior Courts of common law upon the ground that it is erroneous in point of law, not of fact; and in most cases the justices have a discretion to allow or refuse an appeal (F. Bk. 332; Law Dict. pp. 96-99; 31 Law Tim. Rep. 101). It is pretty well known to all persons that burglary (No. IV. p. 133) can be committed in the night time only, and that what is night time depends upon the provisions of the statutes. As shown (ante, p. 42), one of the late Criminal Law Consolidation Acts abrogates the previous Acts, and contains the existing provisions, which, however, are not materially different from what is stated in Law Dict. pp. 76, 77, and F. Bk. 317, 318. As to that part of No. V. (p. 133) which relates to the alteration of a genuine instrument being forgery, the reader is referred to vol. i., pp. 140, 171. It will be seen by No. VI. (p. 133) that a magistrate is bound in some instances to admit a prisoner to

bail, that in other instances he has a discretion to bail or not; whilst in treason he cannot bail, and in cases of murder, it is stated by Mr. Oke, he will not (see Law Dict. 44, 45). We learn from No. VIII. p. 134) that, except in a few cases provided for by a late Act (2 Law Chron., N. S., 3), though it is usual to bring one accused of a criminal offence before a justice of the peace, this is not indispensable, but the prosecutor may, without any such preliminary proceeding, go before a grand jury. From No. XII. (p. 134) it will be seen that there is a difference where a married woman commits crimes (except certain heinous ones) in the company of her husband, and where she commits them without his presence. The mere presence of the husband without any actual coercion by him suffices to exempt the wife; but not unfrequently the authorities speak of his coercion as necessary for the exemption of his wife: the coercion is assumed from the mere presence of the husband (see 8 Week. Rep. 217; 4 Sol. Journ 433).

TRINITY TERM, 1862.

Common Law. The questions and answers will be found ante, pp. 137-157, and 164-168. As to No. I. (p. 137), we presume, from what has already been stated, it is understood that the distinction between arrest on mesne process and on final process is understood that the former is merely to obtain security for the due payment of what may eventually be recovered, whilst the latter is to obtain the fruits of a judgment consequent on proceedings. Formerly, though not originally, the mesne process, that is, the capias, was the mode of commencing the action, but now all actions, even including real actions, are commenced by writ of summons. As to No II. (p. 137), it will be seen that the proceedings, under the Absconding Debtors Act, are but initiatory, and require to be supplemented by a writ of capias. From what has been before stated (No. III., pp. 137, 138), and elsewhere, the reader is supposed to be aware that there are two distinct kinds of interpleader at common law, namely, that where a claim is made on a seizure of goods by a sheriff under an execution, and that made by two private persons to goods or money in the hands of a third person, who has no claim thereto, but is only anxious that the real owner should obtain the same (see 1 Exam. Chron. 125, 126, 163; ante, pp. 137, 138). No. IV. (p. 136) refers to statutory provisions respecting notices of intention to bring actions, being generally such as are for the recovery of damages, and they are generally intended to allow of an offer of compensation. It is to be understood that in ordinary cases no notice is requisite, nor, indeed, any application, but that it is usual for the intending plaintiff's attorney to write a letter for

compensation or for payment before issuing out a writ, but if the defendant settles without action, he cannot be compelled to pay the costs of the letter. No. V. (p. 138) relates to pleas termed, in technical language, puis darrein continuance, because formerly continuances were entered on the pleading roll; in reality they are now pleas, put in after issue joined in respect of matter which has since occurred, and, being out of the usual course, are not allowed as a matter of course, but require, unlike ordinary pleadings, an affidavit (Com. Law Pract., 166, 167). No. VI. (pp. 138, 139) relates to a new head of common law jurisdiction, namely, relief against for breaches of covenant, or condition to insure against loss or damage by fire; as to non-payment of rent, relief could even formerly have been had at law, so that the provisions of the C. L. P. Act, 1860, in relation thereto, are not quite new, but are more extensive than previously (2 Law Chron., N.S., 76, 101, 178). As to No. IX (p. 139), relating to elegit, it is presumed it is known that it is a writ, and that it has reference to choice; that under the writ two species of property may be taken, namely, goods and lands; that when lands are taken or extended, as the usual expression is, there is no other writ or remedy: the party has made his choice.

EXAMINATION EXPERIENCES.

WE have been very kindly favoured with the following communiTM cations, and which we feel great pleasure in inserting in this place, and trust before long others may be induced to follow the example, extending likewise to the "Intermediate Examinations," about which no little anxiety is expressed by very many subscribers :

To show what amount of knowledge I had at the Trinity Term examination, 1862, I had read Williams's Real Property twice, 4th and 6th ed.; Williams's Personal Property twice, 4th ed.; Smith on Contracts twice, 3rd ed.; Smith's Manual of Equity twice, 6th ed.; Hunter's Law of Property and Relief of Trustees Acts, and portions of the following: Broom's Com. on the Common Law, 2nd ed.; Hunter's Suit in Equity, 2nd ed.; Day's C. L. P. and other Acts, &c., Consolidated Orders in Chancery, besides having frequently referred to and carefully read what I considered advisable in Smith's Law Cases, 4th ed.; Selwyn's N. P. 12th ed.; Coke upon Littleton and Burton's Compendium, 8th ed.; and I had read some parts of the Outlines of Practical Law, and the Principles and Practice of the Common Law. It was three out of the five years before I got fairly on my legal legs. The first book I read was Williams on Real Property.