it deserves to be, and we would therefore recommend a perusal of our Com. L. Pract. 149-151, treating of "Order for Writ of Trial." No. IX. (p. 112) requires that the distinction between a writ of inquiry and a writ of trial should be known : shortly, one distinction is that a writ of inquiry issues only where the defendant suffers judgment, whereas a writ of trial issues where in an action for a debt or demand not exceeding £20 and indorsed on the writ, the defendant pleads, and an issue is raised between the parties. In fact, the inquiry is, after an admission of some right in the plaintiff to recover, whilst a writ of trial is where the plaintiff's right is, or may be, totally contested. It must be remembered that the Com. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 94, has rendered a writ of inquiry unnecessary in many cases in which previously it must have been had recourse to the masters of the Court are substituted (see Com. L. Pract. 140, 141). As to No. XI. it is presumed the student is aware that, by the common law, distresses were but as pledges or securities, and could not be sold, and so the law still remains, except where altered by statutes which, however, have extended the power of sale to most cases of distresses, the most important instance which the statutes do not embrace being distress for damage feasant. This is an illustration of the principle laid down and enforced in "Directions for the Study of the Law" (p. 117, et seq.), that the old common law remains in force except so far as it is altered by statute, and it is therefore very necessary to bear in mind the exact extent of the statutory alteration. The difference between distresses for rent and those for damage feasant as to the time of the natural day at which such distresses may be made, arises from necessity in the case of damage feasant, which lets in the maxims or rules of the common law as to "necessity," which are expressed in various forms, as may be seen in our Law Maxims, pp. 84, 85, 87, 108, 109, 128. With regard to that part of the answer which states that a distress for rent must formerly have been made during the continuance of the lease, but now, if the tenant hold over, it may be made within six months after the determination of the lease, provided the landlord's title or interest, as well as the tenant's possession, continue at the time of the distress. Most of our readers are no doubt aware that a promise to pay the debt of another person, referred to in No. XII. (p. 114), is ordinarily spoken of as a guarantee. This is a case in which a statute has modified the common law, but only partially, and then has been modified itself, so as to further affect the common law by another statute. For, first, the 29 Chas. 2, c. 3, s. 4, required the guarantee to be in writing, but it did not say that if in writing it should be effectual, so that the common law principle applicable to an oral guarantee, viz., that there must be a consideration for it, still applied: this is now, however, no longer

requisite by the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 3 (3 L. C. 88, 90; Com. Law Princ. 153. This is a further illustration of the principle above alluded to, to the effect that the old common law remains in force except so far as altered by statute. With reference to No. XIII. (p. 114), it may be observed that the liability of a master for the negligence or wrongful act of his servant arises out of the maxim "qui facit per alium facit per se" (Law Max. 126), and such liability, arising out of an implied agency, is bounded by a reasonable limitation, and does not, therefore, extend to the malicious, wilful, or criminal acts of the servant ; though, if there be an express direction to do, or an after assent to, such acts, the master will be liable, for then there is an express sanction of the act of the servant. As to the after assent, the maxim is “ omnis ratihabitio retro trahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur:" this is fully explained Com. L. Princ. 46, 471, 287; Law Max. pp. 113, 114. No. XV. (p. 115) requires that it should be known that at common law the Courts of Appeal from the Superior Courts are the Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords, and that no case can be taken up to the Lords unless it has gone through the Exchequer Chamber; though in equity, by enrolling the decree of the Master of the Rolls or a vice-chancellor, an appeal lies directly to the Lords (F. Bk. 290, 291, 361). It is somewhat unusual to speak of the proceedings at law as being "appeals" (except in the cases of motions for new trial being refused, discharged, or made absolute; as to which see F. Bk. 274, 275; Com. L. Pract. 208, 210); the proper term is "error," and the writ ef error (except in certain rare cases) being abolished, the usual designation is "proceedings in error" (see Com. L. Pract. 222, 231).

Conveyancing. The questions and answers will be found ante, pp. 115-120, No. I. (p. 115). As to the meaning of the expression "chattel interest on land" is not so easily explained when reference is had to its full legal extent. Mr. Burton (pl. 18) says:-" An estate which is limited to a certain number of years, or other determinate time, is a chattel." At pl. 728 he remarks that there are" some uncertain periods, relating always to the raising of money out of lands or tenements, which, for the sake of convenience, are allowed to constitute chattel interests;" and at pl. 866, 867, he tells us that these instances are where lands are devised to executors for payment of debts, and until they are paid; grant of a rent out of land with power of entry and of taking the profits until arrears satisfied followed by entry thereunder; and an elegit creditor. It will be seen by No. II. (p. 115) that for its proper answer a knowJedge is required of two statutes, but that, simply, it may be answered that leases for more than three years from the making

thereof must be under seal; an exception is noticed at p. 115. We suppose it is understood that the three years are to be reckoned from the making of the lease, and not from the commencement of the term an important distinction to be borne in mind in applying the statutes (see Com. L. Princ. 157–159 ; F. Bk. 171, 172). No. III. (p. 116) assumes it is known that there is a difference between women married prior to 1st January, 1834, as to their being entitled to dower and being deprived thereof, as will appear on perusing the answer ante, p. 116 (see also F. Bk. 127, 128). The husband's ability to deal with his real estate, without the concurrence of his wife, saves some expense on a sale, and, seeing that the husband can thus alone deal with the land, there does not seem to be any justice in inserting, as is now too usual, in conveyances, a declaration against dower, as in such cases the wife is deprived of dower, though her husband should die in her lifetime, and even though intestate, in which case, but for the declaration, the real estate of her husband would have afforded her some means of support. The attachment of the husband's debts, charges, contracts, incumbrances, &c., to the detriment of the dower, constitutes a great difference between the new and the old wife. As to No. IV. (p. 116) the reader should make himself familiar with the various devices formerly had recourse in order to prevent dower attaching to lands, for which purpose he may refer to Hayes's Convey. p. 261, 274, 640, 4th ed., and Merrifield's edition of Watkins' Convey. pp. 53, 54. We presume it is understood that all the devices proceeded upon one or both of the following doctrines, namely, that to entitle the wife to dower there must be a sole seisin (though this did not prevent dower on a seisin as tenant in common: the deprivation went on the distinction that in cases of joint tenants the survivorship overrode everything, not amounting to a partial alienation of the share, Burt. Comp. pl. 353; 2 Bac. Abr. p. 721, 7th ed.), and that dower does not attach upon a remainder or reversion expectant upon a particular estate of freehold (Co. Litt. 29a., 32a.; Hay. Conv. 260, 261, 4th ed.). And this is the same though the husband have a particular estate of freehold, and the remainder in fee, if between them is interposed a vested freehold estate in another person. Thus Burton says, "If A. be tenant for life with a vested remainder to B. for his life, with remainder to A. in fee and A. die before B., the wife of A. will not have dower, because A. was never seised of the freehold and inheritance as one estate." The diligent student will probably be anxious to understand how this can be consistent with the doctrine of the rule in Shelley's case, and which, therefore, we recommend should be here considered (F. Bk. 150; Burt. Comp. pl. 339, 800; ante, p. 117; 3 Law Chron. 10). The point is not one of any great difficulty, but we have

mentioned it here as an example of the general mode in which articled clerks should read and pursue their studies, that is, they should always be on the look out to ascertain how far anything they read squares with or contradicts what they have before read. This is the real means of making progress in study. We are not sure that it will be understood why it is said ante, p. 116, that the ordinary words in the limitation to bar dower, "by any means in his lifetime," are better omitted. We therefore refer the reader to 9 Jarman's Convey. by Sweet, pp. 74, 75. With respect to No. VIII. (p. 117) it is presumed the reader is aware that it is a settled doctrine that the Statute of Uses does not execute a use mounted on a use in other words it executes the first use only, and thus the second use remains a trust to be performed by the person having the executed use (F. Bk. 177). The reader is no doubt aware that there is a difference as to the limitations which will retain and execute a use, according as the deed is one operating by transmutation of possession, or by limitation of use (4 Law Chron. 81). The case put by the examiners is the now ordinary mode of conveying property, namely, a grant which operates by transmutation of possession, or, which is the same thing, by passing the seisin (see F. Bk. 165, 166, 169-171, 175-180). No. IX. (p. 117) requires a knowledge of the Act commonly called, from its originator, Mr. Malins' Act, by which some relaxation is made in the rule that a married woman could not dispose of her choses in action not reduced into possession, and not settled to her separate use by any deed or other instrument. It will be seen (p. 117) that the examiners inquire concerning the married woman's reversionary interest, which might induce the supposition that the same principle was not applicable to interests immediately reducible into possession; but in reality there was no difference in point of principle: it was not the capability of being reduced into possession, but the actual reduction that was to be regarded (Elvin v. Williams, 13 Sim. 309). The student would do well to make himself master of Mr. Malins' Act, which is a short one. It is fully stated in 4 Law Chron. 156, 157. It enables a married woman by an acknowledged deed in which her husband joins to release her reversionary interest in personal estate, and to extinguish her right or equity to a settlement out of her personal estate in possession, where she did not become entitled thereto by her marriage settlement, or is not restrained from aliention (ante, p. 118). to No. X. (p. 118), it is settled that if rent be reserved generally (at p. 118 "yearly" is a misprint for "generally"), without Saying to whom, the law will make the distribution. And in Whitelock's 's case (8 Co. R. 71) it was agreed that in leases under powers this is the safer way; although in practice it is most usual in such

As

leases to reserve the rent to the tenant for life, "and after his decease to the person or persons who shall for the time being be entitled to the reversion inheritance" under the instrument creating the power (18 Jur. 448). The above rule is founded on the principle that the rent issues out of or attaches itself to the actual estate in the land ; in other words, is incident to the reversion (8 Week. Rep. 184). In reference to No XI. (p. 118) readers would do well to read a few good forms of strict settlements; he will find some variances in the limitations, but in the main there is an agreement (see 2 Atk. Com. 327, 328, 1st ed.; 2 Crabb's Preced. 1359, last ed.; Burton's Comp. pl. 776-786; Merrifield's Watkins' Convey. pp. 81-83). As to No. XII. (p. 119), relating to bills of sale, see ante, p. 191.

Equity. The questions and answers will be found ante, pp. 102125. As to No. I. (p. 120) it may be observed that there are many cases of accident in which due relief can be obtained at law, and there equity will not interpose, and, further, there are many cases in which no remedy can be had either at law or in equity. Where a court of law cannot, or, in similar cases, originally could not (see post No. VI.) or did not give adequate relief and take due care of the rights of all interested persons, and the party prejudically affected is free from blame in respect of the accident, and has a conscientious title to relief, it will be granted in Chancery, if it can be done without derogating from any positive agreement, or violating any equal or superior equity in another person (see Smith's Man. Eq. tit. "Accident"). No. II. (p. 120) shows the difference arising out of a purchase by one in the name of a stranger on the one hand, and of a child, &c., on the other; in the former instance there is a constructive trust, in the latter instance it is treated as a case of advancement, and forms an important portion of equitable doctrine. Mr. Dart (Vendors, p. 600, et seq. 3rd edit.) has a good summary of the law, but it is almost too concise for a student. And see 1 Sand. Uses, 322-325; 2 Fonbl. Equity, 116, et seq. Mr. Buxton (pl. 1523) very conspicuously notices the subject thus :-"Another case [of a constructive or implied trust] is where land is purchased in the name of one person, but with the money of another. If the fact appear upon the face of the conveyance, it will in general be sufficient without any further declaration to create a trust for the true purchaser, unless, indeed, the nominal purchaser be his child, or orphan grandchild, and otherwise unprovided for, or his life." From No. IV. (p. 121) it will be seen that a donatio mortis causa is confined to personal property, must be made in extremis, and the thing must be delivered to the donee, or at least he must be put in a position to obtain possession. Where a dying person told her servant to take the key of a dressing case in her room and keep it, and immediately after her death to deliver the trinkets in the box