be upon proceeding relieved, he and they will be entitled to hold the demised lands according to the lease thereof made, without any new lease. And, by sec. 2 of the same Act, in the case of any ejectment for a forfeiture for breach of a covenant or condition to insure against loss or damage by fire, the Court or a Judge may, upon rule or summons, give relief in a summary manner, but subject to appeal, in all cases in which such relief may now be obtained in the Court of Chancery under the provisions of the 22 & 23 Vic. c. 35 (1 Law Chron., N.S., 325, 326), and upon such terms as would be imposed in such Court (2 Law Chron., N. S., 76, 101, 178; Stephen's Act, pp. 40-45).

VII. In an action against an executor, if he plead "plene administravit præter" alone, how should the plaintiff proceed? ANS.-If the plaintiff considers the plea to be correct he may take judgment presently of the assets acknowledged to be in the hands of the defendant, and of assets in futuro for the residue. After signing judgment of assets quando acciderent (after executing a writ of inquiry when necessary), when assets come to the hands of the executor, the plaintiff should proceed against him by scire facias tested and proceeded on in the same manner as a writ of revivor (C. L. P. Act, 1854, s. 91; Broom's Pract. 496).

VIII. What is the law as to set-off where an undisclosed principal sues on a contract made by his agent?

ANS.-Where a principal has allowed his agent to deal in his (the agent's) own name, the party so dealing with the agent, not being a known broker, will enjoy the same rights against the principal as he might have exercised against his agent had that agent been really the principal. The agency must be unknown. Therefore, when a principal brings an action on a contract so made against the purchaser of goods, the latter may set off any claim he may have against the agent in answer to the demand of the principal (Smith's Mer. Law, p. 163, 5th ed.; Broom's Pract. 230; Fish v. Kempton, 18 Law Journ., C. P., 206).

IX. What property does an elegit affect, and how is is executed? ANS.-An elegit affects both the goods and lands of the party against whom it is issued. The writ is delivered to the sheriff, who, in the first place, delivers to the execution creditor all the goods and chattels of the debtor (except his oxen and beasts of the plough), at an appraised value; if these be not enough to satisfy the judgment the party's lands are extended. Formerly, only a moiety of the freehold lands of the debtor could have been extended; but now the whole of them, including copyholds, may be taken by stat. 1 & 2 Vic. c. 110, s. 11 (see more fully, Com. L. Pract. 246, et seq.; F. Bk. 149, 277, 278).

X. If one of several defendants has had execution issued against him, and been compelled to pay the whole damages and costs, in what case has he a right of action for contribution against the others, and when has he no such right?

ANS. There is a difference between actions ex contractu and those in tort. Thus, if an execution be levied against one defendant, in actions ex contractu, on a joint liability by him and others, he may compel the others to contribute by action at law or suit in equity; but, in most cases of tort, he cannot compel a contribution, and is, in general, altogether without a remedy (see 1 Exam. Chron. pp. 22, 45; Exam. Quest., T. T., 1859, p. 42, No. IX.).

XI. In adjudicating on causes of action which have accrued abroad, by what laws and practice are the Courts of this country governed?

ANS.-The remedy upon contracts must be that which is given by the law of the country where the parties reside; in other words, a party suing and seeking to avail himself of the law of a particular country must take the law as he finds it (Brit. Lin. Co. v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 903; Selw. N. P. 150, 11th ed.). But contracts are generally construed according to the law of the place in which they were made, and as a general rule a contract void by the law of the country in which it was made cannot be enforced here. A contract made in this country, but to be completed or performed in a foreign country, is to be taken to have been made in the latter country, according to the principle embodied in the civil law maxim, contraxisse unusquisque in eo loco intelligitur in quo ut solverit se obligaverit (Rothschild v. Currie, 1 Qu. Ben. R. 43; Selw. N. P. 363, 11th ed.). The maxim is otherwise expressed, thus: lex loci contractus regit, or, lex loci regit actum (5 Jur. 867; Law Max. 88, 89).

XII. What remedies has the vendee of a warranted chattel on breach of warranty?

ANS. As we have elsewhere stated, there is no implied warranty of either title or quality on the sale of ascertained chattels, unless under peculiar circumstances (F. Bk. 208, 247; 3 Law. Chron. 401, 402; 3 Jur., N. S., 366). The case is different if there be an express warranty, and to which, therefore, the question is intended to apply (as stated in Roscoe's Evid., pp. 318, 369, 9th ed.). Where the vendor has bound himself by a warranty the vendee may use the breach of that warranty either as evidence in reduction of the vendor's claim, or may bring an action thereon against him. But he cannot, having received the article, return it, and recover the price as money paid on a consideration which has failed, unless there have been a condition in the contract, authorising such return,

and the article has been returned within a reasonable time and in a fit state, or the vendor have received back the chattel, and thereby consented to rescind the contract, or been guilty of a fraud which destroys the contract altogether (Smith's Mer. Law, p. 491, 5th ed.; Dawson v. Collis, 20 Law Journ., C. P., 116).

XIII. What transactions are void as against creditors, within the meaning of the statutes of Elizabeth as to fraudulent gifts and conveyances of lands or chattels ?

ANS.-There are two statutes of Elizabeth relative to fraudulent gifts and conveyances-one for the relief of creditors, the other of purchasers: the latter does not, but the former does, extend to pure personalty. By the 13 Eliz. c. 5, conveyances of landed estates, and also of goods made for the purpose of delaying, hindering, or defrauding creditors, are void as against them, if they were creditors at the time, and the settlor in insolvent circumstances, unless made upon good, which here means valuable consideration, and bonâ fide to any person not having at any time of the conveyance any notice of such fraud (William's Real Prop., p. 66, 5th ed.).

XIV. What is an estoppel? Give examples.

2.

ANS.-According to Lord Coke (1 Inst. 352) there are three kinds of estoppels, viz., by matter of record, by matter in writing, and by matter in pais. 1. By matter of record, as where in an action a point of fact or title has been distinctly put in issue and decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction; neither party is at liberty, in another action, to call in question or controvert such decision. By matter in writing, as where a man has entered into a solemn engagment by deed, under his hand and seal, as to certain facts, he is not permitted to deny any matter which he has so asserted (2 Adol. & El. 291). 3. By matter in pais, as where a person by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is precluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the time (6 Adol. & El. 475; 10 W. R. 471; 6 Sol. Journ. 526). The reader desirous of further information is referred to two articles in 5 Jurist, pp. 858, 1170, believed to have been written by the late Mr. Lewis. It may be added that the Court of Exchequer have denied the application of estoppels to tenancies (Duke v. Ashby, 10 W. R. 273).

XV. State the limitation of time for bringing actions of assumpsit, trespass to person, and slander.

ANS.-Assumpsit must be brought within six years after the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff, except in cases of disability; trespass for injuries to the person within four years; slander within two

years (F. Bk. 268; 1 Exam. Chron. 124; Exam. Quest., H. T., 1860, p. 83, No. XV.).

CONVEYANCING.

I. By what means, if by any, can any owner in fee of land dedicate the land to any object of charity?

ANS.-An owner in fee of land cannot dedicate it to any object of charity by his will, but he may do so, with certain restrictions, by deed, as will appear from the 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, by which no estate or interest of any kind in land rents, or money to be laid out in land, can be conveyed for charitable purposes (except to a few public institutions), unless made by deed (which formerly must have been indented, 1 Exam. Chron. 165, 166) sealed and delivered in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, and enrolled in the Court of Chancery within six calendar months next after the execution thereof and, unless the same be made to take effect in possession for the charitable use intended immediately from the making thereof, and be without any power of revocation, reservation, trust, condition, limitation, clause, or agreement whatever, for the benefit of the donor or grantor, or of any person or persons claiming under him (except a nominal rent, right of way, or minerals, which benefit must also be reserved to his representatives, 24 Vic. c. 9). If the conveyance be not for valuable consideration it will, though enrolled, be void in case of the death of the conveying party within twelve months after the execution of the deed (Will. Real., Prop. 63, 5th ed.; Burt. Comp. pl. 212; 1 Exam. Chron. 26, 34, 46, 131, 159, 165).

II. A man having contracted to purchase land died intestate before the purchase was completed. Who is to pay the purchase money and to take the land? Give the reasons. ANS.-The administrator of the purchaser must pay the money out of the latter's personal estate, and the heir will be entitled to take the land, as upon the death of the purchaser before completion, the equitable ownership of the property contracted for (assuming it to be freehold or copyhold of inheritance) vests in his real representative, as quasi heir or quasi devisee, and he is prima facie entitled to have the purchase money paid or reimbursed out of the personal estate (Dart's Vend. p. 174, 3rd ed.; 1 White and Tud. Lead. Cas. 534; 2. P. Will. 291, 629).

III. State instances of an estate on condition, an executory use, and a shifting use.

ANS.-An estate on condition is where an estate is granted to A. and his heirs on condition that he pays the grantor £10 at Midsummer next; or on condition that if the grantor pays the grantee £10 at Midsummer next the gift shall be void (Burt. Pl. 23). A

shifting use is where an estate is granted by deed to A. and his heirs to the use of B. and his heirs; but in case C. return from Rome during the next year, then immediately to the use of C. and his heirs. The same limitation by will would be an executory use, or one to A. and his heirs after twelve months from the testator's decease; for the distinction between a shifting use and an executory use is this: when the limitations are by deed they are called shifting uses, when by will they are usually designated executory devises, bequests, or uses (F. Bk. 151, 152; 1 Prest. Abstr. 114; 2 Id. 153; Key, Conv. 66, 138).

IV. A. granted a mortgage in fee of land to B., and B. died intestate. What instrument is necessary, and by whom to be signed, to restore the land to A. discharged from the mortgage? Give the reasons.

ANS.-The heir at law of B., the mortgagee, must join his administrators in a re-conveyance of the mortgaged estate; for at law the mortgagee is absolutely entitled, and on his death intestate the estate descends to his heir; but in equity he has only a security for the payment of money, which, like other personal estate, devolves on his administrators, for whom the heir is only a trustee (Will. Real. Prop. 354, 4th ed.; Burt. Comp. pl. 1478; Exam. Quest. H. T. 1860, No. V., p. 85).

V. Are there any means, and, if so, what are they, by which the property of an infant may be effectually settled on marriage? ANS.-By 18 & 19 Vic. c. 43, an infant, with the sanction of the Court of Chancery, may make a valid and binding marriage settlement, or contract for settlement, of all or any part of his or her property, or property over which he or she has any power of appointment, whether real or personal, and whether in possession, reversion, remainder, or expectancy; but this provision does not extend to powers of which it is expressly declared that they shall not be exercised by an infant. The Act does not extend to males under twenty or females under seventeen. The application to the Court is by petition without suit, presented by the infant or his or her guardian, and if there be no guardian the Court may require a guardian to be appointed or not as it shall think fit, and the Court may require any persons appearing to be interested in the property to be served with notice of the petition. If the infant die under age any settlement made under a power of appointment or by disentailing assurances becomes absolutely void (F. Bk. 111; 2 Law Chron. 62, 267; Exam. Ques. T. T. 1859, No. IV., pp. 44, 45.

VI. In what state of circumstances, without decree of foreclosure, will the right of a mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property be extinguished?

N