valuable consideration. The whole amount should be distrained for at once, if there be a sufficient distress on the premises. (3 Steph. Com. 342-352, 3rd edit.; F. Bk. 235, 236; 19 Law Tim. 143.)

XII. Can an oral promise to pay the debt of another be enforced? ANS. Such an oral promise cannot be enforced, in consequence of the Statute of Frauds (sec. 4) enacting that no action shall be brought to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised (see Com. L. Princ., 149, 156; 1 Exam. Chron. 25, 103, 222; F. Bk. 206).

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XIII. Is a master liable for damages sustained through either the negligence or the criminal act of his servant?

ANS.-The master is responsible for the negligence of his servant acting in the prosecution of the master's business, though not under his immediate direction; as if the servant lame a customer's horse in shoeing him, or drive his master's carriage so unskilfully that it injures the person or property of a stranger. But the master is not answerable for the wilful and malicious trespass of his servant: thus if a servant driving a carriage, in order to effect some purpose of his own, wantonly strike the horse of another person, and produce the accident, the master is not liable, though if, intending to effect his master's orders, he strike, but injudiciously and to extricate himself from a difficulty, that will be negligence and careless conduct, for which the master will be liable, being an act done in pursuance of the servant's employment (Com. L. Princ. 333; 4 B. and Ald. 592 ; 6 C. and P. 501). Where the servant commits a tortious act, under the direction or with the assent of his master, each will be liable at the suit of the party injured: the master on the principle or maxim qui facit per alium facit per se (F. Bk. 104; 1 C. B. 578; Law Max. p. 126).

XIV. Is a debt secured by a bond, or otherwise, legally assignable? And if not, in what way is the object practically attained when it is desired to make an assignment?

ANS.-A debt or chose in action cannot, as a general rule, be assigned at law, except by or to the Crown, and by the law merchant and statutes, as in the case of negotiable securities, such as bills of exchange, promissory notes, bail bonds, bills of lading, and the book debts of a bankrupt (ante, p. 51). The mode of assigning a chose in action is, in the deed of assignment of the debt, to give the assignee a power of attorney to sue for the debt at law in the assignor's name.

This being given for a valuable consideration, can only be revoked by the death of the assignor. Notice of the assignment should at once be given to the debtor to perfect the security, so as to secure priority, and also to take the property out of the order and disposition of the assignor in case of his bankruptcy (Law Dict. 30, 126). The assignee can always recover in his own name in equity in case he cannot do so at law (but not otherwise), as Courts of equity recognise these assignments (1 EXAM. CHRON. 86, 87, 110, 111, 225; F. Bk. 197, 198).

XV. To what tribunals successively do appeals lie from the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer ?

ANS.-Appeals by way of error brought upon any judgment of the Courts referred to lie in the first instance to the Exchequer Chamber, which, on appeals from the Court of Queen's Bench, is composed of the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas and Barons of the Exchequer; on appeal from the Court of Common Pleas it is composed of the Justices of the Queen's Bench and the Barons of the Exchequer, and, on appeal from the Court of Exchequer it is composed of the Justices of the two other Courts. From the Exchequer Chamber a final appeal lies to the Queen in her High Court of Parliament, or more popularly to the House of Lords.

CONVEYANCING.

I. What is the meaning of a chattel interest in land?

ANS.-An estate in lands and tenements not amounting to a freehold is a chattel, but inasmuch as it savours of the realty, it is denominated a chattel real in order to distinguish it from things which have no concern with the realty, viz., mere movables and the rights connected with them, which are described as chattels personal. A chattel real is personal property, and, like other personalty, goes to the personal representative on the death of the owner. (F. Bk. 196; Burton's Comp. pl. 931, 946.)

II. What leases must be by deed?

ANS.-All leases exceeding three years, or, being for a smaller term, there is reserved less than two-thirds of a rack-rent, must be by deed; for, by s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Chas. 2, c. 3, all contracts relating to lands, tenements, or any interest therein, must be in writing; but leases not exceeding three years, if at twothirds of a rack-rent, are excepted from the operation of the 4th s., and by 8 and 9 Vic. c. 106, s. 3, all leases required by law to be in writing must be by deed (Princ. Com. L. 157, 158; F. Bk. 134). This last statute does not apply to leases of turnpike tolls (16 Jur. 948).

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III. Out of what estates of her husband is a wife entitled to dower? ANS.-Women married prior to 1854 are entitled to dower out of all the lands and tenements of which their husbands were seised in fee simple or fee tail in possession at any time during the coverture, and of which any issue which they might have had by their husbands might, by possibility, have been heir, even though the husband should, by any deed executed in his lifetime, have disposed of the lands and tenements (1 Law Chron. 331), assuming that the wife has not, by an acknowledged deed, barred her rights. As to women married since 1st January, 1834, they are entitled to dower out of equitable as well as legal estates of inheritance in possession (not being an estate of joint tenancy); also, out of lands to which their husbands had a right of entry or action, although they had not the legal seisin; but they are not entitled to dower out of any land which shall have been absolutely disposed of by their husband in his lifetime, or by his will, and all partial estates and interests and all charges created by any disposition or will of the husband, and all debts, incumbrances, contracts, and engagements to which his lands may be liable are effectual as against the right of his widow to dower. They may also either wholly or partially be deprived of dower by any declaration for that purpose made by the husband by any deed, r by his will; so where the husband devises any land to his wife out of which she would have been dowable, she will not be entitled to dower out of any land, unless a contrary intention appear. But no gift or bequest of personal estate, or of land not liable to dower, will prejudice the wife's right to dower, unless a contrary intention be declared by the will. This is by the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 10.5, called the Dower Act, which does not extend to copyholds. (F. Bk. 127, 128; 9 Week. Rep. 299; 2 Law Chron. 47, 192.)

IV. State and explain the common uses to bar dower.

ANS.-The common uses to bar dower are applicable only to the case of a woman married on or before the 1st of January, 1834; they are as follows:-The estate is conveyed to the purchaser and his heirs, to such uses as he shall by deed appoint; and, in default of and until such appointment, or so far as any such appointment if made shall not extend, to the use of him for life, and, after the determination of his life interest, a remainder (vested) is limited to the use of a trustee and his heirs (or executors and administrators) during the purchaser's life, nevertheless upon trust for him. This remainder is then followed by an ultimate remainder to the heirs and assigns of the purchaser for ever. Under these limitations the wife's right to dower cannot attach, for the purchaser has not, at any time during his life, an estate of inheritance in possession. The ordinary words, "by any means in his lifetime," are better omitted. (2 Law Chron.

192; F. Bk. 127; 2 Crabb's Proced. by Shelf. 953, 954; Hayes Conv. 261, 4th edit.: Burton's Comp. pl. 779.)

V. To what extent can real property be settled without violating the rule against perpetuities?

ANS.-The rule against perpetuities prohibits real property from being tied up or fixed as to its future destination for a longer period than the lives of existing persons, and twenty-one years after the decease (allowing a further time for gestation if it actually exist). An estate may therefore be limited to the unborn child of a living person, but not to the child of an unborn person. (Williams' Real Prop. 49, 5th edit.; Key, Convey. 128; Burton's Comp. pl. 163, 784, 824; F. Bk. 151, 152, 198; 3 Law Chron. 59, 136, 242; 7 Bligh's R. 202.)

VI. State the rule in Shelley's case.

ANS. The rule in Shelley's case is, that whenever an estate of freehold is given to a person, and by the same conveyance or will, an ulterior estate (whether mediately or immediately) is limited to his heirs in fee or in tail, such ulterior estate vests in him in the same manner as if it had been expressly given to him and his heirs; hence it is said that the word "heirs" is a word of limitation, that is of description of estate, and not of purchase. (Burton's Comp. pl. 339; F. Bk. 150; 3 Law Chron. 10; 1 Jur., N.S., 313; Key, Convey. 26.)

VII. What is the distinction between "privity of estate" and "privity of contract" as between lessor and lessee?

ANS.-Privity of estate subsists as well between the immediate parties to the lease, during the continuance of their interests, as the persons taking their whole estates, as the assignee of the estate of the lessee, and the assignee of the reversioner: privity of contract is · created by the contract itself, and subsists between the lessor and lessee, and does not extend to either of their assignees. (See for further information, 1 Exam. Chron. 224; ante, pp. 5, 6.)

VIII. In a grant of land to A. and his heirs, to the use of B. and his heirs, to the use of C. and his heirs, what estates do A., B., and C. respectively take?

ANS.-A. has nothing, B. the legal estate, and C. the equitable fee, the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, converting the first use to B. into a legal estate, but not carrying the use to C, who therefore has but a trust. (Key, Convey. 123; Watkins, by White, p. 256.) IX. What are the forms necessary in order to render valid the disposition by a married woman of her reversionary interest in personal estate?

ANS.-If the estate be not settled to the wife's separate use both

husband and wife must concur therein; the wife being examined separate and apart from her husband as to her consent before a Judge or by two commissioners, &c. ; in addition to which the deed must be acknowledged by her, and a certificate of the acknowledgment filed at the Common Pleas Office (20 & 21 Vic. c. 57). Previously to this Act, called from its introducer Mr. Malins' Act, a married woman could not dispose of her reversionary interest in personal property even with her husband's concurrence (except that in the case of her legal term of years the husband could himself dispose thereof alone), as she could not bind herself in case of her surviving her husband. The Act extends to such property as a married woman takes, whether vested or contingent, in any personal estate whatsoever to which she shall be entitled under any instrument made after December 31st, 1857, except personal estate settled upon her by any settlement or agreement for settlement made on her marriage, or which is given to her without power of anticipation (F. Bk. 111; 1 Law Chron. 264; 4 Id. 156; 5 Id. 157; 1 Crabb's Prec. by Shelf. 415, 416).

X. What is the best form of reddendum in a lease?

ANS.-The best form of reddendum in a lease is to reserve rent yearly during the term, and leave the law to make distribution without an express reservation to any one. (2 Crabb's Prec. by Shelf. 1025.)

XI. What are the usual limitations in a settlement in which real estate is limited in strict settlement?

ANS.-A settlement so as to put it out of the power of the parents to bar their issue is called a strict settlement. This is usually done, where the estate is the husband's by limiting the estate to the use of the husband for life, remainder to trustees for a term to secure a jointure for the wife, remainder to other trustees for raising portions for younger children, remainder to the first and other sons, in tail general or tail male, remainder to the daughters as tenants in common in tail, with cross remainders between them, remainder to the husband in fee. In settlements not so strict, it is usual to limit the estate to such son or sons of the marriage as the husband, or both the parents, or the survivor of them, or in some cases as the wife, shall by deed or will appoint, and to the heirs of his or her body, or to the heirs general; and in default of such appointment, to the first and other sons in tail male in the usual manner, or in tail general, or to all the children as tenants in common in fee or in tail, with cross remainders between them. In settlements of this kind powers are usually inserted for granting leases, for sale and exchange, &c. (2 Crabb's Prec. by Shelf. 1359; 2 Atkinson's