Devise to one of his children-Wild's case.-Again, the common law rules may be modified in an indirect manner by Acts of Parliament. Thus, take the case of a devise to a person "and his issue ". or "his children;" here the construction will vary according to the circumstances. If the party had issue or children at the time when the devise was made, they will take estates for their lives jointly with their parent; but if he had no issue at that time he takes an estate tail. This is the doctrine of Wild's case (6 Co. Rep. 16 b.), which it is said does not apply to personalty (1 L.C., N.S., 90; 7 W. R. 125; 9 Jur. 563-589; 18 Jur. Dig. 120). We have stated the doctrine as it stood prior to the 1 Vic. c. 26: our readers will decide what the effect of that statute has been, first, as to a feesimple passing, and next, as to whether the time of the making of the will or of the testator's death is not the material point.

Distinctions to be attended to-Between words of similar import but differing in application-Occurrence of events, &c.-The reader should be continually on his guard against the misapplication of words or phrases which may vary according to their application. Thus, the term "legal representatives" has a different application according as the party in reference to whom it is used died testate or intestate, and according as the party using it is referring to real or personal estate. And in the case of intestacy and wills it may have a different application. Thus, the 22 and 23 Car. 2, c. 10, s. 5, directs the division of the surplus of an intestate's effects thus: onethird to the wife, and all the residue by equal portions to and amongst the children, and "such persons as legally represent such children, in case any of the children be then dead." The legal representatives here meant are not the executors or administrators of the deceased children, but their children or other descendants (Burt. Comp. pl. 1402). But suppose a child of the intestate to die after the intestate and before receipt of his share, his legal representatives (usually termed legal personal representatives) will be his executors or administrators and not his children. The distinction arises from the different period of death; that in the one case being in the intestate's life, and in the other after his decease.

Accord and satisfaction-Payment of smaller sum than due.Again, a plaintiff who has received a less sum than his debt, is not, unless he have given a release under seal, precluded from recovering the balance; the acceptance of a less sum in satisfaction of a liquidated demand of larger amount not being a good accord and satisfaction, though some additional benefit will make it good (see Law Dict. pp. 6, 7, tit. "Accord and Satisfaction"). Where, however, the less sum is paid by a third party as a full satisfaction, and is so accepted, the creditor cannot sue for the balance (Lewis v. Jones, 4 B. and Co. 513; re Barnes, 4 Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 60). The release under seal imports a consideration, whereas the mere

acceptance from the debtor of a less sum is no consideration for the relinquishment of the residue of the debt. The payment by the stranger stands on different grounds to that by the debtor himself; the creditor has received the stranger's money upon terms, without which it is to be presumed the stranger would not have advanced the money.

Difference between releases and covenants not to sue.-Again, an unqualified covenant not to sue amounts to a release of a debt, but a covenant not to sue for a certain time does not amount to a release; that is, it is no bar to an action for the debt (see Walmesley v. Cooper, 11 Ad. and Ell. 216; Ford v. Beech, 11 Q.B. 853). And though an unqualified release to one of several joint, or joint and several debtors, is a release, and therefore a discharge of all (Nicholson v. Revill, 4 Ad. and Ell. 675), yet the release may be qualified thus a release to one of several contractors reserving the right to join the releasee in an action for the purpose of recovering against the others cannot be pleaded as a release to all (Solly v. Forbes, 2 B. and B. 38). These distinctions are very subtle, but are necessary to be borne in mind in order that the reader may be able to account for the decisions which have been come to.

Action by landlord for goods leased with house.-Again, it is said that where goods leased, as furniture with a house, have been wrongfully taken on an execution, the landlord cannot maintain trover against the sheriff during the continuance of the lease. Why not? Because, in order to recover in an action of trover, the plaintiff must show that he has a right to the immediate possession of the goods; and in the case above put, it is the lessee who has the right during the currency of the lease (see Gordon v. Ha., 7 T. R. 9; Selw. N. P. 1364; 7 Bac. Abr. 799; 9 Jur. 599; Rosc. Ev. 525, 5th ed.). The question will then arise, whether any other remedy could be had, in which the rule as to possession would not arise. The action of detinue will suggest itself, but it is laid down that plaintiff must have the right to immediate possession of the goods at the time of the action being brought (Broom's Pract. 546; Selw. N. P. 663, 11th ed.), which excludes the remedy. The reader will then consider the other forms of action, such as on the case (being a reversioner, for the consequential damage, Attersoll v. St., 1 Tau. 190; Broom's Pract. 545), money had and received, &c., and will extend his inquiries as to whether, if there be no remedy by the lessor against the sheriff there may not be one against the tenant, or one by the tenant against the sheriff.

Contracts not assignable.-Again, a contract cannot be assigned at law, so as to give the assignee a right to sue in his own name. Bills and notes are contracts, and yet it is every day's practice to assign them. Why? Because, in the case of bills, the custom of merchants has been allowed, for the convenience of commerce, to introduce an

exception; the exception as to notes did not arise from the same cause, but is the result of legislative enactment (F. Bk. 127; Selw. N. P. 400, 11th ed.; 3 & 4 Anne, c. 8; 11 Jur. 967). Bills of lading were formerly assignable only so as to pass the goods, and not the right of action; for no right of action can, as a general rule, be assigned at law. But now bills of lading may be enforced by the assignees in their own names; but this is by statute (18 & 19 Vic. c. 140; 2 L. C. 122; F. Bk. 9; 2 St. C. 48, 4th ed.)

The reasons and limitations of propositions.-We might easily continue to adduce examples and to supply explanations, but this would take up too much space, and besides, is not consonant with our present object. The great point for the reader is to seize the spirit of our remarks, and to proceed in a somewhat similar manner with the propositions he may meet in his reading. We know that some will object that such a process is too slow; it may be that a less number of pages may be read per diem, but we are certain that in the long run the reader will find he has made more real progress than he could possibly have done without such a proceeding. When a student has once obtained exact information of the reasons and limitations of a proposition, he is not likely to forget such proposition, and will then be able to apply it with exactitude, which is the only real basis of knowledge. Mr. Jacob Phillips, in his work on "Law Studies," has given some useful hints and examples, which may be seen in " Directions," pp. 87-113, and to which the reader is referred.

Blackstone's Commentaries.-If we should be addressing one who has not yet entered upon the study of the law, and is, therefore, unacquainted with its many doctrines and nice distinctions, we would recommend him, especially if not greatly gifted, to commence with some short and tolerably plain work. By this means he will obtain a notion of the different topics to which he will hereafter be obliged to direct his attention, and, at the same time, be able to see something of their connection. It is very encouraging to the student to have a prospect of his being able to accomplish this within a reasonable time and without an extraordinary degree of labour. It is usual to recommend Blackstone's Commentaries as the first book. Now, we conceive this is not judicious advice, especially for the sort of student to whom we are supposing our observations to be addressed. We venture to think that the four volumes of that work, placed in the hands of a youthful student, are apt to discourage him even at the first sight, and when he enters upon the study of them this feeling will rather grow than diminish. The truth is that Blackstone is not a first book, except under very favourable circumstances, as a previous good training, great powers of mental digestion, and much industry. It is very difficult to keep up the connection of the subjects when extended through so many pages, much less to grasp and

retain the propositions enunciated in the various chapters. Indeed, if a commencement be made with Blackstone, it will be well to pursue the plan of Dr. Johnson in his perusal of new works-namely, to read first very cursorily, and with a view to trace the connection of the subjects, leaving for a second reading a more careful examination of the matter of each chapter.

Stephen's Commentaries.-The remarks made with reference to Blackstone's Commentaries apply to all the full editions, including Stephen's Commentaries. And this leads us to observe that if the student will have one of the full editions of Blackstone, he should by all means purchase that by Mr. Serjeant Stephen, which is much superior to the others, and almost merits to be called a new work altogether. The last edition appeared in 1858, and was edited by the Serjeant's son, Mr. James Stephen. The price (£4 4s.), no doubt, seems large compared with some other editions, but the additional money will be well applied.

Modern reports.-It is very common to recommend students to peruse the current reports, but this is of very doubtful utility, until the student has become grounded in the principal rules or general doctrines. There is no doubt that a judicious abridgment of the older and most esteemed reports, such as Lord Coke's, Saunders's, Peere Williams's, Dyer's, Vesey's, &c., would be very useful, and it may be profitable for the student to read some of the more important of the modern cases, taking those reports which are the most concise; those, for instance, in the Weekly Reporter rather than the Law Times, as the former work gives a shorter and more condensed report. We shall have occasion hereafter to refer to some works called "Leading Cases."

Grounds and maxims of law.-It should be the student's chief object in all his reading to seize upon the true grounds or principles upon which the decisions depend, rather than to attempt to load the memory with a multiplicity of facts or even of particular decisions. Indeed, the student would do well to learn the chief law maxims, and to procure some work containing them. The work of greatest pretension on maxims is that by Mr. Broom, of which there is a third edition, price £1 6s. It contains no equitable maxims, and has only a selection of legal maxims, so that it will not furnish the student with anything like a complete list and notice of the maxims. Most of the maxims noticed are treated of at too great a length, so that the student loses sight of the maxim in the superabundance of illustrations and cases. Mr. Wharton's Lexicon contains an alphabetical list of maxims, but the translations are very poor, and fail in most instances to convey any meaning. But, still more, there is scarcely one maxim explained, so that the work is, so far as relates to maxims, useless. What can be learnt by the following?" Multitudinem decem faciunt. Co. Litt. 247.-Ten make a multitude." "Mulieres

ad probationem status hominis admitti non debent. Co. Litt. 6.Women ought not to be admitted to proof of the estate of a man." The price of Wharton's second edition is 25s. In the second volume of the Law Chronicle, new series, we gave an alphabetical list of maxims, with translations, short explanations, and illustrations, and we think the reader will find this the most useful work which he can procure. It is now published separately, sewed in stiff covers, price 5s.. and contains 140 pages, besides a title-page and an index. It is quite complete. At pp. 2-6 is given a complete list of works on maxims, to which the reader desirous of further information is referred.

Legal principles-Case law. With respect to what has been above said as to the study of the principles of the law in preference to reports, we may add the testimony of competent persons. Thus, Sir Richard Bethell says that the main object of legal education ought to be to guide the young student through the labyrinth which the law presents to the uninitiated, and to establish legal principles systematically in the mind-to ground him as a lawyer in the knowledge of principles as distinguished from a mere mechanical collector of cases. A case lawyer is becoming every day more common, whilst a lawyer of the former class is rare. The bench has of late years encouraged the citing of cases too much, and has thus countenanced the substitution of a mere memoria technica for broad and fundamental reasoning upon acknowledged and established principles of law. Undoubtedly the very best lawyers in the profession on both sides of the Channel are amongst those who cite fewest cases in court, and in the opinions which they give on cases submitted to them. The show of multitudinous citation, whether relevant or irrelevant (as is too often the case), takes with the gallery and with the young members of both branches of the profession; and the latest case often relieves a judge from the duty of canvassing or deliberating upon the principles which the case in argument involves, and from which the decision cited, if a right decision, necessarily flowed. Mr. J. T. Graves observed that this system of quoting cases, instead of arguing upon legal principles, prevails to such an extent at the English bar as to perplex judges as well as to cloud the law itself; and Sir Richard Bethell added "that an individual taking up a book of modern reports, and observing the manner in which cases are argued, will not detect in them evidence of any great extent of reading, of any large acquaintance with the principles of the science of law, any familiarity with the works of any foreign or ancient jurists, which are deemed in all other countries to constitute the basis of legal education. He will observe in arguments a mere habit of calling upon the memory for the citation of what are more or less apt instances of adjudication of similar points found in the reports; and, in truth, the argument is most frequently a mere task of memory