Tim. Rep., N. S., 772; and 4 Id., 837), three judges against one read the word "or" in a will in that case as "and;" even the dissenting judge did not deny that the words might be interchanged, but he thought it not necessary to do this. The judge who delivered the judgment of the majority, observed, "This word 'or' should have its usual signification, unless there is some reason making it necessary to read it otherwise. It seems to us that there is such a reason. We may observe that there is probably less difficulty in substituting 'and' for 'or' than for any other change of language. Instances of necessity for doing so are numerous; the mistake of using one of those words for the other being one which persons very often do, and easily may make." The decision of the majority of the Court has been affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, two judges, however, dissenting (4 Law Tim. Rep. N. S., 836).

Weak foundation-Allegations against own act-Consent.-There is a maxim "DEBILE fundamentum fallet opus" (Max., p. 35), of which the following case is an illustration; it might also, perhaps, be referred to under the head "ALLEGANS contraria non est audiendus." (Max., p. 12), and "CONSENSUS tollit errorem." (Max., pp. 25, 26.) In the case alluded to it was held that a creditor who has executed a deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors may not afterwards take advantage of the assignment, as an act of bankruptcy whereon to found an adjudication of bankruptcy against the assignor. Any such adjudication is bad as contrary to good faith, and being so, cannot be supported upon any other grounds. (Re A. B. 2 Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 777.) The Commissioner said :-"The petition is bad upon the ground, that it was contrary to good faith for the petitioning creditors to present it. I do not think that another creditor can attach himself to a petition which is bad. If there were any other grounds than this of bad faith, the case might be different; but the petition being bad from its foundation, I do not think that it can be supported upon any other grounds. The superstructure built upon it must fall with it. The adjudication must be annulled with costs.

SUMMARY.

JUDGMENT.-Priority-Notice-Re-registration-7 Ann, cap. 20; 1&2 Vic., cap. 110; 2 & 3 Vic., cap. 11; 3 & 4 Vic., cap. 82.-The following decision is a most important one with reference to the effect of judgments, it having been held that a judgment creditor, who, by first registering in Middlesex, has obtained priority at law over a judgment of previous date, registered in the Common Pleas, but not in Middlesex, will not be postponed in Equity because he

had, at the time of so registering, notice of the previous judgment. Notice to a subsequent judgment creditor, under such circumstances, is wholly immaterial; but a mortgagee or purchaser of lands in Middlesex, with notice of a judgment duly registered in the Common Pleas, will be bound by it in Equity, though it be not registered in Middlesex. The omission to re-register a judgment pursuant to the 2 & 3 Vic., cap. 11, sec. 4, renders it null and void as against purchasers and mortgagees, and query creditors claiming, though with notice, after the expiration of five years from the previous registration, under a person who purchased within the five years, and with notice, as well as against purchasers, mortgagees, and creditors of the original judgment debtors. A search for five years in the Common Pleas' registry is sufficient in every case, although it may have to be made in the names of several successive vendors. C., a judgment creditor, was found to be subsequent in order of priority to A. and B., also judgment creditors, but prior to D. and E., mortgagees, who, on the other hand, were entitled in priority to B. Held that, assuming the property charged to be not more than sufficient to satisfy the claims of A. and B., C. had no equity as between himself and B. and E. to take away from them the benefit of the priority they had established between themselves and B. (Benham v. Keane, 9 Week. Rep., 765).

DEED.-Grantor retaining.-It is not uncommon for a grantor to retain a deed after its execution and delivery, and not by way of escrow. It was said by Lord Cranworth that a deed which is irrevocable, and duly executed by the party bound, does not lose its force by being retained in that party's custody. If he destroy the deed, he is a wrong-doer, and the fact of keeping it in his own custody merely renders it more difficult for the other parties to prove its existence (Jeffries v. Alexander, 2 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 748).

MASTER AND SERVANT.-Injury to servant from personal negligence of master-Joint liability of co-proprietors.-It is well established that a master is not liable to his servant for accidents which do not result from his own personal negligence. However, where a master of a coal mine authorised his workmen to use the shaft while it was in an unsafe condition to his knowledge, and an injury resulted therefrom to one of the workmen who was using the shaft without knowledge of the danger, it was held that the master was liable for personal negligence. Also that where one of two partners in a coal mine acts as manager, and is guilty of personal negligence, his co-partner is jointly liable for the injury resulting from such negligence (Mellor v. Shaw, 9 Week. Rep., 748).

COPYRIGHT, ASSIGNMENT OF.-Right of representation of dramatic piece, 8 Ann, cap. 19; 3 & 4 Will. IV., cap. 15.-In an action under

3 & 4 Will. IV., cap. 15, for causing representations of a certain dramatic piece, without the consent of the alleged proprietor, it appeared that the assignment of the copyright to the plaintiff was made in 1835, and that it was attested by one witness only. Held (dissentiente, Pollock C. B.) that the provisions of the 8 Ann, cap. 19 applied, and that neither the copyright nor the right of representation passed to the plaintiff (Cumberland v. Copeland, 9 Week. Rep., 752).

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.-Specific performance-Contract to sell shares in a joint stock company-Power of directors-Jus disponendi. -Shares in joint stock companies, which do not belong to any of the directors are, in the nature of property, and according to the ordinary rule with respect to property, every person who is possessed of property has a right to dispose of it by law, except to the extent that he may have entered into any contract which fetters or diminishes that right, or derogates from it, and, therefore, unless there is something which prevents him from entering into that contract, he has a right to dispose of his property in any share in a joint stock company. However, if having entered into a contract that he would not transfer his share, or enter into any contract for the transfer of his shares, without having previously obtained the assent of certain persons to it, he afterwards contracted to transfer such shares without their assent, it would be a perfectly just observation that he could not enter into such a contract; and though a person who had entered into a contract with him, ignorant of that, might have an action for damages against him, he could not have a decree for specific performance. In the following case, specific performance was decreed of a contract by a shareholder to sell shares in a joint stock company, although the directors of the company objected to the transfer of the shares being made to the person with whom the contract was entered into. And it was held that a clause in the deed of settlement of a joint stock company, that no shareholder should transfer his shares except in such manner as the directors should approve, does not authorise the directors to prohibit a shareholder from contracting to sell his shares; also, as above stated, that shares in a joint stock company are in the nature of property, and are subject to the jus disponendi incident to property (Poole v. Middleton, 9 Week. Rep., 758).

ANCIENT LIGHTS.-Injunction-Larger panes of glass substituted— Privacy.-The following is an important decision as to the effect of an act by the owner of ancient lights, by which he increases the degree of light without any increase in the dimensions of the apertures. It appeared that B., who was possessed of ancient lights, substituted new window frames, with single plate-glass panes, opening

internally, for the old ones, consisting of small panes with lead frames, opening only partially. In consequence of this alteration more light and air were let in, although the apertures were not increased. C., whose premises were adjoining, objected to this alteration on the ground that it was a new easement, and interferred with the privacy of his premises. He proceeded to erect a frame work glazed with opaque coloured glass, within a few inches of B.'s ancient lights. B. thereupon applied for an injunction. Held, that if a party possess ancient lights, and without enlarging the apertures, can acquire an increased degree of light and air, he is entitled to such acquirement without giving a right to the occupier of the servient tenement to say there is a new easement; but if he increases the dimensions of the apertures the occupier of the servient tenement has a right to object, and if, in asserting his right, he interferes with the passage of light and air, he is justified in doing so. Held, also, that the Court will not interfere on the mere ground of invasion of privacy. (Turner v. Spooner, 9 Law Tim. Rep. 732.)

DISENTAILING DEED.-Fines and Recoveries Act 3 & 4 Will. IV., cap. 74 secs. 41, 47, 50, 53, 54-Copyholds-Entry of disentailing deeds on Court roll-Six calendar months-Will of tenant in tail—Copyholds and freeholds intermingled-Annuity to heir in tail, election.The Fines and Recoveries Act directs the entry on the rolls of disentailing deeds, but does not specify any time for doing this; the Master of the Rolls has, however, decided that, under the Fines and Recoveries Act, disentailing assurances, affecting copyholds, must be entered on the Court rolls within the same period after their execution (six calendar months), as is required for the enrolment in the Court of Chancery of similar assurances affecting freeholds. Where, by his will, a tenant in tail of copyholds charged all his real estate with the payment of an annuity to his customary heir in tail, and the freeholds and copyholds were inseparably intermingled, and partly occupied by the testator himself, and partly by his tenants, Held, that the will showed an intention of disposing of the copyholds away from the heir in tail, and that he must elect to take them and give up the annuity, or take under the will and give up the copyholds. (Honeywood v. Foster, 9 Week. Rep., 855.)

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.-13 Eliz., cap. 5-Insolvency of settlor -Intention-Notice to cestuique trust.-By the 13th of Eliz., cap. 5, any conveyance of property is void against creditors (the other Act of Elizabeth refers to purchasers) if it be made to the end, purpose, and intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors. The Courts have, in each particular case, to decide whether, under all the circumstances, it can come to the conclusion that such was the settlor's intention. In the following cases J. was in embarrassed circumstances,

and applied to his mother for a loan, who lent it on his settling a small estate on his children. There being no clear evidence that J. either intended or knew the necessary consequence of the conveyance would be to hinder or delay his creditors, and there being no notice to the mother of any confirmed insolvency of J. at the time, Held (affirming the decree of Kindersley, V. C. and L. JJ.) that the deed was not void under 13 Eliz., cap. 5. It is not necessary to prove the insolvency of the settlor at the time a conveyance defeating creditors is executed in order to set it aside under 13 Eliz., cap. 5. (Thompson v. Webster, 4 Law Tim. Rep., 750.)

PARTNERSHIP.-Effect of a release by one partner of a debt due to the partnership firm.-It is a rule of law that, if the right to bring a personal action be once suspended, it is gone for ever. In the following case it appeared that A. B. C. and D., trading as partners in the building trade, executed certain works for one L., for which the latter became indebted to the firm in a considerable sum. L. happened to be a tenant of a house and premises to D., and had a valuable interest therein; D., after the aforesaid debt was incurred to the firm, proposed and agreed to accept a surrender of L.'s interest in the said house, in full satisfaction and discharge of the debt, whereupon L., acting upon such proposal and agreement, delivered up possession of the house to D. D. shortly afterwards died, and the surviving partners sued L. for the amount of his debt to the firm. L. pleaded that the debt had been discharged, satisfied by D., in his lifetime, under the foregoing circumstances. Held that such was a good answer to the action upon the principle of the above rule of law that, if the right to bring a personal action be once suspended, it is gone for ever (Crowe v. Lysaght, 4 Law Tim. Rep., 744).

TRUSTEES.-Discretion of investment-Sole trustee.-The following case shows the difficulties arising out of trust estates being invested in the shares of public companies, such as joint-stock banks, as a trustee may reasonably object to being a shareholder in such undertakings. A testator, by his will, gave power to his trustees to invest in the purchase of shares in the London and Westminster Bank, or any or of the London joint-stock banks," with usual powers to vary, &c. The trustees had acted under this power by investing part of the residue in shares of the above bank. On the application of infant plaintiffs entitled in remainder, the shares were ordered to be sold and invested in Consols, one of the trustees desiring this change of investment, and willing to retire from the trust (Butler v. Withers, 4 Law Tim. Rep., 736).

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.-Sale by auction-Specific performance — Mistake in authority of auctioneer-Reserved price.—Where, on a